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ABSTRACT 
This study documents the rise of party political public relations in Northern Ireland 
and explores its impact on the media and the peace/political process more generally. 
While this research primarily charts and describes the chronological development of 
public relations pertaining to Northern Ireland's four main political parties (the 
SDLP, Sinn Fein, the DUP and the UUP), it also explores the media-source 
relations or interactions between journalists and public relations personnel. 
Significantly, political public relations has expanded considerably in Northern 
Ireland since the mid-90s, and political parties are increasingly utilising PR to 
enhance their media relations capabilities and improve their image (or `brand') with 
the public. What was once mainly the remit of the British government and its 
agencies in Northern Ireland (that is, political public relations) has now become an 
area in which the four main political parties (to varying degrees of success) have 
become increasingly more professional and well-resourced. The result of this 
expansion of party political public relations has seen the regional media in Northern 
Ireland become increasingly more vulnerable to the promotional efforts of `spin 
doctors' or media relations personnel from all four parties. 
This research, while acknowledging that there are undoubtedly multiple factors 
involved in how people decide to vote, argues that the 71.12% Yes vote in favour of 
the Good Friday Agreement can be partly explained by the significant impact of 
public relations strategies and techniques employed by a number of key behind-the- 
scenes players and conducted publicly by influential, high-profile figures. 
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Essentially, it challenges the argument prevalent in the vast majority of literature on 
elections that public relations campaigns have very little `effect' on voting 
behaviour or that those changes of voting behaviour are due either to other factors 
or to long-term media campaigns and influences. 
This research also argues, on the one hand, that the electoral success of both Sinn 
Fein and the DUP in recent years (the two parties `hungry' for political power, who 
became the leading political parties in nationalism and unionism respectively) can 
be partly explained by their `courting' of the media and their development of strong 
and efficient communications structures. On the other hand, the recent electoral 
failure of both the SDLP and the UUP can be partly explained by their laissez-faire 
or complacent approach to both public relations and the media, and their weak and 
inefficient communications structures in comparison to both Sinn Fein and the 
DUP. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It should be borne in mind that there is nothing more dcult to arrange, more 
doubtful of success, and more dangerous to carry through than initiating changes in 
a state's constitution. The innovator makes enemies of all those who prospered 
under the old order, and only lukewarm support is forthcoming from those who 
would prosper under the new. (Machiavelli; The Prince)' 
From both sides of the stage at a peace concert organised in support of the Good 
Friday Agreement (held in Belfast on Tuesday 19th May 1998) there emerged John 
Hume and David Trimble, opposition leaders of the nationalist SDLP2 and unionist 
UUP3 respectively. They met centre stage and joined hands with U2's Bono, to a 
rapturous applause from an audience made up of Northern Ireland's younger 
generation. They had a common agenda - the pursuit of peace and the promotion of 
a Yes vote that would positively endorse the Agreement. The coming together of 
Hume and Trimble at the peace concert was the first time they publicly shook 
hands, and the event symbolised the possibility of a new beginning between 
unionism and nationalism. Indeed, this image became the most memorable and 
important message that could be relayed to a divided people at this juncture in the 
peace process, and provided a positive `thumbs up' for the Agreement on which the 
electorate would vote three days later. 
1 Machiavelli, N., cited in The Prince, p. 19, translated with an introduction by George Bull (1995) 
2 Social Democratic and Labour Party 
3 Ulster Unionist Party 
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Photographs of this `coming together' have been reprinted in newspapers, and 
footage of the event has been replayed on television in Northern Ireland on 
anniversaries of the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in remembrance of this 
critical moment in the state's troubled history, celebrated since (as at the time) as a 
signifier of hope in a more peaceful future. 
Indeed, the inspiration for the following study is borne out of this symbolic 
rendezvous that occurred in the final days of the 1998 referendum campaign. It was 
upon watching television footage of this event that conceptualisation began, a 
thought process that created a great many more questions than could be easily 
answered at the time. For example, why would two rather old, awkward-looking 
politicians choose to publicly shake hands for the first time at a rock concert in front 
of Northern Ireland's younger generation? Significantly, was this stage-managed 
event the most visible and important public appeal by the two leaders in their 
attempts to sell the Good Friday Agreement, or were there a long list of others, 
meticulously designed to manufacture consent for the Agreement? Furthermore, 
who organised this public relations spectacle? Or, more to the point, who exactly 
are Northern Ireland's behind-the-scenes party political public relations personnel or 
`spin doctors', and just how sophisticated have they become in attempting to 
influence the media and ultimately the public at large in Northern Ireland? These 
questions, and many others, formed the basis of this study. 
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(i) The Rise of Party Political Public Relations 
The profession of political public relations is not new. For example, in Britain 
during the late 70's, the Conservative Party initiated a new era in which political 
public relations became a pivotal dimension of politics and one that was similarly 
adopted by the Labour Party and others during the 1980's. As studies of British 
politics have since documented (Negrine 1996, Jones 1997), all of the main British 
political parties have continually increased their spending on promotional matters 
and allocated greater control to their professional communicators (for example, 
Peter Mandelson and Alastair Campbell in the case of the Labour Party). 
Significantly, the influence of political public relations has become increasingly 
apparent in party and personality brand management (most notably with `New 
Labour') and, in particular, during British election campaigns. 
However, the increasing use of public relations by political parties in Northern 
Ireland to achieve both short and long-term political objectives, has not, as yet, been 
properly focused upon. Although there has been much written by way of 
autobiographies or books that detail Sinn Fein's history (Adamsl995,2003; 
O'Brien 1995; Taylor 1998), there is scant reference in such works to the party's 
public relations developments or key behind-the-scenes communications personnel. 
With the sole exception of an unpublished doctoral thesis by Lago (2000), in which 
she examines Sinn Fein's political communications developments up until 1998, 
there remains a real dearth of material concerning the party's communications 
developments in the post-Agreement era. Indeed, either published or unpublished 
material on the SDLP's, or both the UUP's and DUP's communications or public 
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relations developments in either the pre- or post-Agreement eras are virtually non- 
existent. Although Fawcett (2001) explored some of the public relations 
dimensions of the four main political parties during a short research report on post- 
devolution Northern Ireland, those findings that related to parties' public relations 
or communications constituted only a matter of a few paragraphs, that is, the 
research lacked more thorough or detailed analyses. 
Furthermore, although there has been some material written concerning the media's 
role during the Troubles, highlighting their tendency to adopt dominant (that is, 
British government) explanations of the conflict or to play a supportive role in 
relation to state propaganda in the war against terrorism (Curtis 1984; Schlesinger 
1987; Miller 1994), there is far less material available on the subsequent 
`resolution' of the conflict or the emerging `peace' (Miller and McLaughlin 1996; 
Spencer 2000). There is also a distinct lack of investigation into the role played by 
the media during the 1998 referendum campaign, or whether they played a similarly 
supportive role in adopting dominant explanations in the post-Agreement era. 
A central concern of this study then, is to address some of the deficiencies in 
academic writing on both party political public relations and the media in Northern 
Ireland. Or to put it another way, this study aims to `fill a gap' by critically 
examining an underdeveloped area of research. 
While a number of works have emanated from politics (Kavanagh 1995, Scammell 
1995) and media studies (Franklin 1994, Negrine 1994, McNair 1995) that 
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document the `Americanisation'/`professionalisation' of government and political 
party communications, the development of the `public relations state', and the 
conflicts that arise between `spin doctors' and journalists, there are no 
comprehensive works that specifically document or address these fundamental 
issues or developments in relation to all of the main political parties and the media 
in Northern Ireland. 
In acknowledging these shortcomings, this study documents the rise of party 
political public relations in Northern Ireland and explores its impact on the media 
and the peace/political process more generally. While this research primarily charts 
and describes the chronological development of public relations pertaining to 
Northern Ireland's four main political parties (the SDLP, Sinn Fein, the DUP4 and 
the UUP), it also explores the media-source relations or interactions between 
journalists and public relations personnel. Significantly, political public relations 
has expanded considerably in Northern Ireland since the mid-90s, and political 
parties are increasingly utilising PR to enhance their media relations capabilities and 
improve their image (or `brand') with the public. The result of this expansion has 
seen the regional media in Northern Ireland become increasingly more vulnerable to 
the promotional efforts of `spin doctors' or media relations personnel from all four 
parties. 
4 Democratic Unionist Party 
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(ii) Definitional Problems 
Before progressing, in an attempt to avoid confusion, it seems appropriate at this 
juncture to `spell out' some of the terms that are used during the course of this 
research. 
Political public relations has many sub-specialities and overlapping roles. 
Marketing, advertising, image or brand management and internal staff 
communications are all variously conducted by in-house political public relations 
personnel or external communications specialists. At times this research does refer 
to such activities. However, its principal focus when referring to `public relations' 
(or PR) is `media relations' work - the main activity of the sector. 
Confusion also arises because many of those who work in the field of political 
public relations in Northern Ireland tend to avoid the PR label, preferring titles like 
`Director of Communications', `Director of Publicity', `Information Officer', 
`Media Strategist' etc. Yet, for the purposes of this research, while their preferred 
title is used throughout this study, for all intensive purposes they essentially all 
come under the umbrella of party political public relations personnel. In addition, 
`communications' and `public relations' are used interchangeably throughout this 
research. 
Finally, the term `spin doctor' could do with some further definitional attention. 
Initially, `spin' was a term reserved for the practice of putting the best possible 
gloss on an event breaking in the news, and `spinning' was simply putting a 
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particularised perspective or viewpoint on an issue or debate. From `spinning' grew 
`spin doctors', which is simply another name for media spokespeople. However 
from there, the term `spin doctor' has suffered a degree of negativism and become 
synonymous with anyone believed to be involved in the `black arts' of political 
campaigning (Gould 1998). Yet, in this research, its pejorative connotations are 
avoided, that is, the term is used in its neutral sense to describe someone who is 
responsible for media relations for either one of the four main political parties. 
Indeed, this is a longstanding and completely unexceptional activity. In today's 
political environment in which political parties are often under constant attack (not 
least from the media), it is simply common sense to employ people to put forward 
the views of the party, and to do it to best effect. 
(iii) Selling the Good Friday Agreement: the Context 
Significantly, it was the election of a strong Labour government under Tony Blair in 
May 1997 that helped re-energise the Northern Ireland peace process. Within a 
matter of months a new IRA ceasefire was announced and Sinn Fein's conditions 
for entering talks/negotiations had been met. However, while unionists of all hues 
had serious concerns about entering into a process that included Sinn Fein, the UUP 
remained in the talks, whereas Ian Paisley's DUP subsequently withdrew. 
Negotiations between eight political parties and the British and Irish governments 
continued until agreement was reached on 10th April 1998, that is, Good Friday 
(see Appendix 1 for a simplified version of the Agreement). Fundamentally, the 
Agreement represented the first significant opportunity to have an inclusive power- 
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sharing government in the history of the state. It was envisaged that the four main 
parties would form a coalition government and that an idealised vision of political 
accommodation in a peaceful future could at last be realised. 
One of the Agreement's stipulations was that its very legitimacy would have to be 
strengthened by (or founded upon) a positive endorsement by `the people' of 
Northern Ireland. In the event, a six-week-long referendum campaign on the 
Agreement was to become the largest public relations exercise ever to be carried out 
in Northern Ireland. It included the input of all sections of society, from political 
parties to religious groups, from business groups to trade unions and from 
paramilitary groups to peace groups. Significantly, the importance of the 
Agreement as a framework or model for conflict resolution was also evidenced by 
the international media attention it received in the run up to its signing, and 
subsequently during the referendum campaign itself. 
The date of separate referendums in Northern and Southern Ireland - the 22nd of 
May 1998 - was a unique day in the history of politics in Ireland in the 20th 
century. Not since the general election of 1918 had the people of Ireland voted on 
an all-island basis. In Northern Ireland, the electorate were asked a simple question 
on whether or not they supported the Agreement. Of those who voted, 71.12% 
voted Yes, in favour, and 28.88% voted No, against the Agreement. In the Republic 
of Ireland, the electorate were asked whether or not they approved of amendments 
to Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution, which laid territorial claims on Northern 
Ireland. Of those who voted, 94.4% voted Yes, for amendments that could be 
construed as support for the Agreement; 5.6% voted No. Significantly, the 
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referenda were envisaged as an integral part of the peace process and the results a 
clear indication of the peoples' support for the continuance of that same process. 
A key concern of this study is to explore and understand how the Good Friday 
Agreement was `sold', specifically to the people of `Northern Ireland', from a 
public relations perspective. The term `sold' infers cynicism. This is intentional. 
The Agreement was a complex, legal/political document that contained a number of 
constructive ambiguities. Significantly, the construction of the Agreement by the 
eight political parties and the British and Irish governments was such that different 
people and different constituencies could be sold on different parts of it. In a very 
real sense, historical divisions precluded the Agreement from being constructed and 
subsequently sold in any other way, whereby different parties, different bodies of 
people, or different sectional interests would have something to buy into, perceiving 
that there was something in it for each of them, and believing that they would be 
able to support the Agreement at the cost of accepting other, more unpalatable 
aspects of it. 
Indeed, it can be contended that there was also insufficient time between the signing 
of the Agreement and the referendum vote for the electorate to fully dissect and 
understand the future implications of the complex, 15,000-word Agreement. To 
compound difficulties for the electorate, there was no simplistic guide available 
which would aid them in making an informed choice. 
Essentially, the majority of people in Northern Ireland had to look to their political 
leaders to simplify what the complex Agreement would mean for them in the short 
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to medium-term future. This gave political representatives added weight in selling 
their interpretations of the Agreement, and as a result, different constituencies were 
sold different `lines' by different political parties. Indeed, such disparate 
interpretations were relayed (for the most part via the media) and successfully sold 
to two seemingly irreconcilable communities, as evidenced in the 71.12% Yes vote 
in favour of the Agreement. 
The overarching question is: how was this achieved? Specifically, from a public 
relations perspective, how did the key messages, public relations strategies and 
techniques employed by Northern Ireland's four main political parties contribute 
towards the result? In addition, how did the media in Northern Ireland react to the 
challenges they faced at this critical juncture in the peace process? Or to put it 
another way, were the media biased or unbiased in their coverage of the referendum 
campaign? And, were they helpful or unhelpful in relation to concentrated efforts at 
promoting peace? This research explores and answers these pivotal questions. 
(iv) Pre - and Post-Agreement Developments 
Whilst an examination of the 1998 referendum campaign is a central aspect of this 
research, the study begins by focusing on pre-Agreement developments in party 
political public relations and the media in Northern Ireland (from the outbreak of 
`The Troubles' in 1968-9 up until Good Friday 1998) to better understand the `state 
of play' during the referendum campaign. In addition, this research also examines 
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post-Agreement developments in party political public relations and the media, 
concluding with an exploration of the November 2003 Assembly election. 
Essentially, the fundamental reason for an examination of pre-Agreement 
developments is that it provides strong foundations upon which a greater 
understanding of post-Agreement developments can take place. 
The Agreement represented the culmination of many years work by the British and 
Irish governments, not to mention the work of political leaders and parties from 
Northern Ireland. Given that the peace process had its origins in meetings between 
the SDLP's John Hume and Sinn Fein's Gerry Adams a decade before Good Friday 
1998, it would be difficult to fully understand the trials and tribulations of various 
key actors during the referendum campaign and subsequently in the post-Agreement 
era, without first understanding relevant pre-Agreement developments. For 
example, a crude history of unionism would highlight that (historically) many in the 
Protestant community have felt (and continue to feel) `under siege', and as a result, 
both security and law and order issues are a dominating theme in the psyche of 
unionists. In the context of the Good Friday Agreement, which envisaged IRA 
prisoners being released and changes being made to the make-up of the 
predominantly Protestant police force (the RUC), it becomes easier to comprehend 
(by understanding historical developments) why some unionists would vote No to 
the Agreement. Equally, a crude history of republicanism would highlight that 
generations of republicans have been involved in a struggle for Irish independence. 
Therefore, the act of voting Yes for an Agreement that effectively represented a 
partitionist settlement would (in the minds of some republicans) disgrace the 
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memory of those who made the ultimate sacrifice (died or had been killed) in the 
pursuit of their ideals or beliefs. 
Indeed, other pre-Agreement developments also highlight, for example that Sinn 
Fein, on the one hand, made consistent attempts to keep their own constituency on- 
board by informing their supporters of continuing developments in the peace 
process. On the other hand, pre-Agreement developments would highlight that the 
UUP's David Trimble did not adequately prepare unionists for prisoner releases, the 
reality of power-sharing (in particular, the possibility of Sinn Fein becoming key 
partners in government) and more generally for the leap of faith that would be 
required by unionists if the Agreement's vision of a peaceful future was to be 
realised. 
Essentially, this research is important for a number of reasons: it investigates and 
details pre-Agreement developments in party political public relations and the 
media in Northern Ireland; it comprehensively examines the 1998 referendum 
campaign; and it details developments in party political public relations and the 
media in the post-Agreement era. 
While primarily focusing on the developments of party political public relations in 
Northern Ireland over the last three decades, this research is also concerned with the 
media's ability to fulfil its `ideal' functions. 
With these ideals in mind the research explores the following questions: 
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1: How much has party political public relations expanded in Northern Ireland over 
the last three decades? 
2: How and in what ways has this expansion influenced the media in Northern 
Ireland and impacted on the peace/political process more generally? 
3: Which political parties are utilising PR most in their attempts to influence media 
coverage? And, who is being included or excluded from participation in public 
discourse? 
4: What part was played by PR-inspired media coverage during the 1998 
referendum campaign in influencing the electorate in Northern Ireland to support 
the Good Friday Agreement? 
In exploring these questions, this study also provides illuminating insights into 
media-source relations or the interaction between party political public relations 
personnel and journalists in Northern Ireland. 
(v) Media Sociology, the Fourth Estate Media, and Media-Source 
Relations 
The impact (whether positive or negative) of a rise in political public relations on 
the media naturally follows on from long-running debates between liberal pluralists 
and their critics over the functioning of the fourth estate media. Liberal pluralist 
studies of journalists at work have contributed to an account in which the media 
function as independent `fourth estate' guardians acting in the public interest; that 
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the media remain neutrally objective in reporting a plurality of competing interests 
and opinions; that autonomous journalists have professional values that guide them 
towards neutral coverage of issues; and that the media tend to act as a check on 
major concentrations of power (Gans 1979, Harrison 1985, Schudson 1996). While 
the liberal ideals at the heart of journalism are unlikely to be fully achieved, the 
media still fulfil vital functions in democracies. 
In contrast, radical media sociologists have argued that journalists cannot be 
independent because powerful interests - namely the state and/or corporate elites - 
have continually managed, influenced or manipulated the media. As accounts (such 
as Schlesinger et al. 1983, Glasgow University Media Group 1985) have 
documented, both states and private owners have frequently abused their power and 
sought to influence journalists and the political process for their own particular 
ends. Radicals also argue that independent, autonomous journalism is affected by 
wider economic conditions that contribute to the reduced ability of journalists to 
fulfil the media's role as fourth estate guardians to an acceptable level. 
Research on media-source relations has been one area of enquiry that radicals have 
attempted to supplement macro-level arguments about the fourth estate media with 
arguments at the micro-level. Yet, to date, this work has avoided coming to 
definitive conclusions on the issue of journalists' autonomy in their relations with 
sources. Up until the early 1990's, media sociologists who addressed the question 
(for example, Gans 1979, Tiffen 1989) tended to agree that the attempts of either 
side to manage the other were often superseded by the benefits of co-operation. For 
Gans, `the source journalist relationship is therefore a tug of war: while sources 
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attempt to "manage" the news.., journalists concurrently "manage" the sources in 
order to extract the information they want', but that, more often than not, sources 
`have the edge' (1979, p. 117). Although sources were slightly stronger in this view, 
neither side dominated for long. While there has been increased interest in the 
subject during the 1990's by radical media sociologists (for example, Miller 1994, 
Schlesinger and Tumber 1994) who have found that there is a greater degree of 
complexity in the continuing relations between sources and journalists than hitherto 
acknowledged, the common consensus of much of media sociology still tends to 
remain wedded to Gans's earlier `tug of war' assessment. 
Essentially, there is ample need for a thorough investigation of the `tug of war' 
occurring in Northern Ireland. Indeed, an expansion of party political public 
relations in Northern Ireland has obvious ramifications for the debate on the 
autonomy of the fourth estate media. If political public relations continue to expand 
in Northern Ireland, and, according to industry surveys (for example, PR Week 
survey, 20.8.99), `media relations' is the principal activity of its practitioners, then it 
seems important that the impact of political public relations on journalist autonomy 
is explored. 
(vi) Theoretical Influences 
Rather than concentrate on interpreting developments in party political public 
relations and the media in Northern Ireland within a pre-specified theoretical 
framework, it seemed more appropriate at the beginning of the research process to 
generate empirical material for further debate. There are, however, certain 
theoretical influences that have a bearing on, or guide the research. 
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One such theoretical influence is that of Habermas (1989) who, in his notion of the 
`public sphere', elaborates upon an argument that in an ideal society the media 
would provide people with access to the broadest possible range of information, 
interpretation and debate on areas that involve political choices, and enable them to 
register dissent and propose alternatives. 
However, there are clear limitations of the public sphere as envisaged by Habermas. 
Not only is his historical narrative of the early capitalist period highly idealised but 
also his original notion of the public sphere was an essentially bourgeois space that 
was based on mass exclusion - for example, of the working class, women and 
ethnic minorities. Furthermore, his theory of the public sphere tends to assume that 
rational debate and rational actions will occur, ideals that for the most part have a 
history of being `hard to come by' in Northern Ireland. 
Nevertheless, the idea of the public sphere is worth retaining, providing that it is 
acknowledged that it needs to be open enough that all groups in Northern Ireland 
can recognise themselves and their aspirations as being fairly represented. Indeed, 
the general ideal of the media helping to engender a public cultural space that is 
open, diverse, and accessible, remains an important goal that undoubtedly should be 
strived towards in Northern Ireland. 
A second theoretical influence of this research is that of critical political economy. 
This theory tends to start with sets of social relations and the play of power, 
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including for example, the way news is structured by the prevailing relations 
between editors or journalists and their sources. 
Although this study does not strictly adhere to a critical political economy 
theoretical framework, it is nevertheless concerned with questions about the 
contestation and distribution of resources - that such contestation and distribution, 
as well as media coverage, remain unequal, which is, they tend to favour particular 
interests over others. 
This study is also concerned with the tendency of a critical political economy 
perspective to at times sway towards a `conspiracy theory' of an all-powerful ruling 
directorate of the capitalist class that dictates to editors and reporters what to run in 
their television programmes or newspapers. One such example, Herman and 
Chomsky's Manufacturing Consent (1988), offers a `propaganda model' of the 
mass media -a view that the media `serve to mobilize support for the special 
interests that dominate the state and private activity' (1988, p. xi). For Herman and 
Chomsky, news serves established power, and the propagandistic character of news 
has been brought about (amongst other reasons) by the fact that the media industry 
is dependent on government officials for its sources. This type of dependency has 
been a criticism levelled at the media in Northern Ireland (by researchers in the 
past) and throughout the period under consideration in this study. Furthermore, the 
following research explores a `conspiracy theory' that an `all-powerful' British 
government dictated to the media in Northern Ireland what to run in their television 
programmes or newspapers during the 1998 referendum campaign on the Good 
Friday Agreement. 
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A final theoretical influence of this research draws upon the theory of interpretive 
communities, which recognises that different groups (for example in the case of this 
research, pro- and anti-Agreement unionists or nationalists) have different values 
and goals and thus attribute meaning to a situation or artefact differently (that is, the 
Good Friday Agreement) in line with their own particular interpretations (Yanow, 
2000). 
Interpretive methods are based on the presupposition that we live in a social world 
characterised by the possibilities of multiple interpretations. Indeed, in the case of 
this research many unionists interpreted the Good Friday Agreement as a 
strengthening of the union whereas many nationalists interpreted it as a stepping- 
stone towards a united Ireland. 
In many respects, this research is also influenced by the interpretive approach 
because it relies less on theory than the meaning of experiences by the people who 
experience them; and also because the researcher becomes a translator, helping to 
understand the stories of interviewees and incorporate as many voices as possible 
into the study. As such, this research relies on multiple stories, testimonies or 
viewpoints of a variety of relevant actors. 
Theories then, are not put forward in the main sections of this research, which 
focuses on the description of the case and analysis of its issues, yet they are 
employed at the end of the study. While it is acknowledged that there are 
theoretical influences that guide the research, there is no positioning of the study 
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within any particular theoretical camp before data collection. After data collection 
and analysis there is what may be termed a `theory-after' perspective advanced. 
(vii) Research Parameters and Methods 
This research has clear empirical parameters. To begin with, the study is based in 
Northern Ireland and covers the period from the beginning of the `Troubles' in 
1968-69 until the Assembly election of November 2003. Indeed, there are two 
further parameters. First of all, its principal focus, (as aforementioned) when 
referring to `public relations' (or PR) is `media relations' work. Secondly, all 
specific research conducted that refers to the media in Northern Ireland has been 
confined to the Belfast-based regional print and broadcast media (The Belfast 
Telegraph, The Irish News, BBC NI etc. ), thus excluding mainland British or 
Southern Irish media. 
In conducting this research, data was obtained through thirty in-depth interviews 
with key `high-profile' respondents who were involved directly or indirectly in 
Northern Ireland politics or in the reporting of the peace process (religious and 
political leaders, party political public relations personnel and governmental press 
officers, journalists and editors etc. ). Significantly, the central importance of this 
study resides in the detailed information gleaned from the interviews (see Appendix 
3 for a list of interviewees). 
In the course of this study, public relations materials as well as interviews with 
public relations personnel and political representatives from the four main political 
parties were correlated with media texts and interviews with journalists to provide a 
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multi-faceted narrative that takes the reader into the multiple dimensions of the 
research area and displays it in all of its complexity. 
(viii) Research Outline 
This research is made up of three main sections that collectively aim to examine the 
rise of party political public relations and its impact on the media and the 
peace/political process. Each of the three sections are broken down into six 
subsections, that is, four that examine individual party political public relations 
developments, one that examines the role of the media, and a final subsection that 
takes the form of a summary / conclusion. 
Section one: Pre-Agreement Developments in Party Political Public Relations and 
the Media, explores the period from the beginning of the Troubles in 1968-9 until 
Good Friday 1998 and is, in its simplest form, an introductory section or a 
`forerunner' to sections two and three. It provides historical background and 
context, explores the pre-Agreement political public relations developments of each 
of the four main political parties and outlines the role played by the media during 
the period in question. 
This section also provides a chronological exploration of the four main parties' 
political posters in an attempt to complement an investigation of pre-Agreement 
public relations developments. In doing so, it attempts to ascertain which political 
parties were repetitive, conservative or simplistic in their approach to public 
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relations or which were innovative, creative and imaginative. Essentially, this 
section determines which political parties acknowledged and appreciated the 
importance of public relations, and in particular, the need to develop their media 
relations. 
Section one also investigates the relationship between the political parties and the 
media. In addition, it questions whether the media during this period were for the 
most part orientated towards an official, British government perspective. Finally, it 
determines whether the media were helpful or unhelpful in relation to concentrated 
efforts at promoting peace, that is, whether they could be accused of reinforcing 
differences and disagreements over consensus and agreement. 
Section two: Party Political Public Relations and the Media during the 1998 
Referendum Campaign, chronicles the roles played by each of the four main 
political parties and the media during the referendum campaign in a wider attempt 
to understand more fully how the Good Friday Agreement was sold to the people of 
Northern Ireland. 
This section looks closely at the different public relations campaigns of the four 
rival political parties (and touches on British government involvement), all of whom 
had the common aim of influencing media discourses and more generally the public 
at large. It attempts to ascertain how successful the UUP, the SDLP and Sinn Fein 
were in selling the Agreement within their own constituencies, and gauges how 
effective the DUP were in persuading the electorate to vote No to the Agreement. It 
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also explores public relations strategies and techniques employed by each of the 
parties to determine the significance of such activities, that is, whether it could be 
contended that `public relations' activities had an impact upon the referendum 
result. 
Finally, section two establishes whether the media in Northern Ireland were biased 
or unbiased in their coverage of the referendum campaign, that is, whether they 
appeared to side with either the pro- or anti-Agreement camps. Only a matter of 
weeks prior to the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, the British government 
developed a strategy document (that was leaked by the DUP) on how to sell a 
potential peace deal. The document proposed a strategy of at best, managing, at 
worst manipulating the media in Northern Ireland. As such, this section attempts to 
establish whether the British government (as key signatories to the Agreement) had 
a major influence on the media during the referendum campaign. In addition, it also 
(once again) determines whether (at this juncture) the media were helpful or 
unhelpful in relation to concentrated efforts at promoting peace. 
Section Three: Post Agreement Developments in Party Political Public Relations 
and the Media, explores the five-and-a-half-year period from the 1998 referendum 
campaign result up until the November 2003 Assembly election. It details more 
recent party political public relations developments and highlights the role played 
by the media during this period. 
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This section also details the growing number of public relations personnel who were 
employed by the political parties in the post-Agreement era, in particular, after 
devolution was introduced in December 1999 (when both the Northern Ireland 
Assembly and Executive were established). In addition, it highlights which political 
parties developed on either a centralised or decentralised basis, the implication 
being that it is fundamentally more difficult to provide successful communications 
or keep party members `on message' in a decentralised party. 
Section three also ascertains which political parties were slower or quicker to realise 
the importance that public relations could bring to their future development and 
which parties adequately invested (in terms of both financial and human resources) 
in their communications operations. In acknowledging the successful rise to 
political power in Britain of `New Labour', it also questions whether there is a 
correlation between effective public relations developments (establishing cohesive, 
efficient communications structures etc. ) and electoral or political success. 
Finally, this section explores the symbiotic relationship between party political 
public relations personnel and journalists in an attempt to determine the impact or 
growing influence of `spin doctors' on the media in Northern Ireland. It also 
questions how the media in Northern Ireland faced up to the challenges of the new 
political dispensation, that is, after devolution was introduced in December 1999. 
Significantly, it questions whether the media contributed to a greater understanding 
of the political process or highlighted positive post-devolution work conducted by 
the political parties. In addition, it questions whether the media could be accused at 
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certain times of reproducing or amplifying communal division, thus making the 
road to peace (for political parties) a more difficult one to travel. 
To summarise, this study addresses a number of important questions that are 
intended to shed a reliable light upon, and illuminate further an area of research that 
for the most part has remained in the dark, absented or ignored in contemporary 
literature pertaining to Northern Ireland. 
Critically, this research highlights the important need for scholars and disciplines to 
engage with the literature and empirical material produced on the `other side' of the 
academic divide. For example, media studies scholars frequently omit crucial 
literature in politics and public relations, and those in politics departments 
themselves rarely refer to public relations or the work of media sociologists. This 
study attempts to bridge the gap. 
At the time of writing, almost seven years have come to pass since the people of 
Northern Ireland endorsed the Good Friday Agreement. Yet, Machiavelli's 
prophetic words still ring true. Initiating changes in the state's constitution (that is, 
implementing the Agreement and its institutions) has not been easy to arrange, or 
been without its doubts of success. 
29 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Writing in 1990, John Whyte observed that since the outset of the `Troubles' in 
Northern Ireland in 1968, there had been an `explosion' of research on the area, 
with hundreds of books and an even larger number of articles published (1990, x). 
However, as Miller (1998) stresses, the majority of research and literature on 
Northern Ireland has failed to adequately address the relevant issues: 
The standard of academic, media and popular commentary on the Northern Ireland conflict 
remains abysmal. Specifically, British propaganda, unionist ideology and revisionist 
`scholarship' inform most contemporary discourse. In those spaces where this is not the 
case, traditional nationalist discourse retains something of a grip. The predominance of 
notions of tribal conflict and irrational or self-interested violence gives a seriously 
misleading and distorted view of the conflict in Ireland. This can be explained partly in 
terms of fear, danger and coercion, but also in terms of the class, national and occupational 
interests and ideologies of academics. (1998, xix) 
Too often academics have shied away from researching and theorising on 
controversial issues pertaining to Northern Ireland. It is not the intention of this 
author, however, to get embroiled in the long-standing debate as to the causes of 
conflict in Northern Ireland but to acknowledge with Miller that distorted views 
(and myths) permeate current academic writing. If `peace' holds in Northern 
Ireland, the barriers of fear, danger and coercion may be removed in a relatively 
short period of time, but it is unlikely that barriers consequential to many ill- 
informed and misleading academic viewpoints will be as easily removed. 
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Before digressing, the rise of party political public relations and its impacts on the 
media in Northern Ireland and the peace/political process, is also an area of research 
that has not, as yet, been properly focused upon. Indeed, at the outset, it should be 
established that there is a lack of significant literature specific to this inquiry. In the 
first instance, relevant literature or informed accounts pertaining to the development 
of publicity operations and the subsequent employment of political public relations 
and media strategies by any of the four main political parties in Northern Ireland are 
virtually non-existent. While there remains a dearth of writing on Sinn Fein 
communications, there is even less material available on the SDLP, the UUP and 
the DUP. Those limited accounts that are available, that is, which do highlight 
public relations or communications developments are explored in section (i). 
Furthermore, although there has been some material written concerning the media's 
role during the Troubles, highlighting their tendency to adopt dominant (that is, 
British government) explanations of the conflict or to play a supportive role in 
relation to state propaganda in the war against terrorism, there is far less material 
available on the subsequent `resolution' of the conflict or the emerging `peace'. 
There is also a distinct lack of investigation into the role played by the media during 
the 1998 referendum campaign, or whether they played a similarly supportive role 
in adopting dominant explanations in the post-Agreement era. The negligible 
amount of material devoted to the media and the conflict, and to the ensuing peace 
process is explored in section (ii). 
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Significantly then, a fundamental need arises to explore other literature that will 
help to provide a theoretical starting point for what is a complex and multifaceted 
analysis: that is, an examination of developments in party political public relations 
or communications by Northern Ireland's mainly `resource-poor' parties who 
employ propaganda to influence the electorate within what is commonly termed the 
public sphere. As such, the literature review explores the concepts of (iii) the public 
sphere, (iv) political communication, (v) public relations and media strategies, (vi) 
`resource-poor' groups and finally, (vii) propaganda. 
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(i) Developments in Party Political Public Relations 
Sinn Fein 
As far back as 1974, Sinn Fein produced a Manual of Publicity (a primary source 
used in this research) that reads like a practical guide on gaining positive media 
coverage; akin to Ward's Getting the Message Across (1992) or Salzman's Making 
the News (1998). Curtis in Ireland. The Propaganda War (1984), has examined the 
development of the republican newspaper An Phoblacht / Republican News and her 
pioneering study was the first to detail the emergence of the republican press centre 
in Belfast. Other material relating to this area has been published, such as, 
counterinsurgency theorist Wright's Terrorist Propaganda (1991), Picard's work on 
An Phoblacht/Republican News (1991) and both Picard (1989) and Irvin's (1992) 
work on `terrorist' public relations. 
Nevertheless, there has been a distinct lack of direct investigation of terrorists' 
media strategies in the literature. As Miller (1994) argues, Joanne Wright's (1991) 
study of the propaganda activities of the IRA entirely lacked contact with members 
or former members of the Republican Movement. Miller, on the other hand, gained 
invaluable access while exploring Sinn Fein's communications apparatus, and in so 
doing, acknowledged that the party were not given sympathetic coverage by the 
media. Yet, after Miller's study and in the years following the IRA cease-fire of 
August 1994, Sinn Fein were indeed afforded more sympathetic coverage as they 
became committed to the peace process and were seen to follow the path of 
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constitutional politics (Bean 1994; Cox 1997; Shirlow and McGovern 1998; Ruane 
and Todd 1999). 
Following not far behind the footsteps of Wright (1991), Rita Lago's unpublished 
doctoral thesis, Political Communication and News Coverage: The Case of Sinn 
Fein (2000), is a further example of detailed research conducted without 
interviewing many key republican players. This is not to denigrate Lago's highly 
informative and insightful research into the contemporary communication activities 
of Sinn Fein, but simply to highlight that the study's merit and credibility would 
have been greatly enhanced with the inclusion of firsthand accounts. 
To counter this, invaluable accounts (if not from republicans themselves) were 
gleaned from journalists' interviews and media surveys conducted by Lago that 
highlighted developments in Sinn Fein's sophisticated use and application of 
communications strategies. 
An important point, repeatedly emphasised by Lago throughout her thesis, was that 
a change in journalistic attitudes towards Sinn Fein, were the outcome of a much 
deeper and wider process of political transformation. The more positive reporting 
of Sinn Fein changed over the years, not only because the party itself had evolved, 
but also because government attitudes toward the party and the conflict were 
modified. 
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Whilst Fawcett (2001) explored Sinn Fein PR and media relations during a short 
research report on post-devolution Northern Ireland, and acknowledged that the 
party had led the way for many years in both respects (as opposed to the other main 
political parties in Northern Ireland), those findings that related to Sinn Fein's PR or 
communications constituted only a matter of a few paragraphs, that is, the research 
lacked more thorough or detailed analyses. 
With the sole exception of Lago (2000), what emerges from the literature is the real 
dearth of detailed contemporary writing on the development of the public relations 
and media activities of Sinn Fein. In the autobiographies of Gerry Adams (1986; 
1989; 1995; 2003) or books that detail the party's history (O'Brien 1995; Taylor 
1998) there is scant reference to either communications developments or those key 
players behind-the-scenes within the `publicity department' who have made 
significant contributions to the party's successful development over the years (for 
example, Danny Morrison in the past, or Richard McAuley in the present). 
The SDLP 
As for the SDLP, Kennedy and Hanna (1985) developed a useful handbook 
covering the basics of public relations for party press officers and members entitled 
Dealing with the Media (another primary source used in this research). This 
handbook mirrors an academic text on public relations and media strategies like 
Bland et al's 'Effective Media Relations' (1996) or Jefkins's `Planned Press and 
Public Relations' (1986) - essentially simplistic and practical guides on how to plan 
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PR campaigns, write news releases and work with journalists to get the best possible 
media coverage. 
As with Sinn Fein, autobiographical works, biographies or the few books that chart 
the SDLP's history (McAllister 1977; White 1984; Drower 1995; Hume 1996; 
Routledge 1997) either neglect to mention at all, or only acknowledge in passing, 
the party's communications developments. Murray's John Hume and the SDLP: 
Impact and Survival in Northern Ireland (1998) is the exception to the rule. Murray 
highlights a number of developments, including the financial troubles the SDLP 
experienced in the early 90's when their only full-time press officer left, of his own 
volition, before his bankrupt party would have no choice but to let him go. 
The UUP 
As for the UUP, Butler (1991) analysed how unionists had been presented in the 
media and concluded that during the Troubles, the media had overestimated the 
IRA-as-cause explanation of events, the result of which had seen unionism 
marginalised, absented and ignored. Indeed, the UUP's poor media coverage did 
not drastically improve throughout most of the 1990's due in part to continuing poor 
public relations and presentational skills (Parkinson, 1998). Parkinson argued that 
the lack of analytical coverage of the unionist position and the predominance of 
negative images in the media (for example, bigots in bowler hats) had resulted in 
the current negative stereotyping of unionists in the British media. Yet, while 
Parkinson highlighted some UUP developments (for example, the establishment in 
1996 of the Unionist Information Office in London) his study focused primarily on 
36 
media representations of unionists rather than upon their communications or public 
relations developments. 
The UUP's Thomas Hennessey (2000) provides an interesting behind-the-scenes 
account of the peace process and the referendum campaign on the Good Friday 
Agreement, as does David Trimble's biographer and journalist Henry McDonald 
(2000). However, while both provide important insights into the UUP's 
communications and public relations developments, the narratives are explorations 
of the much wider peace/political process. 
The DUP 
As for the DUP, a negligible amount of information concerning party developments 
can be gleaned from the behind-the-scenes accounts of Hennessey and McDonald as 
well as others, including George Mitchell's autobiographical Making Peace (1999) 
or Irish journalist Deaglan de Breadun's The Far Side of Revenge: Making Peace in 
Northern Ireland (2001). Nevertheless, illuminating works by other journalists like 
Susan McKay's Northern Protestants: An Unsettled People (2000), helps to create a 
better understanding of the DUP's thinking and provide reasons why many 
Protestants in Northern Ireland, felt beleaguered, misunderstood and outmanoeuvred 
(by nationalists and republicans), the result of which has seen them suspicious of the 
entire peace process and the Good Friday Agreement. Another illuminating work 
by Fionnuala O'Connor (another journalist) - Breaking the Bonds: Making Peace in 
Northern Ireland (2002) provides valuable insights in profiles of the leaders and 
deputy leaders of the four main political parties, including the DUP's Ian Paisley 
and Peter Robinson. 
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However, there is not a single academic work or one conducted by a journalist 
(including biographies or works on Paisleyism) that describes or explains in any 
detail the developments in DUP communications over the years. 
What emerges then from the literature is that the very limited material available 
(published or unpublished) on all four main political parties tends to detail or 
highlight the public relations or communication efforts of a single party in isolation 
from the others. A transparent need arises, therefore, to collate the disparate 
information available on the four main political parties' public relations or 
communications and bring all of the pieces together (connected as in a `patchwork 
quilt') to increase, and in so doing, facilitate a better understanding of the history 
and development of political public relations in Northern Ireland. 
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(ii) The Media and Northern Ireland 
The idea of the noble institution of the British media as the trusted `fourth estate', 
wherein notions of balance and impartiality are core elements of its constitution, has 
been seriously undermined by its coverage of Northern Ireland. As Schlesinger et al 
argue: 
The coverage of Northern Irish Affairs in the British media has tended to simplify violent 
incidents, to avoid historical background, to concentrate on human-interest stories and to 
rely heavily on official sources. Even during periods of the most intense constitutional 
activity, such as election campaigns, the story has been pre-eminently one of violence, and 
of irrational, inexplicable violence at that. (Schlesinger et al., 1983, p. 37) 
Curtis (1984) also draws similar conclusions to those of Schlesinger et al: 
The record of the British media coverage of Ireland has been far from heroic. Those in 
positions of power, both in government and in the media, have proved most reluctant to 
provide a full picture of events in the North or their government, and have made 
considerable efforts to prevent journalists, dramatists and film-makers from exploring the 
situation from any angle other than that favoured by the British establishment. (1984, p. 275) 
The recognition that the media have been systematically orientated towards the 
British government perspective (and that journalists relied heavily on `official 
sources') permeates much of the literature on the media and the conflict in Northern 
Ireland. To acknowledge Thomas's phrase, it becomes apparent that the British 
media `toe the establishment line. ' (cited in Butler, 1991, p. 122) 
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However, Miller (1994) demonstrated that the relationship between the media and 
official sources was much more complex than previously acknowledged. In reality, 
the relationship consisted of a process of negotiation that (while still tending to 
favour official sources) was not entirely predictable in terms of its outcomes 
(Fawcett, 2001). Examining governmental attempts to control and shape media 
coverage, Miller established that the government and its agencies were collaborating 
in organised forms of overt and covert propaganda and that they tended to dominate 
and influence journalists and ultimately the news coverage. Yet, it is not that the 
media were simple `dupes' of the government and its agencies, but that they failed 
on many occasions to adequately question the `primary definers' or `official 
sources'. 
With the emergence of the peace process in the early 90's, the media were also 
guilty of failing to adequately challenge the British government over its policies on 
Northern Ireland. For example, there was little criticism in the media when it was 
revealed that John Major lied to the House of Commons by claiming that it would 
turn his stomach to talk to terrorists, when, in fact, his officials were holding secret 
meetings with representatives of the IRA (Miller and Mc Laughlin, 1996). 
Yet, although Schlesinger, Curtis and Miller were important contributors to the 
illumination of the role of the media during the conflict years, their relevance begins 
to wane in light of the media's role in the more contemporary politics of the peace 
process. A more recent study, by Spencer (2000), highlighted that in the changing 
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political climate of the peace process and the subsequent peace negotiations, the 
media shifted from supporting to obstructing dominant political discourse: 
As political wings of paramilitary groups were absorbed into the workings of mainstream 
politics, they became subject to greater media scrutiny and were thus able to inject 
perspectives and comments which challenged dominant official viewpoints. This posed a 
number of difficulties for dominant groups trying to use news as a means for 
communicating the direction of peace and given the growing contestations over this 
direction, the media's role became less orientated towards any dominant consensus about 
peace and more orientated towards emphasising disputes and dissensus. Or, to put it 
another way, the news media were now more concerned with promoting contestation than 
consensus. (Spencer, 2000, p. 183) 
Highlighting the media's tendency to construct the impression of `winners' and 
`losers', politicians interviewed by Spencer concurred with a view that the media's 
propensity to reinforce differences and disagreement during the peace process and 
the subsequent peace negotiations made it difficult to generate trust and confidence 
between the opposing sides. 
What emerges from the literature pertaining to the media and Northern Ireland is a 
conclusion that most commentators have been highly critical of their role at every 
stage of the pre-Agreement era. Spencer's study examined the peace process and 
the subsequent peace negotiations that led up to the signing of the Good Friday 
Agreement. Yet, once the historic Agreement was concluded, the, essential question 
that needed to be answered was how the media would react to the challenges ahead? 
In essence, would the print and broadcast media `toe the establishment line' or 
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might they continue to obstruct dominant political discourse? Indeed, would they 
be helpful or unhelpful in relation to concentrated efforts at promoting peace? Such 
questions are not adequately addressed in the contemporary literature on the media 
and Northern Ireland. The present thesis provides a rigorous and critical answer. 
Significantly, it is proposed that a holistic approach is required whereby the 
complexity of the four main political parties and the media's involvement in `selling 
the Good Friday Agreement' is thoroughly examined. 
While it has become evident that that there is limited published material on either 
the development of party political public relations or the media in Northern Ireland, 
there is other literature that does impinge upon and hold the key to understanding 
more fully the research area. 
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(iii) The Public Sphere 
The importance of an intelligent and knowledgeable electorate dictates that 
democratic politics must be pursued in the public arena, where citizens can freely 
make informed choices or decisions and in so doing, influence public opinion 
(McNair, 1995). Public opinion is formed in an arena or forum - what Jurgen 
Habermas (1989) has called the `public sphere': 
By the public sphere we mean first of all a realm of our social life in which something 
approaching public opinion can be formed... Citizens behave as a public body when they 
confer in an unrestricted fashion - that is, within the guarantee of freedom of assembly and 
association and the freedom to express and publish their opinions. (1989, p. 89) 
Habermas's theorisation of the public sphere, explored in great detail in The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (translated 1989), was an attempt to 
find possibilities through which democracy could be realised. As such, his concept 
relates to the conditions within which healthy and just political conditions may be 
realised. 
Yet, as the widely available literature is testament to, there is no single definition of 
what precisely constitutes the public sphere. Ernst (1988, cited in McNair 1995, 
p. 19) believes that the public sphere should be recognised as `a distinctive 
discursive space' where individuals can converge and transform themselves into a 
powerful and influencing force in the political arena. Curran (1991) views the 
public sphere as `the space between government and society, in which private 
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individuals exercise formal and informal control over the state: formal control 
through the election of government and informal control through the pressure of 
public opinion. ' (1991, p. 29) 
However, the idealised realm or sphere that Habermas originally envisaged, has 
never been realised as there has never been a single forum to which all citizens were 
guaranteed free access, nor, where the discussion of free ideas occurred (Verstraten, 
1996). Indeed, feminist perspectives on Habermas's work have highlighted the 
exclusionary and elitist nature of the public sphere's original conception as an 
idealisation of an historical period of Northern European society. Fraser (1992) 
argues that it is unrealistic to assume that the historical exclusion of women, or the 
racial and property criteria needed to participate in the public sphere can be 
overlooked or ignored. Rather, the likelihood is that overlooking group differences 
will lead to the exclusion of some groups from participation within the public 
sphere. For Fraser, the solution is to see not a singular public sphere but a number 
of public sphericules, through which groups interact, contest and withdraw to when 
they so desire. In viewing the public sphere in this way: `it is possible to offset the 
reality that participatory privileges are something to be enjoyed only by members of 
the dominant group. ' (Hartley, 2002, p. 192) 
Essentially, while it is evident that there is no single definition of what constitutes 
the public sphere, there are two main strands of thought that are important to 
distinguish. The first is the Classical Liberal Theory, whereby the public sphere is 
defined as the area between the government and society where the media has a 
certain degree of influence and has a critical role to play in facilitating information 
44 
and acting as the fourth estate (Curran 1991). The second strand, in sharp contrast, 
relates to more radical conceptualisations of the public sphere, whereby the media 
are no longer the trusted fourth estate but are exploited and used as a tool to sell and 
publicise information by the powerful in society. Thus, within a radical 
understanding of the public sphere, public relations and media strategies are 
employed by governments and political parties to manage or control the media and, 
in doing so, dominate the public sphere in which opinions are formed. However, in 
weighing up the pro's and con's of both strands, one acknowledges that the media 
has increasingly become a forum of debate where a variety of private interests are 
pursued, whilst remembering that it remains a forum in which scrutiny of the 
powerful does still occur. 
Media theorists have used Habermas's public sphere to highlight or explain the 
importance of communication for the processes of democracy (Garnham 1986; 
Price 1995). Yet, as the case of Northern Ireland illustrates, the lack of an arena or 
forum in which ideal communication and discussion occurred (and in which 
nationalists could participate equally) is the enduring legacy of `dominant' unionist 
governments who for half a century presided over an `undemocratic' state. Prior to 
Direct Rule in 1972, the public sphere (for the most part) was reserved for the 
Protestant and unionist community, while Catholics and nationalists were repeatedly 
discriminated against, marginalised or excluded from the main political and social 
process. 
As such, an ideal form of the public sphere has never been realised in Northern 
Ireland. Instead there is contest and division and two (Protestant/unionist and 
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Catholic/nationalist) or perhaps more (republican and loyalist) overlapping public 
spheres or `sphericules' as Fraser has alluded to. 
Northern Ireland, sadly, lacks an ideal forum within which debate occurs, where the 
generation of ideas, shared knowledge and the construction of opinion that occurs 
when people assemble and discuss is present. There is also a distinct lack of what 
Habermas describes as `a network for communicating information and points of 
view' (1996, p. 360) or indeed an arena where ideas and information are shared or 
where public opinions are formed as a result of communication. 
Effectively, the usefulness of the entire concept, as applied to Northern Ireland, can 
be questioned as to its relevance, as Finlayson & Hughes (2000) assert: 
Indeed part of the difficulty with politics in Northern Ireland is the at best opacity at worst 
absence of a public sphere. The public is so divided that there is no bottom-line consensus 
on top of which public political communication may take place. (2000, p. 408) 
Yet, the idea or the concept of a public sphere should not be abandoned. It is an 
ideal that should be worked towards, that is, as a crucial, underpinning notion of 
democracy, operating as a `mode of societal integration. ' (Calhoun, 1992, p. 6) 
Indeed, as a result of the Good Friday Agreement, the Northern Ireland Assembly 
had the potential to transform the nature of the public sphere. While there have 
been four suspensions and continuing `setbacks, ' there is still a potential for 
devolution to lead to a rejuvenation of the public sphere with a much more 
meaningful version of democracy and public debate realised. Crucial to the 
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realisation of such a vision must be the channels of communication through which 
politicians and the public can disseminate and exchange their views (Fawcett, 
2001). 
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(iv) Political Communication 
Like so many other terms or concepts, there is no universal definition of `political 
communication' and therefore the term has been commonly used in reference to 
communicating any information that can be considered relevant to the political 
process. In this respect, (amongst others) the present thesis incorporates a critical 
analysis of Northern Ireland's four main political parties' posters as they too serve 
as `purposeful communication about politics. '(McNair, 1995, p. 4) 
Blumler and Gurevitch argue that `political communication' which they refer to as 
`mediated political messages' are `a composite product, reflecting the contributions 
and interaction of two different types of communication: advocates and journalists' 
(1995, p. 103). In this sense, political communication becomes an interactive, two- 
way process between politicians (or more recently, their spin doctors) and 
journalists, where information is exchanged and both parties contribute to the 
production of the output. 
The main function of `political communication' should (ideally) be to provide 
relevant information that is required for the formation and maintenance of not only 
an informed electorate, but also a viable and healthy public sphere. 
Yet, more recently, there has been a qualitative shift in political communication 
with the introduction of various experts whose backgrounds in marketing, public 
relations and advertising have led some to question whether politicians are either 
`effectively' informing the electorate or indeed `positively' contributing to a healthy 
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public sphere. Many commentators argue that there has been a `dumbing down' of 
politics and a greater amount of insubstantive `spin' disseminated by political 
parties and government information officers alike (Blumler and Gurevitch 1995; 
Franklin 1994). Franklin argues that `politicians and policies have become 
packaged for media presentation and public consumption. ' (1994, p. 4) Indeed, 
there is a growing feeling that `style' has replaced `substance' in politics, whereby 
politicians are now assessed in terms of the sophistication of their image or quality 
of their delivery, rather than on substantive policy issues. 
Yet, there is also an opposing view, whereby the `packaging of politics' has further 
facilitated access to information that was previously in the sole domain of the ruling 
elite. From this perspective, an `opening up' of the political process has contributed 
to a fairer and more balanced public sphere, since `the new methods (of 
campaigning) enable politicians to communicate with millions of voters via 
television or direct mail, rather than hundreds of voters face to face. ' (Kavanagh 
1995, p. 9) 
Nevertheless, `style over substance' politics has for some commentators (including 
Franklin) become a worrying feature of politics in the modern era. Such worries are 
compounded by the significant growth in the hiring of spin doctors or media 
relations personnel whose job it is to `influence' and `shape' media coverage to the 
advantage of the political party who pays their salaries. 
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(v) Public Relations and Media Strategies 
Although at times confused and described as one and the same, it is important to 
first understand the main distinction between public relations and media strategies. 
Essentially, a media strategy is simply a component part or an element within a 
wider `all-encompassing' public relations strategy. Indeed, public relations 
strategies can be aimed or directed at an organisation's internal as well as external 
audiences, whereas media strategies are aimed specifically at improving the 
relationship between an organisation and the media, as well as gaining positive 
media coverage for that organisation. 
Confusion arises because a key `external' audience for the public relations 
practitioner is often the media, as Wragg (1992) explains: 
One of the most important aspects of PR is media relations. There are those who feel that 
the role of media relations is sometimes overemphasised, and that this even reflects the 
presence in PR of many former journalists, but one has to face the fact that in most 
instances the media is the initial audience for the message, and it is through the media that 
the message is channelled to the ultimate target audiences. (1992, p. 43) 
To compound definitional difficulties, there is also confusion surrounding the 
distinction between public relations `practices' and `techniques'. `Practices' refer to 
the different aspects of public relations, for example McNair (1995) suggests four: 
media management, image management, internal communications and information 
management. On the other hand, `techniques' refer to the more `specific' means 
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involved in carrying out a `practice', for example in media management - press 
releases, case studies and feature articles. Indeed, in political public relations there 
are a number of identifiable techniques that range from the traditional `loud- 
speakering' to more contemporary `direct mail-shots', yet these techniques are all 
but absent and are ignored in the literature. 
Turning attention to the specific nature of media strategies, Franklin (1994) arrived 
at four distinct areas, categorised as: attempts to influence the news agenda; 
structuring contacts with broadcasters; the need to train politicians in the area of 
performance and the search for the ways to control the coverage of politics by the 
media. By focusing on broadcasters, Franklin neglected to include the equally 
important role of structuring contacts with the print media. Nevertheless, what is 
evident from Franklin's categories of `media strategies' is that there is significant 
overlap with the `public relations practices' of McNair, in particular, both media 
and image management. It is, therefore, understandable why there is confusion over 
the distinction between public relations and media strategies. 
By delving into the literature, it quickly becomes apparent that there is a 
significantly greater number of works dedicated to the `practical' as opposed to the 
`theoretical' nature of public relations. Cutlip et al. (1994) argue that this imbalance 
reflects `the struggle of an emerging profession seeking its unique identity. ' (1994, 
p. 2) 
51 
Indeed, (once again) there is no universally accepted definition of public relations. 
Harrison (1995) simply suggests that it `means exactly what the words suggest - 
relations with the public. ' (1995, p.! ) 
According to the Institute of Public Relations (1995), the term refers to the `planned 
and sustained effort to establish and maintain goodwill and understanding between 
an organisation and its public. ' (cited in Harrison 1995, p. 2) Yet this definition fails 
to acknowledge that one of the main aims of public relations is to change or alter 
public perceptions, and as such, does not necessarily sit well with benign notions 
like goodwill and understanding. 
Indeed, all investments made in public relations and media strategies by political 
parties should be seen primarily as attempts to further their own particular interests 
(for example, to increase their appeal to the voting public) and therefore they 
naturally reflect more selfish concerns. Sauerhaft and Atkins (1989) come closer to 
the mark when they argue that public relations is the `art and science of informing, 
influencing, changing or neutralising public opinion. ' (cited in Moss et al. 1997, 
p. 3) 
Public relations (just like political communication) should (in its idealised form) be 
a two-way communicative process. However, in the practical world of politics, the 
ideal does not always correspond to the reality, and as with the transformation of 
political communication, there are differences of opinion as to whether the growing 
influence of political public relations has a positive or negative impact on 
democracy. As McNair (1996) highlights: `for some, public relations is a wholly 
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legitimate, indeed essential input to modem politics. For others, the development of 
political public relations has signalled the sinister corruption of democracy. '(1996, 
p. 35) While `public relations' is a pejorative term (just like notions of propaganda 
and persuasion) the `intent' of the practitioner is all important. Thus, public 
relations and media strategies can be directed towards either positive or negative 
ends. 
In Northern Ireland, the sophisticated use of public relations and media strategies 
has only recently become a widespread and integral feature of politics. All of the 
main political parties have become more aware of the dramatic effect the media can 
have on public opinion. In addition, they all now strive for positive media coverage 
in the acknowledgement that their goals (in particular their appeal to voters) can be 
further enhanced by incorporating professional public relations and media 
strategies, as well as by developing more fruitful relationships with journalists and 
broadcasters. 
The increased professionalisation of public relations and media strategies has meant 
that political parties in Northern Ireland now (more than ever before) require greater 
resources to compete with one another via both the print and broadcast media. 
When such resources are not readily available, the ability of the parties to influence 
the media agenda can be severely restricted. 
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(vi) `Resource Poor' Groups 
The term `resource poor' was first introduced or coined by Goldenberg (1976) to 
describe organisations with limited resources. More specifically, he outlined three 
different, yet interrelated categories of resources: financial, organisational and 
cultural. Financial resources relate to the amount of disposable income available to 
the organisation and its ability to raise further funds. Organisational resources refer 
to the availability of facilities, technical equipment and staff levels within an 
organisation. Lastly, cultural resources relate to the advantages or disadvantages, 
respect or disrespect, that an organisation possesses because of its history and 
position within society. 
Miller and Mc Laughlin (1996) highlighted that the British government/Northern 
Ireland Office (NIO) regarded the media as fundamental to the success of their 
strategy, hence their efforts to manage media coverage. Yet, the resources available 
to the institutions of the state, in particular the NIO, could not be matched by any of 
the political parties in Northern Ireland, therefore they had an in-built advantage, 
that is, better financial resources for public relations over the mainly resource-poor 
political parties, and thus a better chance of influencing the media agenda. Miller 
(1996) asserts: 
Governments, businesses and pressure groups actively compete for media space and 
definitional advantage. However, in the competition for access there are marked resources 
inequalities between organisations. (1996, p. 5) 
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Although limited resources are problematic per se, determining and constraining the 
activities of political parties and their members, the situation is further aggravated 
by the fact that these restrictions also impinge upon their ability to gain media 
coverage. Crucially, the overriding communications differences between the four 
main political parties in Northern Ireland and indeed their political fortunes can be 
partly explained by the quantity, quality and variety of resources each has, at any 
given time. Hence, if a particular party is financially constrained, their ability to 
produce a steady stream of posters and party literature for example, is compromised. 
Indeed, the lack of organisational resources, for example, press officers or 
communications personnel, can have serious consequences for both internal and 
external development, in particular the parties' relationships with the media. Yet, 
the ability of a political party to influence the media is also bound up in the power 
and respect that it commands in society (or its cultural resources). While Sinn Mn 
has a history of having adequate financial and organisational resources, their 
greatest problem has been a lack of cultural resources, in particular resulting from 
its associations with IRA violence and the marginal position the republican 
movement has occupied in society. On the other hand, the SDLP have always had 
adequate cultural resources yet in the early 90's (as aforementioned) they found 
themselves in the difficult position of lacking both financial and organisational 
resources. 
Yet, all of the political parties in Northern Ireland, irrespective of whether they have 
adequate or inadequate resources, have continually attempted to influence or win 
over the hearts and minds of the electorate by adopting or using `propaganda'. 
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(vii) Propaganda 
Unionists freely admit they lost the propaganda war to their nationalist opponents early in 
the conflict and never managed to recover from their loss. (Parkinson, 1998, p. 30) 
Much of the material on Northern Ireland relates to a `propaganda war', including 
Curtis (1984), Miller (1994) and counterinsurgency theorists Wilkinson (1990) and 
Wright (1991). Yet, it is always difficult to discuss propaganda objectively because 
it is apparent that in common usage, the term `propaganda' is pejorative. 
Connotations of the word in English have largely reduced it to a device for 
destroying the credibility of opponents - arguments labelled `propaganda' are 
dismissed as negative, dishonest and unworthy of further attention. 
There are many `propagandists' in Northern Ireland, yet, the marked antipathy 
aroused by the term is not necessarily justified; propaganda as a form of 
communication can be regarded in its simple and original form as the propagation 
of a faith (any faith). Because it is essentially a neutral word, it should not always 
be associated with, or imply, negativity and dishonesty. Qualter (1985) contends 
that in discussing propaganda as the attempt to influence attitudes, the initial 
requirement is that one clears their mind of dominant prejudices. Propaganda must 
be approached as a form of communication in the neutral sense of an activity that 
can be directed towards positive or negative ends and conducted by the whole 
gamut of honourable and dishonourable methods. Essentially, `Propaganda is not in 
principle devoted either to truth or falsehood, but to persuasion. ' (1985, p. 17) 
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When describing Allied Psychological Warfare campaigns at the end of the Second 
World War, Crossman (1971) emphasised that all really effective propaganda was 
both factually true and credible. In fact, Allied Propaganda had an impact in Europe 
because it was basically `accurate, objective and sober' (1971, p. 344). E. R. 
Murrow, Director of the United States Information Agenda (USIA) also argued that: 
To be persuasive we must be believable; to be believable we must be credible; to be 
credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as that. (cited in Sorensen 1968, p. 4) 
As the case of the Good Friday Agreement illustrates, arguments or propaganda 
from both unionists and nationalists that the Agreement was either `a strengthening 
of the union' or `a stepping stone towards a united Ireland' respectively, could 
equally be understood as believable, credible and truthful. 
Ubiquitous propaganda techniques were employed by all of the political parties, 
non-party groups and the British government/NIO during the 1998 referendum 
campaign. They all deliberately attempted to influence or alter the attitudes of the 
citizens of Northern Ireland in order to achieve a certain result - `Yes' or `No' - in 
favour or rejection of the Good Friday Agreement. In this sense, they were all 
propagandists, as Qualter argues: 
Once it is established that any statement, book, poster, or rumour, any parade or 
exhibition, any statue or historic monument, any scientific achievement or abstract of 
statistics whether true or false, rational or irrational in appeal or presentation, originates as 
the deliberate policy of someone trying to control or alter attitudes, then that activity 
becomes part of a propaganda process. (1985, p. 122) 
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Essentially, in this age of propaganda, there are countless individuals and groups 
vying to control and alter peoples perceptions and attitudes by employing 
propagandistic messages to accomplish their goals. However, it should not be 
assumed that by the fact that they engage in propaganda, that, propaganda in itself is 
a corrupt or pernicious form of communication. Propagandistic messages can be 
used to accomplish an array of positive social ends, such as campaigns to stop 
smoking, reduce drink driving or in the case of the present research - to help sell 
peace. 
In the political spectrum, extensions of the mass media have enabled propagandistic 
messages to be communicated in extensive and positive ways. Basic political 
freedoms have extended precisely from managing the media in propagandistic ways 
for political ends, for example as aforementioned, Allied Propaganda at the end of 
the Second World War. Robins et al. (1987) argues: 
Far from being exceptional, anomalous or aberrant elements in the democratic process, 
propaganda is a constitutive aspect of actually existing democracy, democracy in the mass 
society. (Robins et al. 1987, p. 8) 
Thus, propaganda could be argued to have become a necessary and important social 
force, articulating and orchestrating the views of people (public opinion) in an 
often-complex society like Northern Ireland. Giddens (1985) highlights: 
Information control is fundamental to, and indispensable for, both the cohesion and 
regulation of social systems spanning large spatial terrains. (1985, p. 180) 
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What emerges from the literature on both public relations and propaganda is that 
they are not opposites or opposed to one another. In their popular usage they are 
often pejorative terms, yet when brought to life, they can be directed to either 
positive or negative ends. It is only by setting aside the derogatory associations of 
propaganda and public relations that one is able to accept that they both have a 
legitimate part to play in the political process and in society at large in Northern 
Ireland. 
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Summation 
To summate, the aforementioned theoretical literature provides a framework for the 
present research. For political parties (resource-poor or otherwise) their continued 
existence within the public sphere or sphericules in Northern Ireland is predicated 
upon their ability to successfully communicate their political analyses to their target 
audiences (including the media) by incorporating effective public relations 
strategies. 
The ability of `sources' to access the media, as such, is one of constriction or 
expansion of the public sphere. Is political public relations simply a means by 
which the British government and state sources can further dominate access and 
manage media agendas in Northern Ireland? Or, does it enable non-institutional or 
`resource-poor' political parties to gain an influence in the media, previously denied 
them? 
Importantly, can `culturally' resource-poor political parties like Sinn Fein or the 
DUP use voluntary human resources and professional public relations strategies in 
place of institutional legitimacy and/or large capital expenditure? If they can, it 
follows that professional political public relations offer some potential for widening, 
rather than restricting, source access. Empirical research into the development of 
political public relations in Northern Ireland, and its influence on the media, 
remains sparse. The question of how the new professional class of political public 
relations practitioners in Northern Ireland is affecting the abilities of various sources 
to gain access to journalists and set media agendas remains to be fully explored. 
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The present thesis makes an attempt to answer such necessary questions and to 
concomitantly pose other pertinent questions emerging from the critical literature 
review. 
In 1922, Walter Lippman argued that the practice of democracy had turned a corner; 
that the democratic process had come to incorporate self-conscious strategies of 
persuasion by political actors in an attempt to influence public opinion; that public 
opinion could be manufactured, shaped and manipulated; and that there was a rise in 
a new professional class of `publicists' or `press agents' who stood between 
political organisations and media institutions whose job it was to influence press 
coverage of their clients and thus, they hoped, public opinion. (cited in McNair 
1995, ix) 
As Northern Ireland heralded the arrival of both a new century and millennia, these 
trends had: 
accelerated to the extent that the practice of democracy and politics were now being played 
out before a global audience through highly technical forms of electronic media and a more 
sophisticated and developed print version. As the role of the media in mediating between 
politicians and the public grew in importance, so too did the role of publicists and press 
agents, now more commonly referred to as the `political public relations industry. ' (McNair 
1995, x) 
Principally, through investigating the development of the political public relations 
industry as it pertains to Northern Ireland, the thesis examines critically the ability 
of its four main political parties to influence and shape media content, particularly 
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those communications personnel who provide the source material. Concurrently, 
focus will be placed upon the producers of journalistic output or the media 
themselves. It is intended, at this juncture, to advance an argument that the public 
relations strategies employed by a number of key political players were critical in 
managing public opinion and manufacturing consent in Northern Ireland for the 
Good Friday Agreement. This `manufactured consent' allowed the Agreement a 
chance to `live', and with this life, create from a strong foundation the subsequent 
conditions whereby a realistic vision of peace could be conceived by the people of a 
country artificially formed; ironically in 1921, the very year Lippman concluded his 
authoritative work. 
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METHODOLOGY 
(i) Research Problem and Method of Inquiry 
The thesis, located within a qualitative paradigm, is based upon extensive 
qualitative interview data, gathered through a series of thirty in-depth interviews 
from 1999-2003 with communications personnel, journalists, editors, politicians and 
other significant figures involved in the politics and the reporting of the peace 
process in Northern Ireland (see appendix 3 for list of interviewees). Indeed, the 
excellent access and the interviews are of key value to this research. 
The research problem to be addressed centres upon how both the rise and the 
developments in party political public relations has had an impact on the media in 
Northern Ireland and the wider peace/political process, in particular, since the 
signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. 
To gather empirical data that enabled interrogation of this problem, one-to-one 
interviews with the aforementioned individuals involved in the politics and the 
reporting of the peace process were conducted. Given that such proposed 
interviews were to be conducted on an individual basis and purposefully to elicit 
information both personal and confidential (at times), it was deemed appropriate to 
use an unstructured interview format (Fielding, 1998). Although the interviews 
were structured from a pre-arranged list of questions they were not always asked in 
a defined order, but rather were raised at points in the interview when they seemed 
most relevant and effective. It was not an intention to be clinical or restrictive in the 
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approach to the interviews. Rather, it was the intention of the interviewer to enable 
the respondents to describe, engage and put forward their own idiosyncratic views 
or to expand upon areas they themselves deemed important. 
The fluid and more open aspects of the unstructured interviews helped to develop a 
rapport between the interviewer and the interviewee which was often conversational 
and consistent with Fielding's description of the unstructured interview, where 
although `interviewers simply have a list of topics which they want the respondent 
to talk about' they are nevertheless `free to phrase the questions as they wish, ask 
them in any order that seems sensible at the time, and even join in the conversation 
by discussing what they think of the topics themselves' (Ibid. p. 136). 
An important objective of the interviews was to gather evidence about interactions 
between communications personnel and journalists and editors that would facilitate 
the discovery of problems and concerns largely unknown. The interview was 
therefore as Searle (1998) puts it `a resource to discover things about events outside 
the interview situation' (1998, p. 215). In the present research, the theoretical 
concerns and central arguments were made in light of the interview material, rather 
than in advance of it being gathered. 
Ethical consideration was given to the entire research process with specific depth 
consideration given to issues of confidentiality and to potential requests for 
anonymity by the respondents. The ethical consideration was discussed with each 
respondent and individual consent and agreement obtained. Some interviewees 
brought attention to the confidential nature of what they were saying and others 
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asked for their comments not to be attributed. For this reason, some respondents 
have been described as `anonymous' or are only identifiable by the positions they 
occupied at the time of the interview. Such identification has been consented to. 
(ii) Interview process 
Interviewees were contacted by telephone and email and most responded 
favourably, that is, they agreed to be interviewed. Of those who responded 
`unfavourably', it was not a case of them declining to be interviewed, rather that 
they were too busy at the time and would try and arrange something for a later date 
(this on occasion did not transpire). For example, on one occasion having travelled 
to Sinn Fein's Headquarters in Dublin and whilst awaiting an interview with their 
National Director of Publicity, Dawn Doyle, she was called to Belfast on urgent 
business and thus the interview proved to be unobtainable. On the other hand, when 
contacting the UUP on occasion, the impression given was that they did not really 
want to be responding to questions about their public relations developments at a 
time when the party was chronically divided. Instead, they kindly replied that they 
were too busy at present but would see what they could do in a fortnight or so (in 
fact, after being continually fobbed off, the decision reached was to attend their 
party conference instead and get to speak, successfully, with their press officer, 
Alex Benjamin). 
All of the interviews were conducted either at the interviewees' offices or places of 
work, or in cafes or bars. In the cases where interviews took place in cafes or bars, 
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it was not so much because the interviewees felt able to talk more openly outside of 
work, but because it was either convenient for them or reduced the possibility of 
disturbance. 
The interviews centred upon specific questions examining the history of party 
political public relations and the role of the media in Northern Ireland. The 
questions focused upon three distinct periods - pre-Agreement developments, the 
1998 referendum campaign, and post-Agreement developments. 
All interviewees consented to having the interviews tape-recorded and in most cases 
the interviews lasted between thirty minutes and one hour, depending upon how 
much time the respondent could give. The interviews themselves were carried out 
in London, Edinburgh, Belfast, Dublin and Derry. 
In transcribing the interviews, the material was broken down into categories and 
concepts that helped to generate ideas for thinking about the subjects and issues 
under discussion, as well as aiding the process of explanation and theoretical design. 
In interpreting and evaluating the interview material, two interrelating processes 
impacted: the management and analysis of data. Management of data requires 
`reducing the size and scope, so that you can report upon it adequately and 
usefully', and analysis of the data once shaped into a manageable size necessitates 
abstracting the material into areas of priority and `drawing attention to what you 
think is of particular importance and significance. ' (Blaxter et al. 1998, p. 183) The 
categories derived from management and analysis of the data also enabled the 
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presentation of data to be delivered in narrative form, convenient to the aim and 
goal of the work. 
The study also applied the technique of non-probability sampling, which involved 
utilising the material that most conveniently and appropriately addressed the subject 
of analysis (Ibid. p. 81). In instances where interviewees spoke about events, issues 
and problems that were not considered relevant for the concerns of the study (for 
example, John Hume speaking about his relationships with various American 
presidents) they were excluded from analysis. One of the problems with 
unstructured interviewing, is that no matter how specific the questioning, the 
flexible nature of the conversation inevitably leaves room for the interviewee to 
divert from the subject of the interview, and to bring in other considerations which 
they may perceive as relevant but which the interviewer may not. Whilst on some 
occasions such deviations can be productive and provide useful additional material 
that has a bearing on the subject of inquiry, often they are not, and through a process 
of discernment were deselected from the data when transcribed. 
(iii) Multiple Sources of Information 
The study purposefully investigates, analyses and explains developments in political 
public relations and the media in Northern Ireland using a qualitative approach. The 
inquiry takes the form of an intrinsic case study, that is the case examined is 
revelatory, unique and no research has been conducted (importantly in a holistic 
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way) in this area from a public relations perspective. Creswell (1998) defines a case 
study as: 
. an exploration of a `bounded system' or a case (or multiple cases) over time through 
detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information rich in context. 
(1998, p. 61) 
Extensive and multiple sources of information pertaining to data collection became 
"texts" purposeful to and utilised to provide a detailed, in-depth narrative of the area 
under study. Newspapers, political magazines, party websites, media reports, 
speeches and statements, campaign literature, political posters and both internal and 
external communication literature (publicity manuals and press releases 
respectively) were examined throughout the research process. As with the 
aforementioned interviews, similar processes came into play in evaluating the 
`multiple sources of information'. During the management and analysis of the data 
the technique of non-probability sampling was also applied to select the most 
relevant data. Following on from this process, the data was arranged 
chronologically into three sections - Pre-Agreement developments, the 1998 
referendum campaign, and Post-Agreement developments. This made it much 
easier to extract relevant information or quotation and enabled the presentation of 
data to be presented in a coherent narrative form. 
During the research process, a decision was made to examine the four main political 
parties' posters as an integral component of section one of the study, `Pre- 
Agreement Developments in Party Political Public Relations and the Media. ' The 
main reason for this was to complement the parties' public relations developments 
and to introduce to the reader pre-Agreement developments, that in many respects 
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would be important in understanding the parties' attitudes to the Good Friday 
Agreement, the role they played during the 1998 referendum campaign, and indeed 
post-Agreement developments. A further reason was a much simpler one. To 
coherently distil three decades of political communication developments in 
Northern Ireland (by the four main political parties) into a single concise section 
proved especially difficult without `the luxury of sufficient previous academic 
research having been conducted within the period under question. A decision to 
include an analysis of political posters from over 3,300 images (mainly posters from 
1968 to 2001) on a CD-ROM painstakingly compiled by the Linen Hall Library in 
Belfast, entitled `Troubled Images' was made. Of the 3,300 images examined 
(using the aforementioned methodological procedures) the most relevant data for 
the study, that is, 134 posters were analysed (see Appendix 2). The aforementioned 
CD-ROM's most important contribution (from the perspective of the present 
research) is that communications personnel from the four main political parties 
undoubtedly left their imprints upon the material contained therein. Without 
substantial research having been conducted previously on communications staff and 
personnel or the political slogans and messages they devised, the CD-ROM became 
an invaluable research tool for the following study. 
(iv) Verification: issues and process 
Essential standards of quality and verification were rigorously adhered to 
throughout the research process. A process of triangulation was used whereby 
multiple and different sources of information (interviews, newspaper articles, press 
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releases etc. ) were examined to corroborate the data and in so doing shed a reliable 
and validating light upon the research. A primary and necessary standard to 
achieving quality and verification adopted was that of constantly examining 
personal pre-understandings to indicate potential researcher bias. This was crucial, 
not only to the integrity of the research process but to ensure that the reader was 
enabled to understand the researcher's position and any biases or assumptions 
impacting upon the inquiry (Merriam, 1988). 
In accepting the paramount nature of the aforementioned standard and, specifically 
in an effort to uphold the integrity of the research, it is acknowledged that, in raising 
questions, gathering and interpreting data and, in constructing textual 
interpretations, the `lived experience' (Van Manen, 1990) of the researcher as a 
Northern Irish Catholic requires transparency. Essentially, the relationship of the 
researcher to that being researched in the epistemological sense, is one of 
`closeness' and of being an `insider' in the field of study. The underlying 
axiological assumption is one of objectiveness in the factual descriptions of the case 
and impacting issues which pertain to the developments in political public relations 
and the media, yet within the narrative and more essentially within interpretative 
stages, judgements emerge which may be construed as subjective and value-laden 
with biases transpiring. This is not an uncommon feature that confronts all 
researchers who choose to interpret political issues relating to Northern Ireland as 
their area of inquiry or study. 
To summate, the present research provides original data on a neglected area of 
research. As such, it makes a significant contribution to the fields of political 
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communication and media research and to understanding the roles of political 
public relations and the media within conflict resolution politics. 
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SECTION ONE: PRE-AGREEMENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PARTY 
POLITICAL PUBLIC RELATIONS AND THE MEDIA 
Introduction: 
It must be acknowledged first and foremost that political public relations in its 
multitudinous and varied guises has undoubtedly existed within Northern Ireland 
since the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 formally separated the island into 
North and South, each with its own parliament and government. 
At this juncture, it becomes important to begin this section by providing a 
rudimentary political history of Northern Ireland before taking an in-depth look at 
developments in political public relations and the media from the beginning of what 
has been deemed `the Troubles'. 
The actual partition of the thirty-two county island occurred in 1921, with the six 
north-eastern counties (a six-county statelet or Northern Ireland) remaining part of 
the United Kingdom. Northern Ireland had an in-built majority (approximately two- 
thirds Protestant and one third Catholic at the time of partition). Although 
sovereignty and reserved matters such as defence and foreign policy were retained 
in Westminster, successive British governments were content to leave Northern 
Ireland responsibilities firmly in the hands of the Protestant-dominated Stormont 
administration. Essentially, Northern Ireland was to become in the words of its first 
prime minister, James Craig, 'a Protestant parliament for a Protestant people' (cited 
in Taylor 1998, p. 19). There were opportunities in the period from inception, until 
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the introduction of direct rule in 1972, for successive Ulster Unionist governments 
in Northern Ireland to assimilate or integrate the Catholic minority into a more 
overtly British cultural and political `way of life'. Yet, a chronically insecure 
Protestant majority (mirroring themselves on a Westminster model of operation) 
relegated the Catholic minority to the status of disloyal second-class citizens and did 
not fully contemplate (not to mention enact) legislation that would infer notions of 
equality of citizenship. In the 1960's, an alienated Catholic minority suffering 
electoral malpractice and ethnic bias in housing allocation and employment teetered 
on the brink of radical change or revolution, in a context of witnessing and 
empathising with civil rights demonstrators and campaigners in the US. The newly 
educated Catholic minority who indirectly benefited from post-war British welfare 
and educational provisions had now graduated to a position whereby they could 
challenge the discriminatory nature of the state apparatus, which in the eyes of their 
own tradition or community had never commanded full political legitimacy. 
For almost fifty years, the majority of political communication in Northern Ireland 
could be attributed to, or was monopolised by a single Protestant party, the 
(Official) Ulster Unionist Party, from the country's formation until the outbreak of 
what was deemed `the Troubles' in Derry on October 5,1968. On that fateful day, 
the media captured and relayed worldwide the barbaric levels of Protestant- 
dominated `security force' aggression that was hitherto hidden, or for the most part 
unacknowledged in the deliberately isolated statelet. On this occasion, the violence 
meted out was directed at civil rights demonstrators, the great majority of whom (if 
not all) were Catholic. Yet, this infamous day was not only significant in terms of 
being a catalyst to the Troubles. Significantly, it is this author's contention that 
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October 5,1968, constituted the date when the real `propaganda war' began - from 
which seemingly immobile Protestant / Unionist / Loyalist ideologies were aligned 
with security force brutality, and from which they (as a community) have never 
quite fully recovered from. On the other hand, seemingly mobile Catholic / 
Nationalist / Republican ideologies appeared to be strengthened by this event, fully 
utilising a potential to move progressively forward (as a community) towards an 
original goal of equality and civil rights and possibly further still to fulfil an 
aspirational goal of a united Ireland. 
Whilst one party dominated the political landscape of Northern Ireland prior to 
1968, it was only in the following years that distinctive groups began to emerge and 
mobilise to form the majority of political parties that we are accustomed to today. 
This section examines developments in political public relations of the state's four 
main political parties, all of whom have played a pre-eminent role in Northern 
Ireland politics during the Troubles and the subsequent peace process. Importantly, 
four major political parties have dominated Northern Ireland's political scene since 
the outbreak of the Troubles - two unionist parties - the Ulster Unionist Party 
(UUP) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) - and two nationalist parties - the 
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and Sinn Fein. In some senses, there 
is symmetry between these alignments. On the one hand, the UUP and SDLP 
increasingly appealed to middle-class and middle-ground unionists and nationalists 
respectively. On the other hand, the DUP and Sinn Fein both tended to attract 
greater support among the working-classes and younger voters of their respective 
communities. 
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Section one also examines the role played by the media in Northern Ireland during 
the Troubles and explores the positive or negative impacts they have had on the 
peace process that led up to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. 
Essentially, there follows a chronological examination of the emergence of political 
public relations efforts from the early conflict years to better understand strategic 
developments and ensuing processes of change that ultimately led Northern 
Ireland's political parties into a new phase of conflict resolution. 
The aims of this section are to explore not only the key communications personnel 
and dominant political messages that emerged from differing persuasions during the 
Troubles, but also the distances the various political parties travelled (great, small or 
non-existent) to arrive at a settlement (whether voluntarily or imposed). By 
introducing a historical context and analysing developments in political public 
relations and the media, we can better determine both how the Good Friday 
Agreement could have been `sold' to the people of Northern Ireland and the reasons 
why its subsequent implementation since 1998 has been so problematic. 
The section is broken into four subsections that examine the four main political 
parties and a fifth that analyses the media's role during the period in question. A 
sixth and final subsection draws together the previous analyses and takes the form 
of a summary discussion to determine how developments in political public 
relations and the media have impacted upon the peace process in the run up to Good 
Friday 1998. 
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(i) Social Democratic and Labour Party 
Seven Stormont politicians, including Westminster MP Gerry Fitt as leader and 
John Hume as deputy leader formed the SDLP in August 1970, as a merger of 
several opposition groups in the Northern Ireland Parliament. The double-barrelled 
name of the party reflected the tensions between its two main founders - the Belfast 
socialist Gerry Fitt from the Republican Labour Party who was leader of the party 
until 1979, and his successor John Hume (1979-2001), a Derry-based social 
democrat and keen supporter of business innovation. The newly formed party 
included independent civil rights MPs and breakaway elements from the Northern 
Ireland Labour Party, the Nationalist Party, the Republican Labour Party and also 
the full membership of the National Democratic Party -a short-lived group of 
modernising nationalists. (Hepburn, 1998) 
The SDLP quickly became the main political voice of the Catholic community, 
consistent in their opposition to violence, yet, committed to working for Irish unity 
`by consent'. They established a link with the British Labour Party and joined the 
Party of European Socialists, enjoying a presence in Europe heavily influenced by 
former French teacher, Hume, who has represented Northern Ireland in the 
European Parliament since elections began in 1979. On the domestic front, the 
party's demands in the political sphere of Northern Ireland remained fairly constant 
from its inception and the Sunningdale Agreement (1973) through to the Anglo- 
Irish Agreement (1985) and more recently the Good Friday Agreement (1998) - 
executive-level power-sharing coupled with a strong `Irish dimension'. The party 
attracted high levels of electoral support from all sections of the nationalist 
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community since its formation. However, with the introduction of Sinn Fein into 
party politics from the early 1980's, the SDLP's vote has consistently come more 
from the emerging middle-class than from the working-class where Sinn Fein has 
acquired a stranglehold (Ibid. ). 
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SDLP Public Relations and Communications Developments 
After a downturn in SDLP electoral fortunes in the 1983 Westminster general 
election (with the increasing politicisation of Sinn Fein), John Hume contacted the 
leadership of the Democratic Party in the US in an attempt to broaden the political 
base of his own party (Murray, 1998). The Democratic Party pointed the SDLP in 
the direction of its National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) 
who in turn concentrated their efforts on the organisational weakness of the SDLP. 
Effectively, the NDI's remit was to help build up the party machine in a context of 
falling membership and outmoded electoral techniques. The NDI believed it was 
totally impractical that some of the SDLP's brightest and best calibre candidates 
were not receiving training. Former SDLP election agent, Tom Kelly, recalled: 
`The NDI were insisting that the SDLP choose the brightest and best candidates for 
training. However, the party leadership selected people for personal reasons rather 
than out of merit' (Ibid. p. 240). 
In reality, interference from an outside body or `a fresh pair of eyes' exposed a 
whole second tier of potential SDLP leaders, who demonstrated considerable talent 
and acumen. This is something which the NDI was keen to cultivate. Yet, at this 
juncture, senior party figures would not subject themselves to a diminution of their 
own power or control at the hands of a younger generation in the party. 
As an offshoot of NDI involvement, the Social Democratic Group (SDG) was 
established as a formal training and development organisation for key figures in the 
SDLP, including training in media techniques. SDG objectives set out to provide 
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technical assistance and training for branch development, campaigning and 
electioneering techniques, communications, fund-raising, policy research and 
political education (Ibid. p. 243). However, the SDLP did not take full advantage of 
the NDI's professional input and a plethora of bureaucratic structures and poor 
communication between the SDG and themselves, and between the SDG and the 
NDI led to its demise in 1989 (Ibid. p. 246). 
Nevertheless, the NDI's influence in 1986 marked the party's first formal 
professional training and with some of the techniques picked up in the US, the 
SDLP's Mark Durkan successfully implemented an effective electoral strategy in 
both 1986 and 1987 for Seamus Mallon and Eddie McGrady respectively (Ibid. 
p. 248). Electoral targeting (as in the case of the two aforementioned Westminster 
MPs) became a priority within the party over and above organisational issues and 
this prioritisation continued into the early 90's. 
The fundamental problems the SDLP experienced from 1992 onwards could be 
simply put down to complacency. From 1983 to 1992 the party had increased its 
representative number of MPs from one to four. Tom Kelly, who became the 
Managing Director of Drury Communications in Northern Ireland and a public 
relations adviser to the SDLP, maintained: 
The European Elections demonstrated that electorally Hume could do no wrong. If 
anything he galvanised Nationalist opinion at this stage. There was no analysis how he got 
that vote out. In the past the party would have looked to see, do they need an extra six votes 
here or there? It was fairly scientific between 1985 and 1992. When things are going well 
people do not feel any need to remedy anything organisationally. There was a very close 
79 
look at key constituencies and vote management. It all went to the wayside because after 
1992 you had the high of the Local Government Elections; the high of Hume's personal 
vote at the European Elections. People then thought there is no need to analyse voting 
patterns because we have won the electoral battle. They obviously hadn't. (Ibid. p. 194) 
The party failed to capitalise on its good performance at the 1992 elections and 
allowed Sinn Fein to utilise the peace process as a vehicle to increase its own 
electoral support. Former SDLP press officer, Jonathan Stephenson, reflected on 
the consequences of Hume helping to bring Adams in from the political wilderness: 
The price has been paid in the electoral performance of Sinn Fein . The price is worth 
paying to get the Republican movement to understand that politics is the way forward. That 
does not mean what John Hume did was the only way to open that door to them. They 
would have reached that decision themselves. John Hume got them to realise that sooner. 
It was extremely worthwhile. It is generally accepted that the Republican movement are 
now on the road to political involvement; Hume with his discussion with Gerry Adams has 
helped that process on the way. Clearly as Sinn Fein moved down the road of political 
involvement and used SDLP language they would eat into SDLP territory. (Ibid. pp 204-5) 
However, although the electoral misfortunes of the SDLP could in part be blamed 
on Hume's attempts to guide Sinn Fein along a peaceful, constitutional path, their 
electoral misfortunes were also symptomatic of problems occurring behind the 
scenes. Continuing financial crises towards the end of 1991 meant that the party 
was left with no other choice than to cut three of its staff at its Belfast headquarters, 
leaving only two. The posts of General Secretary, press officer and a clerical 
position were reduced because of bank debts in excess of £150,000. (Ibid. ). 
Jonathan Stephenson, who resigned as press officer in August 1991 before his 
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position was about to be made redundant, accused the SDLP leadership of reducing 
the party to `the status of a postal address in South Belfast. ' (Ibid. p. 249) For a 
number of subsequent years it would not be Belfast headquarters but the office of 
John Hume in Derry that would handle most media relations. A radical internal 
shake-up was thus required and the SDLP created important changes, the objective 
of which was to modernise and introduce more democratic mechanisms within the 
overall party organisational structure. Despite the financial crises during the early 
90's, by 1996 the SDLP had managed to turn the downward spiral of cutbacks 
around to the extent that it employed seven people at spacious new headquarters in 
Belfast. (Ibid. ). 
For all of the main political parties (with the exception of Sinn Fein) 1996 was a 
pivotal year in terms of communications, as involvement in negotiations would thus 
require a greater public relations capability than they previously had. In November 
1996, the SDLP made a number of appointments including Conall McDevitt as its 
first Director of Communications and Tim Attwood as Director of Organisation and 
Development (including responsibility for fundraising). 5 Attwood (like Mark 
Durkan and previous party members), had returned from America where he gained 
valuable insights whilst helping the Democrats during their elections: `I was looking 
at the technical side of how they run their campaigns, the way they define the 
message, how they get their vote out... Not everything transfers to here but we can 
learn from some of their techniques. ' (Ibid. ). One aspect of politics that is 
universally applicable is the 
5 Attwood Back from Boston Elections, The Belfast Telegraph, p. 6, Nov 15,1996 
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need for financial resources and although the SDLP's bank balance was much 
healthier in 1996 than it was in the early 90s, Attwood's job was to boost the party 
coffers even further. Targeting America was one option; he rejected the notion that 
Sinn Fein had already cornered the market: `John Hume is a political hero in the 
US'. (Ibid. ) Essentially Attwood naively believed that the SDLP had a selling point 
in Hume that no other Irish party could match (that is, Sinn Fein). With the 
optimism and idealism usually associated with someone embarking upon a newly 
appointed role, he stated his objective was to make the SDLP a `better organised, 
better focused, dynamic, modem, political party. ' (Ibid. ) 
Accompanying Attwood at party headquarters was Connal McDevitt, who, with a 
support staff of one, was to take charge of the party's press relations and advise on 
the SDLP's overall communications strategy. McDevitt stated that a major part of 
his job would be to explain and promote the SDLP's significant role in the Northern 
Ireland peace process, in particular the role of John Hume. 6 He would also seek to 
publicise party policy on issues such as health, education and inward investment in 
the run up to the 1997 Westminster general election. Like Attwood, he inferred that 
the party would need to make some changes: `The SDLP is a party with a very 
broad policy base and there is a critical need to be proactive in communicating 
bread and butter issues. ' (Ibid. ) 
McDevitt had a difficult job ahead, especially in the context of painful comparisons 
being drawn between the SDLP's rusty communications machine and that of Sinn 
Fein 's slick, highly polished one. The 24-year-old's appointment was seen as an 
6 PR Week, p. 13, November 15,1996 
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attempt to inject some modernity into the SDLP's greying image and overcome 
internal reviews that acknowledged public perceptions held the party and its 
members to be, `mediocre, middle-aged, middle-class and muddled', effectively a 
party out of touch with its own supporters. (Murray 1998, p. 247) 
Sixteen months into the job and only six weeks before the Good Friday Agreement 
was signed, McDevitt was interviewed for a feature in The Belfast Telegraph. 7 One 
key observation from the interview was that he hadn't performed miracles with the 
SDLP's scarce PR resources and the whiff of glamour that still clung to Sinn Fein , 
given its associations to violence in the recent past. (Ibid. ). 
When he took up his appointment, McDevitt's first priority was to make himself 
accessible to journalists 24 hours a day and to introduce into the organisation a 
culture of using a press office. As he understood it: `We were starting from a minus 
ten situation. Maybe we're just about scratching the surface now but we've a long 
way to go and we need more resources in the long run to do that' (Ibid. ) 
In the course of his interview he praised Hume, yet it was ironic that only two 
months prior to the SDLP inspired `Yes' concert where Hume met U2's Bono on 
stage, McDevitt contended that it wouldn't be a good idea if Hume pepped up his 
party's image by meeting the Spice Girls. He believed that Hume was admired by 
`cool' people but didn't have to emulate them asking: `Would Gandhi have met the 
Spice Girls? ' (Ibid. ) 
7 Man Without a Mission; Brief Encounter; Liz McPherson talks to Connal McDevitt, p. 14, The 
Belfast Telegraph, February 28,1998 
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In relation to his political rivals for the nationalist vote, McDevitt claimed: 
Sinn Fein and the SDLP are two very different parties. Sinn Fein is propaganda driven - 
most political parties don't have propaganda driven publicity machines. I know three or four 
Sinn Fein press officers and presumably there's a lot more, so from a volume point of view 
it's difficult to compete with that (Ibid. ). 
McDevitt believed that for the SDLP, the endgame was more important than the 
short-term gratification of playing everything out in the political domain. As a self- 
proclaimed unselfish, committed party speaking with the `voice of reason' within an 
aggressive political arena, McDevitt maintained: 
The SDLP is committed to having a successful outcome to this process and frequently we 
deliberately choose not to portray ourselves aggressively against another party - we know 
that although it would give us some short term political satisfaction and make a nice 
headline it wouldn't actually do the process any good, I mean it's pointless having a 
fantastic spring this year if we don't have an outcome in the summer. I think what the 
party's working towards is an outcome in the summer, an outcome, which will be able to go 
to referendum and that referendum will be carried. (Ibid. ). 
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SDLP Political Posters 
SDLP communication material (via their political posters) during the period under 
question could in general be regarded as conservative and simplistic and it is 
noticeable by its exclusion of overt political symbolism. The party has distanced 
itself from traditional nationalism not only in its interest in socio-economic and 
European issues, but also in relation to its more `long-term' aspirations for a united 
Ireland. For example, the traditional colours of the tricolour, which since at least 
1848 have represented an Irish republic, (green representing the nation of Ireland, 
orange the traditions of the unionist community and white a symbol of the peace 
between them) are not prominent in SDLP communication material. The party 
colours of green and red do take into account their nationalist tendencies, but the red 
(representing socialism) offsets this or is given equivalence. 
The first election the emerging SDLP contended was the 1973 Northern Ireland 
Assembly election with the slogan, `A New North: A New Ireland' (PP02857). 
This phrase was used by the party from the early 70's, though in later years they 
modified it to, `A New North, A New Ireland, A New Europe' reflecting the party's 
reformist, nationalist and European characteristics. 
In the February 1974 Westminster general election, posters proposed `Another Step 
Forward: Vote SDLP' (PP02873). Party leader Gerry Fitt was the only SDLP 
candidate to win a seat, retaining West Belfast, which he had previously held as a 
Republican Labour MP prior to founding the party. Later that year, in the October 
1974 Westminster general election, the growing confidence of the SDLP shone 
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through with a guiding theme of `strength' incorporated into posters such as `One 
Strong Voice: Vote SDLP' (PP02803). 
By the 1975 Northern Ireland Convention election the theme was modified to 
`Speak With Strength: Vote SDLP' (PP02840). The election returned a clear 
majority of unionists opposed to a Sunningdale-type agreement and failed to 
produce a report acceptable to both nationalists and the British government. 
In the first direct election to the European parliament in 1979, the SDLP won a seat 
that it has retained ever since with the simple message, `Vote Hume, SDLP, Your 
No. 1 for Europe' (PP02846). In the same year's Westminster general election 
Gerry Fitt retained his West Belfast seat with the message `Strengthen Your Voice: 
Vote SDLP' (PP02855). 
A slightly amended message was used in the 1982 Northern Ireland Assembly 
election that called for `constitutional' nationalists to `Stand Firm: Vote SDLP' 
(PP02828). In the wake of republican electoral successes during the hunger strikes 
in the 1981 Fermanagh-South Tyrone by-election, some believed that Sinn Fein 
would rapidly overtake the SDLP as the largest nationalist party in Northern Ireland 
- further destabilising the political situation. The poster featured John Hume, who 
was elected leader in November 1979. 
For the Westminster general election of 1983, the SDLP's slogan was `Build a New 
Ireland' (PP02854) reflecting the party's involvement in the New Ireland Forum 
that involved constitutional nationalist parties throughout Ireland (and for this 
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reason excluded Sinn Fein ). John Hume became an MP for the first time, winning 
the new constituency of Foyle. 
A rehashed message was produced for the 1984 European parliamentary elections: 
`SDLP, Strength in Europe. Hume No.! ' (PP02847) 
Among SDLP electoral communication for the 1987 Westminster general election 
was a text produced for the strongly contested West Belfast constituency fought 
between sitting Sinn Fein MP Gerry Adams and Dr Joe Hendron of the SDLP. 
Posters pointed out `Some logical reasons for voting Hendron ... and some 
emotional ones' (PP02150a&b). They attacked Sinn Fein's abstentionist policy, 
claiming that Gerry Adams `has no right to run away' from local problems and that 
he should `challenge Thatcher face-to-face, at Westminster'. In the event, Adams 
retained his seat with a 2,221 majority over Hendron. In the same election, the 
SDLP's Eddie McGrady won the South Down seat, defeating Ulster Unionist MP 
Enoch Powell, effectively ending his long and often controversial career. 
The slogan for the 1989 European parliamentary elections was much the same as 
before: `Strength in Europe, SDLP, Humel' (PP02845). 
Moving into the 1990's, a lack of original thought was becoming evident with the 
phrase `A New North, A New Ireland, A New Europe' (PP02794) which featured 
prominently in the SDLP's 1992 Westminster general election campaign. 
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Two years later, another simplistic, yet progressive message was produced for the 
1994 European parliamentary election: `Hume - 1. Vote SDLP. Towards a New 
Century. ' (PP02983) The poster also incorporated an emblem of the rose, the 
symbol of the European Socialist Parties of which the SDLP continues to be a 
member. 
Finally, communications for the 1997 Westminster general election centred on the 
message `Your Voice For Peace. Vote SDLP' (PP02834) and featured the party's 
four sitting MPs - John Hume, Seamus Mallon, Eddie McGrady and Joe Hendron. 
The first three retained their seats but Gerry Adams defeated Hendron to regain his 
West Belfast seat after a five-year hiatus. Deputy leader, Seamus Mallon, retained 
his Newry and Armagh seat and acted as the SDLP's chief negotiator in the multi- 
party talks that were to lead to the Good Friday Agreement. 
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(ii) The Ulster Unionist Party 
Sometimes known as the Official Unionist Party, the more common UUP (Ulster 
Unionist Party), is the oldest and (until recently) the largest political party in 
Northern Ireland, having evolved in 1885-6 as a protest movement united by a 
broad antipathy to `Home Rule' in Ireland. The party subsequently governed the 
newly formed `Northern Ireland' continuously from 1921 until the introduction of 
Direct Rule in March 1972. After 1921, and the creation of a `Protestant parliament 
for a Protestant people' (cited in Taylor 1998, p. 19), the party sustained unity 
through a trenchant stand on the Union, an implicit anti-Catholicism, and a passive 
or reactive approach to most other areas of policy. 
Since its inception, the UUP embraced a broad range of Ulster Protestant opinion, 
led by the commercial elite of eastern Ulster, accompanied by a notable residual 
landed presence. In subsequent years, however, the Protestant professional classes 
soon came to dominate the parliamentary party at Stormont, both within the House 
of Commons and the Senate, with proletarian unionism never adequately being 
represented at leadership level. (Jackson, 1998) 
Hampered by the fragile and diverse nature of its support, the party never developed 
far from its original ideology of protest against Home Rule. In fact, unity within the 
UUP has often been bought at the price of inactivity. During the UUP's continuous 
reign in the North, anti-partitionist administrations in Dublin perhaps unwittingly 
aided the party's survival that was based on a simple and uncomplicated appeal to 
British loyalty. The Irish Constitution of 1937 allowed Lord Craigavon to reunite 
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unionism in the Stormont election of 1938, while the declaration of an Irish 
Republic in 1948 enabled Sir Basil Brooke to perform a similar feat in 1949 (Ibid. ). 
Recurrent IRA campaigns throughout a virtually unchallenged half century in power 
reinforced the defensive posture of the party and brought a lasting emphasis on law 
and order policy, from the Special Powers Act (1922) through to later Acts during 
the Troubles such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act (1974). Post-World War 2 
posters produced by the UUP reflected their defensive loyalism: `Ulster holds the 
Fort! Maintain our Freedom, Vote Unionist' (PP02682). 
The fragile nature of the Unionist coalition, and its socially conservative leadership, 
meant that broader social and welfare issues tended to be relegated within the 
party's priorities. Effectively, the UUP duplicated British welfare legislation, in 
particular that of Attlee's post-war government, yet, on Unionist principles rather 
than the party's own intrinsic commitment to reform (Ibid. ). 
Economic differences between Northern Ireland and the Republic were prioritised 
over tackling social problems arising within the state itself. Political posters from 
the 1950's depicted Viscount Brookeborough and Eamon DeValera on either side of 
a road sign, one pointing to the `United Kingdom' and a modern scene of 
prosperity, the other pointing to a poverty-stricken and backward `Eire Republic'. 
The campaign poster asked: `Which is your road? Vote Unionist. ' (PP00587) The 
notion of `which is your road' is a common theme in UUP communication material. 
Along much the same lines, the traditional Protestant image of the signpost signifies 
the moral or religious choices a person has to make throughout his or her life. 
90 
During the 1960's it was ironic that the UUP should use such a traditional signpost 
theme in the poster `Forward Ulster, Prosperity, Keep it that way, Vote Unionist' 
(PP00592) at a time when the party was seeking to modernise itself. Another 
poster of the era entitled `Forward Ulster, Vote for industrial expansion' (PP00618) 
highlighted the party leader and prime minister Terence O'Neill's attempts to 
project such a modernising image. Other images incorporated the portrayal of well- 
dressed and well-nourished school children, accompanied with the attendant 
message: `Forward Ulster, Their future in your vote' (PP00651). 
In the late 60's and early 70's the party experienced severe divisions and splintered 
under the impact of the civil rights movement and the renewal of IRA violence, and 
it began to slowly lose its privileged position within the government and 
administration of Northern Ireland. Liberal Unionists, dissatisfied with internal 
opposition to O'Neill, joined the non-sectarian or non-confessional Alliance Party. 
Working class loyalists, dismayed by O'Neill's leadership, joined the Democratic 
Unionist Party. Militant loyalists, dissatisfied with the apparently impotent 
constitutionalism of the party, turned to the Ulster Vanguard movement or to the 
populist vigilante groups and emergent paramilitaries later unified under the 
umbrella of the Ulster Defence Association (Ibid. ). 
In 1973, a great many Ulster Unionists rejected the Sunningdale Agreement (the 
fundamental principles of which included power-sharing with a Council of Ireland) 
and this led to the resignation of its then party leader, Brian Faulkner. 
Subsequently, in the mid-1970s, the UUP formed part of the United Ulster Unionist 
91 
Coalition that also opposed power-sharing with nationalists in the 1975 Northern 
Ireland Council Convention (Ibid. ). Under the leadership of James Molyneaux 
(1979-95) some degree of consolidation was achieved within the party, including 
the containment of the emerging challenge from the DUP. 
Whilst supportive of economic co-operation with the Republic of Ireland, the party 
has remained adamant that the government in the South should have no political 
role in the affairs of Northern Ireland. Accordingly, the UUP categorically rejected 
the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 that gave the Irish Republic a definite (but 
limited) say on certain political matters in Northern Ireland. Even a decade later, 
the 1995 Framework Documents also provoked a hostile reaction from the UUP for 
broadly similar reasons (Tonge, 1998). 
In 1995, David Trimble was elected party leader, and for the first time in 30 years, a 
UUP leader met the Republic of Ireland's Täoiseach for talks - emphasising the 
party's view that friendly relations with the South were possible. Yet, the flipside 
of this historic encounter were demands by Trimble that `these relationships must 
preserve the political independence and territorial integrity of states which are 
fundamental principles of international law' (Ulster Unionist Information Institute, 
1995, p. 16). The demands fulfilled a core part of Unionist ideology - the rejection 
of claims of Irish nationalism that the geographic unity of Ireland must necessarily 
translate into political unity. The UUP consistently rejected the territorial claims to 
Northern Ireland enshrined in articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution. In the run-up 
to Good Friday 1998, the party viewed Northern Ireland as a legitimate entity, 
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historically, culturally and politically part of Britain and was therefore adamant that 
there must never be a dilution of British sovereignty over the state. 
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WP Public Relations and Communications Developments 
`Unionists freely admit they lost the propaganda war to their nationalist opponents 
early in the conflict and never managed to recover from their loss. '(Parkinson, 
1998, p. 30) One initial reason or argument for this propaganda failure was Ulster 
Unionists' firm belief in the moral supremacy of their case; an unrelenting 
arrogance that they were so `right' that they didn't have to `sell' either themselves 
or the state of affairs they had found themselves in (Ibid. ). With built-in control of 
their state and an uncritical overseer at Westminster, Ulster Unionists did not feel 
pressurised into justifying their political beliefs or policies. An additional argument 
for unionist antipathy towards propaganda in the early years of the Troubles was 
their conviction that the media were so much against them that theirs was a lost 
cause. (Ibid. p. 31) 
The status quo nature of the UUP's political aspirations and the restricted range of 
subjects for publicity purposes meant that their propaganda focused largely on the 
`evil' attributes of `enemy' figures ranging from civil Rights and political leaders to 
representatives of Sinn Fein and the IRA (Ibid. p. 33). Much of the early UUP 
propaganda was directed towards demythising the claims perpetuated about the 
Northern Ireland state by the Civil Rights movement in general and Bernadette 
Devlin in particular. The main targets of Ulster Unionists' `hate' propaganda since 
the early 70s have undoubtedly been republican terrorist groups, most notably, the 
IRA (Ibid. ). Unionist criticism of the IRA was a major feature of their propaganda 
and continued even after the ceasefires of 1994 and '97. Although the choice of 
targets for such literature widened as the Troubles developed, the excesses of the 
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IRA ensured their place at the top of unionist `hate' propaganda. Whilst the tone of 
such literature was always bitterly hostile, its nature changed in the 80's as the 
political dimension of the republican campaign grew stronger. Consequently, UUP 
attacks on `political' republicanism increased, and the party adjusted their position 
to underplay increasing loyalist paramilitary activity whilst claiming that Protestants 
were more likely to suffer from terrorism than Catholics. 
Although the UUP became more adept at compiling propaganda literature for the 
`external' market in the 80's, their publications lacked the cohesion and consistency 
that could be associated with a purpose-built `propaganda' department. (Ibid. p. 3 1) 
Despite the occasionally effective pamphlet or overseas counter-republican 
initiative (such as the visit of unionists to America during the H Block crisis of 1981 
and later trips to the US which coincided with those of Gerry Adams), there was an 
absence of a carefully-orchestrated propaganda campaign. This was not rectified 
until 1988 when Martin Smyth founded the Ulster Unionist Information Institute 
(UUII), from headquarters in Belfast. (Ibid. ) The emergence of the UUII can be 
construed as evidence of the UUP's acceptance that they had failed to make 
adequate inroads into reversing nationalists' and republicans' propaganda successes. 
Moving into the early 90's, the UUP appreciated more fully the need to promote 
their case and pointed out that `a considerable quantity of material is delivered from 
the Unionist Party headquarters at regular intervals. ' (Ibid. ) Unionist public 
relations teams distinguished between propaganda specifically for the `home' 
market (with its emphasis on denigrating political opponents, particularly the DUP) 
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and `external' literature (that downplayed internal divisions), `designed for the 
attention of individuals and institutions, both on the mainland and abroad. ' (Ibid. ) 
After the IRA ceasefire of 31" August 1994, the UUP's David Trimble and 
colleagues made several trips to Washington in attempts to break the public 
relations monopoly long held there by Irish nationalists. (McDonald, 2000) His 
recognition of the impact of the US on events in Northern Ireland prompted him to 
suggest that the UUP should create a Unionist Information Office in Washington as 
a counter-balance to the highly polished PR machine that Sinn Fein had established 
there. Trimble felt that unionism had always undersold its message in the US and 
his brainchild (the Unionist Information Office) was one initiative the then UUP 
leader James Molyneaux readily agreed to. (Ibid. ) 
Yet, in spite of some creative or innovative responses, the general acceptance of 
Ulster Unionists' inability to project their case in a positive light was still 
commonplace, as illustrated by a 19th March 1995 article, `Selling the Unionists' 
published in the Independent on Sunday. The article started with the premise that 
loyalists were `the image-maker's nightmare' and asked six advertising agencies 
how they would counteract the `negativism' of unionism, which `seems to be losing 
them a PR battle with the Republicans' (Ibid. ). The agencies believed that the 
existing unionist image as `dour, stubborn, bigoted, inarticulate (although 
excessively noisy) and tribal' was a `caricature' and that the Unionists had a 
genuine case that could be considered powerful, even moving (Ibid. ). However, 
events on the ground in Northern Ireland (that would receive negative worldwide 
publicity) would have the ad agencies rushing back to their drawing boards. David 
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Trimble's `dance down Carlton Street' with Ian Paisley in the aftermath of 
Drumcree `95 was played over and over again on television screens and appeared 
prominently in national newspapers. In the minds of the press, it had planted an 
idea of Trimble as someone every bit as hard-line and belligerent as Ian Paisley and 
the subsequent fall-out was to include Trimble being depicted in the UK media as a 
`bigot in a bowler hat' (McDonald 2000, p. 150). 
A substantial communications re-think was thus required by the UUP, and during 
this period in question the Ulster Young Unionist Council produced the pamphlet, 
Selling Unionism: Home and Away (cited in O'Dowd, 1998). The mainstay of the 
pamphlet expressed a sense of urgency about communicating the unionist case to a 
variety of audiences, not only in Northern Ireland (Aughey) but also in the rest of 
the UK (Burnside), the USA (Donaldson), Republic of Ireland (Harris) and the EU 
(Adams). 
Two contributors to the pamphlet are worth highlighting or noting because of their 
influence in the field of PR and communications. The first is David Burnside, who 
was a press officer for the Ulster Unionist Party's student branch at Queens 
University, Belfast, during the early years of the Troubles, and subsequently Ulster 
Vanguard's press officer. He left Northern Ireland for a glittering if somewhat 
controversial career in PR, eventually being elevated to the position of the 'UK's 
most important in-house PR man' as British Airways' Director of Publicity! In 
Selling Unionism: Home and Away, Burnside stressed the need for unionists to 
target their audiences in the UK and to combat the successful resources and 
8 Irish Times, July 29,2000 
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techniques of John Hume and the `pan-nationalist front' (O'Dowd 1998, p. 75). 
Burnside listed the British audiences most sympathetic to the unionist cause: new 
right think-tanks and lobby groups; key newspapers such as The Times, Sunday 
Times, Sunday Telegraph and The Sun; the Friends of the Union founded in 1985, 
and `friends in the Labour Party who believe in the Union' (Ibid). Indeed, he 
thought that the party should begin a process of positive image building and also 
stressed the need for unionists not to appear anti-Catholic (Ibid. ). 
The second and most controversial contribution to Selling Unionism came from 
Eoghan Harris, a Southern Irish columnist with the Irish edition of the Sunday 
Times. Harris was also a former Workers' Party strategist (a central intellectual 
influence in the evolution of Official Sinn Fein to the Workers' Party in the 70's 
and 80's), Radio Telefis Eireann television director, and he had also helped to run 
Mary Robinson's media campaign during the 1990 Irish Presidential election. 
Harris (in his role as a media strategist) also eventually became a key adviser to 
David Trimble. In Selling Unionism he began by bluntly stating that Catholics 
have certain cultural advantages over Protestants when it comes to communication. 
They `tell a good story' and thus have rhetorical advantages over Protestants who 
are more prone to preach, make a case, and pay attention to the `text' (Ibid. p. 77). 
For Catholics unlike Protestants, the `truth is in the tone, not in the words. ' (Ibid. ) 
Harris concluded that the `siege mentality plus the evangelical and preaching 
tradition produce a public, polemical sound that is not suitable for television or 
radio. ' (Ibid. ) In his contribution, he also provided a mini-handbook for unionists 
incorporating twelve rules for winning the `propaganda war' in the media and 
pointed out a deeper problem for unionists, that is, that they lack a theory of change, 
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`of political struggle as a process of political change. ' (Ibid. ) Essentially, Harris 
believed that they `seem to want to stop things short, and settle down. But life 
never settles down ... The same cognitive flaws that allow unionists to see politics as 
a product rather than a process, prevent them doing well on the mass media. ' (Ibid. ) 
According to Harris, unionists don't understand the dynamics of change; they `don't 
believe the basic rule that freedom is the recognition of necessity, that you can only 
win ground by giving ground'; and that `unionists are reactive and serial thinkers 
when they need to be proactive and dialectical thinkers. ' (Ibid. ) 
The controversial Eoghan Harris may not have gone down very well in the majority 
of unionist circles but he did highlight key recurrent weaknesses within unionism 
and the fact that they would have to begin a process of self-reflection in an attempt 
to clarify the `positive' substance of their case. 
In September 1995, only a few months after his infamous two-step with Ian Paisley, 
David Trimble became leader of the UUP - the cover of the party journal, Ulster 
Review, celebrated his election by proclaiming the arrival of a `new unionism'9. It 
was to be `pro-active, inclusive, open, pluralist, dynamic, progressive, outward, 
articulate, intelligent, coherent, professional, confident. '(Ibid. ) Some contributors 
to the journal argued that much work remained to be done in modernising the party. 
Nonetheless, they did now feel that some of their leaders were capable of absorbing 
the ideas of a new group of academics, journalists and other professionals who since 
the early 80's had sought to reinvigorate the intellectual case for the Union. `New 
Unionists' believed that for much of the previous 25 years, the case for the Union 
9 Ulster Review 1995-6, cited in O'Dowd 1998, p. 70 
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had been allowed to go by default, by an inability to communicate the merits of 
unionism to a wider audience in a rational and coherent manner. 
To reiterate this point, one analysis of unionism succinctly summarised the on-going 
problems of comprehensibility for unionists of all hues: 
They (the loyalists) are loyal to Britain, yet ready to disobey her; they reject clerical 
tyranny, yet oppose secularism; they proclaim an ideology of freedom and equality, except 
for Catholics; they revere law and authority, then break the law. And they refuse to do the 
rational obvious thing. (Ibid. p. 76) 
Although unionists and loyalists alike had observable problems of 
comprehensibility, the UUP were showing growing signs of a realisation that they 
needed a more structured communications operation. In 1996 a London-based 
publicity department was established, the Unionist Information Office (however, it 
did not get off to the best of starts when it picked up unwanted headlines due to its 
manager, Patricia Campbell, suing the party for alleged discrimination - reported in 
The Times, 27 July1996). In the latter half of `96 (after the Entry to Negotiations 
elections) a young law graduate, David Kerr, was hired by the UUP as a full-time 
press officer/press secretary to David Trimble. 1° Previously, there had been a loose 
configuration of press officers in some of the UUP constituencies with little or no 
central co-ordination and such appointments in the main were not full-time or 
permanent positions. 
10 Interview with Alex Benjamin, UUP Press Officer, 1 June 1999 
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In addition to David Kerr and also a subsequent appointment of Phillip Robinson as 
press officers, based at WP headquarters (from the summer of 1997), assistance 
was forthcoming in the form of Eoghan Harris (Ibid. ). He had been continually 
sending David Trimble position papers on a range of issues running the gamut from 
Drumcree to decommissioning. He was also trying to reshape the stiff, media- 
awkward Ulster Unionist leader into a product that could be sold around the world. 
Harris claims that he is the man who `reinvented Trimble', particularly in the 
Republic of Ireland (McDonald 2000, p. 191). He also claims that he changed 
Trimble's image from the sash-wearing triumphalist holding Ian Paisley's hand 
aloft in Portadown to someone who could reach out beyond the narrow confines of 
the Orange Order, the UUP and Protestant Fortress Ulster: `One of my position 
papers told Trimble to reach out to civil society in Northern Ireland. I told him to 
use this concept of civil society in his speeches' (Ibid. ). Drawing on his years of 
experience in television, Harris also advised that Trimble should change his on- 
screen image. He urged him to control his temper with interviewers, which he saw 
as one of the leader's major weak points (Ibid. ). 
Notions of presentation and style fascinated Trimble, and he took on board many of 
Harris's recommendations. Being somewhat mesmerised by the New Labour spin 
machine (to the horror of some traditionalists) he even called on the party to set up a 
Blairite-style `rapid rebuttal unit' in London (Ibid. p. 200). 
Nevertheless, during the negotiations that led up to the Good Friday Agreement, the 
shambolic organisation of the UUP stood in stark contrast to the cold control of 
Sinn Fein , who marshalled their representatives at the talks with military precision. 
101 
This highlighted that whilst the UUP had begun to take `baby steps' in the direction 
of a sophisticated communications strategy, the progression to `giant leaps' 
remained illusive. 
A historically disunited party was made more publicly evident by the sharp 
departures or walkouts by members of the talks-team during the final round of 
negotiations on Good Friday 1998. In this respect, David Kerr spotted something 
more coldly logical about Jeffrey Donaldson's refusal to support the Agreement and 
his party leader on the 10th April: 
His rationale, his argument to our group that afternoon was that the people out there would 
reject the document because of issues like prisoners, because of decommissioning, because 
of proposed changes to the police. He was saying that he was not sticking with Trimble 
because the people were going to reject it, and he didn't want to be part of the ship when his 
leader fell overboard (Ibid. p. 210). 
It was only at the eleventh hour, after a great deal of persuasion, and more 
importantly, a hand-written letter from Tony Blair, that the obstacles were finally 
surmounted. The UUP's David McNarry confirmed that the road to the Blair letter 
started around noon on Good Friday with a telephone call from a `powerful 
newspaper magnate': 
A call came through to our office and the newspaperman said, `Can I speak to David? ' I 
remember the room very well - everyone was hungry because there was no staff to make 
lunch. The newspaperman said, `What's the problem? ' and David outlined his difficulties. 
Then the newspaper man said, `Leave it with me. ' He must have telephoned Blair, because 
ten minutes later the phone rang again and it was the Prime Minister on the line. Blair 
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asked Trimble for ten minutes, and the phone went again. This time it was Bill Clinton on 
the line. I was standing next to Trimble when he took the call from the President. He told 
Clinton what his problem was and Clinton also said, `Give me ten minutes. ' The end 
product of all those phone calls was Blair's letter (Ibid. p. 211). 
McNarry also revealed that prior to the first call from the newspaper magnate, 
David Trimble had drafted a note to Tony Blair stating that the UUP would not 
accept what was on offer because there was nothing in the letter of the Agreement 
linking decommissioning to Sinn Mn in government. `High noon was the crisis 
point, and the only thing that stopped Trimble from walking away was that series of 
phone calls' (Ibid. ). 
McNarry's illuminating insight poses a number of important questions, including: 
How is it possible that a so-called `powerful newspaper magnate' could so easily 
get through to the prime minister at such a pivotal point in the proceedings? In 
addition, how well does this bode for media organisations that claim to act as a 
trusted fourth estate, as distinctly independent from governmental influence, when 
relationships are so evidently close? 
To conclude, as the referendum on the Agreement loomed, the UUP had two full- 
time press officers located centrally at party HQ and an external `PR pool' available 
that could be utilised as and when required. This pool included people such as 
David Burnside, Eoghan Harris and John Laird. Only time would tell if this 
amalgam of PR professionals could help David Trimble to successfully sell an 
Agreement (that as party leader) he eventually signed up to on Good Friday 1998. 
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UUP Political Posters 
In the early 70's, when the level of political violence was much higher than the 
previous decades (and indeed future ones too) the UUP emphasised `FOR... Safety 
in your home, Security in your work, Stability in the U. K., Vote Unionist. ' 
(PP00646) After Direct Rule was introduced in 1972, the `Unionist blueprint' 
entitled `Towards the Future' highlighted a forward-looking party with a consistent 
view that Northern Ireland's future undoubtedly lay within the United Kingdom. 
However, `Towards the Future' also floated the idea of an all-Ireland 
intergovernmental council, a key issue that broke UUP leader Brian Faulkner's 
power-sharing administration in 1974. In one poster of the time, a red hand (a 
symbol of Ulster) shakes a Union Jack hand implying a contractual agreement 
between two parties rather than an absolute unity (PP00649). Other 
communication material containing the slogan `Towards the Future' prevailed in the 
70's along with `I'm Official Unionist' stickers (PA0109) widely used during this 
period because of the fragmentation of unionism into a number of competing 
political parties. 
A year later, the WP's 1973 manifesto entitled `Peace, Order and Good 
Government', highlighted the party's long-term stance on law and order (PPO0642). 
During the election campaign for the local government elections the UUP issued 
two posters with a politically ubiquitous theme of the Troubles: `Think of their 
welfare and future' - both using photographs of young children and senior citizens 
(PPO0655 &PP02987). 
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For the same year's Border Poll, UUP's press officer, Sam Butler, used a 1950s 
`Keep the Link' design. Entitled `British Connection' (PP00626), unionists 
interpreted the chains as the link with Britain. Many nationalists (on the other hand) 
viewed the chains as a symbol of slavery. 
The slogan `Dublin is just a Sunningdale away' (PP00593) was coined by John 
Laird (now Lord Laird and present owner of a Belfast PR consultancy) for the 
February 1974 Westminster general election. Anti-Sunningdale Agreement 
unionists, operating together in the United Ulster Unionist Council (UUUC) assisted 
in undermining the entire Sunningdale project that was based on power-sharing 
allied to a Council of Ireland. During this period, the UUUC resurrected a tactic 
from the heroic days of `old unionism' - the signing of the Ulster Covenant in 1912 
- yet, this time variously called the `Save Ulster Petition' and the `Anti-Sunningdale 
Petition'. A great deal of imagery was created by the UUUC including an hourglass 
with the attendant warning `Loyalists, Time Is Running Out' (PP00947) that 
brought to the fore biblical connotations - the foreshadowing of a coming 
apocalypse. Other images reverted back to the ubiquitous signpost device and the 
choice between good and evil in Protestant ideology. `You Can't Have It Both 
Ways' was the title of one poster (PPO0967) with opposite posts pointing to a 
`Council of Ireland' and `British heritage. ' Another poster of the time reflected the 
unionist enthusiasm for law and order in the form of scales of justice entitled `In the 
Balance: United Ireland, United Kingdom. Tip the Scales. Vote United Ulster 
Unionist. ' (PPO0935) It is interesting that slightly amended UUUC communication 
material would not have seemed out of place 24 years later in the aftermath of the 
Good Friday Agreement including: `The Big Peace Lie Exposed, Reject the Council 
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of Ireland and SDLP/IRA Rule' (PP00940). It is somewhat ironic that in 1974, 
Ulster Unionists were denouncing an SDLPIIRA alliance, while Sinn Fein was 
denouncing an SDLP/moderate unionist alliance. 
By the end of the decade, elections were taking place for the 1979 European 
parliament - the first in which members were directly elected to Strasbourg. The 
two UUP contenders, Harry West and John Taylor proclaimed `A United Team' 
(PP00596). Taylor was elected, but West had a poor campaign and subsequently 
resigned as party leader, paving the way for the long-standing James Molyneaux 
(1979-95). 
`The Unionist Party, Party of the Union' was the slogan used on a variety of posters 
for the 1983 Westminster general election (PP00640). By 1983, only two parties 
(the UUP and DUP) now overwhelmingly represented unionist public opinion and 
the Ulster Unionists were therefore able to dispense with the name `Official' 
Unionists - widely used during the 70's when unionist party politics were deeply 
fragmented. 
For the May 1985 District Council elections the party produced a poster that was to 
become an enduring theme in subsequent years. The poster incorporated a 
superimposed image of an IRA gunman between the portraits of Gerry Adams and 
Danny Morrison, inferring that the two were closely linked to (if not members of) 
the IRA Army Council (PP00589). The text posed the question `The IRA Army 
Council or your next District Council? Put Sinn Fein out of Business, Vote Ulster 
Unionist, Keep Ulster British'. 
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Another poster for the same District Council elections (that led up to the signing of 
the Anglo-Irish Agreement) attacked Anglo-Irish summits claiming that their 
`careless talk costs lives' (PP00688). However, the UUP were impotent in relation 
to the British and Irish governments' intentions to go over the heads of local 
political parties in their attempts to move forward or find a solution to the Troubles. 
`Democracy not Dictatorship: Scrap the Anglo-Irish Agreement' (PP00785) 
demonstrated the sense of frustration and alienation felt by unionists in the wake of 
the Agreement. The poster suggested that the Northern Ireland Office had isolated 
itself from unionists and an image of Stormont reflected that this `dictatorship' had 
to be protected by barbed wire and the security forces. Thousands of `Unionist 
Solidarity' stickers were also produced by a coalition of unionist parties formed to 
protest the signing of the Agreement and were used throughout January 1986 by- 
elections brought about by the resignation of all unionist MPs in protest against the 
Agreement (PA0042). The central use of the word `Solidarity', its typography and 
the inclusion of barbed wire were borrowed from the Polish Solidarity movement - 
inferring notions of democratic legitimacy in the face of oppressive government. 
Other communication material produced by the UUP in the months following the 
signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement included `Ulster. Let The People Decide' 
(PP00695) -a poster that incorporated a photograph of unionists demonstrating 
against the Agreement in Belfast City centre on 23 November 1985. Estimates of 
the crowds size varied wildly, however, NIO Minister Richard Needham later noted 
in his autobiography `Battling for Peace' that `250,000 people crammed the centre 
of Belfast on the following Saturday. The NIO claimed it was 30,000. It was not. ' 
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(Needham 1998, pp. 76-77) Another widely circulated poster of the period included 
the slogan `No Dublin Rule' (PP00638) -a direct attack by Ulster Unionists at the 
Anglo-Irish secretariat to be based at Maryfield outside Belfast, which they believed 
to constitute a significant and direct input by Dublin in the governance of the state. 
For more than a decade, unionists were unsuccessful in their continued attempts to 
scrap or reverse the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the advances envisaged had been 
made by the Irish government. 
Party political communication for the 1989 District Council elections highlighted a 
more confident and progressive UUP as evidenced in the posters `The Party For The 
90's' (PP00604) and `Into The Future: Vote Ulster Unionist' (PP00605). In the 
same year, Jim Nicholson took over the reins in the European parliament from John 
Taylor who retired as MEP after ten years (1979-89), a position that Nicholson has 
kept since. 
Moving into the early 90's, a UUP recruitment poster of the time reflected the now 
common party line and featured the image of the flag of the UUP - an outline of 
Northern Ireland emblazoned with the Union Jack accompanied with the slogan 
`Join the Ulster Unionist Party. It Serves Ulster. It Serves You. It Maintains the 
Union' (PP00694). 
By the 1992 Westminster general election the party had developed yet another 
slogan: `Ulster Unionist: The People's Choice' incorporating a crowd of people 
carrying posters with the letters UU or the red hand symbol of Ulster (PP00599). A 
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year later, in the 1993 District Council elections, the attendant message produced 
was simple: `Accountable Democracy: Vote Ulster Unionist. ' (PPO0601) 
Three years later, the photograph of a smiling David Trimble was at the forefront of 
communication material designed for the Northern Ireland Forum/Entry to 
Negotiations elections of May 1996. Party-wide communication for the same 
elections used the traditional image of the family group, entitled `Building Your 
Future Within The Union' (PP00677) and also a recurrent message of `The Union 
Tluough Strength' (PP00697). 
One year before the Good Friday Agreement was signed (in the 1997 Westminster 
and District Council elections) the image of a Union Jack arrow with the slogan 
`Secure the Union, Build Your Future' was produced (PP00686). The UUP's 
intention was to convey the impression of a progressive party with the Union at the 
core of its future. 
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(iii) Democratic Unionist Party 
Sometimes referred to as the Ulster Democratic Unionist Party, the DUP was 
formed in September 1971 by Ian Paisley and Desmond Boal as a successor to the 
Protestant Unionist Party that vehemently opposed the UUP prime minister, 
Terence O'Neill's reformist unionism. The party set out to be immovable on the 
constitutional status of Northern Ireland but progressive on social or `bread and 
butter' issues (Jackson, 1998). At its formation, the DUP claimed that it would be 
right wing on constitutional issues but left wing on social policies, an appeal 
designed especially for working class loyalists. In practice, the emphasis of the 
party has been firmly against co-operation with the Catholic Republic of Ireland, 
and against, or at least reluctant to, share power with nationalists, while advocating 
the Westminster majority-rule model of government. Sharing the core beliefs of the 
UUP, the DUP is regarded as the advocate of a more hard-line unionism. This 
includes persistent demands for more vigorous action against the IRA and a refusal 
to deal with Sinn Fein, except where they believe it to be unavoidable at local 
council level. 
The party grew rapidly in the 70's, in the context of a divided Ulster unionism and 
high levels of communal violence `on the ground' in Northern Ireland. Inextricably 
opposed to the Sunningdale Agreement, Ian Paisley identified himself closely with 
the Ulster Workers' Council strike of May 1974 - the organisation that effectively 
brought the Sunningdale Agreement to its knees. The party was also a prominent 
partner in the Unionist alliance (the UUUC - the United Ulster Unionist Council) 
that emerged in opposition to the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. By 1993, the 
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hitherto civilised relationship the DUP had with the UUP began to show widening 
cracks with the two parties taking markedly different approaches to the Downing 
Street Declaration (Dec. 1993) - the DUP being more hostile than its rival. 
Over the years, the party's command over a section of the unionist electorate has 
remained formidable with a local electoral asset in Ian Paisley, one of the most 
prominent individuals in Northern Ireland's political life over the last thirty-five 
years. First elected to Stormont as a Protestant Unionist in 1970, Paisley won the 
Westminster seat of North Antrim in the same year and has held it since. In 
addition, he was Northern Ireland's first elected MEP in 1979, and has topped the 
poll in every Northern Ireland election to the European parliament since. Paisley 
has consistently polled more highly and across a wider base than other DUP 
candidates, the party ultimately benefiting from a relationship with his Free 
Presbyterian Church that has provided a core of dedicated party activists. These 
advantages have allowed the DUP, like earlier populist loyalist movements, to 
cultivate two constituencies neglected by mainstream unionism - the urban working 
classes and rural evangelicals (Ibid. ). 
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DUP Public Relations and Communications Developments 
Early DUP communications (as it was for all the political parties in Northern 
Ireland) during the 70's and early 80's were a bit of a `hit and miss' or hap 
hazardous affair (with the possible exception of Sinn Fein). When a subject or 
contemporary issue arose, it was the media who chased parties or individual party 
members. There were infrequent press conferences held by the political parties' 
themselves. 
As professionalism started to creep into the control and management of news 
(filtering in from US election campaigns) the DUP began to sit up and take notice of 
the importance of the media in getting their party message across. Yet, it was not 
until the mid-80s that the DUP first designated the role of `press officer' within their 
organisation and at that time it was not a full-time position. 11 Party members like 
Sammy Wilson and Ian Paisley Jnr. (to name the two most prominent) were 
designated press officers during this period and this loose arrangement continued 
into the 90's. However, Wilson and Paisley Jnr. acted only if and when they were 
required, their roles encompassing the arrangement of basics for press conferences, 
writing press releases or liaising with the media about a future event (Ibid. ). 
It was not until 1996, when the political scene began to `step up a gear' with the 
talks-process running parallel with the Northern Ireland Forum that it became more 
obvious to the party that they needed to have better liaison, control and interface 
more professionally with the media in general. In line with their newfound 
II Interview with St. Clair McAllister, DUP Director of Communications, 1 November 2001. 
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thinking, the party officers decided to create a new post, that of Director of 
Communications, although the position was not filled until 1998 (Ibid. ). The post 
demanded someone who would be more than a press officer, someone who would 
take charge of all internal and external communications and become involved as a 
party officer in the decision-making process. The DUP's St Clair McAllister 
outlines the qualities required (in a Northern Ireland context) for the job and the 
reasons he was chosen as the party's first Director of Communications: 
They were looking for someone who obviously had the political background, who had say a 
business background, and who was used to public speaking, and who had had an interface 
with the media in the past. We first of all thought about trawling generally outside the party 
as well as inside. It became very obvious, that although some people maybe had great 
talents in PR, etc., they were very weak on the political front. That marriage is difficult and 
I think it is still difficult to get the right people into any particular political party. Yes, 
you're there to help to sell a message, just as Heinz Baked Beans have someone to sell a 
message. But there's a difference because of the politics, the understanding of the nature 
and the background of where you are and where you want to be. From that point of view 
after a lot of thinking about it, researching, talking to people, it was suggested that although 
I was one of the people looking for this person, that I myself was the ideal person for the 
job... For the sake of the party and for the sake of the general good, I made the decision. I 
felt strong convictions about this in every sense, that this was the best way to go forward, 
for myself, for the party, and eventually, obviously for the country (Ibid. ). 
The DUP's ability to communicate as a political party (in a professional sense) was 
greatly enhanced by the introduction of McAllister. As the party's first real `spin- 
doctor', he would oversee a radical shift in party communications. However, as 
Director of Communications he didn't have much time for those who associated his 
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newly appointed role with the pejorative connotations associated with the title 'spin- 
doctor': 
I do not like the term that's used for trackers of communications, I think it's worthwhile 
saying; I do not like the term spin-doctors, although I believe there are spin-doctors. They 
do exist out there in the real world, but although it has been applied to me several times, 
I've always resisted that because it implies you're taking something and bending it and 
shaping it into what suits you. We have never been a party to do that. If you look at our 
party ethos, it would tell you that we are a party who says it how it is and are more 
concerned about getting the truth out. At the end of the day that is what will eventually take 
people into new particular relationships - being honest with themselves and with others 
(Ibid. ). 
All political parties and their political spokespersons in Northern Ireland seem to 
believe that they alone have a monopoly on `the truth' (which shall be discussed 
later). One thing that remains true, however, is that in the run-up to the Good 
Friday Agreement, the DUP (with the inclusion of McAllister) was now better 
positioned than at any time in its history to `sell' their own particular reading of the 
`peace process' and ensuing events. The timing of his introduction coincided with a 
growing membership and potential `target audiences' that included sceptical and 
disaffected Ulster Unionists - figures who were none too pleased with the so-called 
`peace process'. 
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DUP Political Posters 
Pre-DUP communication material reflected Ian Paisley (Moderator of the Free 
Presbyterian Church of Ulster) in typically defiant mood (PA0418) and incorporated 
the unionist slogan from the early twentieth century Home Rule crisis `For God and 
Ulster', co-opted by Paisley in the late 60's as leader of the Protestant Unionist 
Party. The simple yet powerful conjunction of religion and politics has consistently 
been the mainstay of Paisleyism, and this poster illustrated Paisley dressed in 
clerical attire set against the backdrop of a Union Jack flag. 
A poster produced for the 1969 Stormont election, sometimes referred to as the 
`Ulster at the Crossroads' election, displayed a photograph of Paisley accompanied 
with the message `Vote Protestant Unionist. Remember 1690, Keep Ulster Free' 
(PP03222). `Remember 1690' is the loyalist slogan used to celebrate Protestant 
King William III's defeat over Catholic King James II at the Battle of the Boyne. 
In the DUP's formative years of the early 70s, political communication material 
featured the party catchphrase `Service Ever - Surrender Never' (PPO0726) and 
attacked the Ulster Unionists for being less sound on the Union than the DUP -'The 
Unionist Party that has earned your Trust! ' (PP00708) A DUP plaque from this 
period employed the symbol of a burning sword and a six-pointed star (representing 
the six counties) with the Ulster symbol of a red hand in the middle (PA0290). The 
DUP used this symbol until the late 90's when it was replaced by a red lion's head. 
Party badges from the early 70's incorporated the saying `6 into 26 won't go' -a 
reference to the counties of Ireland - and yet another loyalist catchphrase harking 
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back to the `good old days' of the Home Rule crisis -'Ulster will fight and Ulster 
will be right. ' 
In 1971, the year of the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of Northern Ireland 
and the year the DUP was formed, the state's very existence came under threat. 
Paisley chaired the Ulster Constitution Defence Committee (UCDC) espousing a 
now typical apocalyptic rhetoric that became his mainstay throughout his tenure as 
leader. One UCDC loyalist demonstration poster (PP00702) referred to the 
common theme of resistance: `YOUR glorious opportunity to demonstrate your 
determination to resist all Ulster's enemies & to save the province from all Lundies 
[traitors] in church and state... Give the IRA your answer... No Surrender... God 
Save the Queen. ' 
Parallels exist from this period that link both past and present such as those 
surrounding the issue of police reform. A 1971 DUP poster (PP00767) reprinted 
from the Daily Mirror edition of 21 August 1969 headlined with `Who told the 
Truth, Faulkner or Paisley? ' and concerned the abolition of the Ulster Special 
Constabulary (the USC or B-Specials). While the Ulster Unionist leader and prime 
minister of Northern Ireland, Brian Faulkner, had denied there would be any major 
changes to the USC, Paisley had taken an opposing view. On 21 August the Hunt 
inquiry was established to examine the structure of the RUC and USC, subsequently 
finding in favour of the disbanding of the USC, to be replaced by the Ulster Defence 
Regiment. Over a quarter of a century later, history was virtually repeated (as will 
be discussed later). The aforementioned poster also had a recruitment dimension ` 
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Join the Ulster Democratic Unionist Party and help save your Ulster heritage! No 
Compromise... No Surrender. ' 
Another enduring theme or slogan produced by the DUP in the early 70's was `Save 
the Union' which appeared in a 1973 poster (PPO0699) featuring photographs of 
guns and bombs under the heading `Their Weapons' set against the image of a vote 
and ballot box under the heading `Our Weapons. ' 
In the first direct election to the European parliament in June 1979, Paisley topped 
the poll and became Northern Ireland's first MEP. Anti-European integrationist 
attitudes were prevalent from the outset as evidenced in the DUP election campaign 
literature, characterised by an attack on the then European Economic Community 
(EEC) and on what Paisley saw as the strong Catholic influence within it. One 
poster (PP00714) claimed `Ulster desperately needs a strong voice in the European 
Assembly to expose the many scandals of the EEC... So if you want a 
representative who will... Faithfully put Ulster first... Then vote for the Unionist 
you can trust. ' 
The theme of trust, truth and honesty has consistently pervaded a great deal of DUP 
political communication material over the decades and although the slogan `Vote 
for the unionist you can trust' appeared on many 70's election posters it was 
modified and incorporated into communication material in subsequent years. 
In 1981, as increasing political contact continued between the British and Irish 
governments, Paisley and other DUP leaders signed a covenant at Belfast City Hall. 
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The document was modelled on the Ulster Covenant of 1912 signed by over 
500,000 men and women who pledged resistance to Irish Home Rule by any means 
necessary. During `81, Paisley also conducted a series of rallies named `The Carson 
Trail' after his historical hero, the oratorical unionist and anti-Home Rule leader 
Edward Carson. 
Amidst the tension of the hunger strikes of the same year, a DUP poster (PP00713) 
for the District Council elections incorporated a photograph of Fianna Fail leader 
and Irish Täoiseach Charles Haughey - highlighting unionist fears and apprehension 
over Dublin's intentions. The photograph was accompanied with the message 
`Haughey is watching and waiting. Give him your answer: Vote DUP. ' 
Another theme or message to gain prominence on electoral material produced by the 
DUP was developed in the early 80's: `Let's Get Back to the Stormont Way. Vote 
Democratic Unionist -DUP' or `Let's make it the Stormont Way' (PP00706 & 
PP00760 respectively). These were inferences to the golden days of majority rule 
in a `Protestant parliament for a Protestant people' (cited in Taylor, 1998, p. 19). 
In the 1983 Westminster general election campaign, the DUP produced a poster 
(PPO0718) featuring the Union Jack and Northern Ireland flags as the sleeves in a 
contractual handshake that also included the Houses of Parliament in London and 
Parliament Buildings at Stormont. The accompanying DUP slogan was `This we 
will maintain (the link with Britain)... This we will Retain (Northern Ireland). ' 
Additional posters from this period included the party's commitment to social 
issues: `On the ground working for you. Vote DUP. ' (PP00725) 
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By May 1984, constitutional nationalist parties from both sides of the border 
concluded a New Ireland Forum report stating that `the desire of nationalists is for a 
united-Ireland in the form of a sovereign, independent Irish state. ' 12 Other options 
in the report included a federal or confederal state or joint authority. The DUP's 
view on each of these options was simple, as spelled out by a poster produced at the 
time: `ULSTER IS BRITISH' (PP00717). 
In the same year's European elections, the DUP claimed `The EEC puts your pound 
in Dublin's pocket' and Paisley was successfully returned as a sitting MEP 
(PP00731). During this particular term at Strasbourg (in October 1988) Paisley 
interrupted a speech by the Pope in the European parliament when he held up a 
written placard with the message `John Paul II Antichrist. ' As he was physically 
restrained and escorted from the chamber he shouted several times `I renounce you 
as the antichrist. ' These typical Paisley outbursts certainly did not diminish his 
popularity in unionist circles back home, as he consistently topped the Northern 
Ireland poll in every European parliamentary election held since. 
At the launch of the DUP's 1985 manifesto, Paisley produced four sledge hammers 
each carrying the words `Smash Sinn Fein ' and posters for the District Council 
elections included the message `DUP says Smash the IRA and ban Sinn Fein ' 
(PPO0700a). Their manifesto promised to `challenge, confront and confound Sinn 
Fein whenever they dared raise their heads. ' Interestingly, a not too dissimilar form 
of these very words were used by David Trimble on entering into the multi-party 
negotiations in September 1997 (with Sinn Fein ) which ultimately led to the Good 
12 New Ireland Forum, May 1984, Stationery Office, Dublin 
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Friday Agreement. On the other hand, the DUP reneged on previous pledges by 
walking away from the 1997-8 negotiations/talks process and they certainly did not 
`challenge, confront and confound Sinn Fein whenever they dared raise their heads. ' 
Other communication material for the District Council elections of 1985 was less 
aggressive in tone as in `Vote DUP. You can do no better' (PP00727). 
In the aftermath of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of November 1985, a variety of DUP 
posters gained prominence particularly in the period surrounding the January 1986 
by-elections, which occurred because all Unionist MPs resigned in protest at the 
signing of the Agreement. `Keep Ulster British... Vote Democratic Unionist - 
Ulster Says No' (PP00737) and `No Dublin Rule' (PP00721) were the most widely 
used messages emanating from the party during this wayward time for loyalists and 
unionists alike. One DUP poster of the period in question (PP00771) is reflective 
of the genuine mood in the unionist community -a depiction of the Red hand of 
Ulster giving a victory sign as it tramples the Irish tricolour emblazoned with the 
initials IRA. The poster also features the slogans `Ulster Says No' and `No 
Surrender' and incorporates the Union Jack and Northern Ireland flags. 
Throughout its relatively short political history, the DUP has always been keen to 
support the security forces, an important target audience with potential voters in 
their ranks. In 1989, they produced a poster entitled `Hands Off The UDR' 
(PP00738) as part of an ongoing campaign opposing changes to the Ulster Defence 
Regiment. In 1991, the British government announced that the UDR would merge 
with the Royal Irish Rangers to form the Royal Irish Regiment (RIR). The 
government presented the amalgamation as part of an overall review of security 
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needs in the post-Cold War era. Yet, unionists and loyalists were highly suspicious 
of this and believed it to be a smokescreen, the changes simply being what they 
believed to be a sop to nationalists. In July 1992, the newly created RIR was 
formally established. 
1990's political posters reiterated the now common DUP message: `Stop Dublin 
Interference' (PPO3001). Similarly, another poster stated: `We will not have 
Dublin Rule. For God and Ulster' and was accompanied by a photograph of Paisley 
in a ubiquitous pose reminiscent of Edward Carson - Northern Ireland symbols and 
paraphernalia adorned the background. 
In April 1993, as the peace process continued to gather momentum, Secretary of 
State Patrick Mayhew, enraged unionists by implying that Britain was `neutral' in 
relation to Northern Ireland. In the May District Council elections a backlash was 
evident in DUP communication: `Unionists alienated - Answer back! Get Mad 
With Mayhew: Vote DUP' (PP00730). In December of the same year, in the 
aftermath of the Downing Street Declaration, the poster: `Major's Treachery. Resist 
Dublin Rule' (PP00734) was accompanied with the visual image of a knife 
stabbing a Union Jack emblazoned map of Northern Ireland. Rejected by the DUP, 
the joint declaration by the two prime ministers, John Major and Albert Reynolds, 
formed one of the key building blocks upon which the Good Friday Agreement was 
built. 
An additional `block' - the `Frameworks for the Future' documents of February 
1995, were once again completely rejected by the DUP who regarded them as too 
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pro-nationalist. Attending a United Ulster Loyalist Rally in May 1995, the DUP's 
Gregory Campbell was one of two main speakers, the other being Glen Barr, the 
leader of the Ulster Workers Council that brought down the Sunningdale Agreement 
in 1974. The poster advertised to rally support for the event claimed that `PEOPLE 
POWER wrecked the Sunningdale Agreement in 1974 - That same power can 
prevent the Framework Document's united Ireland proposals being implemented... 
The Framework Document presents Ulster Protestants with a choice -A united 
Ireland or self-determination. ' It continued `Reject the Framework Document! Say, 
`°Yes" to self-determination and democracy! ' (PPO 1164). 
One year later, the peace process began to gather momentum with the 1996 
Northern Ireland Forum/Entry to Political Negotiations elections where the DUP's 
message to voters was simple `Give Ian Paisley's Team Your Vote. DUP - The 
Team you can Trust' (PP00733). This seemingly innocuous message caused an 
enormous controversy at the time as a DUP request to the Northern Ireland 
Electoral Office for Ian Paisley to use his own name on the ballot paper was 
granted. Legislation only allowed for the recording of party names on the ballot 
paper, however, the DUP's intentional gamble of boosting its vote by emphasising 
Paisley in the election (as this had benefited the party in European elections) was 
passed and the request stood. 
In the Westminster general election campaign of 1997, the DUP slogan of `This we 
will maintain' was positioned alongside a Union Jack flag (PP00669). In the same 
year (and only 11 months before the Good Friday Agreement was signed) a card 
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and accompanying posters were produced by the DUP featuring Paisley with the 
now recurrent rhetoric of `not an inch to Dublin' (PA0022). 
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(iv) Sinn Fein 
Sinn Fein , translated from Irish as `We Ourselves' or `Ourselves Alone', dates its 
all-island origins from inception in 1905 and later from the independence movement 
that gathered momentum at the end of World War I in 1918. Linked to the 
Provisional IRA, the `modem' Sinn Fein (that is, after the 1970 split) followed a 
traditional policy of abstentionism in politics until after the hunger strikes of the 
early 1980s. Since then it has gained considerable electoral support, predominantly 
from republican and nationalist working class and younger voters. Over the years, 
the party has enjoyed considerable fund raising success in the US. Historically, all 
of the unionist parties in Northern Ireland have either refused, or been generally 
reluctant to co-operate with Sinn Fein; their justification for non-co-operation 
intimately linked to an absence in more recent years of total decommissioning of 
paramilitary weapons by the IRA (Northern Ireland Yearbook, 2003). 
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Sinn Fein Public Relations and Communications Developments 
Sinn Fein in its early modem guise (that is, following the emergence of Provisional 
Sinn Fein in 1970) engaged in a variety of communication activities such as the 
issuing of statements and party pamphleteering, yet their efforts were largely 
simplistic and disorganised (Curtisl984). When republican veteran Jimmy Steele 
opened their first press office in Belfast, it was described by Curtis as `a very loose 
arrangement, with no fixed headquarters or formal meetings. It put out statements 
to the media, which were delivered by hand to the various offices in the city (Ibid. 
p. 263). Essentially, (in the early 70's) the republican movement primarily centred 
on the IRA and its military actions, while any form of political action and 
communication was largely seen as inconsequential, their political wing was 
literally perceived as a `poor second cousin to the IRA' (Adams 1986, p. 150). 
By 1974, the first concerted attempts to empower and improve the press office 
emerged within the organisation with a move to premises off the Falls Road in West 
Belfast where they gained access to a telex machine for the first time, rented from 
the Post Office (Curtis 1984). The press office now began to play an important and 
growing role within the movement, also evidenced in '74 by the publication of a 
`Manual of Publicity' (Sinn Fein 1974) that detailed a complex communications 
strategy. Indeed, the manual highlighted the fact that key personnel within the 
organisation were embarking upon a more sophisticated approach to 
communication. In stark contrast to the focus placed at the time on military 
strategy, the manual highlighted the importance of securing and increasing the 
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support of the republican community by developing their modes of political 
communication: 
The presence and activity of a Sinn Fein cumann should be obvious to all, both to those 
who live in its area of operation and to those who pass through it. This can only be 
achieved by constant publicity. We must be at it all the time, on all occasions and when 
every opportunity presents itself. True, there is plenty of other work to be done. But 
without constant and effective publicity most of it will not reap the rewards it should 
deserve. An active cumann without an active publicity programme does not make sense 
(Ibid. p. 33). 
Importantly, it could only be an informed public who could make a `favourable 
choice' that could ultimately determine the future political success of Sinn Fein: 
The essential point is to realise that a lot of the results of activities in almost any sphere will 
be lost if the public is not fully informed about them. Members of the public may or may 
not be won to your points of view as a result of your actions. But if they are not informed 
of what you are doing, of what you believe, or where you stand on issues that affect them, 
they cannot be expected to make a favourable choice (Ibid. p. 1). 
However, during this period, the party's attempts to communicate to its various 
publics were primarily based upon information and education in the hope of 
mobilising support for the armed struggle. Yet, after the IRA ceasefire of 1975 and 
the subsequent release of a group of young northerners from the internment camps 
(including Gerry Adams), some people within the organisation began to question 
the validity of the movement's on-going military approach - not only in terms of the 
conflict itself, but also in relation to how the movement communicated itself via its 
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newspaper (Republican News) to the wider world. The `new group' who believed 
in a political solution began to make changes. As one former internee, Danny 
Morrison (1985) highlights: 
As we came out of jail, we were very keen to put demands upon the editorial staff of 
Republican News. In a very short period of time we found ourselves assuming editorial 
control of it, and in 1979 managed to merge with the Dublin-based republican paper An 
Phoblacht (Ibid. pp 84-85). 
By the late 70's, a growing politicisation within the organisation led to the 
development of a `twin-track' approach whereby, as Bean (1994) suggests: `as part 
of the revolutionary strategy to mobilise the masses, elections and "politics" would 
be useful platforms and rallying points whilst the armed struggle would act as a 
form of armed propaganda' (1994, p. 7). 
Sinn Fein thus began a process of departing from what was essentially reactionary 
work to pre-emptive `agitational' work, effectively assuming a more proactive 
stance in relation to its communication output that included systematic efforts to 
develop relationships with journalists and the media in general. As Tom Hartley, 
who worked as a Sinn Fein publicist at the time explains, the Republican press 
centre: 
... began to 
be a focus for the press and for foreign support groups, supplanting the previous 
informal network. The telex machine was put to increasing use, and became a crucial tool, 
allowing republicans to convey their version of incidents immediately to the press, and for 
the first time enabling them to compete seriously with the various British public relations 
operations (cited in Curtis 1984, p. 265). 
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Consequently, Sinn Fein PR successes (coupled with the failure of the British army 
and the security forces to defeat the IRA) led the British government to modify its 
strategy. It introduced a policy of `criminalisation' whereby the conflict was 
assumed to be a simple problem of `law and order' and republicans were judged 
under the circumstances to be common criminals. As a result, both the British army 
and security forces conducted raids on republican premises with the aim of 
disrupting and ideally destroying their communicative operations. Nevertheless, 
Sinn Fein staff quickly found alternative arrangements and recommenced their 
activities - demonstrating their skill and resourcefulness in overcoming difficult 
situations (Ibid. ). 
As the 70's drew to a close, staff levels at the Republican press centre continually 
rose as the release of prisoners from the internment camps had resulted in an influx 
of committed Sinn Fein members. This allowed the party to extend its 
communicative efforts to include dealing with media enquiries and the production 
of publicity and information material. In 1981, the organisation created a separate 
department, the Republican Publications Office, where it was staffed at the time by 
up to three `volunteer' workers (Ibid. p. 268). 
By the early 80's, a number of press and publicity personnel were emerging (later to 
become key players in the communications development of the party) who included 
Richard McAuley who became Belfast Head Press Officer in 1980 and Danny 
Morrison who became National Director of Publicity in 1981. During the hunger 
strikes and the election of Bobby Sands in 1981 (and also later when Gerry Adams 
was contesting the Westminster general election in 1983) 'the Press Office on the 
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Falls Road was open 24 hours a day and Morrison and others slept, worked and 
lived from it' (cited in Lago, 2000, p. 92). 
During this period the Republican press centre moved once again to a different 
location on the Falls Road: 
... where 
it shared the upper floor with the Belfast Sinn Fein office and the prisoners' 
welfare department, while the ground floor was used as a waiting room for prisoners' 
relatives and friends awaiting transport to the prisons. The press centre's equipment was 
limited to a desk, a phone - the bills apparently paid by Republican News - and a telex 
machine in a tiny room nearby (Curtis 1984, p. 272). 
In the early 80's, and particularly in the aftermath of the hunger strikes, journalists 
who covered the Troubles became increasingly more interested in information from 
throughout Northern Ireland (that is, other than the Falls press office) and began 
travelling outside Belfast. 
One ensuing development was the beginning (to a degree) of decentralisation of 
republican PR and media relations. On the one hand, this indicated the party's 
belief that it was necessary to decentralise its operation at both the communicative 
and the political level in order to serve its localised communities more efficiently. 
On the other hand, it was also an acknowledgement of changes in journalistic 
practices, and meant that party offices throughout the province, such as in Derry, 
became responsible for dealing with media enquiries regarding their own particular 
area. However, overall party policy still remained under the control of the Dublin 
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headquarters - in acknowledgement of the party's ulterior nationalist aims of a free, 
united Ireland (Tugwell, 1981). 
Increasingly, Sinn Fein's political public relations were transforming into proactive 
and well-developed strategies, which sought to influence the news agenda, 
challenge the British government and, ideally, change the public perception of 
republicanism (Adams, 1986). Yet, despite continuing efforts to highlight socio- 
economic issues such as unemployment and housing, media interest focused 
primarily on the military activities of the IRA. The failure or the inability of the 
media to cover any parallel issues, which also affected republicans, essentially 
meant that the Republican movement was relegated to a crude portrayal as a 
military organisation with little or no political acumen. 
To compound negative media portrayals, organisational problems that impinged 
upon and undermined the success of its communicative efforts, only seemed to add 
to the perception that the organisation was too weak, lacked structure and 
essentially needed to overturn the legacy of the failed republican politics of the 
1970's (Ibid. ). As Adams suggested: 
Sinn Fein's major problem is our failure to date to build an effective organisation after long 
periods of self-imposed isolation derived from conspiratorial politics as well as censorship, 
of harassment by the guards and a lack of political understanding (Ibid. p. 186). 
Such organisational difficulties included the preparation, training and education of 
Sinn Fein politicians and activists. In comparison to the other main political parties 
Adams claimed: `they (middle-class politicians) were taught their politics, methods 
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of management, public relations work and other skills by experts. We learned ours 
on the streets, in prison and through a process of self-education' (Ibid. p. 154). 
As a consequence of a process of internal retrospection, the organisational 
difficulties that were apparent to Adams (who became President of Sinn Fein in 
1983) were addressed, including the development of training and educational 
programmes for activists and political representatives. The party also countered the 
negative effects of the long-standing IRA military campaign by developing a more 
positive discourse that emerged (albeit slowly) and highlighted a more moderate 
and pluralistic outlook. As Shirlow and McGovern (1998) acknowledged: 
Taking possession of the language of peace in order to re-define the meaning of the conflict 
was central to the new strategy and opened up a new communicative dimension. The 
adoption of the word `peace' in 1987 by SF was deliberate and was seen as a means to 
break out of the containment strategy undertaken by the British and Irish states (Ibid. 
P. 180). 
By 1988, the party was continuing to break the shackles of containment imposed 
upon it by forming the International Publicity and Information Committee (IPIC) to 
target overseas audiences. However, in an attempt to thwart the republican 
movement's increasingly successful communicative efforts, the British government 
introduced a `Broadcasting Ban' on the 19th of October 1988 that prohibited both 
television and radio from broadcasting direct statements from Sinn Mn and the 
IRA amongst others. The effect of the ban produced a number of difficulties for the 
party. 
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Although it could be adjudged that they had not (up until that point in time) 
received frequent or favourable media coverage in the first instance, the ban meant 
that they would essentially have to adapt once again under difficult circumstances. 
Essentially, they would have to become more focused and innovative about getting 
their message across to their various publics. 
As the 80's drew to a close, three people were working in the Republican press 
centre alongside Richard McAuley (who in the intervening years had become the 
Director of Publicity for the Six Counties) and Danny Morrison as National Director 
of Publicity. Similar growth patterns were occurring in Dublin, which also had up 
to three people working in their press office (Miller, 1994). 
Crucial to the party at this time was their strategy of internationalising the struggle 
and extending the republican message beyond Ireland and Britain, in particular to 
the United States where they could appeal to an influential Irish-American audience. 
By 1990, Gerry Adams highlighted: 
It is also worth mentioning our efforts to upgrade our own international work. Sinn Fein is, 
contrary to enemy propaganda, a poor organisation with meagre material and financial 
resources - two essential requirements of international work. However, we have in 
conjunction with those involved started to modernise solidarity work in the USA and in 
Europe, and we are currently reviewing this work in Britain, and, at a slower pace, Australia 
(cited in Miller 1994, p. 113). 
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On the home front, by 1991, the party's new National Director of Publicity, Rita 
O'Hare (who replaced Danny Morrison) began to highlight the many issues that 
faced the party including those of a socio-economic nature: 
Obviously our first and main task is to try to explain to people what Sinn Fein is about, 
what our aims are, what our policies are and that covers all aspects - we aren't constantly 
engaged in questions around the war in the North, our job is disseminating information 
about what our policy is on housing, on unemployment, emigration, everything that affects 
peoples lives. So the range is very wide, but of course we'd be concerned to try to give 
people information, to answer some of the more scurrilous allegations that are made against 
republicans, to tell people what is actually happening (Troops Out 1991, p. 13). 
Although it was a difficult task to communicate the republican message whilst the 
Broadcasting Ban remained in place, Sinn Fein were optimistic about the future, as 
is evident by O'Hare's vision for republicans (hinting at the importance of 
communication in its achievement): 
I want that the past can be reflected in our future, to move us on, to be part of our future 
plans, but I also want publicity to reflect that republicans aren't people who are always 
looking back on what's happened in the past. I also think we have a huge duty to reach out 
to the other people in this island so I would want to be able to reflect that in our public 
utterances and our publications. We are looking forward to the future and I'm going to be 
reflecting that in everything that I'm doing - what we want for the future, what we want in 
Ireland, how we want to live (Ibid. p. 15). 
By 1993, Sinn Fein political communication was characterised by a growing 
discourse that incorporated notions of a peaceful future, whilst at the same time 
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acknowledging the difficulties and challenges that the transition from the armed 
struggle to politics held for republicans of all hues (Adams, 1995). 
In 1994, after the IRA announced a ceasefire and the Broadcasting Ban was lifted, 
further changes on how the `enemy' was described also became evident, most 
notably in An Phoblacht/Republican News where the descriptions of the RUC were 
no longer as negative and discriminating as the formerly used `crown forces', 
`sectarian bullies' or `dupes' (cited in Shirlow and Mc Govern 1998, p. 183). As for 
their traditional political foes - the Unionists - Shirlow and McGovern gave an 
insight into the thinking of one republican: `the movement has got to talk to the 
others and we have to give people, like Unionists, a more sympathetic 
understanding. It's hard to swallow but we had to depict our enemies in a clearer 
and more positive light' (Ibid. ). To reiterate this point, Lago (2000) highlights that 
one journalist noted that republican language had become increasingly more 
pluralist, conciliatory and sophisticated, essentially reflecting the changes in Sinn 
Fein's communicative policies, and more importantly, in the politics and strategies 
of the movement as a whole. 
After a breakdown of the IRA's ceasefire in February 1996 and its reinstatement in 
July 1997, Sinn Fein entered political negotiations in September 1997. By 1998, as 
Good Friday approached, the party's communicative apparatus included three main 
offices in Ireland (Dublin, Belfast and Derry) and three offices abroad (New York, 
Washington and Brussels) - all dealing with media relations and garnering support 
for the republican vision of a future united Ireland. The offices in the US targeted 
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financially and politically influential Irish-Americans while the office in Brussels 
attempted to develop contacts throughout continental Europe. 
In Ireland, although there was a degree of decentralisation in terms of the work 
carried out (including issues deemed important or pertinent to local offices) the 
overriding policy and major communications campaigns remained within the remit 
of Dublin Headquarters. In the Belfast press office, according to Lago (Ibid. ), there 
were two full-time staff and a number of part-time or occasional helpers, yet it was 
unclear whether they were paid or voluntary workers. It was observed that although 
the press office was primarily responsible for issuing press releases, it also assisted 
many journalists with their enquiries. Indeed by facilitating the search and retrieval 
of material relevant to journalists' stories, they were (in the process) portraying Sinn 
Fein as a helpful and efficient party. One press officer, Donncha 0' Hara, (whom 
Lago interviewed), suggested that increasingly, journalists were contacting them, 
explaining that they were intending to run a story on a particular topic and 
requesting information and contacts that could be relevant (Ibid. p. 100). Lago 
concluded that this implied a new role for the republican press office where, upon 
request, it was able to influence the content of news by carefully selecting which 
information, opinions and contacts were passed on to journalists (Ibid. ). However, 
it is questionable whether this was a `new role', as communications personnel like 
Richard McAuley and Rita O'Hare would have been well-versed in media 
management techniques as they had been influencing the content of news for a 
number of years prior to 1998. More importantly, Lago's analysis highlighted that 
the media was by 1998, growing in their confidence and trust in Sinn Fein (Ibid. ). 
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In addition to financial resources, a significant organisational resource had been 
addressed (essentially overcoming what Adams (1986) saw as the lack of training of 
its officers and politicians) - the press office now provided organised training and 
advice to any party worker who would be dealing with the media. This was 
conducted through the organisation of weekend media-training courses, where 
topics such as `media relations', `how to influence the media' and `interview 
techniques' were explored (Lago 2000, p. 102). Also, (only six months before the 
signing of the Agreement) they were even training its `younger generation' in PR 
and media relations via Sinn Fein Youth's first ever Winter School and Conference. 
One poster highlighted workshops in: Mural painting, computer aided design, press 
and publicity skills, organisational skills, stencil/banner making, and screen-printing 
(PPO0282). 
As Good Friday 1998 approached, Rita 0' Hare was National Director of Publicity 
and Jim Gibney was the head of Sinn Fein's Belfast press office, however it was 
Richard McAuley working as Gerry Adams' Press Secretary who was regarded as 
`Sinn Fein 's press supremo' (Ibid. ). 
All seemed strong on the communications personnel front with a coterie of 
individuals adept at media relations and `political persuasion' or more generally 
political public relations. On the financial front (and thus their potential to channel 
money into communications) journalists alluded to huge economic resources hailing 
from America whilst the party would generally fob them off as over-zealous claims. 
Miller (1994) has suggested that the yearly budget for the Belfast press operation in 
the early 90's was around £7000, with fax and phone bills ranging from £400 to 
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£800 per quarter and other resources such as paper, approximately £100 a month. 
Richard McAuley told Miller that: 
If they're [the press officers are] really lucky and the party's feeling generous, then they 
might get 50p for their lunch, seriously. There would be a very small allocation of money 
set aside every week just for milk and tea bags and lunches and literally you're talking a 
tenner. Outside that, any other money that's spent on the office is spent on equipment, 
either in terms of phone bills or buying computer disks (1994, p. 133). 
However, Miller's interview with Mc Auley took place before Bill Clinton granted 
a visa to Gerry Adams in the pre-1994 ceasefire period. Essentially from early '94 
until Good Friday 1998 the party's fundraising capabilities increased exponentially. 
Since 1994, journalists like Martin Fletcher, the Belfast correspondent for the 
Times, have repeatedly doubted Sinn Fein's claimed poverty, suggesting that their 
resources are extensive and unsurprisingly primarily come from donations from the 
USA: 
Per capita, they are probably one of the richest parties, certainly in Britain if not in Europe. 
Northern Ireland has the population of the size of Hampshire, 1.6 million people, a million 
dollars goes an awful long way. And on top of that, most of the party workers work for 
nothing, or very small stipend... All the expenses they receive during the Stormont Talks, 
and they got, I don't know, £100 a day per negotiator - all that went to the party. I 
don't 
think they can argue that they are poor (cited in Lago 2000, p. 102). 
To add to Fletcher's opinion, an article published in the Financial Times suggested 
that the party had raised £595,000 in the United States over a two-year period 
(Ibid. ). Indeed, writing in the American Newspaper, The Irish Voice, Gerry Adams 
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himself refers to a fund-raising dinner in New York's Plaza Hotel attended by more 
than 400 people, each of whom paid over $1000, totalling more than £250,000 in 
one single event (Ibid. p. 103). 
It is difficult to determine Sinn Fein's financial situation and how much they have 
invested in communications. Lago (2000) nevertheless correctly suggests that the 
increase in the quantity and quality of publicity material by the party reflected 
enhanced economic resources: 
Even if technological development now means that with fewer resources and facilities, more 
professional and sophisticated material can be produced, its installation and maintenance 
still demands some initial financial investment (Ibid. ). 
While it may remain difficult to conclusively determine the party's pre-Agreement 
financial resources, what remains less difficult to determine is that by 1998, in terms 
of its communicative resources, Sinn Fein was the one party who stood `head and 
shoulders' above all others on Northern Ireland's political stage. For their 
ubiquitous rivals in both traditions it was high time to take stock of their own 
flawed communications structures and lack of personnel; to acknowledge Sinn 
Fein's communications success story (in the Northern Ireland context) and try to 
emulate the party in future attempts to `effectively' communicate their own 
positions. 
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Sinn Fein Political Posters: 
An analysis of Sinn Fein political posters from 1970 to 1998 lends credence to the 
main communications personnel and political public relations developments 
aforementioned, but is also insightful in that it illuminates further the process of 
change that Sinn Fein underwent over three decades. 
The sheer quantity of available Sinn Fein posters has meant that of the hundreds 
available, only a select few or the most relevant are highlighted below. They are 
divided up into three sections - the 70's, the 80's and the 90's. 
THE 70's 
The 70's party political posters were generally simplistic and symptomatic of a 
somewhat `schizophrenic' period for Sinn Fein - they contain dual images and 
discourses on both violence and peace. They also highlight recurrent themes that 
have their origins in the early 70's yet are observable throughout the following 
decades, for example, socio-economic strands or anti-security forces/British army 
campaigns. 
The first few years of the 1970's were arguably the most destructive and violent 
years of the entire Troubles, and therefore, it is not surprising that the party's early 
posters reflect this period: `End British Terror', `Support the Republican 
Movement' (PPOO181) presents a gory image in which the skull and crossbones, a 
traditional emblem of death, is saturated in blood from the British Union Jack. 
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Anti-security forces (and anti-British army) sentiment was widespread in 
republican communities during the early 70's, as one poster (PP00925) highlights 
with a selection of photographs of individuals (presumably Catholics) being 
attacked by the (presumably Protestant) police force, with the accompanying title 
`RUC Out. ' 
Whilst the image - PA0067 - of a computer mouse-pad is from the 1990's, it is 
important because it highlights the `University of Freedom: Long Kesh, est. 1971. ' 
The `university' refers to the tendency of many republicans to use their time in 
prison to debate political strategy and ideology, to read widely and write 
prolifically. It was established in 1971 (when there was a massive influx of 
Catholic prisoners into Long Kesh) mainly as a result of the introduction of 
internment without trial on 9th August of that same year. 
The strong socialist strand or orientation of Republican thinking was also evident in 
the posters from the 70's, as highlighted by one calling `For a Socialist Republic. ' 
(PPOO167) The quotation (the poster's two separate quotations should be read as 
one) asserts - `In the long run the freedom of a nation is measured by the freedom of 
its lowest class; every upward step of that class to the possibility of possessing 
higher things raises the standard of the nation in the scale of civilisation. ' 
Other socialist posters highlighted: `The social and Economic Programme of Sinn 
Fein . Buy 
it - Read it - and work for a New Ireland' (PP00416) and also `Eire 
Nua. Workers' Co-operative Enterprise will re-distribute wealth' (PP00296). 
Adopted by the party in January 1971, the `Eire Nua' or `New Ireland' policy 
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proposed that Ireland should be a federal state based on regional governance for the 
four historic provinces of Ulster, Munster, Leinster and Connaught. Publicity 
material of the time included images of scales and doves, usually accompanied by 
the slogan `peace with justice'; the `N' in `Eire Nua' is seemingly a dove in flight, 
and one poster portrays an image of hands with broken chains reaching into the air 
symbolising freedom (PP00306). 
Although the 70's were characterised by extreme violence, it is evident that Sinn 
Fein's political communication was not totally devoid of peaceful intent, such as: 
`Peace with Justice -A British withdrawal, A new Ireland negotiated by the Irish 
people themselves, A general amnesty for all political prisoners. Support these 
demands for a just and lasting peace. ' (PPO0300) This poster was probably 
produced around the time of the IRA's 1975 ceasefire and implies that peace 
without justice is futile. It is interesting that this poster may not have seemed out of 
place in the 1990's when Sinn Fein used the slogan of `A New Ireland' to signify a 
willingness to negotiate with unionists. 
However, 1970's posters showed more of a willingness to attack other politicians, 
political parties and indeed the governmental institutions themselves. The poster 
`No Return to Stormont' (PP00912) was probably promoted during the June 1973 
Assembly election campaign with Sinn Fein abstaining and bitterly opposed to any 
partial settlement. Memories of the hated pre-1972 Stormont government are 
evoked, and it is John Hume, rather than the SDLP leader of the time, Gerry Fitt, 
who is viewed as co-conspirator with UUP leader, Brian Faulkner, although from a 
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unionist perspective, Hume was the more overtly nationalist of the SDLP 
politicians. 
In addition to `No Return to Stormont' Sinn Fein also called for a boycott of the 
Northern Ireland Convention elections held in 1975: `For Ireland's sake, Boycott 6 
county elections, We want 32' (PP00853). The refusal to participate in `six county' 
political assemblies continued until the development of the peace process in the 
90's. 
Of final note, other images from the 70's highlighted how innovative the party 
could be, such as the development of a Sinn Fein Christmas postal service: `The 
Republican Postal Service has been in operation each Christmas since 1975. Every 
year the motif on the stamps reflects a different aspect of the struggle by the Irish 
people for National Self-Determination' (PA0262). It was Derry Sinn Fein who 
established the Christmas postal service, a practice that its Belfast counterpart 
quickly imitated. This original idea (traditional stamps having the `Queen's Head' 
insignia) served the purpose of both highlighting the party's anti-establishment 
views and questioning the legitimacy of the `state' in which they lived. 
THE 80's 
Moving into the 1980's, Sinn Fein political posters highlighted emerging 
developments that included - electoral communication (that became prominent for 
the first time), censorship and the `Broadcasting Ban', and a new internationalist 
perspective. Other themes or images, which were prominent in the 70's continued 
to be visible throughout the 80's, including campaigns on social issues and posters 
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attacking security forces and the British army. Also, as Sinn Fein became more 
immersed in the electoral process, the party stepped up its attacks on rival 
politicians and parties. 
Sinn Fein entered the electoral affray (after a hiatus of just over 25 years) in 1981 
with the success of hunger striker Bobby Sands who became MP for the 
constituency of Fermanagh/South Tyrone only weeks before he died. 
Standing on the traditional Republican abstentionist platform for the 1982 Northern 
Ireland Assembly election, the party's key slogan was: `Break the British 
connection! Smash Stormont! Vote Sinn Fein - For a new leadership and a 
principled Irish stand' (PP00854). It was produced for the West Belfast 
constituency where Gerry Adams topped the poll and was duly elected. 
Another poster produced for the 1982 Assembly elections incorporated the message 
`Sinn Fein : One Ireland, one people - the only alternative. Vote No. 1 Morrison' 
(PP00864). At that time, Danny Morrison was Sinn Fein Director of Publicity. 
Only a year earlier, Morrison had famously told the party's Ard Fheis `with an 
armalite in one hand and a ballot paper in the other, we will take power in Ireland. ' 
(cited in Taylor, 1998, p. 282) 
A simplistic `Sinn Fein' poster (PP00921) was produced for the 1983 Westminster 
general election featuring the party emblem or logo with the stylised letters 'SF' and 
the island of Ireland on a white background. For the same election, a poster 
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incorporating the text: `Sinn Fein winning seats would worry me - Thatcher. Give 
her a headache. Vote Adams X' was also developed. Gerry Adams became MP for 
West Belfast and subsequently party leader in 1983, also the year Alex Maskey 
became the first member of the party to take a Belfast City Council seat since 1920. 
By the 1989 District Council elections, Sinn Fein 's 2.6 per cent lead in terms of 
first preference votes over its political rival, the SDLP, enabled the party to claim: 
`Sinn Fein is the largest Nationalist party in Belfast: Standing up to Loyalism. 
Setting the pace. For proper representation strengthen your voice. Vote Sinn Fein' 
(PPO0914). 
A ban on the broadcasting of direct statements by representatives of Sinn Fein and 
a number of other organisations was introduced in October 1988. The ban proved 
counter-productive and only served to increase foreign interest, particularly in the 
statements of Sinn Fein . The poster `End Censorship' (PPO 1887) promoted a 1989 
march against the ban, which was lifted in September 1994, two weeks after the 
declaration of the August IRA ceasefire. An additional poster of the time opposing 
censorship - `Fight Censorship' (PP00299) provided a stylistic and visually striking 
image of red lips on a white background. 
The late 80's was a period in which Sinn Fein 's new internationalist perspective 
emerged, as evident in posters like `Stop the Zionist Holocaust! Support the 
Palestinians! ' (PP00440). Here the Middle East is acknowledged - an argument 
that the discrimination that had been inflicted upon the Jews in the 1930s was now 
being inflicted by the Jews themselves upon the Palestinians. 
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On the social front, one of the ways in which Sinn Fein built up its power base in 
the 80's was to offer advice on welfare issues, as seen in the poster `Sinn Fein 
urges you to claim now! ' (PP00467). The increase in `means-testing' meant that 
those who were less well off did not claim state benefits that they were entitled to, 
and as such, Sinn Fein advice would have been invaluable. 
The poster `Keep Your Health Service. Fight The Cuts. ' (PP00373) also 
highlighted the party's continued interest in social issues, in this case opposing cuts 
to the health service. 
As in 70's posters, throughout the 80's, Sinn Fein posters continued with the theme 
of outright resistance to the security forces (RUCIUDR) and the British army. The 
poster `RUC UFF UVF UDR' (PP0045 1), highlights alleged collusion between the 
security forces and loyalist paramilitary organisations, with the initials RUC and 
UDR interlined with those of the UFF and UVF. 
`The Loyalist mUrDeRers' (PP00397) also highlights the letters UDR (Ulster 
Defence Regiment) in the word murderers, and accuses the locally recruited 
regiment of committing a range of crimes against Catholics. The flag behind which 
the men are posing, features the Ulster Vanguard symbol. The Vanguard Unionist 
Party (of which a young David Trimble amongst others aligned himself) had close 
links to the loyalist paramilitary Ulster Defence Association. 
Other Sinn Fein posters specifically related to the British Army presence and 
highlighted some traditional republican rhetoric. `The writing on the wall. ' 
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(PP00376) features a poem from Patrick Galvin entitled, `Letter to a British Soldier 
on Irish Soil' that concludes: `Go home, soldier. Your presence here, Destroys the 
air, Your smile disfigures us. Go home, soldier; Before we send you home, Dead'. 
Whilst not as explicit, `Discover Occupied Ireland' (PP00458), parodies a similar 
tourist board campaign entitled, `Discover Ireland', the former featuring a series of 
photographs showing the British army and the RUC in aggressive postures. 
Other themes or posters that spilled over from the 70's into the 80's included those 
that attacked politicians and political parties. `Don't compromise, vote Sinn Fein' 
(PP00903), was an early 80's poster that made an indirect attack on the nationalist 
credentials of John Hume and the SDLP. The use of a photograph of Hume 
standing behind a podium with the unionist name `Londonderry' rather than the 
nationalist name `Derry', accused Hume and his party of being `compromisers. ' A 
similar poster made much the same point: `Would you vote for the Londonderry 
branch of the SDLP? ' (PP00909). 
Another poster that attacks a politician (PP02608) comes from the aftermath of the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 when there was an upsurge in the number of 
Loyalist killings of Catholics, with Sinn Fein attempting to link some of the murders 
to comments by Ian Paisley who said on 240` June 1986:, "I give notice to the NIO, 
if a Protestant backlash is the only thing that can destroy the Anglo-Irish Agreement 
then I will not stand in its way. " 
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Of final importance (in 80's posters) evidence of conventional fundraising methods 
such as `Sinn Fein Election Fund: National Collection' (PP01536) and `Sinn Fein 
200 club' (PP00427), challenges the presumption by some of Sinn Fein's political 
opponents that it raised all its local funds by illegal means. 
THE 90's 
Moving into the 1990's, the most palpable difference in Sinn Fein political 
communication (as evidenced in the political posters), was the emergence of a more 
conciliatory rhetoric or discourse - in many respects correlating with the `peace 
process' that gained momentum throughout the `90's. An example of this is that the 
harsh rhetoric evident in anti-security-forces posters of the early `90's was 
significantly `toned down' by the end of the decade. 
During the `90's, Sinn Fein aligned themselves more closely with Nelson Mandela 
and the African National Congress (ANC), as part of their strategy of 
internationalising the republican struggle. In addition, the issue of prisoners became 
a dominating theme of republican posters in the aftermath of the IRA's 1994 
ceasefire. 
Yet, some themes remained consistent throughout the '70's, 80's and `90's, for 
example the party continued to campaign on socio-economic issues during the 
peace process. Not unrelated to the party's `on-the-ground' work, Sinn Fein's 
growing electoral confidence also became evident throughout the 190's, whereby the 
party emerged from what could be best described as a dormant electoral state into a 
recognised political force. 
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Recruiting members 
Some early 90's posters demonstrated the party's attempts to widen or increase its 
membership, including: `Join Sinn Fein' (PPO0317). The quote used in the poster: 
"Everyone, republican or otherwise, has their own particular part to play. No part is 
too great or too small, no one is too old or too young to do something" is from the 
hunger striker Bobby Sands. His portrait, along with examples of his writing or 
poetry, was not uncommon in republican posters since his death in 1981, in this case 
his memory was evoked as republican icon or martyr and utilised to recruit 
members into the party from within the Catholic/nationalist community. 
Anniversaries 
While on the issue of evoking the past, an analysis of Sinn Fein posters would 
certainly be incomplete without reference to those posters that commemorate 
turning points in republican history, for example, anniversaries of the 1916 Easter 
Rising, Bloody Sunday, internment etc. One 1995 poster (PP00261) advertised the 
anti-interment march where Gerry Adams responded to a heckler demanding that 
the IRA break its eleventh-month ceasefire with the riposte: `They [the IRA] 
haven't gone away you know'. This riposte was to be repeated consistently by the 
party's political opponents for many subsequent years as evidence of continuing 
IRA activity while `supposedly' on ceasefire. 
Social campaigns 
As in the 70's and 80's, social campaigns were also an integral component of party 
political communication as the 90's progressed, including `Save the RVH [Royal 
Victoria Hospital]' (PP00466) and `Save our Hospital Services. Support the 
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workers. Support the health service. Join the fight to save our hospital' (PP00343). 
The party fought vigorously against any British government cuts in Northern 
Ireland's public services, none more so than for the RVH which is situated in 
Catholic West Belfast and one of the major employers in an area where Sinn Fein 
has widespread support. 
Other social campaigns related to drugs abuse, as the problem became more 
common in the 90's in both parts of Ireland. The party began to develop a proactive 
anti-drugs strategy, particularly in urban areas of Belfast and Dublin, as one poster 
highlights: `Smash the drug rings' (PP00398). 
Internationalising the struggle & the issue of Prisoners 
The internationalisation of the struggle continued throughout the early 90's as 
evident in the poster `FREEDOM' (PP00462). The quote included in the poster is 
from Nelson Mandela: "Our resort to armed struggle was purely a defensive 
action... The factor that necessitated the armed struggle still exists today. We have 
no option but to continue... We have waited too long for freedom. " The 
Republican Movement's close ties with the African National Congress (ANC) are 
illustrated here with an array of anti-apartheid and Irish Republican symbols and the 
inclusion of the iconic figures of both Mandela and Bobby Sands. Republicans 
have always been keen to emphasise their links with the internationally respected 
Mandela and to draw similarities between the widely popular anti-apartheid 
campaign and their own struggle for `freedom'. 
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In the immediate aftermath of the 1994 IRA ceasefire, the issue of prisoner releases 
became central to the party's short to medium term strategy. The establishment of 
Saoirse (a Sinn Fein-related organisation, translated as `Freedom') on 30th 
November 1994 illustrated their objective: `Free the Prisoners: A march for 
Freedom' (PP00209). Indeed this was Saoirse's first march, organised with the 
help of Sinn Fein. The lark, viewed by republicans as the bird of freedom, features 
prominently on many similar posters. 
By 1997, Sinn Fein made attempts to compare Mandela (imprisoned for twenty- 
seven years by the apartheid regime) with Irish Republican prisoners Eddie Butler, 
Joe O'Connell, Harry Duggan, and Hugh Doherty; `We have our Nelson Mandela's. 
22 years in English prisons. Release them now! ' (PPO1247). Known collectively 
as the `Balcombe Street Four' or the `Balcombe Street Gang', the republican 
prisoners were part of an IRA unit that was highly active in London in the 70's 
before being captured after a dramatic siege in which the gang took a couple 
hostage in Balcombe Street. 
Censorship and the Broadcasting Ban (1988-94) 
As in the latter years of the 1980's, early 90's posters were replete with messages 
that protested against the broadcasting ban on Sinn Fein . As the `peace process' 
developed however, their political messages became more conciliatory, as evident 
in the poster `Oppose Censorship' (PPO1945). It features a nationalist/republican 
(in the green, white and gold of the Irish Tricolour) gagged by a Union Jack. It is 
only when he or she is helped to release the gag that he or she can speak in favour of 
peace (as represented by a dove). 
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Sinn Fein were quite capable of adapting to some precarious situations and their 
difficulties surrounding the broadcasting ban (that excluded them from conventional 
broadcasting media) meant that the party needed to create novel ways or channels 
through which they could get their political message across. The posters `Kool SF. 
Sinn Mn Radio 106 FM. ' (PP00442) and `Cool SF 106 FM. St. Valentines Day... ' 
(PP00443) advertise a Sinn Fein pirate radio station, modelled on the local Belfast 
commercial radio station `Cool FM'. Spelt sometimes beginning with a `C' and at 
other times with a `K' one of the posters promotes the station, which `Will be on the 
air Saturday 24th April, with uncensored news and views from West Belfast. ' 
Marketing 
Sinn Fein also began to use their ingenuity by marketing an emerging `brand' 
(mostly to the Irish-American audience) that would help bring funds into the party. 
An image of three mugs (PA0106), from the early to mid 90's, features three 
different messages that the party was keen to emphasise. On one mug, Gerry 
Adams posed in front of the conjoined flags of Ireland and the USA. On another, a 
Robert Ballagh painting produced to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of 
the arrival of British troops in Derry in 1969, said simply `slan abhaile' (safe home) 
to the British soldiers and declared that it was `time for peace. ' The final mug 
featured Gerry Adams shaking the hand of Nelson Mandela. 
Attacks on the SDLP 
Despite the reduction in political violence from 1994 onwards, a number of disputes 
between the Orange Order and local Catholic residents over the routes of Protestant 
marches poisoned community relations. During the 1996 Drumcree dispute the 
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RUC forcefully removed nationalist protestors from the Garvaghy Road in order to 
allow Portadown Orangemen to proceed through the nationalist area. The poster 
`1969 - Nationalist rights did not exist. 1996 - Nationalist rights do not exist' 
(PP00267), provided an argument by Sinn Fein that reform within the UK has not 
improved nationalists' lot. The poster is also a jibe at the constitutional nationalist 
party, the SDLP and was intended to appeal to SDLP supporters, whose core 
argument was that their party's constructive engagement with the British State had 
improved the lot of nationalists since the start of the Troubles. Yet, for Republicans 
`nothing had changed' and the approach taken by Hume and his colleagues was a 
flawed one. Essentially, this type of poster continued in the same vein as 1980's 
posters that claimed the SDLP were `compromisers'. 
Anti-`security forces' and the British Army 
The changes in the republican lexicon from the early to late 90's are most apparent 
when analysing anti-security forces/RUC/UDR/British army posters. For example, 
one 1990 poster attacks the UDR for crimes against nationalists - `20 years of death 
squads: disband the mUrDerRrs' (PP00452). It also states that: `While playing a 
major role within the British war machine the UDR is also engaged in `unofficial' 
activities including murder, attempted murder, bombings and supplying weapons 
and intelligence files on nationalists to loyalist paramilitaries. ' The poster portrays 
the UDR and loyalist paramilitaries as different sides of the same coin while the 
skull and `bleeding' Union Jack reflect images used in more extreme early 70's 
posters. 
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Yet, by the mid 90's there was a toning down of rhetoric and no mention of 
`murderers' or the inclusion of extreme images, as evident in the poster: `Time to 
build. Disband the RUC now' (PPO3147). The text of the poster explained that 
when the force was formed on June Pt 1922; `It was made up of some 2,000 
members of its equally infamous predecessor, the RIC, and recruits from the Ulster 
Volunteer Force. The UVF was formed by loyalists to deny by force of arms the 
Irish people's democratic wish for Home Rule. Its objective a Protestant parliament 
for a Protestant people was granted by the British when they imposed partition and 
announced elections for a parliament at Stormont. Since 1922 the paramilitary RUC 
has existed to defend that objective. Its members have always been above the rule of 
law'. Another poster - `Disband the RUC' (PP00243) depicts an RUC policeman 
wearing an Orange sash - implying that the force is inherently sectarian. 
Essentially, the disbandment of the RUC has been a key demand from republicans 
since the IRA's 1994 ceasefire - one equally opposed by unionists - and was one of 
the major difficulties associated with the implementation of the Good Friday 
Agreement. 
Sinn Fein Peace /Election Communication 
The most palpable difference in the political posters of the 1990's (as opposed to the 
previous two decades) was the progressive move away or shift from traditional 
Republican rhetoric towards a conciliatory discourse - in more or less a direct 
correlation with the peace process as it gained momentum. 
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As evidence of this shift, by the early 90's the word `peace' had become more 
prominent in party posters, for example: `Sinn Fein - Public Meeting: "Towards a 
lasting peace in Ireland" ' (PP00208). Sinn Fein also launched the document 
`Towards a lasting peace in Ireland' in February 1992 and it marked a significant 
shift in their traditional position, hinting that the move towards a united Ireland 
could be preceded by interim measures to allay Unionist fears. It also called on the 
Irish government, Fianna Fail, and the SDLP to pressurise the British government 
into making concessions. 
This phrase from their policy document was also incorporated into election material, 
as in `Towards a lasting peace. Votail Martin Mc Guinness' (PP00836a&b) 
produced for the 1992 Westminster general election. In line with the party's peace 
strategy the poster explained `We are not asking people to vote for an armed 
struggle. We are asking you to accept our analysis that a peace process that goes to 
the heart of the problem - the partition of Ireland - must begin now. An increased 
vote for Sinn Fein will accelerate that process, and make everyone face a new 
reality. ' The reverse of the poster also highlighted the party's position on a variety 
of issues including discrimination, housing, jobs, women, the environment and 
political talks. 
By 1993, the growing confidence of a political party `on the rise' was evident in 
posters including `Our city also. Nationalist rights march to Belfast City Hall' 
(PP00457). `Our city also' was a phrase employed by Sinn Fein to indicate its 
desire for the nationalist and unionist populations to share the traditionally 
Protestant city of Belfast. This was due in part recognition of the growing 
154 
numerical and political strength of Catholics/nationalists/republicans in the city, and 
part reflection of the way in which Sinn Fein was modifying its traditional 
Republican rhetoric as the peace process developed. That this was the first ever 
republican rally to be held outside Belfast City Hall was an indication of how power 
was shifting in the city, and by the late 90's Sinn Mn had in fact become the largest 
political party in Belfast. 
From January to March 1994, the party publicised hearings to be held in Derry, 
Dublin, Galway, Cork and Belfast as part of an overall `Sinn Fein Peace 
Commission' (PP00256). As part of a long consultation exercise, it highlighted 
(amongst other points) that: `A number of submissions, 85 or 37% believed that 
Sinn Fein should encourage the IRA to call a unilateral cease-fire; or a cessation of 
offensive military operations; or initiate a three month cease-fire to enter 
negotiations' (Sinn Fein, 1994). 
Subsequently, the IRA called a ceasefire only a matter of months later on the 31St 
August 1994. Yet, in the ensuing months republicans felt that the British 
government was stalling over the convening of all-party talks, as highlighted in the 
poster `Seize the opportunity for peace' (PP00249). Shortly after August `94, the 
British government insisted that republicans declare their ceasefire `permanent'. 
Only a matter of months later (although that demand was dropped), a more serious 
demand would create difficulties for (at least) a further decade: that the IRA, and 
indeed loyalist paramilitaries, should `decommission' their weapons. 
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The insistence of, or importance placed upon, the issue of decommissioning, meant 
that the transition from conflict to peace would be fraught with difficulty. Although 
some Sinn Fein political posters highlighted the contradictory notions of change 
and continuity together, such as `The Past - Partition and Conflict. The Future - 
Unity and Peace' (PP00387), on closer inspection, a break with the past would not 
be as seamless as the title implied. Textually, the poster appeared to suggest a clear 
break with the `past' and a different 'future' (using an photograph of a child) 
brought about as a result of Sinn Fein's peace strategy. However, the use of the 
very traditional green, white and gold frame, and large Irish Tricolour, served to 
reassure their own constituency that fundamentals were not going to be abandoned. 
Indeed other posters from the early to mid 90's such as `Peace Through British 
Withdrawal' (PP00255), were evidence that republicans continued at times to use a 
mix of both traditional and conciliatory rhetoric, asserting that peace could only be 
achieved in Ireland through a British withdrawal from the North. 
By 1995, Sinn Fein were claiming that it had the `best electorate', was the `best 
party', had the `best members' and called for `equality for all'; as evident in the text 
of the poster `Sinn Fein . Cothromas Do Chach (Equality for All)' (PP00240). 
The aforementioned republican/nationalist confidence-building theme of `Our city 
also' was also continued in an invitation and transcript of the first page of Martin 
McGuinness' speech at the Ulster Hall in November 1995 (PA0278) entitled `ALL 
PARTY TALKS NOW! What's Happening in The Peace Process. ' In his speech he 
called for all-party talks to begin as soon as possible, and highlighted that this was 
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the first occasion that Sinn Fein had held a meeting in the Unionist citadel: `This 
hall is particularly synonymous with unionism and everything unionist. We are 
conscious of this. We have not come here to provoke or antagonise. What we are 
saying loud and clearly is that this city belongs to all the people who live here, and 
this building, just like our City Hall, is our Ulster Hall also! ' 
Although Sinn Fein were showing obvious signs of confidence by the end of 1995, 
they were also sceptical and seemed at times disillusioned with the whole `peace 
process'. The poster `All-Party Talks Now! 1969 Civil Rights, 1995 National 
Rights' (PPOO199), encapsulates the mood within republicanism at this juncture. 
Angered by what they perceived as vacillation by the British government, Sinn Fein 
demanded all-party talks without preconditions as well as an escalation in the 
British government's demilitarisation programme. By early 1996, there had still 
been no talks involving all the political parties in Northern Ireland - undoubtedly a 
contributory factor in the breakdown of the IRA ceasefire on 9th February 1996. 
The poster includes a declaratory `No' by John Major, obviously intended to convey 
the message that the British prime minister of the time favoured unionists (who 
were famous for saying `No') over nationalists. 
By May 1996, as minds were focused (in the aftermath of the breakdown in the 
ceasefire) towards a negotiation process, the message on Sinn Fein's voting card 
(and on many posters) for the Northern Ireland Forum/Entry to Negotiations 
elections, was simple, `Votail do Shiochan. Votail Sinn Fein' (PA0282). This Irish 
language card translates as `Vote for Peace, Vote Sinn Fein ' This election was 
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called to choose the political parties who would negotiate what would eventually 
culminate in the Good Friday Agreement. 
With thoughts in mind of imminent negotiations about to begin, one Sinn Fein 
poster of the period entitled `Stormont District Council' (PP00228), demonstrated 
republican contempt for the idea of a new Northern Ireland Assembly at Stormont, 
which they viewed dismissively as a `District Council. ' 
Throughout the 1990's, the popular phrase `a new opportunity for peace' factored 
into a great deal of party political communication. Employed as early as 1993 for 
the title of a press conference in Brussels by the then National Party Chairperson of 
Sinn Mn, Tom Hartley, the slogan later constituted the title of Sinn Fein's election 
manifesto for the May 1997 Westminster general election - `Sinn Fein. New 
opportunity for Peace' (PPOO159). At this juncture, the slogan referred to the belief 
among Republicans in 1997 that John Major's small majority in government was 
hampering their efforts to deliver a second IRA ceasefire. Their thinking was that a 
decisive result for either the Conservatives or Labour would secure an IRA ceasefire 
and Sinn Fein's entry into all-party talks, thereby giving the peace process 
additional and much needed momentum. In the event, Sinn Fein's vote, at 16.1%, 
was the highest since 1955, Tony Blair's Labour party also secured a 179-seat 
majority, the IRA restored its ceasefire on 20`h July 1997 and Sinn Fein were 
allowed to join the `talks' in September of that year. 
In the Republic of Ireland's general election of the same year, Bertie Ahern's 
Fianna Fäil also triumphed, and the election was important for Sinn Fein for the 
158 
reason that Caoimhgin O'Caolain (with his party's support) broke with the 
republican abstentionist tradition in southern politics by taking his seat in the Dail. 
The poster `Sinn Fein '97' (PP00283) included Gerry Adams and Martin 
McGuinness along with Lucilita Breathnach as they celebrated his victory. 
By November '97, only two months after the party had joined the multi-party talks 
process, one Sinn Fein poster promoted a `Rally for A UNITED IRELAND. What 
is happening in the PEACE PROCESS. What is happening at the STORMONT 
TALKS. If you want to find out, be at THE EUROPA HOTEL at 7pm on Sunday 
23`d November. The rally will be addressed by the SINN FEIN LEADERSHIP. ' 
(PP00281). The rally was clearly intended to reassure Sinn Fein supporters that 
republican principles were not being sacrificed during the course of negotiations, 
highlighting that the leadership were attempting to keep its grassroots informed and 
`on-board'. 
Only months before the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, one Sinn 
Fein poster stated `No British Veto in the Irish Constitution. Support Articles 2 and 
3' (PPO0176). One of the key areas of debate during the talks that led to the 
Agreement was unionists' objection to the Irish Republic's territorial claim to 
Northern Ireland - contained in Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution. As such, 
republicans were opposed to tampering with the Irish Constitution and ultimately to 
the claim being dropped. 
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(V) The Media 
In 1926, Gerald Beadle was appointed the first station director in Belfast of BBC 
Northern Ireland (BBC NI). In March of the following year he wrote to his 
superior, Lord Reith: "I am sure that our position here will be strengthened 
immensely if we can persuade the Northern Government to look upon us as their 
mouthpiece. " " 
For over four decades the BBC and significant elements of the media in Northern 
Ireland kept silent the story of unionist discrimination against their nationalist 
neighbours. It was only when the `Troubles' broke out in the late 1960's that the 
media's inadequacies were finally `exposed'. According to former BBC political 
editor, Stephen Grimason, the media in Northern Ireland had acted outrageously and 
disgracefully in this forty-year period (Interview with author, 20 March, 2003). 
When a new (and questioning) generation of journalists emerged (Grimason 
included), they were subsequently berated and adjudged anti-unionist by the old 
guard: 
The relationship with the media here wasn't good particularly on the unionist side for such a 
long time because there was mistrust. You know, that sort of comment that "There wouldn't 
have been any trouble here if it hadn't been for the media", that sort of nonsense - "You were 
either for us or against us". And the problem for the media was that before 1968, significant 
elements of the media here kept this story quiet, outrageously and disgracefully. So what you 
13 cited in Rex Cathcart, 12BE consolidates: the early years of the BBC in Northern Ireland; in Bill 
Rolston and David Miller (eds) War and Words: The Northern Ireland Media Reader, Beyond the 
Pale publications, 1996 
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had happening was people like me coming through in the 70's, early to mid 70's, and we 
tilted at the old guard. And because of that, the media was seen as anti-unionist because you 
would expose things that were going on... any criticism of the government was implicitly and 
explicitly a criticism of unionism. So unionists, unaware that this type of media was now 
coming at them, thought we were all a bunch of republicans. Within unionist circles, being a 
journalist was not seen as a good thing to do, it was seen as "You're not one of us" or "You're 
either for us or against us". There was a big battle that went on in journalism for a number of 
years through the late 60's and early 70's. It was won obviously by the new generation, it 
was going to be anyway, but you can see how that affects unionism today, particularly UUC 
(Ulster Unionist Council) people who are all in their seventies anyway, they didn't like it. 
There is a chill factor around all of that and the media was seen as something that was dark 
and unpleasant. Half the population didn't engage with it and if you looked at the nature of 
where the young journalists were coming from and through [the Catholic/nationalist 
community], there was a definite balance going one direction and the other, in terms of the 
community here. Now that's turned around again but for a while, there were quite significant 
battles fought over all of that (Ibid. ). 
Grimason highlights that half of the population (that is, unionists) were mistrustful 
and reluctant to engage with the `new' media. Yet suspicions increased further to 
include republicans who also became distrustful of the `new' media in their own 
right (particularly after the IRA entered the equation in the early 70's). As British 
military and political engagement increased, a philosophy of `terrorism as cause' 
won the day over `discrimination as cause' as definer of the conflict in the dominant 
media and political minds (Butler 1995, p. 63). 
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Toeing the establishment line? 
In November 1971, following a speech in which the minister for posts and 
telegraphs, Christopher Chataway, stated that "as between the IRA and the Ulster 
government or between the army and the terrorists" the media "were not required to 
strike a balance" (cited in Miller, 1994, p. 28), BBC Chairman, Lord Hill wrote to 
the Northern Ireland Secretary, Reginald Maudling: "between the British Army and 
the gunmen, the BBC is not and cannot be impartial" (cited in Smith, 1996, p. 3 1). 
As for the Independent Television Authority, Lord Aylestone maintained: "as far as 
I am concerned, Britain is at war with the IRA in Ulster and the IRA will get no 
more coverage than the Nazis would have done in the last war" (cited in Miller 
1994, p. 34). 
Far from safeguarding the `fourth estate', such partisan viewpoints allowed a severe 
question mark to be placed over the exercise of journalistic freedom and media 
independence. Indeed, the whole idea of the noble institution of the British media 
as the trusted `fourth estate' (wherein notions of balance and impartiality are core 
elements of its constitution) became seriously undermined by their coverage of 
Northern Ireland. As Schlesinger et al argued: 
The coverage of Northern Irish Affairs in the British media has tended to simplify violent 
incidents, to avoid historical background, to concentrate on human-interest stories and to rely 
heavily on official sources. Even during periods of the most intense constitutional activity, 
such as election campaigns, the story has been pre-eminently one of violence, and of 
irrational, inexplicable violence at that (1983, p. 37). 
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Curtis also drew similar conclusions to those of Schlesinger et al: - 
The record of the British media coverage of Ireland has been far from heroic. Those in 
positions of power, both in government and in the media, have proved most reluctant to 
provide a full picture of events in the North or their government, and have made 
considerable efforts to prevent journalists, dramatists and film-makers from exploring the 
situation from any angle other than that favoured by the British establishment (1984, p. 275). 
i 
The British government ensured that the media was `brought into line' by utilising a 
number of approaches. These included indirect censorship via pressure, 
intimidation and the use of the law (Miller, 1994). Yet, the most `public' approach 
utilised by the British government was direct censorship under the 1988 
Broadcasting Ban. This was introduced to stop short the `oxygen of publicity' 
allegedly gained by paramilitary groups and their political wings (most notably the 
IRA and Sinn Fein). 
If none of the above approaches worked to the British government's satisfaction, the 
use of misinformation, lies and black propaganda were all weapons in the 
government's armament in its battle for `hearts and minds'(Ibid. ). A former 
director of information at the British government's Northern Ireland Office, David 
Gilliland, admitted to having issued "flat denials" on controversial issues during the 
1970's and 80's: "I didn't resent the fact that we were blamed for telling lies, " as he 
understood that the government had wanted "to manipulate the media and use it as a 
weapon in the arsenal" against the paramilitaries. 14 
14' British Official Admits Lying', Irish Independent, August 29,1994 
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Indeed, Miller's (1994) study examined governmental attempts to control and shape 
media coverage, establishing that the government and its agencies were 
collaborating in organised forms of overt and covert propaganda and that they 
tended to dominate and influence journalists and ultimately the news coverage. It is 
not that the media were simple `dupes' of the government and its agencies, but that 
they failed to adequately question the `primary definers' or `official sources'. 
It seems reasonable to contend that during the Troubles, the media in Northern 
Ireland were reluctant to strongly question some of the motives and actions of the 
British government. On occasion, they simply and subserviently reflected 
government policy. BBC political correspondent, Martina Purdy, highlights this 
point in relation to the media's treatment of Sinn Fein, both before and after the 
August 1994 ceasefire (indeed, two weeks later the British government lifted the 
Broadcasting Ban): 
The media didn't change - government policy changed and the media just tends to reflect 
what the government of the day is saying. Pre-ceasefires, the republicans and the loyalists 
were pariahs. But after the ceasefires, government policy changed, so the media had to start 
reflecting that. If Martin McGuinness and Gerry Adams could go to Downing Street for tea 
and buns, we couldn't turn them away from a studio interview. And also you had to be a 
little more polite. I think the relationships with the paramilitary parties changed. It became 
more open and less guarded to the degree that you could be friendlier. They were more 
accepted. That made it easier for Sinn Fein, for example, to get its messages across and to 
get access (Interview with author, 6 June 2002). 
The recognition that the media tend to reflect government policy and that British 
journalism has been systematically orientated towards a British government 
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perspective permeates much of the literature on the media and the conflict in 
Northern Ireland. To acknowledge a phrase used by Thomas, it became apparent 
that the British media `toe the establishment line' (cited in Butler, 1995: 122). Yet 
for Purdy, this phrase is much too simplistic. Whilst the perception remained that 
the media seemed on occasion to `toe the establishment line', this phrase discounted 
the fact that it does have a mind of its own: 
The government of the day is very, very powerful in setting the media agenda. Now the 
media does have a mind of it's own, it is not completely taking fishes. But if the Prime 
Minister says something, it's newsworthy. It's much more newsworthy than when Joe 
Bloggs says: "It's time to talk". So when the PM is treating Sinn Fein in a certain way and 
is taking a line that "Yes, we have to do business with these people", it's very hard for the 
media to resist that because we are not really meant to take sides so we start reflecting 
government policy. (Interview with author, 6 June, 2002) 
Other journalists and editors believed that it was simply wrong to level such an 
accusation (that is, that they `toe the establishment line') against the media, such as 
Mark Devenport, (who, like Purdy, understood the accusation to be too simplistic): 
No, no, it is certainly not something that you could put against the media. I mean remember 
Eamon Mallie broke the story about secret contact between the government and the IRA 
prior to the Agreement and that was very much against the establishment line. You have 
people, like Eamon, who is known in the media pack as being very much a `hands-on guy', 
who will chip away at things both in press conferences and elsewhere. You know, 
hopefully the rest of us are working to try to establish what the story is. I think it is 
simplistic to say the media `toes the establishment line' but at the same time what happens 
with information is that there are people who are the gatekeepers of information. They have 
in their possession a bit of information that you want which will make your story, so at 
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certain times, stories may come out which appear to reflect the government agenda or the 
Unionist agenda... I don't think that you can say that `across the board' there is any one 
media who act as a morass. Instead, you have got lots of different journalists with different 
kinds of contacts (Interview with author, 6 June 2002). 
The insinuation that the media as a morass, or indeed individual journalists, `toe the 
establishment line', is a slur not only on their profession but also on their 
independence and is often strongly rejected, as Grimason pointed out: 
I think people mistake `toeing the line' for lazy journalism. There are a number of 
journalists who want to be spoon-fed and I think that is outrageous, I never did. On various 
occasions I have been accused in previous employ of trying to wreck the peace process and 
just said: "bugger off'. People have gone the whole way to the top of the BBC to try and 
have me sacked... that's normal, that's what a journalist expects, most journalists have had 
that. Because I was the BBC's political editor I got the `toeing the establishment line' 
nonsense... "Check the track record", that's what I'll say. It's very easy to come up with 
nice pithy generalisations by people who have never done it. Fine, but come up with the 
evidence. Don't actually give us vitriol. The polemicist is king in this country. Give us the 
facts, give us the figures, show us where we got it wrong (Interview with author, 20 March, 
2003). 
In defence of the profession to which he has devoted a great part of his life, 
Grimason is adamant that it is more a case of a few bad apples in an otherwise 
healthy cart: 
There will be times when we will have gotten it wrong but it's not because people are toeing 
the line, it's bad journalism, lazy journalism, mistaken, stupid journalism. It's not because 
some people are in other peoples' pockets. Don't be daft. I'm not saying that there aren't 
journalists who are clearly in other peoples' pockets, there are, but you take the broad sweep 
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of it all, there's a lively, enquiring journalism. Nobody is going to tell me that the Irish 
News takes the establishment line, nobody. They don't always get it right... but they have a 
go and that is all you can ever ask of a journalist, that they have a go. Independent 
journalism is important to me because I don't want a supine journalism. Questioning, 
challenging journalism will always be there and should be there (Ibid. ). 
While it may be difficult to prove that journalists, editors or other media personnel 
are `in other people's pockets', it is evident that some newspapers do print verbatim 
from government press releases, as Magee maintains: "The Belfast Telegraph looks 
at times like a NIO [British Government] bulletin board" (Interview with author, 6 
June 2002). 
For reasons of journalistic pressure, lack of resources, time constraints or what 
Grimason has alluded to as `bad, lazy, mistaken, stupid journalism' there does seem 
to be a tradition (at least within some newspapers if not the broadcast media also) of 
using either government agencies' or other organisations' copy as their own. 
Indeed, one media pundit (who wished to remain anonymous) highlighted that the 
News Letter makes great use of Press Association copy and takes that agency's 
`line' on many an occasion: 
The News Letter really needs to buck up its ideas... There was a big story here yesterday 
and they took the Press Association line on it. Where's their own reporter? It's a big local 
story. I just think they need to re-focus... it just seems to have lost its way a bit (Interview 
with author). 
15 Date not provided as interviewee wished to remain anonymous. 
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Such instances highlight that whilst independent, questioning, challenging 
journalism may be the ideal, it is questionable that such an ideal is always realised. 
While journalists and certain sections of the media continue to present other 
organisations' (including the government's) copy as their own, accusations that they 
`toe the establishment line' will always be levelled. 
Amplifying Division? 
The sociologist, Anthony Giddens (1994), described how cultural diversity could 
both be a source of richness and vibrancy or of fear and violence: 
Difference can be a means of fusion of horizons; what is a potentially virtuous circle, 
however, can in some circumstances become degenerate ... 
Wherever fundamentalism takes 
hold, whether it be religious, ethnic, nationalist or gender fundamentalism, degenerate 
spirals of communication threaten (1994, p. 245). 
For people in Northern Ireland, such degenerate spirals have taken place in and 
through the media. The three regional daily newspapers and both TV stations have 
routinely elided the terms Protestant/unionist and Catholic/nationalist. As Robin 
Wilson (1997) argues: 
This not only renders secular liberals, those who otherwise define themselves as outside the 
conventional political space, those who are a-political or anti-political and those not from 
Northern Ireland (such as the substantial Chinese community) non-persons. It also flattens 
out the diversity within each religious community between more moderate and more 
extreme positions (1997, p. 6). 
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In addition to ideological labelling, physical spaces have also become defined as 
`nationalist' or `loyalist' areas in media discourse and such representations heighten 
the perception of territoriality and so the struggle for territorial control (which is at 
the heart of the parades issue, for example). Worse still, Wilson maintains: 
All Protestants and all (nominal) Catholics are hoovered up into the `unionist community' 
and the `nationalist community', whether they feel part of any such imagined community or 
not, and whether in particular they want to be protagonists for `their' side against the other 
in the way the term assumes. Thus enemy images are constructed of individuals and whole 
communities with whom media consumers may have no direct modulating contact 
whatsoever; even such direct contact as does exist between two individuals drawn from the 
two deeply segregated populations is usually of a low-level and deliberately banal character 
(Ibid. pp 5-6). 
In such a context, `degenerate spirals of communication' (Giddens 1994, p. 245) are 
triggered. Indeed, the controller of BBC NI, Pat Loughrey, understood this to be the 
case and he believed broadcasters had an obligation to communication, dialogue and 
the avoidance of easy labelling. Although he could envisage a danger of being 
accused of `escapism from the polarised truth', he stressed that the future must be 
one of true individualism rather than this collectivism, because collectivism is a way 
to tribalism and danger ... there are not just two communities (cited in Wilson 1997, 
p. 7). . 
Yet, throughout the pre-Agreement years, collectivism and tribalism have been in 
stark evidence in studio debates that more often than not have descended into 
`shouting matches' where degenerate spirals of communication abound. It can be 
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contended that over the years the broadcast media could have devised innovative 
formats or programmes and facilitated different settings in which open discussion 
and civilised dialogue could have taken place. For the former Moderator of the 
Presbyterian Church, the Rev. John Dunlop, the media had it in their power to 
facilitate more constructive and less confrontational debate: 
The [broadcast] media is too keen to get people into studios to argue with one another, 
rather than to facilitate understanding. I do enough inter-church work and cross-community 
work to know that there is a place in this society for people to quietly sit down and interpret 
themselves to other people. When I get engaged in that with many people from the 
community to which I don't belong, either republicans or nationalists, they often say to me 
after listening to what I have had to say: "I never understood it to be like that". I often talk 
about the deep-seated sense of Protestant insecurity, or unionist insecurity and how a lot of 
the negative reactions which come out of unionism, come out of that profound experience of 
insecurity. That needs to be heard. You don't hear that in a studio debate, where you get 
people head-banging one another. There's too much dedicated to facilitate people arguing 
with one another, or facilitating people who are negative without knowing what the 
constructive alternatives are. The media people say they have to be fair; they have to give a 
voice to everybody. Yet I think they could often do it in a more constructive, less 
confrontational way (Interview with author, 23 April 2001). 
To compound Dunlop's criticisms, Spencer (2000) argues that in the changing 
political climate of the peace process and the subsequent peace negotiations the 
news media became more concerned with promoting contestation: 
As political wings of paramilitary groups were absorbed into the workings of mainstream 
politics, they became subject to greater media scrutiny and were thus able to inject 
perspectives and comments which challenged dominant official viewpoints. This posed a 
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number of difficulties for dominant groups trying to use news as a means for 
communicating the direction of peace and given the growing contestations over this 
direction, the media's role became less orientated towards any dominant consensus about 
peace and more orientated towards emphasising disputes and dissensus. Or, to put it 
another way, the news media were now more concerned with promoting contestation than 
consensus (2000, p. 183). 
Highlighting the media's tendency to construct the impression of `winners' and 
`losers', politicians interviewed by Spencer concurred with a view that the media's 
propensity to reinforce differences and disagreement during the peace process and 
the subsequent peace negotiations made it difficult to generate trust and confidence 
between the opposing sides. By constructing such impressions of `winners' and 
`losers' and amplifying division, the media often contributed to a hardening of 
attitudes between groups and were thus unhelpful in relation to concentrated efforts 
at promoting peace. 
To return to Giddens' terminology, it is in assisting positive spirals of 
communication, rather than degenerate ones within Northern Ireland, that the media 
could and should have played a more positive and constructive role in the pre- 
Agreement era. 
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Summation 
Sinn Fein 
By Good Friday 1998, in terms of its communicative or public relations capabilities, 
Sinn Fein was the one political party who stood `head and shoulders' above all 
others on Northern Ireland's political stage. 
However, Sinn Fein's communications success story was not a short one. The tale 
was more reminiscent of a twenty-year old epic struggle, characterised by trial and 
error, hard work and persistence. Party Chairman, Mitchel McLaughlin, provided a 
summary version: 
I think we worked harder and maybe better than most of the parties at publicity. I think 
there is a bias, which is conditioned over twenty years of censorship. I think there are many 
fine journalists in Ireland but they have been subjected to that conditioning process. So 
sometimes there is a different interviewing technique when the Sinn Fein person is up for 
an interview. You find frequently that they're getting interrupted and that they're getting hit 
with three or four questions at the one time and sometimes its more hostile and antagonistic 
than it would be for other parties. But I don't think that it's done us any harm. You know, 
to be honest, I think we've learned in a very hard school. Sometimes people say: "where 
did Sinn Fein get its PR skills? " We had censorship, we had to disseminate our own 
information, and we had media hostilities. We had to learn to cope with that and when it 
came to lifting censorship and when it came to a more open political discourse then we were 
maybe better trained to withstand the type of inquisitions that you would get sometimes. 
On the media, I think we learned in a very hard school but that's the way it goes. I think 
maybe some people were impressed and pleasantly surprised by the ability of Sinn Fein 
people who they discovered despite the years of silence and censorship and propaganda - 
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didn't have horns, could speak for themselves, could think for themselves, had an analysis 
and had a political perspective to offer that was different from the establishment line. I 
think that's reflected in our political support, in our electoral support and in our media 
profile. (Interview with author, 9 June 1999). 
Sinn Fein was the only main political party in Northern Ireland to have full-time 
staff (paid or unpaid) working on a consistent basis in media relations and publicity 
(or political public relations) over an unpunctuated period of twenty-five years. 
From the opening of their first press office in Belfast in the early 70's up until Good 
Friday 1998, the party had created communications structures in both parts of 
Ireland, the USA and continental Europe. 
Their successful growth cannot be simplistically attributed to John Hume helping to 
bring Gerry Adams and his party `in from the political wilderness' in the late 80's 
and early 90's. Throughout their recent history, they have shown a strategic 
astuteness and an ability to adapt and innovate under very difficult circumstances. 
They have also become proficient at campaigning, due in part to their long history 
of highlighting miscarriages of justice as well as campaigning on social issues. 
Indeed, their network of advice centres throughout Northern Ireland have been an 
invaluable port of call for working class nationalists and republicans who have 
required advice on various issues including, for example, state benefits. They have 
also long understood the importance of communications and applied this knowledge 
to their strategic advantage, both internally by (more recently) informing, consulting 
and reassuring their grassroots supporters (at all stages in the peace process) and 
externally by internationalising their struggle as well as, for example, fundraising in 
the US. 
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A recurring theme of the pre-Agreement era was Sinn Fein's strategic attempts to 
portray the SDLP as `compromisers'. Yet, as Good Friday 1998 approached, it 
quickly became apparent that every political party in the talks/negotiations, 
including Sinn Fein, would have to make significant `compromises' if an agreement 
was to be concluded. 
By 1998, Sinn Fein was stressing the importance of their electoral mandate and their 
democratic credentials while attempting to distance themselves from the IRA - 
claiming that they did not speak for that organisation. In doing so, their strategy 
was to widen their support base to include nationalists of all hues and to build upon 
the meagre cultural resources they possessed as a result of their link with the IRA. 
They had also become a party hungry for political power, a party `on the move' and 
one that had both the financial and organisational resources to make further inroads. 
The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) 
As for the SDLP, whilst they had a full-time press officer for a short period in the 
early 90's, it was more than five years later (in 1996) that the party employed a full- 
time member of staff to deal specifically with media relations (Conall McDevitt as 
Director of Communications) and indeed 1997 before a press office was established. 
By Good Friday 1998, because of limited financial and organisational resources, 
McDevitt was unable to make fundamental changes to the development of SDLP 
public relations. As a result, the party's rusty communications machine stood in 
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stark contrast to Sinn Fein's slick, highly polished one. Indeed, in the pre- 
Agreement era, it can be contended that the SDLP had a laissez-faire attitude 
towards both the media and the notion of public relations in general. As Martina 
Purdy highlighted while comparing the SDLP with Sinn Fein: 
The best operation in terms of public relations would have been Sinn Fein ... I think part of 
the reason for that is, that they were hungry for power in a way that the SDLP, you know, 
they were comfortably ahead at that time and they didn't see the importance of the media, 
they just assumed that the media would understand where they were coming from. So at 
that time, there were a lot of Sinn Fein press conferences. They were very keen to get their 
message across. You might have had them almost daily, whereas you would hardly ever get 
an SDLP press conference, it would have to be a special occasion. (Interview with author, 6 
June 2002) 
Indeed, even the SDLP's political communication output via their pre-Agreement 
posters can best be described as lacklustre, simplistic, repetitive and devoid of either 
imagination or original thought. In addition, while the SDLP leader, John Hume, 
had many qualities, organisation was not one of them, and as such, the party's 
organisational weaknesses surfaced from time to time, most notably during the 
financial crises of the early 90's. An additional SDLP flaw included a reluctance of 
senior party figures to subject themselves to a diminution of their own power or 
control at the hands of a younger generation in the party. The result of these flaws 
from a public relations perspective, led to the party being perceived as `mediocre, 
middle-aged, middle-class and muddled' (Murrayl998, p. 247), as well as having a 
`greying' image and also that `you wouldn't know about the SDLP other than Hume 
and [his deputy leader] Mallon' (Interview with Quintin Oliver, 6 June 1999). 
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Yet, this is not to denigrate John Hume and his admirable qualities of patience and 
persistence in the search for peace in Northern Ireland. Hume was the only 
politician and indeed the SDLP, the only political party in Northern Ireland who 
could justifiably claim to be the true architects of the Good Friday Agreement. 
Nevertheless, the SDLP leadership failed to grasp the idea or the strategic 
advantages that both internal and external public relations could have brought to the 
development of their party. As a result of such shortcomings, the SDLP's long-term 
future and success was put in jeopardy. Indeed, Hume's admirable dedication to 
conflict resolution was perhaps at the expense of resolving conflicts within his own 
party. As Good Friday 1998 approached, his very own words had a prescient or 
prophetic ring about them: "If it's a choice between the party and peace, do you 
think I give a fuck for the party" (cited in O'Connor, 2002, p. 24). 
The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP 
Moving onto the DUP, they were also `late starters' when it came to employing full- 
time communications personnel. Although members of the party were involved in 
media relations on a part-time basis, they only began to acknowledge the pivotal 
importance of successfully and professionally communicating their politics 
following the May 1996 Entry to Negotiations election. As Purdy highlighted: 
On the unionist side, the DUP were the hungry party. They were the ones who wanted to 
overtake and so they paid more attention to the media, they were nicer to journalists... Around 
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1996 Ian Paisley Jnr did a lot of their media, was very good at self-promotion and very good at 
promoting the party and also they would have taken a broad approach to their media 
campaigning, thinking about how to sell or not sell their position. (Interview with author, 6 June 
2002) 
In fact, their first Director of Communications, St Clair McAllister, only took up the 
position a matter of months before Good Friday 1998. 
Negativity, insecurity and a `siege mentality' pervaded all DUP communication 
during the pre-Agreement era. The consistent apocalyptic rhetoric of their leader, 
Ian Paisley, featured throughout the period in question. Paisley played on unionist 
fears and apprehension over the intentions of successive Irish governments (as in 
the political posters `Stop Dublin Interference' and `Not an Inch to Dublin') as well 
as successive British governments (as in the political poster `Major's Treachery' - 
accompanied with the visual image of a knife stabbing a Union Jack emblazoned 
map of Northern Ireland). 
Throughout the period, the party favoured a return to the golden days of majority 
rule in a `Protestant parliament for a Protestant people' (cited in Taylor 1998, p. 19). 
In addition, a guiding theme of their pre-Agreement political communication was 
the issue of trust. In their determination to resist all Ulster's enemies, they were the 
one political party who had `earned your trust' or were a `team you can trust'. Yet, 
in 1985, Paisley produced four sledgehammers each carrying the words `Smash 
Sinn Fein' and in their manifesto of that year they promised to `challenge, confront 
and confound Sinn Fein whenever they dared raise their heads' (DUP 1985, p. 1). 
However, by 1997, the not so `trustworthy' DUP reneged on previous pledges by 
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walking away from the negotiations that led to the Good Friday Agreement and 
most certainly did not `challenge, confront and confound Sinn Fein' whenever that 
party entered into the equation. 
Pre-Agreement communications included portraying themselves as a party of black 
and white certainties - good versus evil, right versus wrong, truth versus lies. In as 
much, St Clair McAllister believed that while spin doctors did exist in the real 
world, he was not in the business of bending and shaping information or in fact, of 
telling lies. In the run-up to Good Friday 1998, the DUP's historical insistence of 
`No Compromise, No Surrender' did not bode well for the future and was 
particularly pertinent since the Agreement represented `compromises' that would 
have to be made by all of the political parties in Northern Ireland. 
The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP 
As for the UUP (from the beginning of the Troubles until the mid-90s) they had lost 
the propaganda war because they had a dogmatic belief in the supremacy of their 
case. Essentially, they had an unrelenting arrogance that they were so `right' that 
they didn't have to either apologise for past indiscretions against their Catholic 
neighbours or indeed `sell' themselves or their case to a wider world (Parkinson, 
1998). This period was characterised by woeful public relations and a belief that the 
media were so much against them that theirs was a lost cause. 
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The establishment of two Unionist Information Office's in Washington in 1994/5 
and London in 1996 can be construed as acceptance by the party that they had failed 
to make adequate inroads into reversing nationalists' and republicans' propaganda 
successes. 
Slowly but surely the `penny dropped' and there was a growing sense of urgency in 
the UUP about communicating their cause to a variety of audiences in Ireland, the 
UK and the US. Their public relations concerns at this juncture, included trying not 
to appear anti-Catholic, as well as the realisation that they would need to begin the 
process of positive image-building and develop their networking capabilities. 
In 1995, the cover of the UUP journal, Ulster Review, celebrated David Trimble's 
election as leader by proclaiming the arrival of a `new unionism'. It was to be `pro- 
active, inclusive, open, pluralist, dynamic, progressive, outward, articulate, 
intelligent, coherent, professional, confident' ( cited in O'Dowd, 1998, p. 70). 
`New Unionists' believed that for much of the previous 25 years, the case for the 
Union had been allowed to go by default, by an inability to communicate the merits 
of unionism to a wider audience in a rational and coherent manner. 
For `new unionism' to be realised, it was evident that fundamental changes were 
thus required in UUP public relations. In 1996, a young law graduate, David Kerr, 
was hired by the UUP as a full-time press officer/press secretary to Trimble. 
Previously, there had been a loose configuration of press officers in some of the 18 
WP constituencies with little or no central co-ordination at Belfast headquarters, 
and such appointments in the main were not full-time or permanent positions. 
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However, at this stage, the UUP were in need of a complete communications 
overhaul and should have been hiring the best public relations talent available, not 
an inexperienced graduate with little or no communications background. This 
appointment would simply not have occurred in Sinn Fein, as Purdy pointed out: 
David Kerr was almost on a learning curve himself. He was so young and some of us felt that it 
was incredible that someone with such little experience coming out of university was going to be 
in charge of this big party... it just wouldn't have happened with Sinn Fein . It's quite incredible 
also that this young guy in his twenties was going to boss David Trimble around. (Interview with 
author, 6 June 2002) 
By Good Friday 1998, the UUP had dabbled in image management and had a pool 
of `external' public relations professionals who they could call upon for advice and 
help. Yet, (as the case of David Ken highlights) there seemed to be no sense of 
urgency on the UUP's behalf to radically develop their communications or public 
relations capabilities. Essentially, they were taking `baby-steps' in the right 
direction when they really needed to be taking `giant leaps'. 
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The Media 
As for the media, it would not be wrong to conclude that in general, the role they 
played throughout the period in question has been plagued by a litany of complaints 
or criticisms. 
These include: they were anti-unionist; they were anti-republican; they were 
systematically orientated towards a British government perspective; they 
consistently failed to adequately question the `primary definers' or `official 
sources'; they provided images and stories of irrational violence without sufficient 
context; they reproduced and amplified division through easy ideological labelling; 
they promoted contestation rather than consensus or emphasised disputes and 
dissensus; they reinforced differences and disagreement; and, they were unhelpful in 
relation to concentrated efforts at promoting peace. 
On the flipside, or to counteract such negative assumptions, media personnel 
highlighted that: they were simply being realistic; they were reflecting or holding a 
mirror up to society; they didn't toe the establishment or British government line, it 
was more a case of bad, lazy, mistaken, stupid journalism on occasion; and within 
the broad sweep of it all, there has always been a lively, enquiring, questioning, 
challenging journalism in Northern Ireland. 
While there is no doubt that sections of the media and individual journalists deserve 
to be singled out and praised for various honourable contributions in speaking `truth 
to power', what remains problematic is that this has not been the norm, and such 
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cases are few and far between. From the beginning of the Troubles until Good 
Friday 1998, a lively, enquiring, questioning, challenging journalism has certainly 
not been endemic in Northern Ireland; it is more a case of mavericks or loners (such 
as Eamonn Mallie) who have questioned and challenged the highest levels of 
authority, for example, the British government's direction and policy over the years. 
To compound such media criticisms, prior to Good Friday 1998, it was in assisting 
positive spirals of communication, rather than degenerate ones, that the media in 
Northern Ireland should have played a more positive and constructive role. 
In Conclusion 
To conclude, during the 1990's, that is, prior to Good Friday 1998, all four of the 
main political parties underwent media training and became much more 
professional during the talks process. In addition, for many of Northern Ireland's 
emerging communications personnel, the talks process proved to be a very good 
training ground, as Purdy highlights: 
In terms of the talks themselves, that really was a spin-doctor's dream because you had two 
or three huts full of journalists on a daily basis... quite a contingent up there waiting to be 
fed information... So it was an opportunity to come out into Castle Buildings parking lot 
and just spin away. All kinds of stories got out that way, there were leaks, there was spin 
and counter-spin and it was probably a really good training ground for people like David 
Kerr who got instant access to all these journalists who were just waiting in a hut. You 
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know, most spin-doctors have to develop over time, have to build their contacts, but here 
was a situation where the journalists were there in a heap ready to be exploited if you like, 
or attempted to be manipulated. (Ibid. ) 
In broad brushstrokes, Sinn Fein and the DUP were the hungry parties who were 
more interested in getting into the media because they wanted to get ahead. Both 
the SDLP and the UUP took more of a laissez-faire approach towards the media. 
Only one political party had a competent communications team in place on Good 
Friday 1998 - Sinn Fein. For their ubiquitous rivals in both traditions it was high 
time to take stock of their own flawed communications structures and lack of 
personnel, to learn from Sinn Fein 's communications success story and indeed try 
to emulate the party in future attempts to `effectively' communicate their own 
positions or political analyses. 
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SECTION 2: PARTY POLITICAL PUBLIC RELATIONS AND THE MEDIA 
DURING THE 1998 REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN 
Introduction 
The election of a strong Labour government under Tony Blair in May 1997 helped 
to re-energise the Northern Ireland peace process. Within a matter of months a new 
IRA ceasefire was announced and Sinn Fein's conditions for entering 
talks/negotiations had been met. While unionists of all hues had serious concerns 
about entering into a process that included Sinn Fein, the UUP remained in the 
talks, whereas the DUP, led by Ian Paisley, subsequently withdrew. 
Although successive British governments had attempted to instigate 
talks/negotiations between Northern Ireland's political parties during the state's 
troubled past, on this occasion (although the DUP were absent) the 
talks/negotiations were more inclusive than in previous years and they represented a 
historic move towards compromise and agreement by all of the participants 
involved, as acknowledged by British government/NIO Senior Information Officer, 
Colin Ross: 
Would anyone have believed that you would have got republicanism, nationalism, loyalism, 
unionism, the centre party, a party involving exclusively women, representatives of the 
British and Irish governments, all being presided over by a chairman from the United 
States... if you had mentioned that five years previously you would have been laughed at, 
because some of the parties would have been seen as very uncomfortable even sitting in a 
room with the Irish government and others would not have sat in a room with loyalists. So 
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there was a tremendous amount of breaking down of barriers to get people to that particular 
point. I don't think there was anyone in the negotiations who wasn't aware of the painful path 
that had led to the table. (Interview with author, cited in Kirby 1999, p. 27) 
Importantly, the negotiations between eight political parties and the British and Irish 
governments continued until agreement was reached on 10th April 1998, that is, 
Good Friday. As a result, the Agreement represented the first significant 
opportunity to have an inclusive power-sharing government in the history of the 
state. 
One of the Agreement's stipulations was that its very legitimacy would have to be 
strengthened by (or founded upon) a positive endorsement by `the people' of 
Northern Ireland. In the event, a six-week-long referendum campaign on the Good 
Friday Agreement became the biggest public relations exercise ever to be carried 
out in Northern Ireland. 
Yet, while the Agreement represented an overwhelming achievement, a lot of the 
language contained therein provided protective ambiguities so that different people 
or different constituencies could be sold on different parts of it. 
This section chronicles the roles played by each of the four main political parties 
and the media during the referendum campaign in a wider attempt to understand 
how the Good Friday Agreement was sold to the people of Northern Ireland. 
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It attempts to ascertain how successful the UUP, the SDLP and Sinn Fein were in 
selling the Agreement within their own constituencies, and gauges how successful 
the DUP were in persuading the electorate to vote No to the Agreement. It also 
explores the public relations strategies and techniques employed by the four 
political parties during the referendum campaign in an attempt to determine the 
significance of key public relations activities, that is, how they may have impacted 
upon the referendum result. 
Furthermore, it attempts to establish whether the media in Northern Ireland were 
biased or unbiased in their coverage of the referendum campaign, that is, whether 
they appeared to be `neutral' or indeed sided with one or other of the pro- 
Agreement or anti-Agreement camps. 
This section is broken down into six subsections, that is, four that examine the 
political parties' roles during the referendum campaign, one that examines the 
media, and a final subsection that takes the form of a summary and conclusion. 
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(i) Social Democratic and Labour Party 
In many ways the Agreement was the jewel in the SDLP crown. If any political 
party could have considered themselves to be the architects of it, it would be the 
SDLP. As party leader, John Hume maintained: 
The Agreement, from the SDLP's point of view of course, was totally based on principles that 
we had been putting across over the years. Our analysis of the problem was very consistent 
throughout the 30 years, given that the problem didn't change and neither did our approach to 
solving it. The problem was not just about relationships within Northern Ireland but also 
about relationships within Ireland and between Ireland and Britain. And those are the three 
sets of relationships at the heart of our problem, and therefore, they should be the agenda for 
any talks process. Given that is the agenda, the logic of that would be that the two 
governments would have to come together with all the parties to do the discussions to resolve 
it. And all of that is what happened. Of course our proposal was, throughout as well, that 
there shouldn't be any victory for either side, therefore that our institutions would respect our 
differences in power sharing, now called partnership. We've also always pushed for an all- 
Ireland council of ministers, North and South, backed up by a secretariat. Those were our 
consistent proposals throughout our existence as a party because as I have repeatedly said, the 
real solution to our problem is the healing process. The institutions in themselves are not a 
solution; they are a framework for a solution. When you break your leg, you have to have a 
framework for the healing process. When you have a deeply divided society, divided for 
centuries by prejudice and distrust, in order to erode that distrust and prejudice, the best way 
of doing it is to work together in your common interests. The way I put it publicly is "spill 
your sweat, not your blood" and break down the barriers that way. A new society, a new 
North and a new Ireland will evolve in a generation or two based on agreement and respect 
for differences. (Interview with author, 6 May 2001) 
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The eternal optimist - Hume also believed that the most important element in 
strengthening the Agreement was the SDLP proposal that once an agreement was 
reached that the last word would not be with the politicians, but with the people. 
The notion of a referendum was also a very powerful aspect of the Agreement 
process because it sidelined minority groups involved in violence, which had always 
claimed that they were acting in the name of the people. 
For Hume, one of the major aspects of selling the Agreement or garnering support 
for it, was the transformation of (relative) peace on the streets. The very fact that 
violence had dissipated had transformed the atmosphere on the streets and the whole 
mood of the people, and therefore strengthened any approach to reaching agreement 
and subsequently selling it to the people. 
As for the Agreement itself, a lot of its carefully crafted language offered protective 
ambiguities that meant different people or constituencies could be sold on different 
parts of it. Indeed, the SDLP's Director of the referendum campaign, Mark Durkan, 
likened the Agreement to a hologram: 
If we were going to get an agreement, the reality is that it was going to be something of a 
hologram in that, if unionists held it up to one light they would see one thing and if 
nationalists held it up to another light they would see other things. (Interview with author, 
cited in Kirby 1999, p. 27) 
He also highlighted that: 
There were things in the Agreement put there for unionists and put there by unionists. 
There were things in the Agreement put therefor republicans and nationalists and put there 
by republicans and nationalists. (Ibid. p. 56) 
The SDLP believed that everyone who signed up to the Agreement needed to be up 
front and honest about this; that this was one of the strengths of the Agreement and 
that the outcome was not made simply in the image of one particular identity. The 
very essence of the Agreement was that it provided a framework for possible 
reconciliation between two traditions and one in which the two communities could 
move forward together, not one behind the other. However, talk of possible 
reconciliation during the referendum campaign subsided in favour of the rhetoric of 
victories and defeats, as Conall McDevitt, SDLP Director of Communications, 
pointed out: 
Most of the parties spent most of their time trying to articulate the Agreement as a defeat or 
a victory for one side or the other. Trimble gave you the constant line that it was a victory 
for unionism, that they had protected the union. The republicans gave you another analysis 
that it was a victory for republicanism and that proved that their position had been endorsed. 
Of course both are nonsense, and that's the only word I will find to describe it. (Interview 
with author, cited in Kirby 1999, pp 27-28) 
The Agreement was essentially a total vindication of the SDLP's analysis and as 
such they would undoubtedly gain majority support in their own constituency. 
Nevertheless, the party fought a non-triumphalist Yes campaign and it was designed 
to limit the suspicions and fears of the unionist community in particular, as Mark 
Durkan highlighted: 
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Just as we were very conscious of the needs to factor in the concerns and impressions of 
others in how we would move to get the Agreement, the same was the case in the 
referendum and we were conscious that some parties were in a particularly sensitive 
position, whether because of internal tensions or because of concerns being expressed by 
them about possible dissent within their own constituency... We knew that people had to 
deal very much in respect of their own constituencies but we had a sense that the UUP 
weren't being that effective in relation to their own particular efforts. That was causing us 
concern and that meant that in a couple of instances in so far as we thought it could help, we 
tried doing some particular marking of some of the `No' people, like Jeffrey Donaldson. 
But we had to be careful how far we went and there was a point where I was minded to 
open up very heavily on Jeffrey Donaldson in a way that actually I would have publicly 
recalled some of the meetings between ourselves and the UUP including him and some of 
my own direct negotiations with him and being able to trace them to show that this 
impression he was giving that he only found out in the early hours of Good Friday morning 
that we were looking at Sinn Fein coming into government. You know that was nonsense, 
we had good enough notes on the thing to be able to trace things well, well before that and 
that he was on board in relation to that. But other people in the UUP felt that at that stage 
"No, better not, that would go too far over the top". Part of it was they weren't ready to 
deal with all of those issues themselves. So, we didn't splash in, in ways that would have 
caused serious problems for other `Yes' parties in relation to their own particular issues. 
(Interview with author, 7 June 1999) 
As in the above case, throughout the referendum campaign the SDLP seemed to 
tiptoe around unionist sensitivities. Their general message of the campaign was 
designed to influence all the people of Northern Ireland, irrespective of which 
tradition they belonged to, as McDevitt maintained: 
The fundamental message was that this Agreement was a framework for a new North, that it 
wasn't a solution but it gave you a structure around which a solution could be built. 
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Messages that fell naturally underneath that were messages of interdependence and self- 
sustainability. Put bluntly, "The Good Friday Agreement will mean a more prosperous 
North, deliver more jobs for your community, control over your education and health 
systems". So if you like, empowering people, saying, "For the first time in a generation: 
you've the opportunity to seize control over your own affairs, that's not going to come 
around again and you must seize this now. We are not offering you a panacea because this 
Agreement isn't a solution, but what we're doing is putting in place a framework - 
Assembly, consultative bodies etc. and within that framework we can move forward. " 
(Interview with author, cited in Kirby 1999, p. 35) 
Their attempts to appeal to all sections of the community were also apparent in their 
referendum literature. Incorporating a golden key marked `Yes', Hume maintained 
that the vote represented "your opportunity to leave the past behind and unlock the 
door to a better future. There is much in this Agreement for everyone". 
Strategically, the SDLP were anxious to portray the Agreement as something that 
they felt they had a great deal of ownership over and they wanted the people of 
Northern Ireland to take that ownership from them and all the other parties who had 
negotiated it and use it to actually empower themselves. McDevitt believed their 
strategy was unselfish and quite straightforward, and one that included third party 
endorsement: 
Our strategy was to concentrate on the Agreement, not on the tired rhetoric of victories and 
defeats. The Agreement was a victory for no one, it was a defeat for no one, that's the 
whole point and our strategy was very much to hammer that home... So, that was our 
fundamental strategy and from day one we were very anxious to find messages and images 
that would uphold that strategy. So, for example it was important to us that we had from 
early on in the campaign, people from outside of the political world involved in the 
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campaign. We brought Peter Sutherland, the former European Commissioner and one of 
the most senior businessmen Ireland has, to Belfast, quietly, and we spent an afternoon with 
the leading business people from the North, talking to them about the benefits of trade, and 
we gave them access to him to do that. That was the sort of thing that had a very important 
public relations dimension to it but it wasn't necessarily an up front, out there, press 
activity. We did the same with the arts community. We brought Neil Jordan up to Belfast 
and gave people within the arts community exposure to him. We did the same then 
ultimately with the political community, bringing the party leaders from other parties within 
this island and party leaders from across the water over to stand shoulder to shoulder and to 
talk about the Agreement, and not once did we reserve these people for ourselves, we 
always made sure they met Sinn Fein and the Ulster Unionist Party while they were here. 
(Interview with author, 3 June 1999) 
The SDLP saw their role as the vehicle for change, the leadership in the process of 
change, the architects of it and therefore the people who were not concerned with 
petty squabbling of victories and defeats. They also promoted future policies and 
produced a booklet for the referendum that was a pre-manifesto for the Assembly 
elections. The manifesto spent a lot of time looking at how the Agreement shaped a 
new framework for helping to deal with bread-and-butter issues and how it would 
empower people across all policy areas and across all social and religious divides. 
Whilst on the issue of religion, the SDLP canvass in support of the Agreement 
could be compared with Christ's disciples `spreading the word' in an unselfish or 
benign way. As Mark Durkan pointed out, nationalists were doubtful of unionist 
support for the Agreement, and as such, their approach was influenced on a number 
of levels: 
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One, we didn't want people to be seen to be taking anything for granted. Two, we actually 
felt that it was important to go back to voters and say "we are not actually asking you to 
vote for us this time, we are asking you to vote for yourselves, this is important". In many 
ways it was the most benign canvass that you could actually do because you were going up 
to people and you were saying "this is what it's about and your vote is important, it's not 
important for me, it's important for you and your children". It was a very healthy thing to 
do. Also at a personal level and being involved in the negotiations and having felt at times 
almost a sense of cabin-fever while you were stuck up there in Castle Buildings, it was 
important to go out and spread the word in a sense about the Agreement, because an awful 
lot of the media stuff had all been about the release of the prisoners, policing and the North- 
South Ministerial Council. We were out to try and make sure people got a fuller sense of all 
that was in the Agreement and that they would get a direct first-hand sense from people like 
myself in spite of what `argey-bargey' might be going on in the media, that we had 
confidence in the Agreement and we had confidence in the referendum outcome. A lot of 
non-unionists believed the Paisley-hype that this was going to go down and that unionism 
wouldn't pass it and we were trying to say "No, we think they will go for it, it's important, 
it's not another false dawn. " (Interview with author, 7 June 1999) 
Throughout their canvassing, the SDLP were especially angry with the British 
prime minister, Tony Blair, whom they believed was selling the Agreement (to the 
unionist community) in a dishonest fashion. In doing so, they believed he also 
compromised their own pro-Agreement position, as Durkan highlighted: 
During the campaign Tony Blair in particular came in very, very strongly in ways that we 
weren't just sure were necessarily going to help. Writing up the pledges... it did create 
problems for us because we were quite clear that we were going to be honest about this 
throughout, because we have negotiated this Agreement and because we are going to have 
to live it through to its full implementation. So whenever Blair was implying that there was 
a precondition for a national executive, we had to say: "There is not". Of course there's 
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then the risk of people saying "here you are, you're giving divided messages between pro- 
Agreement elements", but we thought that it was important for ourselves that we do that 
because we felt people needed to have some point of certainty on which to rest in relation to 
these things. So we thought we may as well try to be it [the point of certainty] if nobody 
else is going to be it. We were trying to do that and we felt that was important too with the 
forthcoming election campaign. You don't want to be in a position where people can 
accuse you of having lied or bluffed or dodged in relation to an issue in the context of the 
referendum itself. (Ibid. ). 
Indeed, it seemed throughout the referendum campaign that the UUP were not only 
given disproportionate help from the British prime minister (whom the SDLP 
accused of lying, bluffing and dodging issues) to sell the Agreement to the unionist 
community, but were also helped throughout the campaign by the SDLP 
themselves, as Durkan maintained: 
We felt that it was particularly important to try to get to younger people and also 
particularly to a lot of the traditional non-voters who had just given up on politics because 
we saw that they would be a key additive in a referendum outcome, particularly whereby 
the unionists on the Yes side were reporting some difficulties. So, one of the calculations 
we made was that the unionist turnout particularly in the East had been going down 
historically and there was a lot of people switched off, and there must be a way of reaching 
them and re-engaging them. If traditional unionist politics or traditional Northern Ireland 
politics hadn't motivated them, is there something in and around the Agreement that can? 
And, can we present to them the prospectus of a changed politics that the Agreement might 
hold? (Ibid. ) 
In fact, the SDLP tried on a number of occasions to have a joint approach with the 
UUP but to no avail as Durkan highlighted: 
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We did start making approaches to the UUP through shared contacts we had with church or 
religious interests. We were making the point that basic goodwill was out there for the 
Agreement and that people wanted to be able to see it expressed in some way and the fact is 
that since Good Friday, all the efforts of the parties appear to be disparate. We nevertheless 
said "look, people want to see a handshake", but at the same time we knew that people 
weren't just going to go for superficial gimmicks. So we had in play an idea that essentially 
myself and church-related people and some people close to Trimble were discussing "well 
how do you do it in a way that is credible and effective and particularly in the context of a 
suspicious unionist community? " We were looking at maybe having a gathering, essentially 
of church people, on a question and answer basis, but something that you could have had 
Hume and Trimble coming into a room together to address the audience, in reasonable 
circumstances, an intelligent audience, answering questions and in doing so, both leaders 
would talk about the Agreement. Obviously, in coming to the stage, they would do the 
handshake. It was going to be something like that because people didn't want anything too 
glib or flashy at that point. We were getting humming and hawing from the unionists that 
they just weren't sure about this and the idea was biting stronger after the Sinn Fein Ard 
Fheis and the Balcombe Street gang appearing and it really did register with some of the 
people in the UUP that a different picture other than the clenched fist was needed, and so 
there was a bit more interest in the idea. But still, while there was still an interest in having 
something like that, it was a case of "well I am not sure how we would do the audience and 
there could be sensitivities - even at this sort of event, and is it the best thing? " That was 
grand, all valid and legitimate questions. So meanwhile during this same period and 
basically over that same weekend of the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis, Tim Attwood in SDLP HQ 
said that he believed from the contacts that he had made that there was a good chance of 
getting Bono to come up and do something. There had been a couple of things like Mo 
Mowlam running around with Richard Branson and none of that quite working or clicking. 
The thing with Bono was "Yes that would do, but what to do with it? " And also, if the UUP 
were so difficult about a church-related type of meeting, which was very much designed to 
relate to their constituency more so than anything else, we were wondering that they're 
hardly going to be in the market for this. (Ibid. ) 
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At this juncture, an opinion poll published in The Irish Times on 15th May, 1998 
showed a sharp drop in unionist support for the Agreement. Compared with an 
overall 84 per cent in favour by both unionists and nationalists in the previous Irish 
Times/MRBI survey conducted after Good Friday, the figure was now at a much 
lower 69 per cent (cited in De Breadun 2001, p158). The figures pointed to 55 per 
cent of unionists against the Agreement, a figure echoed by private NIO polls, 
which estimated that after the prison releases and subsequent appearance of the 
Balcombe Street gang at the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis, the No vote had increased in 
unionist ranks by ten per cent (Ibid. ). The figures also reflected an energetic and 
well-focused campaign by the No camp, which contrasted with a lacklustre pro- 
Agreement effort on the unionist side. The poll did however highlight that the 
highest percentage of undecided voters was in the 18-24 age group (Ibid. ). 
With things starting to slip badly for the Yes camp, the SDLP's Tim Attwood 
suggested that what was needed to boost the Yes campaign's flagging fortunes was 
a major event that could capture the public's imagination. If Bono could be invited 
to Belfast and become involved in a concert promoting a Yes vote (in the final week 
of the referendum campaign) the fortunes of the Yes camp might just turn around. 
The idea of the leaders of unionism and nationalism united by one of the world's 
most famous rock stars was now biting strong, and the SDLP, concerned that 
Trimble needed help, sent Attwood and Conall McDevitt to seek out David Kerr, 
Trimble's Press Secretary. 
In the meantime, Eamon McCann, one of Ireland's premier pop-concert promoter's 
was asked to help set up an event at Belfast's Waterfront Hall, and he told the SDLP 
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he might be able to get rock group Ash to join U2 at the peace concert. This band 
of young Protestants from Downpatrick, he thought, would be a perfect counter- 
balance to the Dublin-based super-group. Bono subsequently telephoned the SDLP 
office and told Attwood he thought the peace concert was a great idea (McDonald, 
2000). 
Essentially, after the loyalist killer, Michael Stone, appeared at the UDP rally in the 
Ulster Hall and with the Balcombe Street episode still fresh in unionist minds, a lot 
of media comment was claiming that the `Yes' parties were now losing it and 
weren't doing anything about it (Ibid. ). Not before time, the UUP were prepared to 
pick up on this high visibility version that would bring the two figureheads of 
unionism and nationalism together in ways that the UUP had been quite reticent to 
do before then. The UUP's David Kerr was very taken by the idea, as Attwood 
recalls: `Kerr was delirious... He kept saying to us, "What? Bono? You can get 
Bono? " He thought it was a brilliant move' (ibid. p. 232). 
Indeed, the SDLP's Conall McDevitt highlighted how pivotal the U2 / Ash concert 
was at this particular juncture in the referendum campaign: 
We felt it was a very necessary thing at that time because the whole campaign had become 
dominated by two very negative, very retarded, very old images - one of the Balcombe 
Street gang at the RDS in Dublin and the other one, Michael Stone here in Belfast, and they 
begun to polarise opinion around them and were leading the referendum debate into a cul- 
de-sac, into a very large one. So when the opportunity arose to create another image, an 
image which was forward-looking, which was youthful, which was dynamic, not regressive, 
old-fashioned and staid, we jumped at it and a very intensive four days, actually exhausting 
four days, meant'we were able to cram three and a half thousand kids into the Waterfront 
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Hall and the rest is history. But that was a very important part of fulfilling our strategy. It 
was a tactical decision taken at the last minute, it wasn't written down in any plan but it was 
one that was fully consistent with the overall strategic objective of the campaign and when 
the opportunity arose, we were just fortunate enough to take advantage of it. (Interview with 
author, 3 June 1999) 
One of the main logistical problems in relation to the concert was the distribution of 
the free tickets. Tim Attwood was concerned that some of them could fall into the 
hands of DUP supporters, who might disrupt the gig with a publicity stunt of their 
own. They finally chose to hand out the tickets through Northern Ireland's schools 
and spent all weekend contacting hundreds of principals to offer the tickets to their 
sixth-formers. A smaller number were reserved for the youth wings of the political 
parties in the Yes camp. 
An inspired leak to the media on Monday 18th May got the story rushing and 
running, yet there was still some apprehension in the SDLP about how the concert 
may have unfolded: 
There are so many dimensions to that story - whether it was the Protestant band from 
Downpatrick; young up and coming kids and the great Irish legends; whether it was the fact 
that Tim Wheeler, the lead singer of Ash's dad is a judge; whether it was the fact that Bono 
had allegedly burned a tricolour some years back and why he had done that; whether it was 
the fact that you were going to successfully put two men over fifty on a stage in front of 
three and a half thousand kids, keep them quiet and still have a powerful message about it. 
(Interview with McDevitt, cited in Kirby 1999, pp 44-45) 
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Nevertheless, the leak highlighting the proposed concert was of fundamental 
importance because it helped to steal publicity away from what was meant to have 
been a major coup for the No camp - former UUP leader, Jim Molyneaux was 
holding a press conference to call for a No vote in the following referendum. 
Indeed, Molyneaux's public rebuff of Trimble was drowned in the deluge of media 
coverage of the forthcoming concert. 
Effectively, a single public relations activity inspired by the SDLP and conducted 
jointly with the UUP became the most memorable and important message that could 
be relayed to a divided people. The coming together of David Trimble and John 
Hume on Tuesday 19th May at the U2 / Ash concert symbolised the possibility of a 
new beginning between unionism and nationalism and it provided a positive 
`thumbs up' for the Agreement on which the electorate would vote three days later. 
Many commentators suggested the handshake between the two leaders at the 
concert was the turning point in the referendum campaign, including Quintin Oliver, 
Director of the non-party `Yes' campaign: 
They came together for the first time ever, not just in the campaign, but the first time ever 
they publicly shook hands... that's what in our view turned the campaign in the last week. 
Because if the vote had have been a week earlier, it would have been a very different story 
because it was very negative then after the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis when the Balcombe Street 
gang appeared and after Michael Stone appeared at the UDP rally in the Ulster Hall. Things 
were looking very bleak and prisoner release was the issue that was damaging the coherence 
of the `Yes' vote. (Interview with author, cited in Kirby 1999, pp 43.. 44) 
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Significantly the SDLP believed that the concert made a lot of what happened 
afterwards more credible in the final days of the Yes campaign, as McDevitt pointed 
out: 
The [British] prime ministers' successive visits were more credible. It also allowed us to be 
able to roll Hume out and I presume for the unionists, to be able to roll Trimble out, in a 
very authoritative way, in a nearly presidential way because yes, unlike anyone else they 
had had both sides of the community, they had had the future of Northern Ireland there at 
the concert and they endorsed them. So everyone saw that, the world saw that. (Interview 
with author, 3 June 1999) 
Fundamentally, the coming together of Hume and Trimble contributed to a 
significant turnaround in the polls from No to Yes: 
The people wanted Hume and Trimble to stand shoulder to shoulder and say "we want you 
to vote yes". Until they got that image they were doubtful, and it was only after that image 
that things really began to consolidate themselves. In the final week you got a 15% swing 
back within unionism, which was very critical. (Interview with author, cited in Kirby 1999, 
p. 61) 
Indeed, the tireless work that many in the SDLP put into making the concert an 
overwhelming success was subsequently rewarded with a 71.12 per cent Yes vote in 
the referendum. With eyes glistening, deputy leader, Seamus Mallon, said it was 
the most important moment of his political life. It was no longer a case of `Ulster 
says No', but `The North of Ireland Says Yes' (De Breadun 2001 p. 161). Hume 
was elated with the result: `We are overcoming, ' he said, an advance on the old 
civil rights song, `We Shall Overcome' (Ibid. ). 
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(ii) Ulster Unionist Party 
The Good Friday Agreement had hinged on David Trimble's willingness to trust the 
promises contained in Tony Blair's handwritten letter of 10`h April 1998. Some 
questioned that Trimble might have invested too much faith in the prime minister, 
or whether Blair could really be relied upon to keep to his word; including Brian 
Garret: 
I was very concerned that Tony Blair might be putting too much pressure on David. I was 
aware of this, because David and I had spoken about Blair given my Labour connections. 
He obviously liked Blair a lot. But I hoped at the time that Blair wasn't doing what Bob Mc 
Cartney predicted he would do - that he was taking David up to the top of the temple and 
saying, "Look this can all be yours", and maybe entrapping Trimble with the grandeur of it 
all. I think you have to remember that David, like many other people, is vulnerable to 
flattery. I saw that as a danger even on the day. (Cited in McDonald 2000, p. 214) 
The arguments over whether Blair's charisma or his promises had a guiding 
influence or not on Trimble's decision to eventually sign up to the Agreement, 
meant little to unionist ultras. They proclaimed Trimble as the worst traitor since 
the Reverend Lundy 16' The debate over whether he had sold out his tradition or 
community was essentially the old intellectual (if reinvigorated) argument between 
rational and emotional unionism. Shortly after the Agreement was signed, Trimble 
told the world that the deal was `as good as it gets' (Ibid. p. 215). This was a clear 
admission that unionism would have to swallow unpalatable compromises on 
16 Governor during the Siege of Derry in 1689 who was accused of opening the gates of the city to 
Catholic King James II. 
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prisoners and Sinn Fein in government, as the price for amending Articles 2 and 3 
of the Irish constitution, forcing nationalists to accept the principle of consent and 
the curbing of cross-border integration (Ibid. ). 
Trimble believed that he had kept all the promises he made at the start of the talks, 
such as the ending of the Irish Republic's territorial claim and recognition of the 
territorial integrity of the United Kingdom. He thought it was important to 
distinguish between the parts of the Agreement that related to structures and those 
that related to policies. The structures, such as the Assembly and the British-Irish 
Council, were `as good as they could be' (Hennessey 2000, p. 190). The Union was 
safe, as he claimed: `Dublin cannot dictate to us' (Ibid. ). Trimble argued that 
unionists were not bound to accept the policies the British government was 
pursuing: `They are not good. By policies I mean the so-called equality agenda, 
policing, prisoners, and so on' (Ibid. ). The UUP would press the British 
government for more changes on these; but it `must be obvious that we are in a 
better position to achieve change in those policies within the new structures than 
without them' (Ibid. ). 
Although Trimble and his negotiating team had scored several victories (particularly 
in Strand 2 of the North-South relationship) none of this seemed to have any impact 
on those tied to the emotional wing of unionism. They accused him of "going too 
far on prisoners and of getting too few guarantees to link decommissioning with 
Sinn Fein entering government" (McDonald 2000, p. 217). 
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Revulsion at the prospect of the IRA's political wing entering an Executive 
government was indeed shared by thousands of ordinary unionists. Trimble now 
had to `sell' the Agreement not only within his own party but also to these very 
people who had elected him and his colleagues into office. Ultimately the 
Agreement could survive or collapse depending upon his ability to persuade the 
majority of unionists to back the deal (Ibid. ). 
This was a second Sisyphean journey (after the signing of the Agreement) in the 
same number of months - that is, pushing the dead weight of emotional unionism, 
with all its historical baggage and bitter memories, up the mountain in an attempt to 
reach the summit of a new power- sharing government at Stormont (Ibid. ). 
His journey was eased somewhat on the 18th April when the Ulster Unionist Council 
completed its deliberations on the Agreement, endorsing it by 540 votes to 210.72 
per cent of the council voted for the Agreement, despite the opposition of MPs 
Willie Ross and Willie Thompson and the Orange Order in Trimble's Upper Bann 
constituency. Trimble's victory convinced him that the party would now rally 
around his line, as he predicted: 
Even those who were unhappy with the Agreement and voted against it, made it absolutely 
clear that they had no recriminations of the talks team as a whole, or the leadership in 
particular. I think that's an indication that now the vote is over, the party is going to unite 
around the line that the council has adopted, and we proceed into the next round on that 
basis. We will not have a split unionist party. (Ibid. p. 219) 
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Yet, his vision of a party united behind the Agreement was optimistic to say the 
least and the UUP's make-up meant there would always be room for internal 
rebellion to grow. The disaffected 28 per cent who lost on 18th April were not going 
to quietly accept defeat. 
In any normal political party in the democratic world a 72 per cent vote in favour of 
a given policy would have bound almost the entire membership to that position. 
However, the UUP has never been a normal political party and although it had run 
Northern Ireland on the lines of a one-party state for half a century it was now the 
most fractious, disorganised political movement in Western Europe (Ibid. ). 
The party's rebels were split into two factions that sometimes overlapped. The 
larger group consisted of five of the UUP's nine MPs, a majority of the Young 
Unionists and the Orange Order. The balance included Jeffrey Donaldson who, 
while speaking against the Agreement at the Council meeting, was careful not to say 
he opposed David Trimble (Ibid. ). In this early stage of the referendum campaign, 
former UUP leader Jim Molyneaux was part of the latter camp: he had opposed the 
Agreement but, initially at least, declined to join the platform of the No camp with 
Ian Paisley and Robert McCartney. Donaldson's opposition to the Agreement was 
qualitatively different from that of Ross or Thompson. The older MPs were 
viscerally opposed to any form of power-sharing with nationalists (let alone 
republicans), whereas Donaldson recognised what he believed was the fatal design 
fault in the Agreement - the absence of a link between decommissioning and Sinn 
Fein entering a Stormont government. 
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Trimble's troubles with his dissidents (following the UUC vote) were not made any 
easier after Gerry Adams told his delegates at their party conference on the same 
day that he heard of Trimble's success: `We welcome it. Well done, David' (cited 
in McDonald 2000, p. 220). When one of Trimble's aides heard Adam's remarks on 
the television news that evening he shuddered: `I could just imagine all those 
ordinary unionists out there, uncertain as to whether they should support the 
Agreement, watching Adams smiling and him saying, "Well done, David. " They 
were bound to be asking themselves why Adams was praising Trimble. Why would 
the political wing of the IRA be so enthusiastic about this deal? ' (Ibid. ) 
Yet, Trimble's riposte to those from the No camp, who cried treachery over the 
Agreement was simply that they had no alternative strategy except maintaining the 
status quo, which meant the continuation of the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement. They 
were effectively the `No' voices that had `deserted the battlefield' (Hennessey 2000, 
p. 189). 
Nevertheless, it was the `No' voices that were first out of the starting blocks during 
the referendum campaign and if unionist opinion was moving against the 
Agreement, the UUP were definitely not blameless for its shift. Soon after the 
conclusion of negotiations, Trimble had gone to a long-standing engagement in the 
United States, Deputy Leader, John Taylor returned to his political commitments in 
Europe and Ken Maginnis left for a holiday in Cyprus. Effectively, this meant that 
the WP's big hitters were out of the country in the opening stages of the 
referendum campaign. To compound difficulties, senior party organisers made an 
error of judgement by deciding to concentrate on the Assembly elections rather than 
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the referendum campaign, the result of which saw the anti-Agreement unionists 
having virtually a free run in its opening weeks. If wrong internal decision-making 
was not bad enough, the party found that it had lost nearly its entire potential 
campaign staff early in the campaign when younger members of the talks team 
(such as Peter King and Peter Weir) joined the No camp. The UUP found that it 
could not get party workers to even put up posters or canvass in support of the 
Agreement (Ibid. ). 
When Trimble returned from the US, he realised that without assuming a positive 
pro-Agreement stance and providing the accompanying imagery (in what was fast 
becoming the most highly televised political campaign in Irish history) he would 
lose the battle for unionist hearts and minds. 
At this juncture he hit upon the idea of hiring an external media campaign director 
for the month-long battle ahead. His choice was Ray Haydn who at the time was 
running a successful PR and media-training agency in Belfast. Yet, there was 
another important advantage for the UUP in hiring Haydn - he strongly believed in 
the merits of the Agreement and its benefits not only for Ulster Unionism but also 
for all the people in Northern Ireland. 
One of the first things Haydn changed within the Ulster Unionists' campaign was 
the leader himself. He knew how the camera could easily distort a politician's 
public image and was worried that Trimble's hair appeared greasy and unkempt on 
television: `No one else would touch the subject in Glengall Street, so I said it. I 
told him, "David, you've a problem with your hair. You are going to have to wash 
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it every day. " He actually took my advice and for the first three days of the 
campaign he washed his hair every morning' (McDonald 2000, p. 222). 
Haydn then insisted on further radical improvements to Trimble's image, 
highlighting his tendency to wear the same suit and tie two or three days running. 
Trimble was at first indignant but Haydn eventually persuaded him to also invest in 
a `new wardrobe' (Ibid. ). 
Cosmetic changes aside, there were more fundamental difficulties for Trimble at 
this juncture. Only half of the UUP appeared to be behind him - the majority of his 
MPs, scores of local councillors, the Orange Order, most of the Young Unionists 
and some of Trimble's closest friends had joined the No camp. Haydn made up 
for the dearth of support among party stalwarts with a strategically planned PR 
offensive. He drew up a table prioritising the media and a hierarchy was established 
with local newspapers and broadcasters at its apex; then the Southern papers, radio 
stations and RTE, then the UK national papers, and at its base were the foreign 
media. Haydn was helping to make this the most professionally run UUP media 
campaign in its history. Never before had the party been given such national and 
international media attention (Ibid. p. 223). 
The UUP strategy included the targeting of those unionists living in prosperous 
middle-class areas east of the Bann. At an early stage the campaign team concluded 
that the only way to get a 70 per cent-plus Yes vote was to persuade this normally 
indifferent band of affluent Protestants to take time out from the garden, the boat or 
the golf club and vote Yes to the Agreement on 22nd May (Ibid. p. 224). 
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However, the UUP strategy for the referendum campaign could not have included 
issues beyond their own control. One such `external setback' was the triumphant 
welcome-home party arranged for the Balcombe Street Four who appeared at the 
Sinn Fein special Ard Fheis on 10th May. Their rapturous reception went down like 
the proverbial lead balloon among the unionist community. `It has certainly not 
helped things one little bit' unionist Yes campaigners said gloomily, `It was like 
Christmas for the No lobby' (cited in De Breadun, 2001, p. 158). At this juncture, a 
significant proportion of unionists remained undecided and the issue of prisoner 
releases was the one that may have concerned them most. The subtleties of 
constitutional legislation were left for another day, but the prospect of `terrorists' 
convicted of paramilitary offences being freed to walk the streets was causing 
unionists to question the merits of the Agreement (Ibid. ). 
The damage that the Balcombe Street episode had inflicted on the Yes unionist 
camp led (in the short-term) to low morale that was rapidly becoming fatalistic 
pessimism. On a canvass in Armagh city, two days after the Ard Fheis, only three 
supporters came out to `pound the pavements' with Trimble (McDonald 2000, 
p. 225). 
The results of an Irish Times opinion poll on the same day, found that 56 per cent of 
the Northern Ireland electorate would vote Yes. Although it was a technical 
majority in favour of the Agreement, the figure meant that only a small percentage 
(certainly a minority) of Protestants would back the deal (Ibid. ). 
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Trimble was furious with the two governments who had released prisoners to help 
bolster other parties' support for the Agreement, but those closest to Trimble during 
this more pessimistic time were also furious with party dissidents whom they 
believed had stabbed Trimble in the back. Ken Maginnis was unforgiving in his 
attitude towards Jeffrey Donaldson in particular, but also John Taylor's 
performance during the referendum campaign: `John Taylor disappeared off the 
scene. He did not campaign and instead went AWOL' (Ibid. p. 226). 
Trimble took the view that deserting MPs Smyth, Forsythe, Beggs, Ross and 
Thompson, were simply short-sighted rather than overtly treacherous. His 
unwillingness to dismiss Donaldson as he did the other parliamentary rebels is seen 
by even his closest supporters as the fatal weakness of his leadership. During the 
referendum campaign Eoghan Harris continually urged Trimble to deal with 
Donaldson: 
I told David that Donaldson should have been despatched on the principle that if people 
commit treachery then they should go. I used to quote what I call `Leonard's law' to David, 
which is named after the Dublin writer Hugh Leonard. Hugh said that if you do somebody 
a favour in Dublin you make an enemy of them for life. I told David it would be very 
wrong for him to forgive Donaldson, because he would do it again in the future. Every great 
politician needs a chip of ice in his heart. It's probably the only down side to David's 
character as a politician that he can't put people like Donaldson down. (Ibid. p. 226) 
After a disastrous opening and middle to the campaign, optimism slowly crept in in 
the penultimate week of the campaign when there were signs that the unionist grass 
roots were not as vehemently opposed to the Agreement as some of the dissident 
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WP MPs and sceptics in the No camp had been. Indeed, Trimble was given a 
standing ovation by Jeffrey Donaldson's own Lagan Valley constituency 
association only days after the Balcombe Street Four appearance. 
However, the roller-coaster ride for Trimble was only beginning. The Yes unionists 
then suffered a second major setback on 14`h May when a loyalist audience in 
Belfast's Ulster Hall gave the convicted UDA killer, Michael Stone, a massive 
hero's welcome. The Ulster Democratic Party-organised rally in favour of the 
Agreement turned into a public relations disaster as pictures were beamed around 
the world of Stone (who had launched a lone gun and bomb attack on the funerals 
of three IRA members killed in Gibraltar ten years earlier) being treated like a 
movie star by his adoring fans. It was a turn-off for middle-ground unionist 
opinion, which felt almost as much distaste for loyalist paramilitaries as for 
republicans. 
One of Trimble's aides called Michael Stone's adulation a `fucking disaster. We 
now had D. T. lumped in the same camp as the Balcombe Street gang and the 
Milltown murderer. Paisley and McCartney would exploit that to the hilt' (Ibid. ). 
David Kerr recalled, `We thought that image of Stone combined with the Balcombe 
Street gang had finished us off' (Ibid. ). 
With the referendum vote on the horizon, Trimble rejected suggestions that he had 
not prepared unionists sufficiently for the terms of the Agreement. He noted the 
`remarkable absence' of argument in the campaign over constitutional matters and 
the three strands, particularly the `very elaborate' provisions for running the 
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Assembly (Hennessey 2000, p. 194). Instead, the `problem has been prisoners' he 
argued and insisted that prisoners `are not our problem' (Ibid. ). It was a 
government problem. He blamed the Irish government and the NIO, which had 
`spectacularly screwed up' on this issue and the `conniving at the Balcombe Street 
extravaganza in Dublin' (Ibid. ). 
Trimble was not only accused of failing to sufficiently prepare unionists for the 
terms of the Agreement but also of vacillating in his own position towards what he 
had signed up to on Good Friday. One political commentator, Fionnuala O'Connor, 
perceptively described him as `divided internally' (0' Connor 2002, p. 176). At 
times throughout the referendum campaign he seemed to positively endorse the 
Agreement, if only by cherry-picking elements that would be received well by his 
audience. Yet at other times, he assumed a more distant, hard-line or negative 
position that left people with a distinct impression that he was undoubtedly 
ambivalent about the whole Agreement. It seemed at times that Trimble had not 
only to reassure his audience at hand of the merits of the Agreement, but also 
himself. Nevertheless, UUP press officer, Alex Benjamin, claimed that his party 
did indeed sell the Agreement to unionists: 
The key message was one of reassurance and backing up our point with `what we're doing 
is the right thing'. We sold it on a number of issues, namely the fact that our reading of the 
Agreement was that it secured Northern Ireland within the union, gave power back to the 
people of Northern Ireland and enabled everyone to get involved and participate in politics 
and have a say in how Northern Ireland was run. But it also fundamentally accepts, it forces 
if you like, republicans and nationalists to accept the legitimacy of partition, which they 
haven't done before - so we sold that. (Interview with author, cited in Kirby 1999, p. 33) 
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Although Benjamin believed that his party `sold' a pro-Agreement position, 
questions still arose over the strength of their convictions. The party's referendum 
campaign leaflet once again stated that the Agreement secured Northern Ireland's 
union with Britain. "Say YES for the union" the cover exhorted and included a 
photograph of Trimble and his deputy - John Taylor (who was mostly absent from 
the campaign itself) pictured smiling outside Stormont where the new Northern 
Ireland government would be based. Yet, the text of the leaflet was not overly 
confident in its tone or indeed conciliatory in its nature. Trimble wrote inside: 
"Whilst no one believes that voting `Yes' will of itself guarantee a long and lasting 
peace, voting `No' will surely guarantee a return to violence... This would be a 
victory for Sinn Fein / IRA which must be denied them". 17 
To return to the trials and tribulations between the UUP leader and his `Young 
Pretender', Trimble explained that the difference between himself and Jeffrey 
Donaldson (who decided to vote No to the Agreement), centred on the small but 
important point about the `effectiveness of the mechanism that would be used to 
exclude unreconstructed terrorists' (Hennessey 2000, p. 194). As far as Trimble was 
concerned, the decommissioning issue had been dealt with and there was `no point 
in worrying around the edges. It has been dealt with in a way which I am sure we 
can work' (Ibid. ). The key phrase here was `unreconstructed terrorists'. Trimble was 
quick to point out that he had no fundamental objection to Sinn Fein in government 
- provided republicans proved that they had abandoned violence for good, as 
demonstrated by IRA decommissioning (Ibid. ). 
17 Text from referendum campaign leaflet, UUP, 1998. 
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On the 16th May, Trimble came under further attack from a new and more damaging 
quarter - his predecessor Jim Molyneaux. The ex-UUP leader stood on a United 
Unionist platform in Lurgan and affirmed his support for the No campaign. 
Unionist misgivings about the Agreement were indeed deep-rooted. An Irish Times 
opinion poll one week before the vote suggested 55 per cent of unionists were 
against the Agreement. '8 It was evident that Trimble was failing to sell the 
Agreement to his own constituency and his vacillation meant that at times he 
seemed to be pro-Agreement but at others his stance almost echoed that of the No 
camp. 
Trimble's adviser, Sean O'Callaghan, thought that the language of the campaign 
had to change in order to give the unionist community reassurance on issues like 
prisoners, decommissioning and Sinn Fein in government. He contacted Jonathan 
Powell, the prime minister's chief of staff, through a third party, and suggested that 
Powell should talk to an Orangeman in Co. Tyrone whom he regarded a good 
touchstone of grassroots unionist opinion (McDonald 2000, p. 229). O'Callaghan 
believed that if Powell listened to this Orangeman's concerns and then conveyed 
them to Tony Blair, the language of the campaign could change radically in the final 
week. 
0' Callaghan then worked on Lord Cranbome, (opposition leader in the House of 
Lords) who was sceptical about the Agreement, especially the rather vague 
promises on decommissioning. However, he managed to persuade Cranborne and 
Labour MP Kate Hoey to travel to Northern Ireland and canvass with Trimble. The 
18 The Irish Times, 15th May, 1998. 
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Northern Ireland-born Hoey was an important addition to Trimble's team because 
she had formerly been a close ally of the No camp's Robert (Bob) McCartney. 
O'Callaghan also sought to influence the chaplain of the Orange Order in Armagh, 
the Reverend William Bingham, stating: 
Bingham was very important to get on to Trimble's side. He was respected throughout the 
rank and file of the Orange Order and the wider Protestant community. Jonathan Powell, 
who once told me that `William tells me what to say and I write the script', also held 
Bingham in high regard. (Cited in Mc Donald, 2000, p. 230) 
O'Callaghan's personal crusade to persuade this strange but important `motley 
crew' of supporters to come to Trimble's aid proved an invaluable contribution to 
the UUP's flagging Yes campaign. Cranborne and Hoey travelled to Northern 
Ireland on 18th May to accompany Trimble on his canvass of Deny. While on their 
walkabout of the city's historic walls, Trimble declared: 
As Mitchel McLaughlin [Sinn Fein's national chairman] acknowledged last week, this 
Agreement is one in which the Irish government, nationalists and republicans are 
recognising the legitimacy of Ulster. They are saying that Londonderry and the Bogside 
here behind me are as British now as Bangor or Bournemouth (Ibid. ). 
Although the claim was unlikely to win nationalist hearts, his remarks were 
obviously aimed at winning unionist votes, not nationalist affections. Cranborne 
then told reporters following the group that unionists should vote Yes and show 
they were prepared to take a chance for peace and prosperity. He also recalled that 
he was one of `those 27 heroes' who voted against the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement 
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at Westminister - and would do so again today (De Breadun 2000, p. 159). The 
subtext for suspicious and fearful unionists was: if this pillar of the British 
establishment was urging a Yes vote, then the Agreement must be OK. Hoey then 
attacked her old comrade Robert McCartney: `I think he set out to make sure he 
could not agree with the Agreement, and now has to say some ridiculous things. ' 
(McDonald 2000, p. 231) 
On the Derry walkabout it was evident that Trimble still had a good deal to learn 
about media relations. As they were leaving, he was nearly caught out by a 
disastrous photo opportunity. After he had recalled that his ancestors were in the 
Siege of Derry in 1689, a photographer pointed out a gravestone in an adjacent 
cemetery with the name `Trimble' on it and asked him if he would pose beside it. 
The UUP leader was heading straight for the grave when his media minders 
frantically intervened and quickly ushered him away. The last thing they wanted 
was a picture of Trimble beside a gravestone bearing his name, which would have 
been immediately exploited by the No camp as an image of a man whose political 
career was about to be buried. (Ibid. ) 
The Derry walkabout was an attempt to steady unionist nerves and shore up the 
Trimble campaign and were undoubtedly important contributions. Yet, the most 
critical moves were still to come when in the final days of the campaign four 
radically different players entered the affray - Glen Barr, Bono, Tony Blair and the 
former RUC Chief Constable Sir Jack Hermon. 
215 
Glen Barr had held some residual loyalty to Trimble as an old Vanguard comrade 
from the 70's who had been appointed to the British government's Parades 
Commission -a quango charged with taking decisions on controversial loyalist 
parades. During the referendum campaign the Commission was scheduled to 
deliver its preliminary verdict on whether the 1998 Drumcree parade would be 
allowed to pass through the nationalist Garvaghy Road (as it turned out, the 
Commission recommended that the Orange march be rerouted away from the 
Garvaghy Road. The verdict, however, did not make the light of day until after the 
referendum). Barr realised that during the campaign, the No camp would exploit 
the ban and dress it up as just one more sop to violent republicanism and as a result 
he contacted Trimble and informed him of the Commission's intentions to ban the 
march (Ibid. ). Trimble then relayed to Downing Street his concerns about the 
impact that this would have on unionists and more generally on the Yes campaign. 
Tony Blair agreed with Trimble's analysis and intervened to delay the 
Commission's report. Significantly, Trimble was thus able, via Barr and ultimately 
Blair, to compromise the Parades Commission's political independence in the wider 
interests of saving the Good Friday Agreement (Ibid. p. 232). 
In the meantime, a proposed SDLP-inspired U2/Ash concert was in the process of 
becoming a reality and was scheduled to take place in the final week of 
campaigning. When an excited David Kerr told Trimble about the proposed concert 
his first reaction was: `Who's Bono? ' (Ibid. p. 233). Ray Haydn, who burst out 
laughing, recalled: 
About sixty million people around the world knew who Bono was - except David Trimble. 
I suppose if it had been Pavarotti or Domingo he would have known. But I jumped at the 
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idea, even though there was huge reluctance initially from many of the old guard - the ones 
with the Neanderthal attitudes in Glengall Street. I was trying to drag the party into the 
twentieth century, never mind the twenty-first, and this was the perfect opportunity to do 
that. (Ibid. ) 
As with almost every decision during the referendum campaign, Haydn made 
Trimble agree. `That's great, that's great, ' he kept repeating in order to convince 
his media director that he was taking the whole thing seriously. (Ibid. ) 
The rock group Ash (whose members were Protestant) agreed to attend a press 
conference with Trimble at the Waterfront Hall just hours before the concert to urge 
a Yes vote. Haydn claimed it was the most enjoyable press conference of the entire 
campaign and highlighted its importance: `We needed a young Protestant image to 
urge first-time voters in the unionist community to come out and vote. ' (Ibid. p. 234) 
During the concert (at Bono's invitation) John Hume and David Trimble discarded 
their suit jackets and strode onto the stage in front of a backdrop which proclaimed: 
`YES - Make Your Own History'. The audience, composed mainly of teenagers, 
went ecstatic when Bono grabbed Hume and Trimble's arms and held them aloft. 
The gesture turned out to be the dominant image of the referendum campaign, 
eclipsing the triumphalist hero-worship of the Balcombe Street Four and Michael 
Stone. This public demonstration of unity between constitutional Irish nationalism 
and Ulster unionism was in complete contrast to the last time Trimble had presented 
such a public image - hands held aloft once again but this time with Ian Paisley at 
Drumcree in 1995. 
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However, the Bono-Hume-Trimble image almost never happened. According to the 
SDLP's Tim Attwood, the original plan had been for the two party leaders simply to 
be seen in the audience and it was Bono's idea on the day to bring both of them on 
stage during the concert. (Ibid. p. 235) 
Yet, Trimble could not simply `bank' on the goodwill provided by the peace concert 
to sell the Agreement to a sceptical and nervous unionist population. He also 
needed a political `superstar' to convince the unionist community, or at least a 
majority of it, to `buy into' the Agreement. As with Good Friday, Tony Blair 
returned again to rescue Trimble, armed with a raft of pledges aimed specifically at 
assuaging unionist fears. 19 
In addition, Trimble's campaign team had a final ace up their sleeve to play before 
he went into two head-to-head television battles with Paisley and McCartney on the 
eve of the poll. One of the most nervous constituencies inside the wider unionist 
community was that of the RUC and their families who were deeply concerned 
about their own future and what Chris Patten's commission (a stipulation of the 
Agreement) would mean for them. Haydn and his team needed an experienced, 
well-respected policeman to calm those fears, which they eventually found in 
former Chief Constable, Sir Jack Hermon. Indeed, Hermon had guided the RUC 
through troubled waters (including the shoot-to-kill controversies and subsequent 
Stalker investigation) and was still highly respected inside its ranks. 
19 Blair's pledges included that there had to be IRA decommissioning otherwise Sinn Fein would be 
excluded from office in the Northern Ireland Assembly and he also reassured unionists that the RUC 
would not be disbanded. See Hennessey (2000). 
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On the morning of the 2 1St May he joined Trimble outside Belfast City Hall and the 
subsequent pictures of the two together on the Yes trail were an invaluable 
propaganda coup. In fact, Haydn insisted that the walkabout may have even been 
more important than the U2/Ash concert in gaining wavering unionists' support. 
(Ibid. p. 238) 
Later that afternoon, Trimble's first televised clash with Robert McCartney was 
recorded for BBC Northern Ireland's flagship politics programme Hearts and 
Minds. During the course of the debate McCartney clearly landed a number of 
severe blows on Trimble, particularly on decommissioning. He berated Trimble so 
much that the UUP leader made a damaging gaffe, calling disarmament 
`irrelevant. '(Ibid. ) It was thus evident that Trimble had lost `round one'. 
`Round two' was less than three hours away, when he was scheduled for his first 
live television debate with Ian Paisley. Haydn armed Trimble with a secret weapon 
to produce during the course of the debate -a series of photographs of Paisley and 
DUP colleagues wearing the red berets of the paramilitary styled Ulster Resistance 
in 1986. When Paisley accused Trimble of supping with the paramilitary devil, that 
was the IRA / Sinn Fein, by signing the Agreement, Trimble pulled out the pictures. 
`What about these, Ian? ' he kept shouting at the DUP leader (Ibid. p. 239). Trimble 
kept his notorious temper under control and won round two by listening to Haydn's 
advice and effectively using the photographs to shield against Paisley's line of 
attack. 
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Some onlookers, including Gerry Adams, believed Trimble had won the head-to- 
head with Paisley because: `he took up a positive position, putting clear blue water 
between the pro-and anti-Agreement unionist camps. For once he sold the 
agreement like a leader who believed in it. ' (Cited in Adams, 2003, p. 374) 
Trimble's more positive pro-Agreement approach in the final week of campaigning 
may well have contributed to the successful 71.12 per cent Yes vote announced on 
the 23`d May. At the count he proclaimed: `The people want to go forward... They 
cannot be held back any longer. ' (Mc Donald 2000, p. 241) 
Yet, worrying signs for future developments were never far away and indeed 
evident on the day of the count itself at the King's Hall in Belfast when Trimble still 
refused to talk directly to Sinn Fein. Instead, he made indirect demands or 
ultimatums from Gerry Adams and his party, calling on the republican movement to 
disarm their war machine and make the promise that there would never ever be a 
return to violence. 
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(iii) Democratic United Party / United Unionists 
In the opening weeks of the referendum campaign the DUP and the `No' camp hit 
the ground running; they were `first out of the blocks' because (in comparison to the 
other parties) they had adequate time to prepare. The DUP and Robert Mc 
Cartney's UKUP had left the talks in September 1997 when Sinn Fein were allowed 
to participate and unlike the eight political parties advocating a Yes vote in the 
referendum (who had spent an exhaustive time preceding - the signing of the 
Agreement in negotiations), the No camp were fresh and ready to fight a campaign. 
At the DUP's campaign launch on the 150' April, Ian Paisley demanded that both 
sides of the argument get equal treatment in the forthcoming referendum campaign 
(Oliver, 1998). He said the DUP would take legal action if the Yes campaign got 
government backing - remarks that could be attributed to a leaked memo by the new 
Director of the Northern Ireland Information Service, Tom Kelly, which was 
published by the DUP on Friday 28th March 1998. The memo outlined a British 
government communications strategy for a potentially historic referendum 
campaign and consisted of measures that would be taken to ensure a favourable 
outcome for the government, that is, a high Yes vote. It is interesting that initially 
the document was leaked to the UUP - as this infers that it may have been a 
disaffected or anti-Agreement member of this party who copied or passed it on to 
the chief opponents of any emerging deal - the DUP. St Clair McAllister, Director 
of Communications for the DUP, highlighted the UUP's role in the affair (as well as 
voicing his distrust of the British government/NIO in general): 
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The Ulster Unionist Party had the Tom Kelly document some 24 hours before we did. In 
the Forum I asked a question that particular day: "Well if you had it 24 hours, which they 
admitted, what were you doing with it for 24 hours? Did you not think it was significant to 
release it? " Of course they didn't want to release it because they were basically pro- 
Agreement. It was the DUP that revealed it. It had a clear and obvious deception about it, 
and in relation to the people, it was... Entertain them, bring them on, spin the message out, 
and sell the whole product. From that point of view it revealed what we've always thought 
about the British government and the NIO... I do not see the NIO as a friend; I see them as 
the enemy, in gentle terms. (Interview with author, 1 November 2001) 
For McAllister, the entire `peace process' had only come to fruition as evidenced by 
the Agreement because four key factors had fallen into place at the right time: 
A weak British government, continuing violence, a weak leader of Ulster Unionism and a 
weak leader of the RUC... all those things came together and people said "Right! Here's the 
opportunity, it has come together, we can do this now". For a con job to work several 
factors have to be in place; it can't work just around one particular person (Ibid. ). 
The challenge at this point, for the DUP and the No camp was to stave off the 
emerging pro-Agreement caucus (or those key players involved in what they 
deemed `the con job') by running an effective campaign of their own to convince 
the unionist electorate to vote No in the forthcoming referendum. As such, they 
began to develop a number of key messages and slogans, two of which were pivotal 
during the referendum campaign. McAllister provides an illuminating insight into 
the process (and importantly, the thinking) behind the creation of their first core 
message or key slogan of the campaign: 
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The slogan came up as a combined effort. I remember we were sitting talking about this 
and we were saying that we had to tell people that there was nothing wrong with saying No. 
One thing I put forward - if you analyse it - most of us sitting around that table were all 
parents... You actually have more often to tell your child No for its own good, more often 
than you say Yes. No to drugs, No to drink, and people think No is a very non-constructive 
word. I put forward the case that it was probably a more constructive word than saying Yes. 
Also the fact -I put this in, I thought it was quite good - that if you even look at the Ten 
Commandments, apart from one, every other said `No'. And I said "well now, I wouldn't 
like to go to God and say: "You're not being very constructive with these Ten 
Commandments". We had to get people to want to say that it's right to say No. Suddenly 
we had it.. . after sitting 
down with around 200 options, somebody said "that's it! ' - It's 
right to say No! In this case it's right! " Like a lot of good ideas, you toil over them for a 
matter of days or weeks and then suddenly within seconds the whole thing just comes 
together (Ibid. ). 
The No camp's key slogan of the referendum campaign was coherent, simple and 
dogged and cleverly turned a negative into a positive. Essentially, this simplistic 
`line' was pursued or `hammered home' throughout the referendum campaign. 
Indeed, McAllister summed up the DUP's position: 
We want an agreement but we want an agreement that the vast majority on both sides of the 
fence can agree with. So we're saying give us an agreement that the vast majority of both 
nationalists and unionists do like. Devolved government Yes, we've always been a party for 
a devolved government and we've always been positive in that. We are saying that it's right 
to say No against this particular Agreement (Ibid. ). 
Equally insightful, McAllister also explains how the second and subsidiary message 
or theme was arrived at: 
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We had a committee of anti-Agreement unionists with ourselves being the main party... 
there was also Robert McCartney, for example, involved at that time as well as others. We 
wanted to have a campaign, a slogan, and a message that people could identify with. We sat 
down and we thought about it. When you cut away all the economics etc. what is it that 
really drives people on? What is it that holds people together? If a football team is losing or 
if a family is having problems? Well it's their heart. They love their family or their team 
because they have a passion for it. It's a very emotive thing obviously as well. It really 
came about by that, by sitting down and analysing the situation and it was very obvious that 
the heart symbol has been used for a long, long time for various things. It's a symbol of 
love, a symbol of broken hearts etc. It was also a very acceptable type of symbolism and 
the obvious thing then was to have a heart-shaped Union Jack with the attendant message 
`have a heart for Ulster. ' (Ibid. ) 
The key theme of `have a heart for Ulster' summed up everything that their 
campaign was about - pulling on the heart strings of Ulster and asking the people to 
vote No for Ulster. During the referendum campaign, heart-shaped lapel pins were 
sold in the thousands to raise finance for the No campaign. 
The No camp's combined themes or messages were widely regarded by political 
friends and foes alike as being the best slogans of the referendum campaign, 
including the SDLP's Director of Communications, Conall McDevitt: 
They got off to a very good start with a couple of exceptionally smart moves. They chose to 
use a base British-Unionist nationalist ticket and they articulated it extremely clearly. The 
`have a heart for Ulster' was the most effective campaign image I have seen in a very long 
time. It was a very tasteful image in terms of you found it very difficult to offend you even 
though you didn't agree with it, and it was a very upfront and honest image as 
well ... whoever thought that up 
did a very good job and their campaign consolidated very 
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well around it. They managed to divide the Ulster Unionist Party, which is always a very 
sensible thing to do when you are trying to stir up unionist opinion. (Interview with author, 
3 June 1999) 
Indeed, during the referendum campaign, the No camp took the fight to the UUP 
leader's own constituency. A United Unionist coordinating committee consisting of 
the DUP, the Orange Order, the Ulster Clubs and several anti-Agreement members 
of the UUP set up an office in Portadown, in the heart of David Trimble's Upper 
Bann constituency (McDonald 2000). While Trimble could call on the support of 
intellectuals and academics, the No camp played on the real fears of ordinary 
unionists. From the outset, the No camp played the emotional card with unionist 
voters who were horrified at the prospect of terrorists walking free from prison. 
The referendum effectively became an intellectual struggle within unionism 
between the rational and emotional wings. 
Essentially, the central thrust of the No camp's assault on the Agreement was to 
play on the raw emotions of Protestants who had withstood thirty years of 
republican terrorism. Also during the referendum campaign the more extreme wing 
of the No camp (the LVF, along with some of the Ulster Independence faction etc. ) 
`terrorised' UUP members using dirty tricks and intimidation tactics. Vandals 
attacked Trimble's offices in Portadown, and party workers in his Upper Bann 
constituency faced a constant barrage of verbal abuse via the telephone (Ibid. 
p. 221). Leaflets distributed in the constituency contained the home telephone 
numbers of Trimble and some of his more faithful party stalwarts. Under the title: 
`Trimble embraces the IRA' one leaflet printed the constituency office numbers of 
Trimble, along with John Taylor, Ken Maginnis and Cecil Walker (Ibid. ). The text 
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of the leaflet claimed that Trimble was an agent of the British security services: 
`Why is David Trimble taking this course of action? Is he an M15/6 agent - 
recruited during his Vanguard days - as some allege? ' (Ibid. ) Another leaflet 
produced at the time incorporated a picture of a bomb-damaged Portadown with the 
attendant message: `If you want some good to come of this destruction of our town 
make yourself this promise. I WILL NEVER VOTE FOR DAVID TRIMBLE 
AGAIN! ' (Ibid. ) In addition, one of the more subtle propaganda ploys was the 
overnight appearance of a series of fly posters in mainly Protestant areas of 
Northern Ireland. They depicted an Irish tricolour with the message: `Vote Yes. ' 
(Ibid. ) The UUP was convinced that the posters had been put up by elements in the 
No camp, designed to make Protestants see the Agreement as an exclusively 
republican/nationalist project. 
Indeed, throughout the referendum campaign, the DUP's deputy leader, Peter 
Robinson, had claimed that it should now be clear to all unionists that the 
Agreement was a `vehicle to trundle us into a united Ireland' (cited in Hennessey, 
2000, p. 189). 
Although the Good Friday Agreement was arrived at after negotiations between 
several parties, Paisley termed the settlement a `Trimble-Adams' pact, and it was, in 
his view: 
Worse than the Anglo-Irish Agreement, more treacherous than the Framework Document 
and poses far greater dangers to the Union than the Sunningdale Agreement ever did. 
Under the deal, the Union is weakened. It is nothing short of deception and lies to portray 
this deal as strengthening the Union. Unionists know that any deal so enthusiastically 
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endorsed by the Dublin government and the SDLP is something that represents a dilution 
and diminution of the Union. (Ibid. ) 
Although the No camp attempted to soften their image with the message `Have a 
heart for Ulster', this was very much at odds with the emotive and often apocalyptic 
language employed throughout their campaign, as evident in the DUP's referendum 
campaign leaflet featuring a grandfatherly portrait of Ian Paisley accompanied by a 
`dear friend and voter' letter: "The Agreement is a staging post to a united Ireland 
and has come about by abject surrender to IRA/ Sinn Fein .A Yes vote is a vote 
which the enemies of our Province and those who have surrendered to them are 
calling for. " Paisley concludes: "Let the world know that the Ulster people will not 
be bullied, bribed or butchered into accepting fascist rule. It is suicidal to do 
otherwise". 
MacGinty believed that the DUP were quite clever and deliberate in their use of 
emotive terms: 
It isn't the case that they are unsophisticated in using this language. They've sat down and 
they've thought: `How are we going to maximise our vote? The answer is by scaring the 
hell out of people. ' (Interview with author, 2 June 1999) 
Indeed, St Clair McAllister lends credence to MacGinty's assertion that the DUP 
intentionally use emotive language and he sees no problem with this: 
I have no problem in using emotive language and I have no problems with emotions. I 
don't know what planet people come from if they want to have this dead, zombie-like 
existence of neutrality. It doesn't exist anywhere in the real world. It's the passion that 
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men have, the desire that men have, that drives them on. The desire to know what's over 
the other hill, to see what's in a foreign country, to make a better motor car, to get to the 
moon. All those things start with emotion, they don't start with a cold, clinical fact. 
They're emotional. I've used umpteen examples and no one has ever proved me wrong on 
this. You go to the likes of a Louis Pasteur who gave his life working night and day to 
bring about advanced medicine. Why did he do it? To make money? To be famous? No. 
He cared passionately and emotionally about people. You go to any really good 
organisation that is achieving anything. There's passion there. Yes, they have to pay their 
way; they have to have their shareholders - all of those things. But the most successful 
companies are the ones who deal in emotions. I think it's important to use emotive 
language. It's there, it's part of our being and I have no problem using it. If you're talking 
about telling lies and using emotive language, then that's a different subject, that's basically 
telling lies. I don't believe in telling lies, but I have no problem in having the right position 
and using emotive language. (Interview with author, 1 November 2001) 
Returning to the referendum campaign, on 5th May, a growing number of anti- 
Agreement unionists came together under one umbrella group and `officially' 
launched their campaign with the aforementioned slogan `It's Right to Say No. ' 
Calling themselves the United Unionists, their campaign team composed the DUP, 
the UKUP and dissident UUP MPs Willie Ross and Willie Thompson. The former 
UUP leader, Lord Molyneaux, also launched an attack on the Agreement from the 
House of Lords, warning that the IRA's failure to decommission would threaten a 
`nightmare situation' of elected Assembly politicians `sitting at the table side by 
side with terrorists with guns on the table, under the table or outside the door' 
(Hennessey 2000, p. 190). 
In outlining the strategy of the United Unionists, Peter Robinson was confident that 
a majority of unionists would vote No in the referendum and once that was 
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achieved, the objective would be to elect as many anti-Agreement unionists as 
possible to the Assembly, where they could dismantle the entire process from 
within. (Ibid. ) They would attempt to frustrate the establishment of cross-border 
bodies; would vote against Sinn Fein entering government; and would oppose the 
release of prisoners. Robinson believed that nationalists, and in particular the 
SDLP, had provided the anti-Agreement unionists with the means to achieve this: 
`John Hume has been too clever by half. By insisting on an Assembly with a 
nationalist veto, he has also provided an Assembly with a unionist veto. He may 
regret that. ' (Ibid. ) He predicted that the Agreement would inevitably collapse and 
that `for the first time in generations the thrust of government policy would have to 
be: "How can we accommodate unionists? "' (Ibid. ) 
Robinson also denied that the United Unionists were acting irresponsibly. For him, 
it was the Yes campaigners who were acting immorally. They supported the 
establishment of a `rigged and undemocratic' Assembly that was not based on 
majoritarian principles; they had agreed to cross-border bodies that allowed a 
`hostile foreign state' a growing role in Northern Ireland's internal affairs; they 
were proposing to sit `cheek-to-cheek with Adams and McGuinness in government' 
while the IRA remained `armed to the teeth'; and they would allow the release of 
`unrepentant' prisoners and the destruction of the RUC, which had valiantly upheld 
law and order in trying times. (Ibid. p. 191) In addition, the only way for Adams and 
McGuinness to be removed from office - because of the need for cross-community 
support - was if they were `found with a smoking gun in their hand' (Ibid. ). 
Furthermore, Robinson believed that the IRA would resume its terrorist campaign. 
He found it `unbelievable' that the UUP leaders who had opposed the Sunningdale 
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Agreement would now support this Agreement: `I stood shoulder to shoulder with 
David Trimble and John Taylor back then. They told us that agreement was bad for 
the Union because it put [the SDLP's] Gerry Fitt in government. Now they tell us 
this agreement strengthens the Union when it puts Gerry Adams in government. ' 
(Ibid. ) 
The DUP deputy leader also rejected the arguments of the 32-County Sovereignty 
Committee and Republican Sinn Fein - that the Agreement copper-fastened 
partition: `Those people simply want a united Ireland today. They are not prepared 
to wait even a few months like the Sinn Fein leadership. ' (Ibid. ) His contention was 
that the repeal of the Government of Ireland Act 1920 meant that Northern Ireland 
was no longer an integral part of the United Kingdom: `The mooring ropes have 
been loosened and we have been set adrift and pushed towards a united Ireland. ' 
(Ibid. ) 
Only a matter of days after the United Unionists' campaign launch, the No camp 
were handed their greatest propaganda coup of the campaign to date. The stars of 
the show at Sinn Fein's special Ard Fheis (to endorse the Agreement and end their 
policy of abstentionism) were the IRA's Balcombe Street Four who had been 
imprisoned for 23 years. The four, who had been transferred to jails in the Irish 
Republic, were granted temporary release to attend the conference, and were greeted 
with wild cheers and a standing ovation. The triumphalist reception of what many 
Protestants deemed `IRA murderers' being hugged by Sinn Fein politicians on the 
platform and the general heroes' welcome they received, led to outrage in unionist 
quarters in the North. The No camp could justifiably argue that triumphant scenes 
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like these would be the norm each time IRA prisoners walked free from jail without 
completing their sentences over the following two years. Only by voting No to the 
Agreement, they believed, could this sickening prospect be prevented. Essentially, 
the notion of prisoner releases only seemed to confirm Robert McCartney's 
contention that the Agreement was all about appeasing terrorists (McDonald 2000). 
The No camp were handed a further propaganda coup on 14`x' May when loyalist 
killer, Michael Stone, appeared at a UDP (Ulster Democratic Party) rally in the 
Ulster Hall in support of a Yes vote in the forthcoming referendum. 
At this juncture, the No camp were making inroads in the battle for unionist hearts 
and minds. In stepping up their campaign, they then launched an emotive media 
blitz via poster and newspaper advertisements. One showed a young woman wiping 
away a tear, a year after the referendum, asking: `How did I bring myself to vote 
SF/IRA into government? ' (Ibid. p. 227). 
The United Unionists also cleverly turned sufficient consensus on its head. After 
decades insisting that the majority in Northern Ireland - effectively the unionist 
population - should decide the constitutional future of Northern Ireland, anti- 
Agreement unionists now claimed that a Yes vote would be invalid unless a 
majority of unionists and nationalists separately voted in favour of the Agreement 
(Hennessey 2000 p. 192). This view was also widely accepted in government 
circles. As such, Tony Blair began to move into overdrive to reassure the unionist 
community of the Agreement's merits, and one individual in particular, the UUP's 
Jeffrey Donaldson. Unlike many anti-Agreement unionists, Donaldson had 
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supported the constitutional arrangements in the Agreement; however, he also 
believed that there were weaknesses and amoral aspects of the Agreement. 
Intensive pressure was applied by Downing Street to persuade Donaldson to come 
down in favour of a Yes vote, as such an outcome could sway many undecided 
unionist voters. (Ibid. ) Finally, a week before the referendum vote, Donaldson 
confirmed that he would be voting No. 
Also in the final week of the campaign, former UUP leader, Lord Molyneaux 
confirmed he would be voting No. Indeed, the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland 
added further to the British government's misery at this time when it declared that 
as an `organisation committed to civil and religious liberty' it could not instruct 
anyone how to vote but it was `unable to recommend the Agreement to the people 
of Ulster' (Ibid. p. 194). 
At this juncture, with the No camp inflicting damage to the Yes vote and seemingly 
in the ascendancy within unionism, the UUP made attempts to hit back. They did 
so with the help of the SDLP-inspired U2/Ash peace concert. However, the DUP's 
McAllister was dismissive of the concert and its effect on Northern Ireland's 
younger generation: 
People look back to the U2 concert as being the super masterstroke or whatever the case 
may be... that this rather strained handshake between Hume and Trimble was somehow a 
tremendous step forward. I have the facts and figures to show that during the referendum 
campaign, the vast majority of 18-26 year olds, which was the targeted age group, were 
actually coming to the DUP. We had 23%. The next was actually Sinn Fein who were not 
involved in the U2 concert as well at around 15%. The SDLP were down at 8% and I think 
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Trimble's UUP was about 12 or 13%. We were 10 points clear [of the UUP]. That was a 
very worrying thing for the government at that particular time. I've always maintained that 
young people have much more savvy than you give them credit for, and I think that one 
thing that they're looking for above all else is honesty, they're looking for the truth, what is 
the bottom line here? They respect that straightforward honesty and they don't want any 
nonsense or flannel. They can see through all that flannel. I think that ours was a 
straightforward message, in spite of the U2 concert and all its attempts to make appeals to 
people. (Interview with author, 1 November 2001) 
McAllister may indeed be dismissive of the concert's effect on younger voters, yet 
the event did represent a defining moment in the referendum campaign when for the 
first time (in such a public way) the two traditions came together in a show of unity. 
Its positive reverberations undoubtedly contributed towards a swing back in 
unionism from No to Yes. Indeed, in the final week of the campaign the No camp 
began to steadily lose ground, none more so than in its final throes. According to 
Stephen Grimason, BBC Northern Ireland's political editor during the referendum 
campaign, Robert McCartney's public haranguing of Tony Blair (caught on camera) 
had a negative impact on the No camp: 
And then the last dregs of the campaign... the disastrous meeting between Bob McCartney 
and the Prime Minister in Holywood, absolutely had a very bad effect on the No camp's 
campaign because at that point it wasn't fashionable at all to be haranguing the Prime 
Minister. Then interestingly McCartney was savaged by a bunch of women after he called 
them a rent-a-mob, one of them Lord Napier's wife, Lady Napier. You know, it wasn't his 
finest day and given that he was supposed to have been in Belfast at that point with Ian 
Paisley and various other people on that part of the campaign and didn't tell them what he 
was doing. Paisley made it be known very clearly to Bob as to how he thought that had 
been handled... there was an awful row between them. And that happening the night 
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before, well the coverage was the day before the referendum itself... I think that nudged the 
figure in a certain direction. (Interview with author, 20 March 2003) 
After a strong pro-Agreement surge in the final week, the referendum result came in 
at 71.12% Yes, and 21.88% No. 
The No camp's leaders tried their best to put a brave face on their defeat. As he left 
the count centre Robert McCartney insisted that a majority of unionists had actually 
voted No (McDonald 2000). In fact, a Sunday Times/Coopers and Lybrand survey 
published a day after the result showed that 96 per cent of Catholics voted Yes, 
while a smaller majority of Protestants, around 55 per cent, also backed the 
Agreement. (Ibid. p. 241) Behind McCartney, came Paisley and his DUP team, who 
had to run the gauntlet of jeering loyalists who were chanting: `Cheerio, cheerio, 
cheerio ... cheerio, cheerio, cheerio! 
'(Ibid. ) 
McAllister was adamant that one person in particular had greatly contributed to the 
No camps' failure to win over unionist hearts and minds - Tony Blair. The British 
prime minister's interventions and the `pledges' he made to the unionist community 
was in McAllister's mind the main reason for the Yes camp's success in the 
referendum vote: 
It was quite obvious that the Yes campaign was under pressure because they didn't have one 
central distinct message that they kept saying. Government focus groups were revealing 
that we were winning a tremendous amount of ground... the turning factor for the Yes 
campaign was the prime minister's promises - in other words if you couldn't trust the prime 
minister, who could you trust? That was the turning point for them. That was, shall we say, 
their masterstroke, even though it was deception and lies to try and turn the campaign 
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around. I think if he hadn't done that, with their mixed message and our very definite 
central message, I think we would have got the required numbers in the unionist 
community. We would have clawed back that extra 10% or whatever it was, to around 
62%, where David Trimble would not have been able with 62-63% to go ahead with the 
Agreement. So those percentage points that we lost in that sense were entirely due to the 
prime minister. (Interview with author, 1 November 2001) 
For McAllister, the Agreement was sold by Tony Blair in a way that a snake-oil 
salesman sells to a naive audience: 
They [the people of Northern Ireland] were told this was going to cure all your ills, that 
there would be no side effects from it, that one dose would do it... I'll use the analogy of 
the snake oil salesman... He's coming into a town where there's been no excitement, no 
buzz for a long time. There suddenly arrives a brightly painted, coloured wagon and it 
looks good. He'd stop and he'd rest, he looks good, he's well groomed, people around and 
about him. He's talking about the success he's had somewhere else. He's got the magic 
cure for all your ills; it's only a dollar a bottle. You can use all the analogies in the world 
and that is what it basically came down to. It was a snake-oil salesman arriving in a place 
where people were willing and wanting to buy. I'm glad to say that not everybody in the 
town bought a bottle. (Ibid. ) 
After failing to achieve the requisite number of Assembly seats needed to produce 
an anti-Agreement unionist majority, the challenge now for Paisley and the DUP 
was to persuade enough UUP `waverers' to defect to the combined anti-Agreement 
benches. If he could help to alter the balance in the Assembly and produce a 
majority of unionists opposed to the Agreement, the entire project would collapse. 
The process was predicated on the central condition that the Agreement must have 
cross-community support in the Assembly, and therefore, if a unionist majority 
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voted against its implementation the entire arrangement could not function and 
would essentially be deemed unworkable. 
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(iv) Sinn Fein 
In the aftermath of Good Friday, the Sinn Fein leadership had a somewhat difficult 
task in selling the Agreement to the republican grassroots. After the 1970 split, 
Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness had built their revolutionary reputations 
partly by accusing Official Sinn Fein of selling out on basic principles. In the early 
70's, the Officials had decided upon a more reformist path that entailed the de facto 
recognition of partition and their willingness to enter into a Stormont-based 
administration. A quarter of a century later, in relation to the Northern Ireland 
institutions set out in Strand One of the Agreement (whether they liked to admit it 
or not), Sinn Fein were effectively following the same course (although every 
ideological retreat could be dressed up as a strategic move to either gain ground 
politically or essentially wrong-foot unionism) (McDonald 2000). 
On Strand Two (or the North-South dimension), Adams (in the run-up to Good 
Friday) set out as his bottom line (Ireland on Sunday on 8th March) - that he wanted 
cross-border bodies operating independently of the Assembly; the retention of 
Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution; and policing and courts coming under the 
remit of new all-Ireland institutions. In the Agreement, however, there was a 
reduced number of North-South bodies - under the Northern Ireland Assembly's 
control, amendments to Articles 2 and 3 and no provision for all-Ireland police and 
courts services. The Agreement's strength derived from the fact that no political 
party achieved their `bottom line' and that all participants had made `compromises'. 
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The scale of the philosophical recasting of republicanism (and Irish nationalism in 
general) was ambitious and innovative - the territorial basis was (on the face of it 
anyway) being discarded and the claim to Irish unity was now to be a matter of 
argument and persuasion rather than doctrine. While there may have been cynicism 
about their true value, the amending of Articles 2 and 3 did represent a major 
change in the nationalist and republican mindset (De Breadun 2001). 
For some Sinn Fein supporters (who may have dwelt on issues like changing the 
Irish constitution or entering Stormont) a sudden change of mindset would not be 
forthcoming and there was a very real prospect that some members would fall away 
and join the hardline 32-County Sovereignty Committee or Republican Sinn Fein . 
The political journalist, Deaglan de Breadun, summed up Sinn Fein's predicament 
at this juncture: 
If the North-South bodies had a wider remit and the policing reform(s) were `nailed down' 
better, the document would have been easier for the Sinn Fein leadership to sell to its 
members. The issue of whether the new Assembly was a truly partitionist institution or not 
was bound to surface. Given the safeguards for the minority and the link with the North- 
South Ministerial Council, there was an argument that this was a fundamentally different 
institution from the old Stormont. Some Sinn Fein members felt the North-South bodies 
would never be more than token institutions unless the party was represented on them. For 
that to happen, Sinn Fein would have to stand for the Assembly, take its seats and overcome 
any decommissioning obstacle that might exist to becoming ministers. Although Sinn Fein 
would not put it this way, in order to push for a united Ireland there would have to be pro 
tem acceptance of partition. (Ibid. pp 148-149) 
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Even if the referenda passed, in both Northern and Southern Ireland - or perhaps 
especially if they passed - further violence was envisaged. Yet, the Sinn Fein 
leadership seemed to be keeping a firm grip on most of the grassroots in the 
republican heartlands of the North. The party left the negotiations with a number of 
positives - the `equality agenda', prisoner releases and policing reform. Sinn Fein 
believed that life `on the ground' would have to improve for ordinary nationalists in 
the short term and that the bread-and-butter concerns of nationalists and the political 
structures necessary to accommodate them should now take precedence over 
`physical force' republicanism. (Ibid. ) 
It was the equality agenda espoused by the party, which was the key that would help 
unlock the door to republican participation in the Assembly and the northern 
executive. As de Breadun highlighted: 
The ultimate objective of a united Ireland would be maintained but, in the meantime, what 
could be wrong with achieving the maximum level of rights and equality for nationalists 
within the existing set-up, especially if you were also undermining partition in the process? 
Mainstream republicans argued that unionism was based on sectarian supremacy and that, 
by campaigning for equality, you were helping to remove the basis for unionism. (Ibid. pp 
149-150) 
Yet, dissident republicans rejected this analysis (and indeed Sinn Fein's) out of 
hand, that is, collaboration with six-county institutions would end up with 
republicans being absorbed into the existing scheme of things or else pushed to the 
margins of political life. 
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As tensions began to emerge, Sinn Fein decided that two weekend gatherings were 
needed to reach a decision on the Agreement. The first was the 92nd Sinn Fein Ard 
Fheis that began on 18th April 1998. One of its highlights was a speech by 
Thenjiwe Mtintso, the Deputy Secretary General of the ANC (African National 
Congress), South Africa, who arrived with a prepared speech but discarded her text 
and instead spoke from her heart. She told the delegates of her experience of 
revolutionary struggle as a soldier in her fight against the apartheid system. She 
also dealt at length on her experiences of negotiations. It was a fitting contribution 
that caught the mood of the moment and touched on many of the fears evident 
among republicans (Adams 2003). 
While many at the first Ard Fheis raised their concerns about the Agreement, the 
overwhelming majority expressed confidence in the party leadership and its 
strategy. However, it was also obvious from the speeches that there was a real 
difficulty for Sinn Fein in the South. An unambiguous `Yes' vote in the 
forthcoming referendum was at this stage not an absolute `given' as tampering with 
the Irish constitution remained unpopular. 
There would be some erosion of republican ranks, but at this juncture the 
circumstances did not exist for a massive split. It was evident that there was a war- 
weariness in the air at the first Ard Fheis, and several speakers from the North 
(older and more experienced than most of the Southern contributors) voiced the 
desire that their children and their children's children would not have to go through 
what they had suffered, (De Breadun 2001). Watching the debate, De Breadun 
stated that: 
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One was tempted to conclude that when this document was accepted and when, as expected, 
Sinn Fein entered the new Assembly not as a servant but as one of the masters of the 
banquet, then it could indeed be said that the war, if not over, had at least lost most of its 
soldiers. (Ibid. p. 151) 
The party president would normally give the keynote address at an Ard Fheis, but 
this time Martin McGuinness (possibly in an attempt to win over the more hard-line 
element) joined Adams to give delegates a lengthy, blow-by-blow account of the 
negotiations. Adams told those present that he wasn't going to prejudge the 
outcome of the vote that they would have in a matter of weeks, but that, united they 
could achieve what they desired. (Adams 2003) 
A reconvened one-day session on 10`h May was scheduled to take a formal decision 
on the Agreement. Adams was determined that he would not be rushed and that 
there needed to be time for party activists and republicans generally, to discuss and 
debate the many issues that arose from the Agreement. Essentially, his hope was to 
maintain internal unity and cohesion - that could best be accomplished if people 
had ownership of the process of agreeing a position on the Agreement. A further 
hope was that members could endorse it, but do so in a way that even those opposed 
to it would not walk away from the struggle. (Ibid. ) 
After the (first) Ard Fheis, Sinn Fein delegates returned to their own areas with 
instructions to hold strategic discussions at all levels of the party. There was also a 
leadership-led nationwide series of meetings. (Ibid. ) 
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As part of Sinn Fein's internal debate, the leadership asked President Mandela if he 
would send a senior ANC delegation to Ireland to speak to republicans about their 
process of negotiations, the management of change and the challenges this entailed. 
The effect of Thenjiwe's contribution to the first Ard Fheis was the trigger for this 
request. If activists could learn from the experience and question those who had 
previously been on a similar path, then post-Agreement events would not seem such 
a leap into the dark. The request was granted and key participants from the process 
of negotiations in South Africa arrived to offer their views. (Ibid. ) 
The South African contingent travelled widely throughout republican Ireland. In 
Crossmaglen in South Armagh, Mac Maharaj (Minister for Transport who had spent 
twelve years imprisoned on Robben Island) spoke of change as a permanent 
condition, in which republicans would have to reconcile their strategy, tactics and 
principles. He told the audience `You can make a wrong choice in your strategy, but 
if you do it as a united force you can later change your course. ' (Ibid. p. 371) To 
allay fears over a new political dispensation, he pointed out that for everyone `When 
change looms there is doubt and hesitation' (Ibid. ). 
It was very hard to argue with revolutionaries who had succeeded in their own 
country when they said tactical flexibility did not imply selling-out on principles. 
At a rally in Belfast's Ulster Hall, Cyril Ramaphosa, ANC chief negotiator during 
the transition to South African democracy, told the audience: `Negotiations are 
about give and take. Had we wanted everything or nothing, we would have ended 
up with nothing' (Ibid. ). Ramaphosa and Matthew Phose also visited the men and 
women prisoners in Long Kesh and Maghaberry. 
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Sinn Fein Chairman, Mitchel McLaughlin highlighted the difficulties the leadership 
faced at this point in time: 
We had to change the party constitution. It stood for 80 years. We had to end the policy of 
abstentionism that had existed since partition. It wasn't easy to do and we did meetings 
travelling night and day in the weeks immediately after the Good Friday Agreement. We 
had to deliver more than anybody else. We had to convince our people that giving up on 
Articles 2 and 3 was the right thing to do, that ending the policy of abstentionism was the 
right thing to do and that returning to Stormont was the right thing to do as part of our 
commitment to the Good Friday Agreement. We had to do all of that against a background 
of David Trimble misrepresenting what we had agreed to. He was telling his constituency 
that we had agreed to decommission IRA weapons, well we hadn't, we never had... David 
Trimble's argument to his constituency was creating difficulties in ours. (Interview with 
author, 9 June 1999) 
Behind-the-scenes or the public glare of the media spotlight, widespread briefings 
of Provisional IRA members were taking place. These indicated that the Agreement 
was `better than expected'; that the Northern Ireland Assembly was part of 
`transitional' arrangements; and that there would be no point in further continued 
violence, because within 610 to 15 years' there would be significant `demographic' 
change in the North's population to provide for a nationalist majority in favour of a 
united Ireland (Hennessey 2000, p. 189). This message, reinforced by all prisoners 
to be released within two years, meant that the Provisional IRA was prepared to 
accept the Agreement. It was understood that Sinn Fein negotiators at the talks had 
rejected a longer period for prisoner releases. The offer of a two-year release 
deadline had been communicated to prisoners at the Maze and was immediately 
accepted. The role of the prisoners in supporting the peace process and the 
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emotional pull of getting their comrades home was a decisive factor in convincing 
members of the republican movement to lend support to the Agreement. (Ibid. ) 
On the 30`h April, the IRA issued a statement, which said that, while the Agreement 
fell short of what was required, it nevertheless marked `a significant development' 
(De Breadun 2001, p. 154). However, the organisation maintained its hard line 
position on the weapons issue: `Let us make it clear that there will be no 
decommissioning by the IRA. '(Ibid. ) They also restated their belief that a durable 
peace required national self-determination and that whether the Agreement heralded 
a transformation of the situation was entirely dependent on the will of the British 
government. Its statement concluded by commending the efforts of Sinn Fein. 
(Ibid. ) 
The call now among republicans was for a united front, as no one wanted a split in 
the ranks. Adams (who had been lobbying for months for the British to transfer 
republican prisoners from jails in Britain to Ireland) made it clear to Mo Mowlam 
that this was crucial in the build-up to the second Ard Fheis on 10th May, (Adams 
2003). In a move clearly calculated to influence republican thinking, six prisoners 
were eventually transferred to the Republic of Ireland. Among the six were four 
IRA volunteers - Hugh Doherty, Harry Duggan, Joe O'Connell and Eddie Butler - 
known collectively as the Balcombe Street Four. 
The Ard Chomhairle met again, and the Sinn Fein leadership agreed two emergency 
motions to be put to the delegates at the reconvened Ard Fheis. There were many in 
the media who believed the `emergency' motions to be a foregone conclusion and 
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they were essentially convinced that the leadership would win any vote (Ibid. 
p. 372). However, Adams claimed that there remained inherent difficulties: 
For Sinn Fein to take seats in the assembly in the North, we had to change the party's 
constitution and rules. That required a two-thirds majority. I knew that to carry the party 
and remove any risk of a serious schism we needed a massive endorsement. The Ard 
Chomhairle also agreed to ask the Ard Fheis to pass a motion to call for a "Yes" vote in the 
referendum in the Twenty-six Counties. Many colleagues in the South were especially 
unhappy with the proposed changes to the Irish constitution. I knew there was bound to be 
resistance, but I couldn't judge how extensive it might be. All of the feedback from our 
internal meetings pointed to almost all the Southern delegates being against changes to 
articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution. Some of our key activists, including leadership 
people, felt strongly about this. (Ibid. pp 372 - 373) 
Despite the claims by Adams, many sceptics remained critical that the Sinn Fein 
debate on the Agreement was a total sham, a charade for the benefit of the voters 
and the media (De Breadun 2001). It was presumed that delegates would vote 
whatever way the IRA leadership (dominated by prominent members of Sinn Fein) 
had decided. Whereas, the first debate on the 18th April had clearly been genuine, 
with Southern delegates obviously plagued by doubts, after the IRA gave a qualified 
blessing to the Agreement criticisms began to mount. By the time of the second 
Ard Fheis on the 10th May, the only difficulties that the sceptics could foresee for 
the leadership was how to keep it from looking too easy. (Ibid. ) 
At the second Ard Fheis, Martin McGuinness told the delegates that the Good 
Friday Agreement had weakened the Union because of a clause limiting its life to 
the will of a majority in the Six Counties (ignoring that this had been British 
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government policy since 1973) (Hennessey 2000). He accepted that the Agreement 
did not go as far as most nationalists wished but it was the basis for advancement 
and the republican analysis was now at the heart of Irish politics as never before. 
Britain's role in the Union was now somewhat akin to one partner saying the 
relationship was over but that he or she was willing to wait `until the children have 
grown up. ' (Ibid. p. 188) There was now `no absolute commitment, no raft of 
parliamentary Acts to back up an absolute claim, but only an agreement to stay until 
the majority decides otherwise. This is a long way from being as British as 
Finchley. ' (Ibid. ) 
The downside to the Agreement for republicans involved the proposed inclusion of 
the consent clause in the Irish Constitution and the definition of the nation in terms 
of its people rather than its territory. However, on a more positive note, 
McGuinness drew the delegates' attention to the Irish constitutional amendments 
that established North-South bodies. Although the Union had been weakened, 
partition remained. Nevertheless, this too could be weakened by the dynamic 
operation of all-Ireland structures which were part of the Agreement and which 
unionists had fought `tooth and nail to prevent. ' (Ibid. p. 189) From the beginning, 
explained McGuinness, Sinn Fein knew that the talks parameters laid down by the 
two governments meant that a united Ireland would not come out of this phase of 
the negotiations. So the party set itself the task of `weakening the British link while 
defending the rights of Irish men and women and it is in this context that we must 
honestly measure the gains and losses. ' (Ibid. ) 
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Critics and sceptics alike would claim a contrary view to McGuinness - that an 
ageing, war-weary movement had come to terms with reality and settled for political 
advances within Northern Ireland while accepting that the Border was there to stay. 
(De Breadun 2001. ) Closer to the truth was that everything was still to play for. 
Every concession boasted by unionists in the Agreement could be matched with a 
gain claimed by nationalists. The unionist veto had been secured but the link with 
the crown weakened. 
Unbeknownst to the delegates and visitors attending the Ard Fheis, the Sinn Fein 
leadership had persuaded firstly Mo Mowlam and then the Irish government to 
release the recently transferred Balcombe Street Four for their first parole in twenty- 
three years. Indeed, other prisoners were also released on parole from prisons in the 
North, including Padraid Wilson, the Officer Commanding (OC) of Long Kesh, and 
Geraldine Ferrity, the OC of the women republican prisoners in Maghaberry. 
(Adams 2003) 
If there were any prospects of substantial opposition to the Agreement by delegates, 
it quickly dissipated with the Balcombe Street Four's arrival. They were greeted 
with sustained and wild applause and cheering lasting over ten minutes. Although 
some accused Sinn Fein of triumphalism, Adams maintained: 
In truth, the intention was to show that the Agreement was making a difference. Still, all of 
us underestimated the reception these men would receive. That shows how busy we were 
on other issues. The Balcombe Street Four were iconic figures. There is a great affinity 
with prisoners within republicanism, and prisoners incarcerated in Britain itself are held in 
special regard. Some years before, we had launched a publicity campaign around the 
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Balcombe Street Four. The huge spontaneous outpouring of welcome when they entered 
the Ard Fheis was a measure of the love and respect in which they were held. Tears flowed 
freely down many faces. They came on to the stage, and the RDS shook with the sound of 
clapping and the rhythmic stamping of feet (Ibid. p. 373). 
Indeed, few in the modern era who claimed the label `political prisoner' had served 
so much time as the Balcombe Street Four and Adams (once again) compared them 
to Nelson Mandela. Other prisoners also appeared, spoke from the platform and 
mixed with the crowd. Republicans, who had been locked up with the key thrown 
away, were now (much to the distaste of unionists) almost on the point of release as 
part of the terms of the Agreement that had been negotiated by Sinn Fein. 
In the event, there was a huge majority in favour of ending the policy of 
abstentionism and Sinn Fein's successful candidates taking their seats in a Northern 
Ireland Assembly. The motion advocating the move was supported by 331 of the 
350 delegates (Hennessey 2000). Significantly, they had placed their trust in the 
Sinn Fein leadership, a leadership that had the pedigree of leading the republican 
movement in war and now, in relative peace. Adams maintained that: 
Of all the moments that have been described as historic, this truly deserved that description. 
The Ard Fheis really did make history. I again had the job of summing up, of giving people 
some sense of how far we had come, but also of how much we still had to do. British rule 
was not ended. Neither was partition. Our struggle had to continue. But that brought us 
back to the development of strategies and tactics that were needed to build and increase our 
political strength. The struggle is where the activist is, I told them it was about ending 
poverty, building political and economic democracy, as well as equality and ending British 
rule. (Adams 2003, pp 373-374) 
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In the aftermath of victory at the RDS, if Adams felt any temptation to break into a 
broad smile, he successfully resisted it. His expression was sombre and in his 
concluding speech to delegates he went out of his way to console the opponents of 
change (De Breadun 2001). He may have been thinking of the much larger number 
of dissidents who were not in the hall but would still consider themselves part of the 
republican movement. It would not be wrong to contend that significant numbers in 
attendance may have voted the right way out of loyalty rather than conviction. 
Indeed in Parnell Square, a short distance from Sinn Fein's Dublin office, posters of 
Adams and McGuinness were displayed with the motto: `Wanted for Treachery' 
(Ibid. p. 155). The Sinn Fein leaders were accused of betraying `the memory of the 
Irishmen and women who made the supreme sacrifice. ' (Ibid. ) Although the posters 
lost a great deal of their force through being anonymous, they were a disturbing 
indication of the climate developing in some quarters of the republican movement. 
There were also reports that Provisional dissidents had regrouped in a new 
organisation, variously dubbed `IRA Nua' (Irish translation of `New IRA') or `Real 
IRA'. 
Although Sinn Fein had not convinced everyone of their political analysis or the 
way forward, they had brought the vast majority of the republican movement with 
them. Their challenge now was to persuade a deeply suspicious unionist 
community of their peaceful intent. Adams attempted (in his concluding remarks to 
the second Ard Fheis) to reassure unionists that when Sinn Fein spoke of ending the 
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British presence in Ireland, it did not mean driving the Protestants into the sea. 
(Adams 2003) 
Yet, the media publicity surrounding the Ard Fheis and particularly the reception 
received by the Balcombe Street Four, (dubbed a `PR disaster' by the other 
members of the Yes camp), did not help unionists to feel any more at ease or 
reassured. However, Sinn Fein's Chairman, Mitchel McLaughlin was more 
circumspect: 
If it was a PR disaster, you have to ask yourself who it was a PR disaster for? And would it 
have been a bigger PR disaster if the Sinn Fein organisation had rejected the Good Friday 
Agreement? We delivered big time, we went through the pain and we took the brick bats 
and we took the criticisms, internally and externally. We brought most of our party who 
voted it through with 93% support, but we also lost people. There was 7% of our 
organisation that didn't agree with us and thought that the Good Friday Agreement was not 
a good deal. They were entitled to their democratic opinion and most of them expressed 
this and then accepted the will of the party, which passed it with such a vast majority. 
Others didn't and we lost people who were good friends of ours, comrades over many, 
many years. The IRA, it seems, had similar difficulties and people left and formed another 
organisation and we got `Omagh' as a result. So you can see that the stakes we were 
playing with were very high. The Balcombe Street Four, I don't deny that they had a huge 
impact on public opinion but nobody expected to happen what would happen. It was just a 
question of people who had been buried alive in the British penal system for 23 years 
suddenly presented - what did they expect to happen? I was there - you could have walked 
on the atmosphere. There was no question that it was stage-managed; there was no question 
[if] it was artificial. What was happening there was genuine, raw emotion. People 
sometimes either cling on too long to issues or exaggerate them, sometimes they may be 
beneficial and the positive dimensions of it are not properly explored. That's what should 
happen. (Interview with author, 9 June 1999) 
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After the second Ard Fheis, the challenge for Sinn Fein was to mobilise support for 
a Yes vote on the Agreement and in the referenda on the 22°d May 1998. With the 
SDLP promoting a Yes vote and a positive endorsement from Sinn Fein, it was 
obvious that the nationalist vote, North and South, would be overwhelmingly Yes. 
McLaughlin highlighted Sinn Fein's approach at this juncture: 
In our case, we took an electioneering approach as we were about to contest an election 
following the referendum and therefore it had a two-fold function. Firstly, our approach 
helped to get the election machine cranked up. Secondly, it gave us an opportunity on a 
very positive message to be on the doorsteps recommending a `Yes' vote, analysing and 
articulating the analysis that we had developed, the reasons why we supported the Good 
Friday Agreement, the changes that we thought it would bring about and the purpose of that 
in strategic terms for a society that was in transition but was also coming out of the turmoil 
of 30 years of warfare. There were a lot of positive reasons why we would support it and a 
lot of positive arguments that we presented on the door, which resounded positively on us as 
an electioneering party. (Ibid. ) 
Although McLaughlin was adamant that there was a great deal of positive public 
support throughout Northern Ireland for the Agreement, he was also generally 
dismissive of how David Trimble and his party took advantage of this: 
I have to say, in PR terms, we were gnashing our teeth at the way in which Trimble and co. 
went about the business of selling the Agreement and thought the UUP had a very inept 
approach... David Trimble could and should have benefited much more than he did, but in 
some ways he misrepresented it, he was vacillating, he was betwixt and between at times in 
his messages and you didn't know whether he was actually at the end of the day genuinely 
in favour of the Good Friday Agreement or not. (Ibid. ) 
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McLaughlin clearly laid the blame for much of the anti-Agreement or the No 
camp's relative success at Trimble's doorstep, once again berating the UUP leader: 
I think they [the No camp] did better than they should have done because David Trimble 
just wobbled all over the place. He was inconsistent, inept, and hostile in his presentation 
and was confrontational within the Yes camp. I think he could have taken advantage and a 
lot of cover from the huge support that was coming out of nationalism. Even with all his 
ineptitude he still managed to get a majority of unionism to support it. Now, what would he 
have gotten had he taken a more positive and confident approach? I think he may have been 
able to push unionist support up as far as 70 per cent and really wiped Paisley's eye. The 
No camp had an effective campaign but David Trimble was almost an ally at times. `No' to 
the Good Friday Agreement meant `Yes' to a return to war. For God's sake, David Trimble 
should have wiped the floor with them. Instead he was trying to fight republicans or was at 
war mentally with republicans. Instead of saying the same message, delivering it 
consistently and coming back with a totally and absolutely irrefutable majority within 
unionism that would have empowered him to do the rest of what he has yet to do, he made a 
haims [mess] of the referendum campaign... it was time to expose the fact that Paisley 
represented a declining perspective within unionism and I think that David Trimble bottled 
out. (Ibid. ) 
During the final week of the referendum campaign, Sinn Fein mapped out a strategy 
that included leafleting, a poster campaign and a doorstep canvass. Yet, for 
McLaughlin it turned out to be the easiest campaign he had ever been engaged in 
simply because nationalists/republicans were already sold on it at this stage: 
The dynamics of the peace process obviously had been around for 4 or 5 years. I think a lot 
of people were clued in. I have heard it observed often that the general public and public 
opinion in many ways was in advance of the political parties and the political process. They 
were tuned into the potentials and the opportunities that were there and we were working 
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within the nationalist/republican community with enormous goodwill and it was an easy 
message... We found it a very relaxing campaign and we were delivering a message that 
our people readily understood, appreciated, enjoyed and welcomed. (Ibid. ) 
However, while Mc Laughlin refers to party efforts during the latter stages of the 
referendum campaign, Sinn Fein (usually one of the most energetic and proactive 
parties) were noticeable by their absence in public and they hardly canvassed at all 
on the streets of republican heartlands like West Belfast. Sceptics or critics claimed 
this was due to the overall lack of enthusiasm for the Agreement amongst the 
Provisionals' rank and file. 
Yet, closer to the truth was that Sinn Fein had (after the second Ard Fheis) 
completed the `workload' needed to gain majority support in their own constituency 
for the Agreement (mostly behind the public glare of the media). Unlike the other 
more orthodox political parties during the referendum campaign, Sinn Fein, sold the 
Agreement in their own idiosyncratic or unconventional way. As the party's 
Northern Director of Publicity, Mark Mc Lemon pointed out: 
Our view in this, all in all, was always to talk our base through, right from pre-ceasefire 
days, it's the old ANC position where you talk to your own people before you talk to 
anybody else. (Interview with author, 30 October 2001) 
Even if the Agreement was to receive a massive endorsement and Sinn Mn were 
successful in the Assembly elections, Gerry Adams acknowledged that it's 
implementation was going to be a long and arduous process, that is, there was still a 
great deal of work to do: 
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I knew that thirty years on we were into the endgame. Maybe it was only the beginning of 
the endgame, but we had to see our way through the next few decades if we were to bed 
down a peace process and to build a new Ireland. There was so much to do. Building a 
political party right across the island. Delivering on the outcome of the negotiations and 
getting the Agreement implemented... When the euphoria died down, when the elections 
were over, it would be back to the tedious, mind-numbing effort to make the rhetoric of the 
Agreement a reality. I didn't underestimate how difficult all of this was going to be. 
Particularly in meeting the needs and removing the fears, or at least helping unionists to 
remove the fears and concerns they had about the future. Senator Mitchell's words came 
back to me. Implementing the Agreement was going to be harder than negotiating it. 
(Adams 2003, pp 375 -376) 
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(v) The Media 
Northern Ireland has a very sensitive and by and large, sensible media... The political media, 
the political process and the politicians are almost a kind of symbiosis. It is true that 
politicians used the media from time to time as a conduit. At the same time, the media also 
knew when not to be used and when to step back. They were clever enough to understand 
when there was going to be an element of manipulation entering into the equation. They were 
so skilled, they knew the issues being discussed, the potential of those issues to at any 
moment cause ripples in society, which at times may not have been helpful and could have 
resulted perhaps in violence. They were always sensitive and careful to keep what they were 
reporting within the bounds of good sense and good political judgement. (Interview with 
Colin Ross, 8 June 1999) 
Senior Information Officer of the British government, Colin Ross, depicts the media 
as sensitive, sensible and skilled and of possessing good political judgement. Yet, 
during the referendum campaign some critics questioned whether the media showed 
good political judgement, knew when not to be used and when to step back, or were 
indeed clever enough to understand when there was going to be an element of 
manipulation entering the equation. 
On the 26`h March 1998, as the negotiations were entering its final stages, the DUP 
leaked a British government document on selling a potential peace deal, entitled 
'Information Strategy'. Written by Tom Kelly, Director of Communications at the 
NIO, the document outlined the British government's strategy for obtaining a 
positive result, that is, a substantial Yes vote in the 'most crucial election campaign 
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in Northern Ireland's histoy - the 22"d of May referendum on the Good Friday 
Agreement. (Kelly 1998, p. 1) 
The Information Strategy proposed a campaign of organised media manipulation 
designed to overwhelm Northern Ireland with positive stories about the benefits of 
the deal. The accompanying commentary stated `government officials will be used 
to manipulate media/public'. (Ibid. ) The strategy proposed 'effective monitoring' of 
media coverage so that ministers and civil servants would be better placed to 
intervene and set the agenda. (Ibid. p. 3) The document's key references to the 
media were as follows: 
We will wish to put more emphasis on the briefing of media people generally... We will be 
particularly anxious to use this as a means of exerting some influence on the content and 
quality of media coverage. The many weekly newspapers around Northern Ireland offer 
considerable scope for us to present our message, and the editors of these papers should 
feature in the efforts of ministers to cultivate the media... (Ibid. p. 3) 
And, 
It would be open to us to encourage some degree of public opinion polling, by, for example, 
newspapers and current affairs programmes, where we believe the results are likely to be 
supportive. Some of this can be encouraged during meetings and briefings of senior media 
people. (Ibid. p. 5) 
The strategy document also referred to `10-12 current affairs broadcast programmes 
with which Information Service will liaise closely', mentioned important 
`intelligence gleaned from informal contacts with key media people' and included 
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how Kelly would become personally involved: "I will myself arrange a number of 
occasions on which I will bring together selective influential media people. " (Ibid. 
pp 5-6) 
In the article `Spinning the peace deal', 20 Brendan O'Neill (1998) argued that 
before and during the referendum campaign, the media in Northern Ireland were 
`enlisted' by the British government and that they unquestioningly endorsed its line: 
Despite New Labour's claim that the peace deal was born of `the People', in reality the `key 
message' of the deal `It's Your Choice' was agreed in the backrooms of the Northern Ireland 
Office while the negotiations were still taking place. A comprehensive strategy for selling the 
deal and enlisting the media to do the government's dirty work was drawn up even before the 
nationalist and Unionist parties had agreed to it. It is not often I find myself agreeing with Ian 
Paisley, but I sympathise with his claim that this document 'makes Machiavelli look like a 
rank amateur' (Ibid. pp 2-3). 
O'Neill also made reference to a (largely unreported) survey of media coverage in 
the weeks following the signing of the Agreement by the UKUP's Robert 
McCartney, to confirm his own analysis and suspicions that the media had indeed 
become the mouthpiece for the British government. The survey found that: 
The BBC gave 68 per cent of its coverage to Yes campaigners and 32 per cent to the No 
camp; Ulster Television gave 72 per cent and 28 per cent respectively; the Belfast 
Telegraph gave 78 per cent to Yes and 22 per cent to No and the Irish News gave 74 per 
cent and 26 per cent respectively. (Ibid. ) 
20 In LM Magazine 111, June 1998 
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While O'Neill's assertions may on the surface seem plausible (and indeed some 
may well be correct) they are not backed up with either hard facts or substantial 
evidence. The `Information Strategy Document' was indeed a composite publicity 
plan, but one in which any Northern Ireland Office (NIO) Director of 
Communications would undoubtedly have had to compile in the prospective 
scenario of a historic deal being reached that would eventually be decided by a 
referendum. It would also be quite naive to assume that in his position as Director 
of Communications, Kelly would not use his influence to either `spin' or `push' the 
government `line' with senior media personnel or employ a range of public relations 
techniques (including only availing of the most positive opinion poll results) to 
pursue a substantial `Yes' vote in the referendum campaign (as they were ultimately 
key signatories to the Agreement). As the BBC political editor during the 
referendum campaign, Stephen Grimason, pointed out, the story of the leaked 
document was neither too damaging for the British government, nor really pre- 
eminent in the overall context of the referendum itself: 
It was not really damaging, it was just part of what washed up. One would have expected at 
that time that there would be that type of stuff floating around. The politicians seized upon it, 
particularly the anti-Agreement politicians. I think its importance can be overestimated. I 
mean one would expect anyone charged with, not even in terms of selling, but promoting 
what had been signed up to, would have had that type of plan together. I mean, we focussed 
upon it, we discussed it and it was a story, but it wasn't pre-eminent in terms of the overall 
referendum scenario. (Interview with author, 20 March 2003) 
Martina Purdy, who was working as political correspondent for The Belfast 
Telegraph during the referendum campaign, pointed out that in Kelly's attempts to 
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influence the media: "He wouldn't have bothered so much with the likes of me at 
the time but he certainly would have been on the phone to Stephen Grimason, Ken 
Reid [UTV political editor], television people, spinning, pushing. " (Interview with 
author, 6 June 2002). However, while this may well have been the case, it does not 
simply follow that media personnel would subserviently acquiesce with the wishes 
or demands of either Kelly or the British government in their pursuit of a substantial 
`Yes' vote in the referendum campaign. 
As a result of the document being leaked, many people named therein as 
`champions' of the cause, would have been very wary to come forward or indeed 
associate themselves with Kelly during the referendum campaign in case it smacked 
of canvassing for the government (Kelly1998, p. 4). As Purdy maintained: 
That leaked document was embarrassing for a lot of people... It not only embarrassed the 
media but it embarrassed a lot of people like Archbishop Eames who then felt that their 
hands were tied, that they simply weren't going to go out and sell this Agreement because 
they had no credibility. Sceptical unionists were not going to accept the word of these 
people because all of a sudden they became NIO poodles... that memo damaged the 
campaign to sell the Agreement really badly. (Interview with author, 6 June 2002) 
Whilst the British government did make strenuous attempts to influence the media 
agenda during the referendum campaign, if the BBC were indeed their mouthpiece 
(as 0' Neill would purport), then presumably the BBC would have been `on-side' or 
would have publicised what the government wished (on all occasions), which was 
clearly not the case, as Mark Devenport highlighted: 
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Clearly in the referendum campaign, there were strenuous attempts by the government to 
influence the agenda. These constant visits by Tony Blair and the bringing in of 
personalities were an attempt to influence the agenda. One of the interesting things 
however, was that to a large extent, a lot of the tactics that were used backfired. For 
instance, the visits by Tony Blair - it's one of those things where the first time you get a 
visit by a Prime Minister this is big news. The second time, it is diminishing once you have 
started using that particular weapon in terms of the media. It really does take on a lesser 
role and there was an occasion in which Tony Blair visited Northern Ireland but on that 
particular night they had released Michael Stone from jail and he was brought to the Ulster 
Hall for a rally for Loyalist prisoners. I know that Alasdair Campbell was of the view that 
the Prime Minister's visit was significant and should lead the news ahead of Michael Stone. 
The BBC and everybody else said "We are looking at what is new here and what's 
newsworthy and we deem these pictures of Michael Stone and his rally to be more 
newsworthy and more relevant"... to that extent it backfired for them. (Interview with 
author, 6 June 2002) 
While O'Neill brings Robert McCartney's survey results to bear in order to confirm 
his suspicions of media compliance with the Labour government's strategy, he fails 
to mention that the results (compiled only a couple of weeks into the six-week-long 
campaign), may have been methodologically unsound or even biased (considering 
McCartney's anti-Agreement position). One of the survey's findings was that the 
BBC gave 68 per cent of their coverage to the Yes campaigners and 32 per cent to 
the No's. This observation was indeed correct, yet it could be contended that this 
was simply a reflection of the ongoing debate, as BBC Political Editor Stephen 
Grimason maintained: 
Interestingly, the BBC took the view that there were three campaigns on the referendum and 
that's why you got a third going to pro-Agreement nationalism, you got a third going to pro- 
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Agreement unionism and a third going to anti-Agreement unionism. We at the time came to 
that conclusion because of the widely different positions that those three groups had... You 
had nationalism basically saying that this brought a united Ireland closer. You had pro- 
Agreement unionism saying that it actually secured the union and then you had anti- 
Agreement unionism taking the same standpoint effectively as the nationalists on this but 
obviously in the overall tilting match between the two political blocs within unionism, they 
had to have their say. The anti-Agreement unionists at that point wanted half and half. 
They wanted half of the coverage to be on pro-Agreement unionism and nationalism and 
half of the coverage to be on anti-Agreement. So there were some quite fine judgements 
made and it was pretty tough and you know all sorts of things were threatened. (Interview 
with author, 20 March 2003) 
Political parties, the British Government / NIO and non-party groups like Quintin 
Oliver's `Yes Campaign' were all keeping a close eye on television coverage during 
the referendum campaign. The BBC's political editor acknowledged that he would 
be criticised by at least one group for almost every decision taken or difficult choice 
made throughout the campaign. For example, to broadcast lengthy `actuality' 
footage of a public relations disaster for the No camp's Robert McCartney (who 
harangued Tony Blair) the day before the referendum vote, brought severe criticism 
from anti-Agreement supporters and indeed may even have nudged the vote in 
favour of the Yes camp. According to Grimason: 
At that point, we were very concerned in the BBC that we would be seen to be leading the 
charge or anything, and my advice at the time, which was followed, was that we wouldn't 
put our voices on that exchange, we would run it raw. We would run it and let people make 
their own minds up; we wouldn't say this is good or this is bad or indicate anything like 
that. Mark Simpson [BBC political correspondent] was actually doing the coverage that 
night and I said, "Look, keep your voice off it. What you do is just present it and let people 
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make up their own minds as to what it was they saw". And for the first two to three minutes 
I think you heard about seven or eight words from Mark. The actuality was compelling, it 
was absolutely compelling, very good stuff. But it's not something you want to tinker with 
that close to a referendum because the accusation of bias is always there. (Ibid. ) 
Of course for O'Neill, this incident would only add to evidence that Tom Kelly, 
Alasdair Campbell or even Mo Mowlam for example, had influenced a BBC 
political editor into carrying out the British government's dirty work. Yet, 
Grimason prided himself on his balanced approach during the referendum campaign 
and argued that he took criticism from all quarters, including the government: 
I worked very hard to give all sides of that [referendum campaign] and I'll stand on the 
record for that. Obviously we took criticism, fine. I like to get criticised by everybody, 
which I was and that kept me happy. If I was only getting criticism from one place all the 
time then I would have been worried, but I got it from everywhere, including the 
government, so I was relaxed about it. (Ibid. ) 
To return to McCartney's survey results, although he claimed that The Belfast 
Telegraph gave 78 per cent of their coverage to the Yes camp and 22 per cent to the 
No's, on this occasion these figures simply did not add up in the context of the 
overall referendum campaign (O'Neill 1998, p. 3). For example, Oliver maintained 
that The Belfast Telegraph played an unhelpful role in respect to the non-party Yes 
campaign: 
We had most trouble with The Belfast Telegraph. It seemed both to insist on equal 
coverage each day, regardless of the news content or innovation of the stories available, and 
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yet, it also appeared to give inordinate prominence to the `No' campaigners in news story 
length, picture stories and the letters columns. (Oliver 1998, p. 55) 
Indeed, Oliver is very close to the mark, as acknowledged by Purdy of The Belfast 
Telegraph: 
The editorial line was to be in favour of the Agreement and that was the case for all three 
Belfast dailies, but at the same time the editor [of The Belfast Telegraph] made it clear to us 
that for every line of copy that we were using for the `Yes' we had to have a similar amount 
for the `No'. So, everything had to be evenly balanced and some of the Yes people were 
unhappy about this because they were saying: "Look, out of the ten parties that were elected 
to the talks, two-thirds of them are in favour of the Agreement and therefore we should get 
two-thirds of the coverage. " But, in the end I think it was very balanced, although we got 
plenty of complaints from both sides. (Interview with author, 6 June 2002) 
In relation to the question of the media's `balance' throughout the referendum 
campaign, Oliver claimed that: "The two television stations - BBC Northern Ireland 
and UTV - felt and acted as if they were bound by it... Newspapers are not covered 
by any such requirement, but some acted as if they were. " (Interview with author, 6 
June 1999) He argued that balance should have been interpreted as either that 
reflected by the current opinion polls, which showed 2: 1 in favour of the Agreement 
or by a count of the political parties for and against it. This was also about 2: 1, but 
only if one included the Irish Republican Socialist Party and the Conservative Party 
(Northern Ireland) alongside the DUP and the UKUP as being against the 
Agreement. If one didn't, the ratio increased to 4: 1 or even 5: 1, especially if one 
included Democratic Left, the Green Party and the Workers' Party in favour. Oliver 
was unforgiving in his assessment of the press during the referendum campaign: 
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The press were poor on it [the referendum campaign]; they didn't understand how to handle 
it. They didn't have clear policies on it, they didn't have a clear line on it, they were 
muddled and a lot of them had very artificial notions of balance. (Ibid. ) 
As for the broadcast media, Oliver made formal complaints to the BBC and UTV 
who he argued went for 50: 50 on studio panels and in the audiences. He claimed 
that those against the Agreement tended to be vocally and vigorously against it, 
whereas those in favour may have had some doubts or qualifications but on the 
whole supported it. For Oliver, this meant that the `No' supporters combined with 
the undecided or doubters, seemed to dominate most audiences, creating squabbles 
and good TV perhaps, but definitely not helpful for informed debate. (Ibid. ) 
Similarly, he also believed it was absurd to hunt for a `No' voter amongst the 
thousands of sixth formers who attended the U2/Ash peace concert, which was 
promoting a `Yes' vote. Yet, according to Oliver the BBC did so, finding a teenage 
son of a dissident Unionist MP to push an aggressively negative message. 
Infuriated, he questioned: "When does the search for balance become distortion? " 
(Oliver 1998, p. 53) 
However, for some media personnel, Oliver was treading a very thin line 
(throughout the referendum campaign) between simply promoting a Yes vote and 
wanting to use the media as a propaganda tool. As Grimason maintained: 
He wanted full pursuit... You can't have that. You undermine the thing by overstating it. 
While it is perfectly legitimate for him to make the case that he wanted more help, I don't 
think it would have been right to give it to him... It actually undermined the campaign. 
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You tell people something is wonderful often enough and they become suspicious. I think 
the process is robust enough to withstand significant criticism and always was. The Belfast 
Telegraph was broadly pro-Agreement and still is, but once you start getting into 
propaganda, which is where I think he wanted to go with it on the Yes campaign, it is 
another matter. I have nothing against the Yes campaign at all; it's perfectly legitimate 
what they did, but I think newspapers have to be slightly more careful... we live in the real 
world and those newspapers are right to live in the real world and you know a significant 
number of people who buy The Belfast Telegraph are anti-Agreement as well. So, in 
business terms, it's not very smart. I'm not convinced that The Belfast Telegraph did 
anything wrong. (Interview with author, 20 March 2003) 
Indeed, for Mark Devenport, Oliver's complaints that he wanted more positive 
coverage from the media for the Yes campaign were unhelpful at a time when the 
media was more concerned with their responsibility to reflect the debate fairly: 
You could say from Quintin Oliver's perspective that the angels were all on one side but at 
the same time if you are a unionist who had relatives killed by the IRA and you see the 
Balcombe Street Gang released or equally if you had relatives killed by loyalists and you 
see Michael Stone released then you have a legitimate point of view if you want to say I 
don't want peace at this particular price. So we have a responsibility to report the debate. 
(Interview with author, 6 June 2002) 
It is because the print and broadcast media were central to reporting and interpreting 
the debate that so many (like Oliver) made attempts to dominate the media agenda. 
Indeed, dominating the media agenda could prove crucial to a party or group's 
success. For example, in describing the SDLP-inspired U2/Ash concert where John 
Hume and David Trimble shook hands publicly for the first time, Conall Mc Devitt, 
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the SDLP Director of Communications, summed up the widespread belief within 
the `Yes' camp: 
The media were critical. They had been the vehicles for the very negative images that 
began to polarise the campaign, and so we were entirely reliant on them to `turn it' in the 
most overwhelming way. That is, why in turning it, we needed to create one great big bang, 
a glitzy image, which would have so much currency that it would not be dropped until 
polling day. The concert was the only thing that would offer that. We needed something, 
which would just blow everything else off the agenda, and the media needed that. The 
media will not fight a campaign for you. They may be willing and anxious to reflect the 
campaign favourably but what they couldn't do, and what they will never do, is do it for 
you. They will just respond to your activities if you can set them up and that's why the 
concert became such a pivotal exercise in the whole campaign, because it offered the media 
that one jewel of a story. (Interview with author, cited in Kirby 1999, p. 52) 
Mc Devitt continued to stress the pivotal role played by the media during the 
referendum campaign as the conduit for both positive and negative messages or 
images: 
Lord Molyneaux of the UUP [the former leader] came out on the day of the concert to say 
`Vote No' and was knocked to an inside page of The Belfast Telegraph. Had there not been 
a concert that night, Molyneaux's coverage would have set the tone for the final week of the 
campaign. So again, it goes to show you the role the media played in all of it, the 
importance of knowing what the media need out of a campaign and being able to respond to 
that. (Ibid. ) 
For the duration of the referendum campaign, the local, regional, national and 
international media had a voracious appetite for stories. It could be proposed that 
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because of this appetite the media played a positive role (although perhaps 
unwittingly) in favour of the `Yes' vote, as McDevitt pointed out: 
The international interest was overwhelming and whenever you left on a canvass or a 
campaign trail there were literally three or four camera crews with you... People felt 
attracted to and motivated by this and ordinary people on the streets felt a sense that 
something very special was happening here. (Ibid. ) 
Essentially, the media played an influential role in creating intense interest within 
Northern Ireland and further afield in almost epic proportions. The people of 
Northern Ireland were left in no doubt as to the weight of expectation (created in a 
sense by the media) to move forward, and because the eyes of the world were 
watching and may not forgive, this may have been a pressurising variable in the 
mind of the electorate. Whether this element or variable helped to change voting 
patterns and contribute to the overall outcome of the referendum is speculative to 
say the least, yet it should not be completely overlooked. 
Another variable that should not be discounted is the fact that two of Northern 
Ireland's local daily newspapers, the nationalist Irish News and the unionist News 
Letter were able to agree on joint editorials during the referendum campaign. As 
the Rev John Dunlop acknowledged: "I thought that was very significant and very 
important and I think the two editors deserve to be commended for attempting to do 
that. " (Interview with author, 23 April 2001) 
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Northern Ireland's three regional daily newspapers (the other being The Belfast 
Telegraph) were to varying degrees all supportive of a Yes vote in the referendum, 
as Grimason highlighted: 
The newspapers definitely were all pro-Agreement because that's where they were coming 
from, they had supported the talks process the whole way through... people who were 
reading those newspapers knew that they were pro-Agreement. It was more difficult for the 
News Letter, given the split within unionism but not slavishly, but broadly speaking was 
quite pro-Agreement and quite pro-the talks process, pro-involvement of loyalists and they 
had been brought onside as much as possible by the politicians themselves at all levels. 
(Interview with author, 20 March 2003) 
Indeed, The News Letter's front page on the day of the referendum was emphatic: 
`Say Yes and Say it Loud' (The News Letter, 22nd May, 1998). The Irish News was 
consistently behind the Yes vote as it represented the nationalist community and the 
SDLP in particular. The Belfast Telegraph (Northern Ireland's largest circulation 
paper read mainly by unionists but also by nationalists) was quite reticent 
throughout the referendum campaign to come out in clear support of the Yes vote, 
but on the eve of the vote they made their position quite clear: `This deal is right, 
just and proper. ' (The Belfast Telegraph, 21s' May, 1998) 
Essentially, once the historic Agreement was signed on Good Friday 1998, the 
media in Northern Ireland reacted to the challenges ahead by supporting, rather than 
obstructing, the dominant political discourse. Both the BBC and UTV, and the 
three main regional newspapers were helpful rather than unhelpful in relation to 
concentrated efforts at promoting peace. 
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Whilst the individuals who make up `the media in Northern Ireland' are 
professionals whose job it is to refrain from telling only one side of the story, during 
the referendum campaign, only one side seemed to prevail -a pro-Agreement one. 
On this particular occasion, it remains problematic to contend that the media `toed 
the establishment line, ' simply because the British government line, in this instance, 
mirrored the `majority line' of those individuals who work for media organisations 
in Northern Ireland. The following three quotes highlight some underlying reasons 
why journalists and broadcasters may have (wittingly or unwittingly) contributed to 
the pro-Agreement nature of coverage during the referendum campaign: 
I would say that the media is generally, if you take individuals working for the media, that 
most of them are pro-Agreement, but that in part, is because we reflect society and the 
majority are pro-Agreement. But also, most middle-class people are pro-Agreement and the 
media tends to be middle-class. (Interview with Martina Purdy, 6 June 2002) 
I think there is a genuine issue around the general pro-Agreement nature of journalism 
because remember the journalists here have been covering this story for 25 years, 30 years. 
We've been through all the murder and the mayhem, we'd seen all that, we didn't want to 
go through that again ourselves. (Interview with Stephen Grimason, 20 March 2003) 
You've an awful lot of men and women out there [in the media] who are motivated by the 
best of intentions, they want to see a decent society, not just for themselves but for their 
children. They want to do whatever they can to assist the politicians and the people when 
arriving at something that is mutually agreeable. (Interview with Colin Ross, 8 June 1999) 
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Summation 
Sinn Fein 
Unconventionally, Sinn Fein sold the Good Friday Agreement internally, out of the 
glare of the media spotlight. The party had to overcome a number of difficulties 
that included ending their policy of abstentionism, which would mean entering a 
(partitionist) Stormont-based government. They also had to acknowledge that by 
signing up to the Agreement it would mean amending articles 2 and 3 of the Irish 
constitution, which was also problematic for many republicans. As Martin Fletcher 
of The Times argued: 
Subsequently they did a good job in presenting an agreement, which was not very 
favourable to them; they did a very good job in selling it to their followers -a much better 
job than the UUP. (cited in Lago 2000, p. 235) 
Sinn Fein's many public relations activities during the referendum campaign 
included calling upon ANC leaders from South Africa (who had been through a 
comparable experience) to help sell the Agreement to their grassroots. They also 
held strategic discussions at all levels of the party and embarked upon a leadership- 
led nationwide series of meetings. In addition, behind-the-scenes or privately there 
were widespread briefings of Provisional IRA members; the party's public relations 
efforts designed to sell the Agreement without causing major rifts or a serious 
schism. Indeed, the only substantial `public' event to be captured by the media was 
during the party's second Ard Fheis, which included the appearances of the 
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Balcombe Street Four. This public relations spectacle was important (and 
successful) because delegates had no prior knowledge that the iconic `Mandela-like' 
figures were going to be released. Furthermore, this spectacle (more so than any 
other) highlighted that prisoner releases and indeed significant `change' in other 
areas (like the equality agenda and demilitarisation) could be swift and therefore 
may have been an influencing variable or indeed may have swung the Yes vote in 
favour of the Good Friday Agreement for many wavering republicans. 
The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 
The DUP and the No camp's key messages ('It's Right to Say No' and `Have a 
Heart for Ulster') were the best of all the political parties' slogans during the 
referendum campaign. Indeed, the first message cleverly turned a negative into a 
positive whereas the second sympathetically appealed to the emotions of their target 
audience, unionists of all hues. 
During their negative campaign, anti-Agreement DUP leaders advocating a No vote, 
portrayed the Agreement as a Trimble-Adams pact or a vehicle that would trundle 
unionists into a united Ireland. In their ubiquitous attacks on Trimble, the DUP 
claimed that it was nothing short of deception or lies to portray the Agreement as a 
strengthening of the Union, as Trimble was doing. 
The No camp also conjured up `nightmare scenarios' that included future Assembly 
members sitting side-by-side with terrorists in government who had guns on the 
table, under the table or outside the door. Indeed, their whole campaign was 
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noticeable by the intentional use of emotive, apocalyptic rhetoric or language. Their 
various public relations activities included the launch of an emotive blitz via poster 
and newspaper advertisements, one of which showed a woman wiping away a tear a 
year after the referendum, asking "How did I bring myself to vote Sinn Fein /IRA 
into government? " (McDonald 2000, p. 227) 
Throughout the referendum campaign, the No camp were bolstered by a number of 
propaganda coups, most notably the releases from prison of the Balcombe Street 
Four and Michael Stone. High-profile UUP members, such as Jeffrey Donaldson 
and Lord Molyneaux, also gave impetus to the anti-Agreement campaign after they 
confirmed they would be voting No in the forthcoming referendum. 
However, in the final days of campaigning, the No camp suffered a public relations 
disaster when the media captured Robert McCartney publicly haranguing Tony 
Blair and subsequently turning on a crowd of women whom he called a rent-a-mob. 
Indeed, the DUP believed that their failure to get a high No vote was because of 
similar interventions by the British prime minister and in particular, pledges he 
made in order to win unionist support for the Agreement. 
The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) 
Whilst being constantly attacked throughout the referendum campaign by the 
emotional wing of unionism, David Trimble and his party had a somewhat difficult 
task to sell the Agreement and appeal to the rational wing. The No camp 
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consistently portrayed Trimble as a traitor or a `Lundy' who had sold out unionism 
by signing up for the Agreement. 
Trimble's riposte to the No camp was that they had deserted the battlefield and had 
no alternative strategy except maintaining the status quo, which meant the 
continuation of the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, that is, unionists having no say 
whatsoever in how the Irish government was interfering in the affairs of Northern 
Ireland. 
Yet, Trimble had failed to sufficiently prepare unionists for the terms of the 
Agreement and he and his party were also to blame for the No camp's free run in 
the opening weeks of the campaign. High-profile members of the UUP (Trimble, 
Taylor and Maginnis) were either on holiday or attending other engagements and 
were not even in Northern Ireland for its opening stages. Also, senior party 
organisers made a potentially disastrous decision to concentrate on the Assembly 
elections rather than the referendum campaign. To compound growing difficulties, 
younger party members switched to the No camp, which meant the UUP lost 
potential campaign staff, that is, they weren't able to get sufficient numbers of party 
workers out to put up posters or campaign in support of the Agreement. (Hennessey 
2000) 
After a disastrous start, the party did begin to make some inroads. The UUP hired a 
media strategist, Ray Haydn, who changed Trimble's image (including his hair and 
clothes) and planned a strategic PR offensive that included running the most 
professional media campaign in the party's history. They also enlisted the support 
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of Lord Cranborne and Kate Hoey to canvass with Trimble and thus help the party's 
flagging Yes campaign. 
Yet, it was Glen Barr, the SDLP and Bono, Tony Blair and finally Jack Hermon 
who contributed most in helping Trimble to sell the Agreement to unionists. In 
addition, (the night before the referendum vote), in a television debate with the 
DUP's Ian Paisley, Haydn armed Trimble with a series of photographs of Paisley 
and DUP colleagues wearing the red berets of (the paramilitary-style) Ulster 
Resistance in 1986. When Paisley accused Trimble of cosying up to Sinn Fein 
/IRA, the UUP leader was able to effectively use the photographs to hit back and 
ultimately quieten Paisley. Essentially, Trimble won the debate by listening to 
Haydn's advice and for once, selling the Agreement like a leader who believed in it. 
However, this was a rare `stand' in the context of the overall campaign. Closer to 
the mark was that a vacillating Trimble appeared internally divided over the 
Agreement, was mainly inept and unconvincing on his own, and required, not to 
mention relied upon, the help of others to sell the Agreement to the wider unionist 
community. 
The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) 
The Good Friday Agreement represented the culmination or the vision behind 
twenty-five years work by John Hume and his party and was indeed the jewel in the 
SDLP crown. They were the only political party that could claim to be its 
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architects, and as such, they would undoubtedly gain majority if not full, support 
within their own constituency. 
Nevertheless, the party fought a non-triumphalist Yes campaign, strategically 
designed to tiptoe around unionist sensitivities and thus limit the fears and 
suspicions the unionist community held in relation to the Agreement. The SDLP 
were also the only main political party whose public relations activities and key 
messages were designed to appeal to `all' the people of Northern Ireland 
irrespective of which tradition they belonged to. In doing so, they made clear that 
the Agreement was a framework for conflict resolution and that it neither signified 
nor represented a victory or a defeat for any single political party in Northern 
Ireland. 
Their attempts to appeal to all sections of the community were also apparent in their 
well-designed referendum poster. Incorporating a golden key marked `Yes', John 
Hume maintained that the vote represented `Your opportunity to leave the past 
behind and unlock the door to a better future. There is much in this Agreement for 
everyone'. (SDLP referendum campaign leaflet, 1998) 
The SDLP's PR offensive included a strategy of third party endorsement, whereby 
they brought high-profile figures to Northern Ireland from outside of the political 
world to endorse a Yes vote, including, amongst others, businessman Peter 
Sutherland and film director Neil Jordan. 
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Indeed, as a result of an SDLP-inspired Yes peace concert, the most important third 
party endorsement of their campaign came in the form of U2's Bono. In particular, 
the Bono/Hume/Trimble handshake became the dominant image of the referendum 
campaign and its importance cannot be overstated, as it was the only major public 
demonstration of unity between constitutional Irish nationalism and Ulster unionism 
during the referendum campaign. The concert stole publicity away from the No 
camp, provided the Yes camp with a positive platform on which to build, and 
contributed to a swing from No to Yes in the final week of the campaign. As Conall 
McDevitt highlighted: 
The people wanted Hume and Trimble to stand shoulder to shoulder and say: "We want you 
to vote Yes". Until they got that image they were doubtful, and it was only after that image 
that things really began to consolidate themselves. In the final week you got a 15% swing- 
back within unionism, which was very critical (Interview with author, cited in Kirby 1999, 
p. 61) 
The Media 
Only a matter of weeks before Good Friday 1998, the DUP leaked a British 
government document that outlined the government's strategy on how best to sell a 
potential peace agreement, entitled 'Information Strategy'. Written by Tom Kelly, 
Director of Communications at the NIO, the Information Strategy proposed a 
campaign of organised media manipulation designed to gamer widespread support 
for a Yes vote. 
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Indeed, during the referendum campaign itself, there was little doubt that the media 
in Northern Ireland (as a morass) were pro-Agreement or were supportive of a Yes 
vote, as Mac Ginty observed: 
Looking at the news media, you would have to look far and wide to find anyone who would 
support the No vote. I think the tightness of the pro Yes vote was remarkable given a free 
press. That doesn't happen automatically, it was quite an artificial coalition and it was far 
and wide. The newspaper bedfellows that were editorialising more or less in unison, was 
quite remarkable. (Interview with author, 2 June 1999) 
Indeed, to varying degrees, both the BBC and UTV, and the three main regional 
newspapers were pro-Agreement. Accusations that the media were `toeing the 
establishment line' during the campaign were rife among anti-Agreement supporters 
and such accusations could only be given credibility by comments like those of 
British government/NIO Information officer, Colin Ross: 
I found them an excellent bunch [the media]; they never let me down. There were people 
that I could have gone the extra mile in briefing; I would have asked them to retain it, it was 
confidential. They never broke the trust and I hope that it helped them arrive at a 
reasonable view of what was going on, what the British government was trying to do. 
(Interview with author, 8 June 1999) 
Yet, while the British government undoubtedly made attempts to influence the 
media agenda during the referendum campaign, there is no conclusive evidence to 
support the view that the media either reciprocated or indeed `toed the establishment 
line' because of governmental pressure. Furthermore, it would be quite naive to 
assume that Kelly (as NIO Director of Communications) would not have such a 
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strategy in place or that both he and Ross would not use their influence to either 
`spin' or `push' the government `line' with senior media personnel. Although it can 
be questioned whether it was right or wrong to do so, it was in many respects 
obvious that the NIO would employ a range of public relations techniques to pursue 
a substantial Yes vote in the campaign (as the British government was ultimately a 
key signatory of the Agreement itself). 
Indeed, the reason for a great deal of confusion over whether the media were 
government `dupes' or not, is that the `establishment line' (in this instance) 
mirrored the `majority line' of those individuals who worked in media organisations 
throughout Northern Ireland, that is, they supported the Good Friday Agreement. 
Underlying reasons why journalists and broadcasters may have (wittingly or 
unwittingly) contributed to the pro-Agreement nature of coverage during the 
referendum campaign include: the media reflect society, the majority of which are 
pro-Agreement; most middle-class people are pro-Agreement and the media tends 
to be middle-class; media personnel had been through all the murder and the 
mayhem and didn't want to go through it again; and those working in the media 
want to see a decent society, not just for themselves but for their children and will 
do whatever they can to assist the politicians and the people when arriving at 
something that is mutually agreeable. 
Essentially, the media in Northern Ireland played an important and influential role 
during the 1998 referendum campaign. They supported, rather than obstructed the 
dominant political discourse and they were helpful rather than unhelpful in relation 
to concentrated efforts at promoting peace. 
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In Conclusion 
The Good Friday Agreement was sold to the people of Northern Ireland in a 
disparate, rather than a cohesive manner, that is, there was no collective party 
political `Yes' campaign. The three main parties who supported a Yes vote (the 
SDLP, Sinn Fein and the UUP) interpreted the Agreement in their own idiosyncratic 
ways and as a result, differing and sometimes confusing spins and emphases were 
relayed to the electorate throughout the referendum campaign. In the political 
spectrum and the public arena, party leaders, after signing the Agreement together, 
failed to show the political will or courage to develop a new politics for Northern 
Ireland. Unionists, in particular, were wary about joining forces with pro- 
Agreement nationalists and republicans, as Oliver argued: 
Why did the unionists not sell this Agreement with the people they had agreed it with? You 
agreed it together on Good Friday, why could you not sell it together and would that not 
have been good politics? Here was a golden opportunity for them to say "This could lead to 
the most remarkable accommodation between unionism and nationalism for eight centuries. 
Isn't this something to be proud of? " But they couldn't do that. (Interview with author, 
cited in Kirby 1999, p. 28) 
The reason why they didn't sell the Agreement together was a simple one -a lack 
of trust between unionists and nationalists/republicans. Whereas the SDLP 
embraced the reconciliatory principles of the Agreement and designed their 
campaign to appeal to both traditions, the UUP and Sinn Fein reverted to selling the 
Agreement specifically within their own constituencies. As a result, while both 
were advocating a Yes vote, they were also seemingly poles apart, as acknowledged 
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by Mac Ginty: "I thought it was absolutely bizarre, simply because here was the 
Ulster Unionist Party and Sinn Fein, both advising us to vote for the same thing 
[Yes to the Agreement] but approaching it from different angles. " (Interview with 
author, 2 June 1999) Consequently, throughout the referendum campaign, the 
fractured nature of the Yes campaigns was set against a singularly strong and 
emotionally appealing `No' campaign. 
In the literature on propaganda, Qualter (1985) contends that propaganda is 
something consciously or deliberately done to achieve results. In this respect, all 
four of the main political parties were propagandists. They were all guilty of 
deliberately attempting to influence the electorate and their intentions were directed 
to either positive or negative ends depending on which side of the equation - Yes or 
No, pro-Agreement or anti-Agreement - one was situated. 
During the referendum campaign, those institutions that wield a significant amount 
of power and influence in Northern Ireland (that is, the British government/NIO and 
the media) may not have unabashedly come out in full support of the Agreement, 
yet they did divert from their own (often strict) remits of objectivity and impartiality 
to at worst favour, at best promote, a Yes vote. 
Essentially, the British government/NIO had at their disposal the power to wield 
influence in media circles and by so doing, help to legitimate the call for peace 
epitomised by voting Yes for the Good Friday Agreement. The extent to which the 
media acquiesced is not easily discernible. 
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It is also difficult to determine exactly how the 71.12% vote in favour of the Good 
Friday Agreement was achieved. From a public relations perspective, the 
evaluation stage of the cause and effect of political campaigning is always difficult 
to measure. It could be measured in terms of the turnout, that is, more people voted 
than would normally in Northern Ireland elections, or in terms of the 71.12% vote 
itself, yet difficulties emerge when attempting to measure individual or group 
contributions. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that certain public relations activities and 
communications personnel were highly influential during the course of the 
referendum campaign, for example: Sinn Fein's public relations efforts that 
included endorsement of the Agreement by ANC leaders and the Balcombe Street 
Four; Ray Haydn's involvement with the UUP, as well as other contributors like 
Tony Blair and Jack Hermon who helped persuade unionists to come out in support 
of a Yes vote; and last but not least, the SDLP-inspired U2/Ash peace concert that 
provided the dominant image of the referendum campaign and helped to gamer 
cross-community support for a Yes vote. 
Essentially, public relations activities, like the peace concert, contributed to an all- 
important swing of 15 per cent in support for the Agreement within unionism in the 
final week of campaigning. Considering that two referendum exit polls21 variously 
estimated that 55 per cent and 51 per cent of unionist electors voted in favour of the 
Agreement, this `swing' was crucially important. As Stephen Grimason, (and 
almost everyone else who was interviewed in the course of this research) 
21 The Sunday Times, May 24th, 1998 and RTE May 23rd, 1998 
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acknowledged: `The Bono bringing together Trimble and Hume was a big moment. 
It turned the campaign. ' (Interview with author, 20 March 2003) It follows then, 
that it would have been impossible for the Agreement (which is based on sufficient 
consensus or cross-community support) to achieve the requisite support (that is, 
over 50% in favour) in the Protestant/unionist community, had it not been for a 
number of pivotal, pre-arranged public relations activities. Indeed, the Agreement 
may not have even `gotten off the ground' were it not for such activities. In this 
respect, the 1998 referendum campaign highlights that party political public 
relations efforts by the Yes camp had a direct and profound impact upon the peace 
process, that is, such efforts helped sell the Agreement and ultimately gave it a 
chance to live. 
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SECTION 3: POST-AGREEMENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PARTY 
POLITICAL PUBLIC RELATIONS AND THE MEDIA 
Introduction: 
Following the Good Friday Agreement and the positive referendum result, attention 
switched to the Assembly elections. Importantly, the 1998 Assembly election 
campaign represented an extension of the referendum campaign. The best word to 
describe the mood of this subsequent campaign was `apathy'. Indeed, it was as if 
both Northern Ireland's media and electorate were suffering from collective 
exhaustion. In the event, the life-long work of John Hume and his SDLP (that is, as 
the Agreement's main architects) was acknowledged and rewarded by Northern 
Ireland's electorate. When the Assembly election results came in on the 25th June 
1998, the SDLP secured the highest number of first-preference votes for any 
political party (the first time this had happened to a nationalist party in the history of 
the state). However, the vagaries of `proportional representation' meant that the 
UUP acquired more seats than their nationalist opponents in the 108-member 
Assembly. The final distribution of seats in the Assembly revealed the split within 
unionism, with a number of the UUP's Members of the Legislative Assembly 
(MLA's) publicly opposed to the Agreement. The results of the four main parties 
were: UUP - 28 seats, SDLP - 24 seats, DUP - 20 seats, Sinn Fein - 18 seats and 
Others - 18 seats. 
Significantly, the four mistrustful protagonists divided into four principal pillars 
suggesting a `Balkanisation' of the region's politics: republican (Sinn Fein), 
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constitutional-nationalist (SDLP), constitutional-unionist (UUP) and fundamentalist 
(DUP) (Wilson 2001, p. 7). 
Throughout the 1990's as the `peace process' developed, the Protestant/unionist 
community and their (main) political representatives in the UUP and DUP had 
become increasingly restless, torn between those who sniffed `betrayal' by the 
British government in appeasement of IRA `terrorism' and those who insisted 
republican advances could only be stemmed by confronting Sinn Fein in 
negotiations. Originally associated with hard-line unionism, the UUP's David 
Trimble chose the latter position for tactical reasons that harked back to the Anglo- 
Irish Agreement of 1985 -a clear indicator of the limits of the `unionist veto' and 
the evolving direction of both British and Irish governmental thinking. Yet, to say 
that this was a pragmatic or moderate position taken by Trimble and his party is not 
to say that it was either harmonising or conciliatory. 
The period between the 1998 Assembly elections and the transfer of devolved 
powers in December 1999 was dogged for the most part by inactivity, save for the 
then customary calls for `guns before government' or `government before guns'. 
This period was earmarked by the harsh reality of unionist-nationalist mistrust and 
antagonism and as a result, the Assembly lingered long in shadow form. 
The consociational-type partnership that was perhaps envisaged by the progenitors 
of the Good Friday Agreement then, was not realised until almost 20 months after 
its inception in April 1998, with the devolution of power to the Northern Ireland 
Assembly occurring in December 1999. Even when powers were finally transferred 
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to the new administration on 2nd December of this year, the involuntary coalition 
that had been constructed was far from a utopian ideal, with the anti-Agreement 
DUP absent at the historic roundtable meeting of the fledgling Executive 
Committee. 
The following period under analysis (post-1998 referendum campaign up until 
November 2003 Assembly Election) is fundamentally marked by both unionism and 
nationalism appearing to be more obsessed with the pressures within their own 
constituencies, with scant appreciation for the needs of their partners in government. 
Essentially, the following sections analyse the major political public relations or 
communications developments of the four main protagonists and highlight the 
media's role and the challenges they faced within the new political dispensation. 
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(i) Social Democratic and Labour Party 
During the period beginning on Good Friday 1998 and up until the Assembly 
elections in November 2003, SDLP communications could best be described as `in 
a state of flux. ' The party underwent fundamental shifts, beginning with electoral 
defeat to Sinn Fein in the 2001 general election that meant the party could no longer 
claim to be the true political voice of nationalism. Consequently, this electoral 
defeat factored into a changing of the guard - long standing founder and leader, 
John Hume, along with older politicians stood down to be replaced by Mark Durkan 
and a younger contingent of party members. 
Although their Director of Communications, Conall McDevitt, was confident in the 
pre-Agreement days (see section one) that the SDLP would successfully develop an 
effective communications structure (including an efficient press office system), such 
hopes simply did not materialise. A year after the Agreement in 1999, a closer 
examination of the party's predicament in regard to public relations was best 
described by the very same leader-in-waiting, Mark Durkan: 
I mean, there's a lot more we could and should be doing and need to do on the whole PR 
front... Yes, there are health warnings about making PR the master of all your politics, but 
the fact is there is more the SDLP could be doing to make PR a more useful or influential 
servant of our political concerns. I know people caricature "You don't want to be going down 
the Tony Blair road" on the one hand, or our people would say, "You don't want to be going 
over the top with the wall to wall PR of Sinn Fdin ". But I would point out to them that "Yes, 
you could point to the excesses of anything, but that doesn't mean you do none of it. " 
(Interview with author, 7 June 1999) 
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As Durkan highlights, members of the SDLP were suspicious about employing PR, 
as if it were a `black art' (Gould, 1998) only practiced by unscrupulous individuals 
and parties. More importantly, it highlights the mentality of SDLP members who 
were `light years' behind their counterparts in Sinn Fein in that they were slow to 
acknowledge, or simply ignorant of, the benefits that strategic PR could bring to 
their party's future development. 
On the public relations personnel front, Conall McDevitt did not have the requisite 
human and financial resources at his disposal to oversee the fundamental overhaul 
of SDLP communications that would be required if his party were to develop along 
the lines of Sinn Fein, not least in their media relations effort. To compound 
difficulties for the SDLP, McDevitt did not remain in his position for a substantially 
long enough period to implement much needed long-term changes, and 
subsequently left the party in early 1999 to be succeeded in February of that year by 
a new Director of Communications, Barry Turley. For more than three years (until 
May 2002 when he left the SDLP to work for political lobbyists Stratagem), Turley 
attempted to develop the party's communications structures and media operation, 
yet seemed to find himself in the same predicament as his predecessor - working 
alone for the most part with limited resources at hand. After two years, the SDLP 
brought on board a full-time press officer to help Turley to advance the party's 
communicative ability. Under Turley's tutelage, Gayle McGreevey (who took up 
her position in March 2001) remembered being introduced to a disorganised and 
unprofessional state of affairs (in terms of party communications) that she believed 
had been the norm for a number of preceding years: 
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It was a very amateurish set-up at that stage to be quite honest. Conall was the Director of 
Communications for a while and then Barry, and they didn't have any support in terms of any 
other press officers. They would have had support from the wider party, you know, Director 
of Organisation, Headquarters stuff and so on, but there wasn't a press office established. 
(Interview with author, 19 March 2003) 
With such a lack of support in terms of other press officers, it is understandable why 
political journalists (in research conducted by Liz Fawcett) believed that in relation 
to `quality of media service' or `efficiency' the SDLP was incapable of `delivering 
the goods. ' (Fawcett 2001, p. 13) 
It is difficult to determine whether Turley himself was either ineffective or inept as 
Director of Communications, or was a victim of circumstances given the obvious 
pressures he faced in professionally delivering various communicative functions 
without adequate resources. Nevertheless, conclusions from Fawcett's research are 
reiterated by other journalists (including Eamon Houston, former Sunday Derry 
Journal Editor) who described the SDLP as `lazy' (Interview with author, 1 June 
2003) and by Kevin Magee who believed Turley had a flawed approach in the way 
he dealt with journalists: 
I knew Turley. I didn't think he was very effective to tell you the truth. He was difficult, you 
know. Journalists don't like that. All we're really trying to do is make programmes or tell the 
story under a lot of pressure and tight deadlines and you just can't afford the luxury of 
somebody messing you about. Sometimes I think they see it as an exercise of power and 
control over some journalists. Really, it's completely the wrong tactic. (Interview with 
author, 6 June 2002) 
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In addition, Magee also made comparisons between the SDLP and Sinn Fein: 
The SDLP press office is nowhere near as efficient as Sinn Fein's office nor does it have the 
same control over its participants. There's much more of a one-to-one emphasis, a 
relationship between a journalist and a politician with the SDLP rather than a party with a 
centralised nature like Sinn Fein. (Ibid. ) 
When Mark Durkan took over the reins as leader of the SDLP in November 2001, 
he was adamant that the party's PR and communications would have to be 
reassessed and it was indeed an area that needed to be addressed, as Gayle 
McGreevey highlighted: 
When Mark took over I can remember him going to America and he said, "the party has 
needs, these needs need to be addressed, there are communications needs, there are 
organisational needs and they will be addressed and very quickly". (Interview with author, 19 
March 2003) 
Indeed, the new SDLP leadership began to address and initiate changes that 
included a new party logo, launched on the 25th June 2002. McGreevey described 
its significance: 
The SDLP is obviously in there, the corporate colours had always been red and green and 
we added a new colour being orange this time which was to symbolise the diversity, the 
inclusivity, the bringing together of all of our communities. The little flower is supposed to 
symbolise in many ways the shamrock, which is all about our all-Ireland identity and that 
aspect of things. The design was also sourced from different designs in the Book of Kells, 
which gave us this idea of ancient Ireland and Irishness and bringing that on board. The 
actual way the SDLP was written was different again, the type of font used was clear, 
289 
modern and so it was to symbolise a new, modem party. It was about changing the 
corporate identity of the SDLP in many ways. (Ibid. ) 
Although the logo was designed to signify or symbolise a `new, modem party' 
many of the `old, traditional' communications problems that the SDLP had 
experienced in the past were re-emerging once again. Only two months before the 
launch of the logo, Turley (as Director of Communications), resigned from the 
party. His sole accompanying press officer, McGreevey, was left in the unenviable 
position of having to assume responsibility for most, if not all, of the SDLP's 
communicative functions. A simple, yet lengthy listing of McGreevey's 
responsibilities, highlight the problematic nature that both she and her predecessors 
faced, for the most part alone, whilst head of SDLP Communications. These 
responsibilities included: 
Basically implementing the party's communication strategy both internally and externally. I 
would be responsible for looking after any publications that we format, the Social Democrat 
is the quarterly paper that we distribute through the Irish News and the papers. There's the 
internal party newssheet, there's a monthly newsletter to America, and I would be 
responsible for all of those. On a Monday and Tuesday the Assembly obviously sits here, 
and I am responsible for trying to get the message out in terms of what the SDLP MLAs are 
doing in the Assembly, if we have questions down to ministers, obviously highlighting 
those and putting out press statements on them. If we have motions down, adjournment 
debates, obviously trying to get the maximum press coverage out of those motions... 
throughout the rest of the week, I am also responsible for all of our councillors' press, so 
that just varies from week to week. And I am also responsible for the wider political issues, 
looking after the leadership, after Brid Rodgers [Deputy leader]; I have responsibility for 
co-ordinating leadership visits to local constituencies and co-ordinating any local press 
there. So it's quite varied and quite widespread, and there is a lack of resources at the 
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moment within the press office. I mean I am doing all of that at the moment with only me. 
It is a lot but when you're down a body, and we are in fact down two bodies it's not terribly 
structured and you are dealing with a lot of "fire-fighting". You're really dealing with a lot 
of the day-to-day stuff, and you don't have the capacity, and you don't have the resources to 
really put in place a longer-term strategy. (Interview with McAteer, 6 June 2002) 
McGreevey could not possibly have consistently operated effectively within this 
apparently chaotic communications environment. The party's leadership (in 
acknowledging that the press office was not working effectively), reviewed its 
structures and came up with an arrangement that included McGreevey taking over 
as Senior Press Officer in May 2002 (that is, there would be no Director of 
Communications) and the provision of resources to have `two bodies' recruited -a 
press officer and an assistant press officer. 
In March 2003 (10 months later), McGreevey highlighted that for the first time in 
the history of the SDLP, there were three full-time staff working in the press office 
(accompanying McGreevey was Paula Kavanagh as press officer and James Dillon 
as assistant press officer). The SDLP also had staff throughout the 18 
constituencies doing `local press' for the party although they were not full-time 
media relations personnel. A more upbeat McGreevey still acknowledged that the 
SDLP had limited resources in comparison to other parties, yet believed there had 
been a major shift in party members' attitudes towards public relations: 
Things have changed in the last year, there's been a change of personnel, a change of 
attitude and we do run a much tighter ship and you can even see that in many ways. I mean, 
people do talk about Sinn Fein being a very media-orientated party and that's true and the 
DUP would be very similar in that regard. You know they have a huge amount of resources 
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and a huge amount of personnel and they are able to do that. This idea of a big party 
machine, I mean it's no great mystery, it's just having a lot of people doing a lot of work 
and unfortunately the SDLP has never had the resources of those parties and it is really only 
now or really only in the past year and a half that it has come to plough what resources it 
does have into press. So the changes that have been made are the results of an awakening of 
"we know we have to compete in a very competitive market, we know we have to be more 
PR-focused". (Interview with author, 19 March 2003) 
By March 2003, the party was indeed `running a tighter ship' and on the 
communications front there were signs of central coordination that included, for the 
first time, a daily dispatch to party members to help ensure that they were `on 
message' (Ibid. ). Whereas in the past they seemed only to be `fire-fighting' and at 
times incapable of seeing through the fog, they were now implementing longer-term 
strategic communications plans. In addition, whereas in 2001 the party's Youth 
Group had completely collapsed, by 2003, after steady and targeted support, the 
group was showing visible signs of recovery with approximately 100 members. 
Essentially, the SDLP underwent a process of introspection; party members had 
reassessed their relationship with journalists and with one eye on their rivals for the 
nationalist vote, Sinn Fein, who were highly successful in `dealing with the media', 
they began to make incremental advances, as McGreevey highlighted: 
I think the party is making inroads. I think it can be difficult sometimes, it's a vicious circle 
that people think the Shinners are very, very good at doing press and PR and they do have 
more resources. A criticism of the party [the SDLP] was that in the past they didn't maybe 
brief journalists such as they should have done. Now that has totally changed. That idea 
that you shouldn't tell journalists things has gone. You have a very young, vibrant 
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leadership here now. Mark is someone who would have always dealt with the press himself 
and he understands the importance of working and briefing the media. We have more 
briefings now with people than we've ever had and in fact in the Hillsborough talks there 
was a cover piece by Dan Keenan in the Irish Times and it said something like "Not even 
the spin by Sinn Fein or the counter-spin by the SDLP could entertain us". I thought that 
was interesting because we were never ever, or people did not pick up that there was ever 
any counter-spin. But you know there is a system of rebuttal in place that whenever the 
Shinners say something that is incorrect we do rebut it and there is a lot more briefing going 
on of journalists. So, they are ways that you make inroads and its difficult when the 
perception is there that they are better, that you have to keep pushing and trying and 
working a lot harder even than they work, but it's being done. (Ibid. ) 
While the SDLP were obviously making inroads, it may be a little naYve to believe 
that the SDLP's `three' full-time staff would be able to compete with Sinn Fein's 
well resourced media operation. Indeed, McGreevey's obvious delight at her party 
being associated with counter-spin on rare occasions only highlighted how far the 
SDLP were really behind their rivals in this regard. Nevertheless (in the 
communication stakes), the SDLP were at least moving in the right direction for 
example, by introducing a system of rebuttal. They also increased their media 
training of party members through internal workshops and courses provided by the 
National Democratic Institute (NDI) who were working with all of the pro- 
Agreement parties (Ibid. ). 
For the most part, McGreevey believed that the SDLP's continuing efforts to court 
journalists was reaping rewards and that overall, she could not complain too much 
about the party's media representation. Yet, in some instances, she believed the 
SDLP had been marginalised in the media when the success of the peace process 
293 
was portrayed as hinging on a future relationship between two main parties - the 
UUP and Sinn Fein: 
There are times when you have to push things a bit with people especially in recent times 
it's quite easy to be written out of negotiations because we are not necessarily the people 
causing the problems and it can be easy to ignore the SDLP view. I mean generally, I be 
happy enough. There are a couple of things that cause concern. There is the Daily Mirror, 
for example, once a week have a Sinn Fein and DUP column but won't give the SDLP or 
the Ulster Unionists one. Things like that that are blatantly unfair and I would have 
difficulty with that. But generally things aren't too bad and certainly the Irish News we 
wouldn't have any difficulty with. None of the main newspapers or news agencies, I mean, 
now and again there are times when you have to complain but overall it's not that bad. The 
broadcast media aren't bad either. I have to say UTV would be fairly good. Now and again 
things like the programmes [on the BBC] - `Let's Talk' and `Hearts and Minds' - 
sometimes I feel that we can be slightly sidelined on those and that would be a concern, but 
generally overall I don't think we have got too much to complain about. (Ibid. ) 
On the communications front (under McGreevey) the SDLP were showing visible 
signs of progress in many areas, yet there was still much work to be done, for 
example, the party's website (and thus their ability to disseminate information via 
the internet) in the run-up to the 2003 Assembly elections was significantly below 
par. As McGreevey readily acknowledged: 
It's currently being developed. The one we have is rubbish at the moment. Somebody 
created it for about a £1000 a few years ago and it was rubbish. That was a matter of just 
getting the money passed; the budget has been passed and there is a design company in 
Dublin working on that, so that will be launched, touch wood, before the election. (Ibid. ) 
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Although the SDLP was still experiencing internal organisational and 
communications problems, McGreevey and her colleagues were at least attempting 
to address these. For example, they appointed regional organisers - one in the 
northwest, northeast and so on - to coordinate constituencies and get people out 
canvassing for the party. 
The party's communications, whilst moving in the right direction, could best be 
described as `work-in-progress'. However, in many ways it was a matter of `too 
little, too late'. While communications flaws could undoubtedly be improved upon 
in the medium to long term, with the Assembly elections looming, a more 
fundamental or immediate problem for the party was becoming more and more 
apparent. The SDLP were at a significant electoral disadvantage with many of its 
older members or `big hitters' standing down (for example Seamus Mallon, Brid 
Rodgers and Eddie McGrady). As McGreevey highlighted: 
They were people who were big vote getters and they were people who had spent 30 years 
working for the party so yes, they had high media profiles, well known throughout the 
South, the North and America, so it will be a loss but it just makes it a challenge to promote 
other people up. (Ibid. ) 
However, a fundamental problem for the SDLP was that they had failed for a great 
number of years, both organisationally and in a communications capacity, to target 
and promote younger party members, in stark contrast to Sinn Fein. As Kevin 
Magee pointed out: 
295 
I would say that if you looked at the various parties, Sinn Fein I'd imagine could put up 
maybe 40 people who'd give a polished view of their position, where they're coming from. 
I mean, you just don't get that in any of the other parties. Particularly in the SDLP they 
really have lost that battle, vis-ä-vis Sinn Fein , because they haven't promoted the people 
that they have. They have some very astute young people but they don't give them the 
platform... assets they have that they are not fully utilising. But if it was Sinn Fein, they 
would have spotted their potential years ago and they would have been building them and 
building them and manoeuvring them into positions whereby they would have positions of 
power. That's the classic example of how Sinn Fein have a very, very well-worked-out 
strategy whereas the SDLP over the years, one person once described it to me that it wasn't 
a party at all, it was just a collective of fiefdoms - South Down, Armagh and Derry. Sinn 
Fein target long in advance as you can see with Alex Maskey and [Belfast] City Hall, that's 
all part of the grand strategy and it's paying dividends. The SDLP have serious, serious 
problems but it's not as if they weren't made aware of them. Brian Feeney [former SDLP 
member and now a political pundit] has been trying to bring it to their attention since 1984, 
yet they just haven't progressed anyway near the same way Sinn Fein has. (Interview with 
author, 6 June 2002) 
In the run up to the 2003 Assembly elections, there was a growing expectation that 
Sinn Fein would continue to profit at the expense of what was perceived as an 
ageing SDLP. To counter the threat of a well-organised and well-financed 
opponent in Sinn Mn, the SDLP drafted in advisors from parties in the Republic of 
Ireland as well as the British Labour Party (Wilson and Fawcett 2004). 
The SDLP's key slogan for the election attempted to persuade voters that it was 
particularly important this time around to vote SDLP: `Now More Than Ever'. 
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They produced a 30-page manifesto in both large-print and audiotape versions, as 
well as summary versions in Cantonese, Irish and Urdu. They also went beyond the 
traditional-style manifesto by producing a summary version on CD-rom. 
Remaining on the technical front, only months before the election campaign, the 
SDLP developed a new and improved website that helped to make it easier for 
policy issues to be addressed during the campaign, for example, what the party was 
both for (education and health) and against (water charges). 
During the campaign, the SDLP also targeted first-time voters by sending out 
10,000 copies of a DVD entitled `Rock Your Vote'. Their target audience were 
given the chance to win free tickets to a Justin Timberlake concert but they had to 
watch the DVD in order to find out how to enter the prize draw. (Ibid. ) 
Their Party Election Broadcast (PEB) featured a background soundtrack of middle- 
of-the-road Irish music with ordinary citizens expressing their wishes for the future. 
Only one politician made a brief appearance at the end of the video, party leader 
Mark Durkan, who said: `All these hopes and more can be fulfilled. Together we 
can make it happen. Now more than ever'. 
The party opted for a `presidential-style' campaign that focused on the SDLP leader, 
although one main billboard poster featured Mark Durkan and six other candidates. 
However, in an attempt to get away from the traditional `group shot' the candidates 
all faced in slightly different directions and their poses looked staged, awkward and 
unnatural. 
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While lesser key messages of other parties' campaigns were related to their main 
slogans, the SDLP opted for eye-catching additional catchphrases not obviously 
linked to their main slogan `Now More Than Ever'. The party produced two 
election posters that attempted to persuade the public that voting for, or transferring 
to, the SDLP, would prevent the DUP from gaining power. One contained a road- 
sign with `Stop the DUP'. Underneath were the messages `Vote SDLP', followed in 
slightly smaller letters by `Transfer SDLP' and lastly, in an even smaller typeface, 
`Protect the Agreement'. The other poster contained a picture of Ian Paisley Senior 
and Junior with the words `Two Good Reasons to Vote SDLP'. Yet, neither of the 
posters explained why voting for, or giving a transfer to, the SDLP would stop the 
DUP. (Ibid. p. 19) 
All political parties should attempt to avoid sending out mixed or confusing 
messages during an election campaign. The `Stop the DUP' slogan was not a logical 
extension of their main campaign slogan and because it was not self-explanatory it 
risked confusing voters. (Ibid. ) 
When the results of the Assembly elections came in, the swing in the balance of 
unionist advantage from the UUP to the DUP was matched by the reversal of 
fortunes in nationalist politics. The SDLP, having in 1998 for the first time topped 
the poll in securing its highest share of the vote at any election, now languished in 
fourth place. 
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Under the leadership of Mark Durkan (after the 2003 Assembly election) the SDLP 
looked fated to be the junior partner, not just in nationalist but also indeed in 
regional politics. 
Throughout the 1990's and into the new millennium, it was widely acknowledged 
that the fundamental reason for the party's electoral downturn in recent years was 
due to their unselfish attempts, through the Hume/Adams talks, to help direct the 
republican movement away from the path of political violence and down the road of 
democratic politics. Yet, such contentions only serve to cloak or disguise more 
complex reasons for the party's electoral downfall and in fact, seemingly absolve 
the SDLP of their own internal sins. These include structural faults within the 
internal organisational working of the party, a failure to develop an effective 
communications capability and also to recognise the importance of magnanimity in 
politics - thereby encouraging the advancement of younger party members. Indeed, 
Magee was adamant that the party's main rivals for the nationalist vote, Sinn Fein, 
would continue to advance in the electoral stakes at the SDLP's expense: 
[Within Sinn Fdin] individuals are really instruments or the collateral; the progress of 
individuals is paramount. I don't think you can say the same about the SDLP, I just don't 
think there's the magnanimity there that is necessary in their development as a political 
party, whereby Seamus Mallon ten years ago might have said, "Well O. K, I'll give this seat 
up if we are sure we can find a successor for the next twenty years". It's like self- 
destruction. If they don't have the young people coming up behind they can't really expect 
that they'll advance. It's serious, serious problems as opposed to Sinn Fein. (Ibid. ) 
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The prescient Magee was not wrong. After a humiliating defeat in the 2003 
assembly elections, the SDLP would once again have to reassess their position 
within the nationalist fold and a further process of introspection would have to 
begin. A legacy of organisational and communications problems within the party 
had come to bear and would seemingly afflict the party for some time to come. 
Only the most optimistic party members could believe that their difficulties would 
indeed be surmounted in the coming years whereby they would once again be able 
to claim that their party represented the true voice of northern nationalists. 
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(ii) Ulster Unionist Party 
In the wake of the 1998 referendum campaign, the Assembly elections and 
throughout the intervening years under analysis (that is, 1998-2003) the UUP was 
split between party members who were, for the most part pro-Agreement and those 
who were anti-Agreement. However, the dilemma many party members faced was 
not a simple black and white one; there was a great expanse of `grey' in the middle 
whereby members within the pro-Agreement wing were sceptical about certain 
elements of the Agreement, yet had not uniformly sided with those in the anti- 
Agreement camp. A new and very vocal political category quickly emerged - anti- 
Agreement UUP members - who began to have a major impact upon the party's 
ability to communicate effectively, that is, to deliver a clear, cogent and cohesive 
political argument or message. The divisions occurring within the party were 
highly publicised affairs, as evidenced in the broadcast media who often stood two 
UUP members in a single slot, each with conflicting viewpoints, as Kevin Magee 
explained: 
One interesting thing in terms of the political debate was, and this is very important for us, 
what we saw over the whole referendum campaign and since the Agreement was signed was 
that it was no longer sufficient to stand an Ulster Unionist, you needed to have an Ulster 
Unionist, an anti and pro-Agreement, and that was almost as if you were dealing with 
another political category here although they're in the same party. They don't say that 
there's a split but for all intensive purposes they have split (Interview with author, 6 June 
2002) 
301 
Magee elaborated upon this observation by comparing a `mixed message' UUP with 
an `on message' Sinn Fein: 
The difference between them [the UUP] and Sinn Fein is that they're not really a 
homogeneous type of party, there are a lot of different strands, a very broad spectrum really 
within Ulster Unionism right at the moment from No right across to pro-Agreement. You 
could speak to a Shinner [member of Sinn Fein] now on the street and he's what we call "on 
message", I mean he just talks `Sinn Fein speak' and if you stopped another and they were a 
Shinner so would they, and you don't get the same variety of opinion. And that's why it's 
always a lot more interesting dealing with the Ulster Unionists because of the problems 
they've had. I mean, John Taylor [UUP Deputy Leader] isn't going to tell you the same 
thing as David Trimble and that can make it a bit more interesting. (Ibid. ) 
As the UUP began to haemorrhage following the signing of the Agreement, the task 
that David Trimble faced in attempting to keep his party united was a very difficult 
and daunting one. Throughout the period under analysis, Trimble's ongoing 
struggle to unite his party should be understood within the context of a wider 
fractured unionist/Protestant community, best described by the former Moderator of 
the Presbyterian Church (to which Trimble belonged), the Rev John Dunlop: 
I believe that David Trimble has probably had the most difficult job of anybody, because he 
is constantly, the whole way through the process, having to deal with the vociferous 
dissidents inside his own party, as well as the dissenters from the DUP and he has to try and 
make his way through that. He also has to negotiate with the SDLP, with Sinn Fein, with 
the Irish government and all the other bits and pieces who are all part of that, in terms of 
British government involvement and the American government's involvement. And all the 
time Trimble is trying to make his way through this, with unionism being as usual always 
factional... Trimble is fighting with this all the time. In relation to selling the Agreement, 
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as far as inside Protestantism is concerned, there is not a Protestant community, there's a 
multitude of sub-communities inside the Protestant community. There are a bunch of sub- 
unionist parties inside the broad spectrum of unionism. So there isn't therefore a Protestant 
community, there are subsets of Protestant communities. There isn't a Protestant church, 
there's a multiplicity of Protestant churches. This fractured community is not much given 
to behaving in a cohesive way nor are you selling an agreement to a bunch of people who 
already have a degree of solidarity amongst one another because that doesn't exist. 
(Interview with author, 23 April 2001) 
It could be contended that such a fractured community (from which UUP members 
themselves hailed) were in need of a charismatic and principled leader with strong 
convictions to guide them through an often-painful conflict resolution process. In 
addition, the party itself required a confident leader who could act and speak with 
convincing authority, thus quelling dissent and the output of mixed messages and 
ultimately unite the party around a positive and accommodating unionist vision of a 
future Northern Ireland, integral within the United Kingdom. 
Yet, David Trimble failed to provide such an image. He vacillated in his support of 
the Agreement and it became very difficult to determine whether he actually 
believed in his decision to sign up for the Agreement on Good Friday, 1998. Hearts 
and Minds producer, Mary Kelly, believed that Trimble (while obviously not 
literally), signed the Agreement with one hand, whilst using his other to pinch his 
nose, as if a nauseating smell emanated from it. (Interview with author, 4 June 2002) 
Four years later in 2002, Trimble provided a glimpse of his true feelings whilst on a 
visit to America, when questioned by a student from Missouri Southern about his 
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personal opinion of the Good Friday Agreement. He replied, "Well, I have a slight 
commitment to it. " 22 
This was quite a remarkable response to make from a supposedly pro-Agreement 
leader, and only served to confirm nationalists' suspicions that Unionism in all of its 
forms was incapable of making requisite compromises or changes, that is, fully 
implementing the democratically endorsed Agreement. His ambiguous response 
was in keeping with Fionnuala O'Connor's description of Trimble as `divided 
internally' (O'Connor 2002, p. 176), that is, was he really pro-Agreement or anti- 
Agreement? The difficultly in deciphering Trimble's true intentions would prove 
problematic for a number of `one-dimensional' members within his own party and 
indeed those at large within the wider community, as the Rev John Dunlop 
highlighted: 
Presbyterians are people who do not live easily with ambiguity. Normally the Presbyterian 
way of doing things is you try to be as explicit and clear about an issue as you can so that 
your yea be yea and your nay be nay and don't be living in this middle ground of ambiguity 
which can go in either one or two ways. (Interview with author, 23 April 2001) 
Indeed, Trimble was very rarely explicit or clear in support of the Agreement or 
indeed in selling its vision of the future -a Northern Ireland where vibrant and 
fruitful relationships had the potential to emerge and exist whereby equality of 
treatment or `parity of esteem, ' was the guiding principle. Dunlop acknowledges 
that Trimble fell short in promoting such a vision, although he believed attempts to 
22 My Itallics, 'First Minister answers peace questions' by Karena Wells, Chart reporter, Internet 
address httn: //w' 'w'. mssc. edu/internationat/mccaleb/Ireland/stories/trimble htm accessed 16/05/03 
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persuade unionists of the merits of the Agreement were discernible (yet not a 
dominating theme) and that Trimble's personality traits may have impacted 
negatively upon his ability to appeal to a wider audience: 
I think that David Trimble might well have sold the vision behind the Agreement more 
persuasively that he has done... I think that if you wanted to sell the Agreement you have to 
sell, not so much the nuts and bolts of the Agreement, but sell the vision of where it's trying 
to get to and how it answers a historic problem and sell it in those terms... the vision which 
lies behind it, which is this concept of accommodation in a different future. You find, say, 
in Trimble's speeches [that] it occurs from time to time within them. It's not a dominating 
theme, but it's nevertheless in there. And it's articulated - coming from a Presbyterian 
background - in quite significant persuasive kinds of ways. But it's not delivered in high- 
flowing oratory. It is delivered in an academic sort of way. Perhaps one might say 
sometimes it lacks warmth. But then David Trimble is an academic; he's not that kind of 
individual, although I think he's got a lot better at it than he was before. (Ibid. ) 
Dunlop highlights an important point when he expressed his opinion that Trimble 
had `got a lot better at it than he was before'. This was a true reflection of changes 
occurring within UUP communications and the personnel behind-the-scenes of the 
party who attempted to improve and modernise both Trimble and his party's image 
(see below). 
As the party continued to experience bitter internal feuding and debilitating 
infighting, alarm bells were ringing on the UUP's communications front. Only one 
year after the Assembly elections (that is, in June 1999), the disorganised state of 
UUP communications was highlighted by Quintin Oliver when conjuring up images 
of a party at death's door, one with a decentralised and chaotic character, whereby 
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mixed messages - both pro and anti-Agreement - were publicised via all of the 
party's 18 constituency associations: 
You wouldn't know about the UUP because it's still constituency-based and their 
headquarters is like a morgue or a cemetery. There's no sense that this is a campaigning 
centre. You wouldn't know that this is the biggest political party in Northern Ireland and a 
party out for its political survival because they have not re-organised and come up to speed 
with the modem world. (Interview with author, 6 June 1999) 
The main problem for press officers at UUP headquarters was that the more 
information that came from multiple sources (that is, either the pro - or anti - 
Agreement party members or constituency associations), the less control they had 
over it. Discipline and control are pivotal factors in implementing a successful 
communications strategy, as David Kerr explained: "spin doctors can only do so 
much - ultimately you have to be singing from the same hymn-sheet. More 
importantly, the party needs to be saying what you are saying. " 23 
Indeed, David Kerr spent a great deal of time trying to keep party members `on 
message', as is evident in an internal memorandum from March 1999 that restated 
the `party line' on decommissioning. Its communications importance is revealed in 
its final few words, which ended with the terse exhortation "Stay on message. 
Thank you" (The Irish Times, 3`d March, 1999). 
If it was impossible to keep the party `on message', the spin doctor's role in such 
circumstances was to try to play down division and dissent. Yet, because of internal 
23 Irish Times, September 23`d, 1998 
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rivalries and differences over the Agreement, WP communications personnel 
found it very difficult to maintain a united front. The lack of central control made it 
easy for journalists to bypass press officers and effectively glean in-depth 
information - counteracting any attempts to downplay the apparent division and 
dissent. Kevin Magee highlights this point, while also alluding to the ineffective 
qualities of UUP communications personnel: 
I don't find the Ulster Unionists particularly helpful to us, they prevaricate; they don't really 
understand what journalists need. You know, if you're making a program its no good for 
efficiency reasons or whatever, just being so long in making their decisions or deciding 
which person [to have on]. So a lot of the time we just bypass their press people. I would 
tend to do that generally anyway. I think you're much more successful when you deal with 
them directly particularly when you've worked in the area for a long, long period of time. 
You know the politicians better than you know their press people. (Interview with author, 6 
June 2002) 
In 1999, as UUP relations with the media continued to deteriorate, the party seemed 
to be in a `communications meltdown' scenario. At this juncture, Trimble's Press 
Secretary and special adviser, David Kerr, as well as UUP press officer, Alex 
Benjamin, were assisted on the PR front by an `old hand'. Indeed, Eoghan Harris 
began, behind-the-scenes, to advise Trimble once again, as he had in pre-Agreement 
days (McDonald 2000). 
For Harris, Trimble and the UUP would have to set up a government before IRA 
decommissioning. He warned Trimble that his party, and unionism in general, were 
again in danger of losing the PR battle to republicans. At a secret meeting of 
Trimble's twenty-seven loyal Assembly members on 26 September 1999, he 
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recommended: "To win this war you have to do three things. (a) Purge the party. 
(b) Speak to Sinn Fein dead cool, as if you knew the war was over. (c) Sell the 
Agreement to your own side with or without decommissioning. " (Ibid. pp 313-314) 
Two weeks later (at the UUP Annual Conference) Trimble used Harris to limber 
party members up for a leap of faith. Harris obliged by ranting and raving at 
delegates during a debate on the media and unionism over their absolutist and 
moralistic policy of `no guns, no government': "Look, Sinn Fein fought for thirty 
years. It's like a kid wanting a bike for Christmas. The bike they wanted was a 
united Ireland. They didn't get the bike. Please give them the stickers. " (Ibid. 
p. 307) 
Subsequently (on the 18th November, 1999), Trimble used a press conference at 
party headquarters to announce a special meeting of the Ulster Unionist Council in 
order to overturn the `no guns, no government' policy. Ray Haydn was once again 
hired to assist with UUP communications but ultimately to help Trimble sell the 
deal to his party. Haydn summed up the foreseeable difficulties: `This is the 
Agreement, the Referendum, the Assembly and Euro elections all rolled into one. 
The next seven days will be hell. ' (Ibid. p. 318) 
Harris (who remained active behind-the-scenes) offered advice to Trimble on how 
to structure his keynote speech to the UUC. Although he did not offer to write it, he 
recommended that Trimble break the speech into three Aristotelian segments: 
told him the best advice for writing any speech comes from Aristotle's The Rhetoric, in 
which he breaks down an argument into three parts - character, argument and emotion. I 
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told Trimble he should start his speech with a reference to his character, his background, his 
history including the opposition to Sunningdale and his Vanguard days. Then he should 
move on to the fine detail of the argument, the detailed reasons why they must back the 
deal. And then finally to switch to emotion. I believe in hindsight he took this advice on 
board -I even provided him with a rough guide for the times he should apply to each of the 
three parts of his speech. (Ibid. p. 322) 
However, the UUP leader could not rely on Aristotelian rhetoric alone to win the 
day. Trimble returned to a Professor Paul Bew / Eoghan Harris inspired plan of 
July 1999 -a post-dated cheque of resignation - whereby he and the three UUP 
ministers in a future executive would resign in February 2000 if his leap of faith 
turned out to be misplaced. (Ibid. ) 
Essentially, Harris's important ongoing advice to Trimble, his Assembly team and 
members attending the party conference, was a major factor in influencing the UUP 
to move beyond the long-standing hurdle of `no guns, no government' and helped to 
edge the party into a new political dispensation - devolved government on 2"a 
December 1999. 
Additional advice by Harris around this time also included helping to write part of 
Trimble's Nobel Peace Prize address in Oslo on the 11 t' December 1999, which 
included helping with references used throughout. He even wrote camera directions 
for Trimble on the script, enabling him to be at ease when he spoke. Instructions 
such as `Look up at the camera', `Look down at the lectern', `Smile' and `Turn to 
the audience' were marked on the speech in block capitals. (Ibid. p. 277) 
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Yet, it was not only Eoghan Harris who was furnishing Trimble with PR advice at a 
personal level or indeed, at party political level. John Laird initiated changes that 
would fashion for Trimble and the UUP a more congenial look modelling 
modernisation plans on the revamping strategy adopted by New Labour 24' 
Following in the footsteps of Ray Haydn during the referendum campaign, Laird 
began with an image makeover of the party leader. As a result, Trimble began to 
smile more often, not because of a shift in his personality, but because of Laird's 
advice. Trimble had been known in the past to turn up in newspaper offices, puce 
with indignation at a particular article that appeared that day. (Ibid. ) His proclivity 
for publicly fuming bright red in the face at awkward questions from the media was 
also well known but became more a thing of the past. With Laird's influence at 
work on his public persona, Trimble's annoyance became controlled, his responses 
more decorous and reasonable. Laird's objective was to promote the idea that the 
UUP could ditch its appearance of unvaried negativity and essentially portray itself 
as a progressive political outfit. (Ibid. ) 
On the surface at least, this signalled that the UUP leadership was acknowledging 
the need for more focused PR. They also brought forward able spokesmen like 
Stephen King who became a senior adviser to Trimble and on whose behalf he 
began to constantly appear on television, radio and in print. King also began to do 
much of the daily backroom spinning to journalists and became perpetually 
accessible to the media (Ibid. ). During this time, Alex Benjamin left the UUP as 
full-time press officer (replaced by Philip Robinson) and by May 2001, further 
24 The Sunday Business Post, November 5h, 2000 
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changes included the appointment of David Kerr as the party's first ever Director of 
Communications. 
However, only a month later, the party suffered electoral humiliation at the hands of 
the DUP in the 2001 general election. Essentially, Trimble's anti-Agreement 
enemies had made plans to unseat him as leader, utilising a series of simple steps: 
(a) get rid of him; (b) collapse the Agreement; (c) renegotiate the deal (Ibid. ). They 
foretold that no-one in his circle of allies and advisers, paid or unpaid, experienced 
or not, could keep Humpty Dumpty on the wall, let alone put him together again if 
he fell. 
Yet, while Trimble persistently wobbled on the wall without falling as party leader, 
the UUP's communications would continue to remain in pieces as long as divisions 
persisted. While a number of talented PR individuals made attempts to put the UUP 
back together again, the idea of unity, in the face of electoral defeat, was now more 
elusive than ever. 
In research conducted by Liz Fawcett (in 2001), the UUP's communications efforts 
were castigated once again by a variety of political editors and journalists. Fawcett 
highlighted that when a journalist telephones a party to request an interview or 
information, they simply want their request acted upon as quickly as possible. Both 
political editors and journalists alike deemed the UUP as the least efficient of all the 
major parties, rating its ability `to deliver' as `poor'. (2001, p. 13) While 
acknowledging that the UUP were chronically divided internally over the 
Agreement, the political editors and journalists suggested that Trimble could have 
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done more personally to court a larger number of them and to keep his press officers 
informed of his thinking on important issues. (Ibid. ) 
One television broadcaster (who wished to remain anonymous) dismissed out of 
hand the party's PR efforts and their ability to make a significant turnaround in time 
for the 2003 Assembly elections: 
The Ulster Unionist Party has been in bits; their PR has been in bits for a long time and 
continues to be. Largely, I think, the difficulty for the PR officers is that their politicians 
don't do what they advise... they try to get media opportunities for them and they turn them 
down. We have this frequently with David Trimble, for example, he's very hard to get on 
television and they've other people that we get frustrated with too, like Sylvia Hermon [MP] 
who is a very attractive proposition, rarely does anything, never available. You know, they 
need to think they've got an election coming up and you don't get much sense that they 
think in a joined up way there at all. I think a lot of press officers who have worked with 
the Ulster Unionist Party have been very frustrated; I know they're frustrating to deal with. 
(Interview with author) 
Indeed, this very frustration with their political masters, who either failed to keep 
them adequately informed of high-level party thinking or to heed their 
communications advice, were perhaps contributory factors in the decisions by both 
David Kerr and Philip Robinson to resign from the party in early 2002.25 Their 
departures sparked off a somewhat bizarre (but as we shall see below, not 
unprecedented) chain of events within the history or the development of the party's 
communications. 
25 Irish News, 9t' February, 2002 
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In March 2002, Grant Cameron, a former Coleraine Chronicle editor, was 
appointed press officer for the UUP's Assembly group. 26 Only a matter of months 
later in May, Martin McNeely, formerly an assistant press officer of the 
Presbyterian Church, was appointed the new `media link-man' for the UUP (that is, 
Director of Communications). 27 McNeely acknowledged that the party was in need 
of a PR makeover and that relations with large sections of the media were little 
short of disastrous. 
They [the UUP] need to recognise that they now have to have a pro-active relationship with 
the media. During the last few years the party has been undergoing a difficult time, but it is 
looking to the future now. (Ibid. ) 
Yet, in looking to the future, the WP should have been headhunting far and wide 
for professionals with proven track records to take responsibility for the party's 
highest-ranking communications positions. Like their predecessor, David Kerr 
(who began working in the party's communications frontline in his early twenties 
after graduating with a Law degree), the appointments of Cameron and McNeely 
would simply not have occurred within a party like Sinn Fein (for example). 
Although both Cameron and McNeely had a working knowledge of the media as an 
editor of a very small, local paper and as an assistant press officer of the 
Presbyterian Church respectively, the UUP, at this juncture, required PR 
`heavyweights' as they embarked upon a fight for their political survival. 
26 The Sunday People, Yd March, 2002 
27 The Belfast Telegraph, 2"d May, 2002 
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One question springs to mind; was it simply a case that there were a limited pool of 
people who applied for the positions because of the daunting. and difficult prospect, 
that is, of attempting to overhaul or even manage such a decentralised and bitterly 
divided party? The answer may be difficult to conclusively ascertain but the fact 
that both Cameron and McNeely only remained in their positions for a matter of 
months and not years, speaks volumes. 
By February 2003, after being `bruised' by making seemingly `lightweight' choices, 
a true PR `heavyweight' in the form of Ray Haydn had become their Director of 
Communications and Alex Benjamin had returned to the party as a full-time press 
officer. 
However, only weeks before the 2003 Assembly elections (at the party's Annual 
Conference) the UUP were still attempting to freshen, renew and enliven their 
appeal to lapsed and potential unionists. Tim McKane, Chief Executive of 
marketing company, Fireimc, had been briefed to present the UUP to the electorate 
as a dynamic, modem, efficient, evolutionary and fresh political party. 
28 
Research that had been undertaken by Fireimc concluded that the party's weakened 
position was the culmination of disjointed messages and a lack of clarity on the 
Good Friday Agreement. 
In attempts to address a number of difficult issues, McKane and his company also 
developed a new logo for the UUP that dropped the word `party' from the 
28 Information gathered from UUP's 2003 Annual Conference, 18t' October, 2003 
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marketing material because it suggested that to be an Ulster Unionist one would 
have to join the party and that this could impinge upon their ability to attract voters. 
He explained to the delegates how his company arrived at the new `Ulster 
Unionists' logo: 
We designed this logo in mind with the dynamic power of the Ulster Unionists. The double 
U in the logo is a strong representation of the two U's in the party name. It is red, white and 
blue. It is in design terms a dynamic moving curve... it has a movement sweeping forward. 
It has a slight representation of a bugle and you trumpet your values, there is nothing to be 
ashamed of. And it is a reclaiming of the unionist name. All of the other parties, 
competitors for your target audience, use the word `unionist'; they use it because it's yours 
and you created a unionist party in Northern Ireland many, many years ago and all of the 
other parties call themselves unionist because you do. It's about time you reclaimed 
ownership of it. (Ibid. ) 
The Union Jack was also not in the newly-developed logo, as McKane believed that 
its inclusion did not represent a fresh, dynamic and forward-thinking party since it 
had been hijacked and could be seen by potential and lapsed unionists to represent 
extremist views, not the views of the UUP. In addition, Fireimc also developed a 
strap-line or brand position statement: 
The brand position statement "Simply British" developed in conjunction with the party 
leadership captures the identifying core value, the core values of what people are wanting to 
say and it reinvents the values in the new Ulster Unionists wanting to be British. It is fresh, 
dynamic and innovative and it is quite the most simple thing you can say about yourself. It 
is very, very easy to understand by people who want to say out loud what they are in 
Northern Ireland... "Simply British". (Ibid. ) 
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McKane believed that the new logo and brand position statement provided a strong, 
confident message that was very much at the core of what it meant to be an Ulster 
Unionist - taking ownership of being British whilst avoiding extremism. However, 
the cosmetic changes of a new logo and brand position statement could hardly paper 
over the party's ever-widening cracks. The reality of the predicament that Trimble 
and the UUP faced was alluded to in his speech at the conference: 
It is traditional at Conferences and Annual General Meetings to appeal for party unity. After 
the summer I spent a week touring round the constituency associations. One message came 
over again and again. Our biggest problem is the mixed message, the constant infighting. 
(Ibid. ) 
Over the entire period under analysis (that is, 1998-2003) it was these two main 
constants - the mixed message and constant infighting - that continued to directly 
impinge upon the ability of the party's PR personnel to develop successful 
communications strategies, as McDevitt maintained: 
I think it's very difficult to provide any sort of cohesive communications strategy when you 
don't have a cohesive political entity. I think until unionism itself settles down into 
whatever shape that it does and until Trimble ultimately deals with those who are 
disaffected or history deals with them, that it will be difficult for anyone. I mean no amount 
of public relations talent or expertise is going to overcome the fact that people can't agree 
amongst themselves. I think that's the biggest obstacle. I've no doubt that in the absence of 
disagreement, you would see a pretty professional outfit in a reasonably short space of time. 
And that the same, I would say about any party and I think that as soon as any political 
party begins to show cracks the first place it shows them is in terms of its communications 
strategy because if it can't agree a message, well then you've got a pretty big problem in PR 
terms. (Interview with author, cited in Kirby 1999, pp 65-66) 
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As the 2003 Assembly election approached, the UUP's key campaign slogan sought 
to differentiate itself from the DUP with: `The Future not the Past. ' 
The party also launched its campaign with a slogan from their party conference: 
`Simply British'. This was intended to both suggest that the UUP would preserve 
British culture and to appeal to those unionists who might be questioning why 
devolution was preferable to direct rule. Yet, it could be contended that the slogan 
simply implicitly equated life under a devolved, WP-dominated executive with 
that under direct rule or that the UUP had little to offer beyond the Westminster 
governed status quo. Indeed, it could also be argued that the `Simply British' 
slogan was not obviously linked to their key campaign slogan `The Future not the 
Past', that is, it sent out mixed or confusing messages and risked suggesting that 
direct rule was actually preferable to devolution. (Wilson and Fawcett 2004) 
During the election campaign, the UUP opted for posters featuring two `Simply 
British' images: the classic Mini car with a Union flag on the roof, and a bag of fish 
and chips. Other posters aimed specifically at first-time voters incorporated an 
uncharacteristically humorous slogan `You never forget your first time'. 
Yet, during the campaign the party's website had a rather impersonal feel about it, 
with a lone picture of Trimble on its home page. This merely brought to the 
forefront the public image of isolation within his divided party. Indeed, the UUP 
opted throughout for a `presidential-style' campaign that focused mainly on Trimble 
as the party's leader. 
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During the election campaign, the party also produced a rather thin 9-page 
manifesto, representing a triumph of style over substance and provided little more 
on policy than on its website. 
In an attempt to establish a set of principles, the UUP produced a 10-point `Ulster 
Unionist Charter', agreed to by both pro- and anti-Agreement candidates. This was 
clearly designed to try to provide a veneer of unity over a bitterly divided set of 
candidates, yet Jeffrey Donaldson subsequently produced a `dissidents charter' that 
flew in the face of notions of party unity and included an altogether different set of 
principles. 
The culmination of all of this division clearly compromised the UUP's campaign 
and was ultimately a godsend to their rivals in the DUP. 
The outcome of the election saw the realisation of Trimble's `nightmare scenario': 
in terms of vote share, the DUP and Sinn Fein emerged as the two largest parties, 
with the UUP and SDLP relegated to third and fourth places respectively. 
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(ii) Democratic Unionist Party 
DUP communications personnel perceived that they had an uphill struggle or indeed 
`battle' to fight during the period beginning on Good Friday 1998 and up until the 
2003 Assembly elections that is best understood or summarised by their Director of 
Communications, St Clair McAllister: 
We're going to have a difficult battle ahead because the process that was being foisted upon 
us through the Belfast Agreement was not acceptable to us and we felt would not be 
acceptable to the vast majority of right-thinking unionists. It has been a tough battle. 
People know the battle that has raged politically, that we have a situation now that we were 
being told that the `product', I'll use that term for the Belfast [Good Friday] Agreement, 
was going to be the panacea for all our ills, it was going to bring in a new dawn politically, 
it was going to bring in peace, stability, an economic boom etc., all the plus things. But of 
course the reality is that it has brought none of those things. We have a very unstable 
situation; the vast majority of unionists are now anti-Agreement and are very unhappy with 
the way this process is going. That's an ongoing battle; it's an ongoing fight, which we 
have to fight every day because it's quite obvious that we are up against two governments 
and the media. Even anyone who has no political interest at all, if they came in as an outside 
observer and observed the amount of space that we get in the papers, on television, the point 
of slanted questions etc., they would have no doubt that there is a movement out there 
against those people who are anti-Agreement and obviously it stems from government right 
down. (Interview with author, 1 November 2001) 
Essentially, the DUP felt that they were at worst demonised, at best marginalised, 
within the so called `peace process'. Indeed, when McAllister alludes to media or 
governmental bias he could so easily be quoting a Sinn Fein spokesperson from 
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before the 1994 IRA ceasefire, and just as in the case of Sinn Fein, seemingly 
hostile and discriminatory practices by the two governments and the media only 
served to harden the DUP's resolve to continue the fight. 
Outside the domain of party politics, (that is, the DUP's consistent vitriolic attacks 
against the UUP and in particular against their leader, David Trimble), a target for 
DUP disdain was Tony Blair, whose pledges made during the referendum campaign 
McAllister believed had significantly contributed to the Yes vote within the unionist 
fold: 
The turning factor for the Yes campaign was the fact that the Prime Minister's promises - in 
other words if you couldn't trust the Prime Minister, who could you trust? Well of course 
he has turned out to be a media-driven liar as far as things are concerned on this. He has 
dishonoured all those things; he's dishonoured the things that he even promised about the 
RUC etc. This is a Prime Minister that is totally discredited as far as I'm concerned and as 
far as our party is concerned. But that was the turning point for them. That was, shall we 
say, their master stroke, even though it was deception and lies to try and turn the campaign 
around. (Ibid. ) 
Although exit polls conducted during the referendum vote indicated that over half of 
those unionists who had voted, endorsed the Agreement, 
29 McAllister `papered 
over, this and was adamant that ongoing communicative efforts would be targeted 
towards helping to bring about a new agreement: 
The vast majority of unionists didn't buy the Agreement and that's an encouraging sign 
because it means that the hope is there that we'll get down to the reality, that no agreement, 
whether it's called the Belfast Agreement, the Good Friday Agreement or whatever 
29 The Sunday Times, May 24th, 1998 and RTE May 23rd, 1998 
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agreement is going to work until you have the vast majority of nationalists and unionists 
supporting it. There's nothing about this Agreement that will bring that about. So it has to 
be a new agreement and I think that's the message that we've got to get across and I think 
that it will come across more and more, and we are ready for action tomorrow if it comes - 
we'd love that. (Ibid. ) 
Throughout the period under analysis (that is, post-referendum 1998 up until the 
2003 Assembly elections) the DUP made consistent attempts to thwart progress 
made by pro-Agreement parties and to essentially delay the Agreement's 
implementation. According to McAllister, the people of Northern Ireland (inferring 
mainly the unionist community) were dishonestly sold a flawed Agreement, and 
therefore deserved an honest and durable (new) agreement that would command the 
overwhelming support of both communities: 
I think that any product, whether it be a peace process, a political process or a commercial 
product, if it is to be successful it must be sold on honesty and durability. If you're going 
out to buy a product like a car, people are looking for service from that, they're looking for 
durability overall, that it will do its job, day-in-day-out efficiently, effectively. That's what 
they want in politics too and it must be sold with honesty. People must be aware of 
something, warts and all. I don't think they'll get a perfect agreement. I don't think in this 
world we live in, that anything is ever perfect. But you can work at getting the best you 
can. What is more important, is not a perfect agreement but an agreement that the vast 
majority of both sections of the community will have trust and confidence in. That by itself 
will give it the durability that it needs. (Ibid. ) 
The DUP (who contributed least to the effective and efficient working of the 
Agreement and by virtue, it's institutions) seemed to believe that (among Northern 
Ireland political parties) they were the sole inheritors of an honest and truthful 
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political analysis. Indeed, throughout their history as a political party they have 
portrayed themselves, with a seemingly religious pride, as `The team you can trust' 
among other political parties who would either `sell-out' or contribute to the 
ruination of Ulster. As distinct from the other main political parties, the issue of 
religion is one that pervades the rhetoric of the DUP and the tendency to quote from 
scriptural verse was none more obvious than from their Director of 
Communications when alluding to the false premises or promises upon which the 
Agreement was founded: 
Above all, we've got to be honest and we've got to be honest about the product, what the 
product will achieve, what it won't achieve, and we've got to be honest in portraying that 
product. At the end of the day that's what I'm about. I'm about a seeker of the truth and 
portraying the truth because at the end of the day the only thing that will set me free from 
anything is the truth. I'll end with scriptural verse: there's a verse in the bible, which says 
the truth shall set you free. I think that's more than just a gospel truth that's applied in the 
bible. If you and I meet today for the first time, as we have, we find out between ourselves 
that we enjoy each others company and we'd say there's a relationship -a friendship is 
going to start. The only way that it will be a successful relationship is if it's based on the 
truth, if I know you and you know me warts and all, and you're prepared to go on on that 
basis. Yet, if we start off our relationship upon a false promise, a false premise, a false 
foundation, it is bound to end in failure at some time or other. Therefore, that's what I 
believe, that the truth shall set you free. (Ibid. ) 
The DUP incorporate strong moralistic overtones and a simplistic, yet dogmatic 
religious fervour into a great deal of their political rhetoric that encompasses notions 
of right and wrong, good and evil, truth and lies etc. Yet, their mix of religion and 
politics seems at odds with one another; the former infers taking a principled stand 
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on issues whereas the latter infers the compromising of principles to some degree or 
other. Having an uncomplicated idea about various issues and seeing them in black 
and white terms with little or no grey in the middle does not seem to bode well for 
future negotiations with other political parties. 
Unsurprisingly, in relation to notions of spin and either the bending or shaping of 
information, McAllister once again took to the moral high ground: 
We have never been a party to do that. If you look at our party ethos, it would tell you that 
we are a party who says it how it is and are more concerned about getting the truth out, 
because at the end of the day that is, what will eventually take people into a new particular 
relationship - being honest with themselves and with others. (Ibid. ) 
McAllister's uncompromising goal of `getting the truth out' and successfully 
communicating his party's anti-Agreement political analysis seems only to have 
been strengthened (as in the case of Sinn Fein) by what he perceives as a barrage of 
hostile attacks by what he considers a biased media: 
The media are biased towards us or against us and that pertains right through to even 
today... I think there's a need for some basic honesty and fairness and they should at least 
try and give both sides of the case, which is what good journalism, what a good media is 
about... Ask appropriate questions but give equal time and space, but that doesn't happen 
and it's not happening today. It's a constant battle we have... I could name several 
broadcasters and even their very tone, attitude and body language towards the DUP is 
totally different when they're interviewing anybody from the pro-Agreement camp. So 
there still is that, go lightly on the pro-Agreement people but put the boot in as much as you 
can to the anti-Agreement people, which is mainly the DUP because it's the biggest party 
obviously. We're not deterred by that; we'll just keep on going. (Ibid. ) 
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McAllister's personal resolve permeated party communications in an efficient and 
effective way and as such, as a centralised party, they seemed to adequately prepare 
for all manner of questioning, even though answers at times seemed manufactured 
or regurgitated from a well-rehearsed script. For example, when asked to explain 
why his party had yet to formulate a viable (and indeed had no) alternative to the 
Good Friday Agreement, he simply explained: 
I believe there's always an alternative. When someone says, "Oh when you're dead, that's 
it, there's no alternative" I don't even believe that, I believe there is an alternative when you 
die. I don't believe in the whole existence of god's creation, that there's not an alternative 
way of doing things. People were always being told in every field you can think of: 
engineering, medicine, etc. "You'll never be able to do that, you'll never build that 
pyramid" - they built them, "You'll never get a man on the moon" - they got a man on the 
moon. I'm an optimist by nature, by faith and existence so I always believe that there is an 
alternative. We were told that there was no alternative to certain things like the poll tax. 
Maggie Thatcher said there was no alternative to the poll tax yet the poll tax fell away and 
the people rejected it. I believe that there is an alternative and we can change the Belfast 
Agreement. The people who tell you there's no alternative are telling lies. We're back to 
the honesty criteria. (Ibid. ) 
McAllister seemed to have a plausible (if pre-arranged) answer for awkward 
questions and as such, was recognised by many in the media as `very good as the 
DUP spin doctor'. (Interviews with Mary Kelly and Noel Russell, 4 June 2002) He 
presided over the rapid development of the party's communications structures (that 
included an efficient media relations operation) and by 2002 was confident that the 
DUP had sufficient personnel on board to relay the party's message in an effective 
way: 
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If you encompassed the number of people that work for us, we have certainly enough 
people on board. So therefore, our needs are being met. There's no worry that we are 
understaffed or under pressure and therefore our message is not getting out or we're 
suffering in that sense. (Interview with author, 1 November 2001) 
Indeed, to reiterate this point, Spotlight's investigative reporter, Kevin Magee, 
highlighted and praised the communications advances the party had made with 
McAllister at the helm: 
The DUP are very, very keen to sell their argument and I have never known anyone at the 
DUP who wouldn't want to participate. If you were to rank the parties in terms of media 
savvy I mean they're right up there with the Shinners. They know and appreciate the 
importance of TV exposure. (Interview with author, 6 June 2002) 
One particular communications development that McAllister was proud of in his 
capacity as Director of Communications, was the party's web site: 
One area which has come to the fore and is an ever-increasing part of communications is the 
IT revolution. We have an award-winning DUP site and now a very innovative 
dup2win. com campaign site, which won great acclaim. It's a very interactive site and that's 
an area where we're very keen to develop and we've been at the forefront of that and I'm 
determined that we're going to stay to the forefront of that. More and more people are 
coming online and more and more people are going to the net for general information and 
that includes politics. It's very vital that we are at the cutting edge of that. I think even a 
cursory glance at our web site compared to others would show that we are at the forefront. 
(Interview with author, 1 November 2001) 
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His enthusiasm to progress the technical side of party communications correlated 
with a drive to both strengthen grass roots support and lead a crusade to target 
potential voters, as evident in the 2001 general election: 
We've always had our support from the ordinary mass of people in Northern Ireland and 
we've always maintained that, but we continue to grow, just like a company would grow its 
business we continue to grow our business politically. There are people voting for us now 
who never would have voted for us in the past or perhaps didn't vote at all, people who 
were of a unionist persuasion but maybe more Ulster Unionist. It's quite obvious they're 
moving over to us because of the number of seats we have now. You can put forward 
policies; you can put forward plans and all the rest of it but the hard facts are - how many 
people have you got elected? That's what it comes down to. Now with 5 MPs and only 
2,800 short of getting 8 MPs, I think that's missed on a lot of people, that if 2,800 more 
people had voted for us in the right areas, we would now have 8 MPs which would clearly 
demonstrate that the overall majority of unionist supporters held to our analysis. (Ibid. ) 
Significantly, when McAllister left the DUP to concentrate on personal and business 
interests in 2002, he and his party had helped to convert a substantial swathe of 
unionists who had voted Yes to the Agreement in 1998 over to the anti-Agreement 
wing. In many ways the DUP mirrored Sinn Fein in that they had successfully 
targeted potential voters within their respective communities (that is, UUP voters in 
the case of the DUP, SDLP voters in the case of Sinn Fein). Indeed, like Sinn Fein, 
they became increasingly active on the ground and were successful in targeting and 
attracting younger voters. 
McAllister's legacy was that at the time of his departure he had become the main 
contributor in the development of an effective communications structure within the 
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DUP that was passed on to, and upheld, by those who followed - Timothy Johnston 
as Director of Communications and Mike Wolseley as DUP press officer. 
30 
As a party who were hungry for political power and appreciated the importance of 
television exposure, they eventually decided to enter studio debates with Sinn Fein 
in October 2002, when Stormont was suspended due to allegations of spying and 
continuing IRA activity. This departure was a tactical communications decision 
taken in acknowledgement that if they wanted to progress as a political party they 
would both have to tackle their marginalisation in the media and confront Sinn Fein 
as the leading voice of nationalism / republicanism, if they wanted to one day speak 
as the true voice of unionism. 
Of pivotal importance to an examination of DUP communications during the years 
under analysis (that is, 1998 to 2003), party leader, Ian Paisley, became increasingly 
less visible publicly - to the point that he was only available for television 
interviews on rare occasions. Indeed, there were signs during the 2003 assembly 
elections of continuing marginalisation, when Paisley spent most of the campaign 
canvassing `on the ground' as opposed to engaging in television debate. Yet the 
DUP's communication strategy of shielding Paisley at times was a successful one, 
and as Kevin Magee alludes, whatever decision the party takes on the future role of 
their leader, they will have thought through their medium to long-term objectives: 
I think that they understand the inevitability that Paisley is going to go at some point. 
Believe me, they'll have thought well in advance how to deal with that and how they see 
their party progressing over the next couple of years. There's one thing about the DUP, 
30 See party website; http: //www. dup. org. uk 
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they're a very, very efficient party and they pride themselves on that. That's a reason why 
individual profiles have been raised to the extent that they have... they are efficient and 
business-like in the ways they get things done. You mightn't like what they say or do, but 
they're efficient. (Interview with author, 6 June 2002) 
Such a corporate, efficient mode of both operation and conduct seemed increasingly 
to pervade DUP political communications and would more than likely continue into 
the foreseeable future. 
As the 2003 Assembly election approached, the DUP's key slogan for the election 
summed up the essence of their campaign strategy and implied that the other parties 
had failed to deliver an Agreement that could be equally supported by both 
communities: `It's Time for a Fair Deal'. 
The party ran the most effective election campaign of the four main political parties 
in terms of publications and use of other media forms to appeal directly to voters 
(Wilson and Fawcett 2004). They presented an appealing and coherent image, and 
all of their additional messages complemented and reinforced the key campaign 
slogan. The party's literature, posters and website all provided humour as well as 
information. The success of the party's strategy of relentless attack on David 
Trimble and the Agreement demonstrated once again that negative campaigning 
does not necessarily alienate a great many Protestant voters. 
Indeed, the party continually highlighted its opposition to the Good Friday 
Agreement and its determination to renegotiate it. By attempting to build on the 
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fears of unionist voters they painted a `nightmare scenario' of a Northern Ireland 
executive in which `terrorists' held sway. 
With the exception of the DUP, all the main parties' manifestos focused largely or 
exclusively on policies related to bread-and-butter issues, such as health and 
education, rather than on constitutional or `sectarian' issues such as the Good Friday 
Agreement, demilitarisation or policing reform. 
The DUP was also the only party to set up a special website for the election 
campaign (Dup2win. com. ) and also attempted to get away from traditional-style 
manifestos by issuing theirs in the form of a glossy magazine. 
In addition, they adopted a strategy of producing a set of `principles' to help secure 
the votes of fundamentalist unionist voters concerned that their party might be 
prepared to compromise in the future on key principles. 
The DUP's cartoon posters employed during the election were professional and 
humourous and were the most effective of any produced by the parties. Each 
belittled David Trimble for making too many `concessions' to Sinn Fein. One of 
the three cartoons used on candidates' election leaflets showed a hapless Trimble 
sweeping paper notes listing the alleged concessions - `IRA in government', 
`Stormont Spy Ring' etc. under a carpet. In the leaflet, behind Trimble stood Gerry 
Adams with a box full of more `concession notes', while behind the Sinn Fein 
leader stood a grinning paramilitary waving a grenade (Ibid. p. 20). The election 
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leaflets also featured a series of images, also used as posters, which showed 
ordinary citizens saying why they were going to vote DUP. (Ibid. ) 
Throughout the election campaign, the party also opted for promoting a `team' 
image and the DUP's main photo image featuring the party's five MPs was used on 
its website and on its campaign `battle bus'. 
They also made two Party Election Broadcasts (PEB's), yet, it was their second that 
was the most effective. It featured Peter Robinson who kept up the `nightmare 
scenario' theme. The audience were treated to mock newspaper headlines like 
`Twelfth parades banned' and `Irish compulsory in all schools'. (Ibid. p. 22) The 
DUP deputy leader also consistently attacked the UUP for all the `concessions' it 
had allegedly made to republicans. (Ibid. ) 
As the final election results came in on 28th November (although an overwhelming 
majority - 74 out of 108 - of those elected were pro-Agreement) the emergence of 
the DUP as Northern Ireland's largest political party meant that there was little 
prospect of an early restoration of devolution along the lines of the model so 
painstakingly crafted in 1998 by the pro-Agreement parties. 
Looking across the traditional divide, what was particularly significant in relation to 
the trend in electoral support for Sinn Fein was how this had been matched by the 
DUP. Whether the DUP's advance in the Assembly election constituted an 
irreversible trend was perhaps less certain than in the case of Sinn Fein. However, 
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their symbolic electoral relationship suggested that their political fortunes could be 
inextricably linked. 
With a British general election likely in 2005, there seemed to be little prospect that 
the DUP would, under its current leadership, relax its total opposition to Sinn Fein's 
inclusion in a devolved `executive' government short of complete IRA 
disbandment. 
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(iv) Sinn Fein 
During the period under consideration (that is, 1998-2003) it quickly became 
apparent that Sinn Fein had continued in the same vein as pre-Agreement days, 
remaining the leading political party in Northern Ireland in terms of PR and 
communications, as highlighted by BBC political correspondent, Mark Simpson: "I 
would have no hesitation in saying that nobody does it better than Sinn Fein in 
terms of PR" (Interview with author, 4 June 2002). 
Spotlight reporter, Kevin Magee, reiterated his BBC colleague's assessment, while 
substituting PR for the more pejorative term `political propaganda': "There is no 
doubt that the Shinners [Sinn Fein] are the most sophisticated in terms of 
propaganda, because that's what it all is really, party political propaganda from all 
of them. " (Interview with author, 6 June 2002) 
In the post-Agreement era, changes in the party's communications structures 
included (most notably) the establishment of a publicity operation at Stormont. 
Other less significant changes included the relocation of the Washington operation 
to New York - headed up by Rita O'Hare (who was replaced in Dublin as national 
Director of Publicity by Dawn Doyle). In addition, whereas the party once had a 
lobbying presence in Brussels (that also facilitated European visits), their EU 
operation was now closed down, on this occasion being subsumed within a wider 
`International Department' based in Ireland. In June 2002, Sinn Fein also decided 
to open a London press office, influenced both by their MP's successes in the 2001 
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general election and their wider strategy of gaining a foothold or `voice' within the 
corridors of power at Westminster. 
On the personnel front, the party's key communications players during the period 
under consideration (within the publicity department) included Dawn Doyle, who 
(as all-island Director of Publicity) was responsible for Sinn Fein's press operation 
north and south. She simplified her role as follows: 
Basically it is my job to ensure that our PR strategy is in place, that it's being carried out, 
and that on any one day that we are responding to things being raised in the media and that 
we are setting out our proactive agenda as well (Interview with McAteer, 10 June 2002). 
Directly responsible to Doyle was Mark McLernon who became head of the party's 
northern operations (mainly Connolly House in Belfast where he was based, and 
also the Stormont operation) - principally the two central press offices in Northern 
Ireland. McLernon summarised the extent of the media relations effort within the 
`six counties' context: 
You have three people work here with me: two press officers and another administration 
person. In Stormont there is a press officer and an administration person. We're actually 
looking at getting another one on board. And then there is a smaller operation in Derry, 
which is run. Then we have another press officer who deals/liases with the departments [at 
Stormont] and ourselves, and deals with the international output. In terms of tomorrow 
he'll travel to London to brief or have editorial board meetings with the English papers. 
(Interview with author, 30 October 2001) 
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In providing a synopsis of Sinn Fein's key communications players during the post- 
Agreement years, it would undoubtedly be incomplete without specific reference or 
acknowledgement to the pivotal role fulfilled by Richard McAuley. While not 
directly involved with the publicity department in his capacity as Press Secretary to 
Gerry Adams, his influence is nevertheless highly significant and his proficiency in 
media relations is unquestioned within the party, as McLemon pointed out: "We 
deal with some media requests but we'd pass them all back to be cleared centrally, 
Richard wouldn't. " (Ibid. ) 
Indeed, BBC producer, Noel Russell, highlighted how fundamental McAuley was 
within the party's media operation, while acknowledging the strength of Sinn Fein's 
press office system within a Northern Ireland context: 
Sinn Fein is the most efficient party... they have a very responsive media operation and 
they put out statements regularly, they are very good at that. They really have a very good 
press office system: a separate one at the Assembly that Ned Cohen runs and Mark 
McLernon runs the one at Connolly House and Richard McAuley is top gun really as 
Adams's Press Secretary. (Interview with author, 4 June 2002) 
While Russell acknowledged McAuley as `top gun' within Sinn Fein 
communications, other political editors and journalists alike recognised his pre- 
eminence on the Northern Ireland political scene and even likened McAuley at 
times to New Labour's Alasdair Campbell. As BBC Northern Ireland's political 
editor, Mark Devenport, maintained: 
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I think consistently Sinn Fein has had a good media operation because down through the 
years of the Troubles they were trained with consistently dealing with hard questions from 
the media, having to defend themselves about accusations over their complicity with IRA 
violence. Their politicians like Gerry Adams became very well honed at dealing with those 
questions and somebody like Richard McAuley became very well honed at spinning their 
particular line. I think McAuley is right up there and certainly he could teach Alastair a few 
lessons and Alastair could teach him a few lessons. Although it's a different game he is 
playing [Campbell], generally speaking McAuley's been really right up there in terms of 
communications. (Interview with author, 6 June 2002) 
Devenport's predecessor as BBC political editor, Steven Grimason, also reiterated a 
positive assessment of Adams's Press Secretary: 
Richard McAuley is pretty much up there... He's a pretty sharp operator, he knows his way 
around the course. People forget that Richard was involved in the Sinn Fein press office 25 
years ago, so he's there a very long time. (Interview with author, 20 March 2003) 
McAuley's long-term involvement in Sinn Fein communications is best understood 
as a `vocation'; one in which he has been on a continuous learning curve. In this 
respect, Magee relates back to the 1994 IRA ceasefire announcement to highlight 
McAuley's media savvy both in the past and at present: 
Yes, he's the best. The way that you get to Gerry Adams is through McAuley. You may as 
well be speaking to Adams when you're talking to McAuley. He understands programmes, 
he understands the needs of journalists, he understands the strategic nature of different 
programmes - one might carry more weight than another. I remember it was very, very 
evident the day of the Sinn Fein ceasefire when interviews were taking place at Connolly 
House and there was a hierarchy of journalists that they would let in. It began with the 
network programmes. It was really, really irritating for people who had been covering this 
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story here for 10 or 15 years, to be standing at a gate with McAuley on one side saying, 
"Well hold on, let Mr Snow in". I remember that distinctly, calling Jon Snow because he 
[McAuley] understood the significance of Channel 4, Dimbleby for Panorama, and all these 
people took priority over local journalists on that ceasefire announcement. I thought that 
was a good insight into his savvy and his understanding of the significance of different 
programmes and the weight that is attached to them. (Interview with author, 6 June 2002) 
While both McAuley and his party's primary goal in 1994 and indeed since, 
remains Irish unity, this objective, (for the mean-time), seemed to be `put on the 
back burner' in the years following the signing of the Good Friday Agreement. 
Their immediate political priority was to sustain the peace process and to defend the 
Agreement while pursuing its full implementation. During this period, the party 
was also preoccupied with building a lasting political strength both north and south 
so that their strategic long-term goal or aspiration of a united Ireland could indeed 
be realised. 
On the public relations front, their approach was to put in place an all-Ireland PR 
strategy, as highlighted by Dawn Doyle: 
We don't have a separate strategy as such for the south of Ireland, there is one strategy, 
which would be on an all-island basis. Obviously at different times there would be different 
things you would be doing north and south because of the political realities... because of the 
nature of the press office in Belfast it will carry more of the peace process work by the pure 
nature that there is press conferences there every morning on the peace process. (Interview 
with McAteer, 10 June 2002) 
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In both jurisdictions the party's communications team made attempts to ensure all 
members were consistently `on message'. For example, one key message laboured 
throughout was that the apparatus of the state (Northern Ireland) had failed on some 
level or other (most notably in policing) and that consequently, the operation of the 
six counties was unworkable and corrupt (justification for the party not taking their 
rightful place on the new Policing Board). As the party progressed (in the post- 
Agreement years) onto a permanent election footing, Sinn Fein members 
consistently sang in unison from the same communications `hymn sheet' which 
included key messages or buzzwords that became familiarised into the republican 
lexicon like equality, justice, freedom, and peace. 
The ability to successfully relay or `sell' such messages to the electorate is always 
closely related to, or dependent upon, a party's resources - always a bone of 
contention (at least in the financial sense) when referring to Sinn Fein. Media 
reports suggest that the party has huge financial resources whereas public relations 
personnel themselves at worst plead poverty, or at best contend that they have 
limited financial resources available for communications. 
According to the Public Office Commission in the Irish Republic, in April 2001 to 
April 2002, Sinn Fein (with just one member in the Irish Parliament) received twice 
the donations (387,787 euro) as the main governing party Fianna Fail (194,615 
euro) who had 75 members of parliament. 
31 
31 `Sinn Fein Outstrips Rivals in Donations League' by Mark Sage, PA News, 17 April, 2002 
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Indeed, such figures may only represent `the tip of the iceberg', according to Mark 
Devenport: 
There is a strong suspicion on the republican side that not all the money that you see being 
declared to any of these bodies is actually the money they've got but I'm not sure if anyone 
has proven that yet. The announcement in the South was interesting because Sinn Fein was 
the best-funded party, even more so than Fianna Fail, which is obviously a disparity in 
terms of their electoral mandate. (Interview with author, 6 June 2002) 
The Electoral Commission in Northern Ireland (at this stage) had not extended its 
role to investigate the finances of political parties and even if they had, media 
pundits like Devenport would remain cautious or sceptical of their significance in 
relation to Sinn Fein : "Whether we believe them [such figures] is another matter. " 
(Ibid. ) 
While it remains difficult to ascertain the true financial status of Sinn Fein, it is 
apparent that they do stand apart from other political parties in relation to their 
international fundraising capabilities. They are also a very different political party 
from others in that they have a great number of members and activists who are 
prepared to work without salaries. Mark McLernon, six-counties Director of 
Communications, highlights this point while stressing the need to fight for limited 
resources within his so-called `small party': 
In terms of resources, there's no one in the press department who's on a salary. Resources 
have improved in recent years in terms of Stormont, which is fitted out. As you can see 
we're still a bit behind the times. We have two fax links going here basically all the time, 
piling stuff out. But we're a small party, and there are a lot of people here who gets a slice 
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of the Sinn Fein cake within the party and we have to fight for our share annually in the 
same way as everybody else does. (Interview with author, 30 October 2001) 
Certainly, for all of Northern Ireland's political parties, there has been a re- 
allocation of resources in the post-Agreement era. The introduction of the devolved 
Assembly meant that resources were diverted when all parties recognised the need 
to get a handle on broader social and economic issues, as Doyle acknowledged: 
You have seen the evolving of a strategy around broader issues being covered in the north, 
and it's not just around the peace process. The media are covering stories on health and 
education, the ordinary day-to-day issues. So that would be a big change and it means a lot 
of pressure in terms of having very limited resources and we would be trying to get the 
positions right on all of these. We don't have enough research on policy, and legislative 
backup yet. (Interview with McAteer, 10 June 2002) 
Doyle also points out that because of limited resources Sinn Fein could not conduct 
the extensive media analyses or produce the quick responses that they would like to: 
We do to an extent, but not nearly as much as we should do. It's one of the things we're 
looking at, at the moment in terms of information. Because sometimes you're missing out 
on responding to issues because so much is happening just in the day-to-day running of the 
different press offices, but sometimes we miss stories, or miss responding to stories, or 
developing stories. It's one of the things we are looking at, at the moment that were not 
nearly as strong on. The difficulty is that in the overall press operation you have ten people 
working in the different press offices, so you're talking about limited resources. We're 
taking on two more people now but they are moving into Leinster house, diverting some 
resources ... a large number of our people work on a voluntary basis and are not paid a 
salary or anything like that. Some people are, but a lot of people still aren't. Despite what is 
said about all the money from America, we would not have anything like the resources of 
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the bigger parties, not even close. We would love to have way more resources. I mean it is 
one of the things we fall down on in terms of having enough information, having a speedy 
response to issues as they unfold around us. (Ibid. ) 
While Sinn Fein does not have in place a New Labour-type `Excalibur'32 media 
system and indeed Doyle (like all Directors of Communications) would love to have 
more resources at hand, the fact that Sinn Fein had 10-12 full-time staff (paid or 
unpaid) working in media relations alone, put them at a distinct advantage over the 
other main political parties in the Northern Ireland context. Sinn Fein also remained 
the largest political party in terms of their available manpower (paid or unpaid) and 
party activists clearly contribute to the success of their publicity operation as a 
whole. In addition, the majority of Sinn Fein personnel who have entered the higher 
echelons of party communications (in particular, media relations) have been at a 
distinct advantage over rival political parties in that they have spent a number of 
years working for the newspaper An Phoblacht/Republican News. Only those 
promising individuals who demonstrated aptitude or potential were promoted, as 
McLernon, who went through this process himself, pointed out: 
A lot of those of us who came in to the press department have come in through AP/RN [An 
Phoblacht / Republican News], which was always going to be a useful place to pick up 
people because of their time at the paper. They're skilled enough writers, they know the 
craic, they know structurally the basics of how to put a press statement together and they 
know how Sinn Fein works. It's always been a useful place for picking up good people. 
(Interview with author, 30 October 2001) 
32 Excalibur is a computer with a huge capacity and the ability to read articles and documents and 
was a pivotal component in New Labour's `rapid rebuttal system' of the 90's, (See Gould, 1998). 
340 
McLernon's colleague, Ned Cohen, who had previously no formal media 
experience, also typified those promoted up through the party's communications 
ranks. Cohen spent two years at AP/RN and subsequently worked as a press officer 
for three years before being appointed Sinn Fein publicity officer at the Assembly. 
While Sinn Fein were progressively developing on the personnel front in the post- 
Agreement years (in terms of both quality and quantity), they were also developing 
new relationships with the media in general. 
Sinn Fein and the Media 
For many years, there was a large body of journalists in the North who unbelievably 
supported censorship and had a disgraceful record in support of the political censorship of 
Sinn Fein. Likewise in the South, our team was reviled by a collection from the Workers 
Party for many, many years - the Eoghan Harris's of this world who would still quite openly 
support censorship. I don't rate them as journalists and I don't think they're credible 
journalists holding that position. So I think a lot of journalists, if you've grown up through 
that system of political censorship, you've clearly some political education to go through. I 
think it was in South Africa that journalists were invited to re-education camps and I 
jokingly suggested that sometimes to the journalists here. (Interview with Mark McLernon, 
30 October2001) 
Sinn Fein has had substantial gripes with many sections of the media in Northern 
Ireland throughout the Troubles, yet, relationships did begin to improve and evolve 
when the party chose to pursue a democratic path in the early to mid 90's. 
Although Sinn Fein still had to fight its corner and take journalists and editors to 
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task over biased coverage, their relationships with the media continually progressed 
in the years following the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, as described by Doyle: 
It has changed a lot over the past ten years and it has improved an awful lot. In the main, 
it's okay, it's like anything else, you have to fight your corner, try to get statements out, 
stories covered and interviews done. You go and make your pitch to the media and try to 
get coverage and if you don't get what you think you should have gotten, it's up to me to 
ring up and ask why it didn't get covered or why they covered a story in a particular way. I 
don't think it's any better or any worse than the other political parties to be honest. I think 
that people are slightly more open to us than they would have been a couple of years ago. I 
think it's the same as everyone else in that the peace process has influenced the media. 
While the vast majority of them would not be our biggest fans I think that they are slightly 
more open... but I think it's evolving and it's improving as time goes on. (Interview with 
McAteer, 10 June 2002) 
For Ned Cohen there was even the feeling of a growing trust within certain sections 
of the media: 
There is a long history of republicans engaging with the media, there are long-term 
relationships built up... I think a lot of journalists trust what Sinn Fein says, because it's 
above board. However, the media is not a uniform thing; the relationship is developing. 
(Interview with McAteer, 7 June 2002) 
Like Doyle, Cohen believed that while there were improving relationships, there 
was also a need for Sinn Fein to continually fight its corner: 
If you're concerned about something you might spend a month looking at a particular 
programme or a particular paper, and actually looking at the coverage they give us. So you 
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have the hard evidence to go back and say, "Look we put out say 65 press releases and you 
picked up on maybe only 2 stories out of 10, and that's not a fair reflection" - those sort of 
arguments. A lot of the media organisations would have a very clear, conscious agenda, 
rather than a subconscious agenda, a lot of which would be of a Unionist bias or a state bias. 
(Ibid. ) 
Indeed, for some within Sinn Fein it was really editorial decision-making that was 
causing most problems for the party and although both communications personnel 
and party members were enjoying more fruitful relationships with individual 
journalists they believed that some still relied too heavily on official sources and 
therefore had failed over the years to change their proverbial spots, as McLernon 
alluded to: 
I certainly have very good relationships with many journalists. But often that's not the 
problem. It's the political direction that their editorial boards take which are certainly anti- 
republican. I would fight with people or plead cases with people over our stuff not getting 
carried or certain spins being put on our stuff. The Colombian stuff is a prime example 
where gullible journalists took lies from various secret services - MI5 sources - ran it as 
truth and quickly the story unravelled. I think that journalists need to be very careful in the 
sources that they use, particularly military sources and particularly British military sources. 
Some journalists are still using them and some journalists have made a career out of using 
them. (Interview with author, 30 October 2001) 
Although it would be naive to assume that Sinn Fein do not `spin' their own case or 
that they have consistently espoused a `truthful version of events' at all times, party 
communications personnel remained aware of the importance of not unduly using or 
manipulating journalists, as McLernon maintains: 
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Journalists don't like, in my experience, being used by political parties, especially 
journalists here; I think they're around long enough and they're wise enough to know when 
they're being sold a pup. So I don't think this kind of Machiavellian, spin-doctor type 
person is realistically a goer and I think even the influence they have over British politics 
have started to be criticised more and more. (Ibid. ) 
McLernon acknowledged the benefits of both being `straight' in dealings with 
journalists and attending to their needs - in particular `delivering on' information or 
people for interview when requested: 
The journalists here are looking at efficiency; they're looking to process their requests 
quickly. If you're going to do it, do it. If you're not going to do it, tell them you're not 
going to do it. They like people being straight with them and I think they think that we are 
straight with them. (Ibid. ) 
McLernon's understanding of journalists' needs is supported by research conducted 
by Liz Fawcett (2001) who found that the quality that journalists valued most in a 
party's efforts in regard to media relations was efficiency. In this respect, Sinn Fein 
scored the highest among the main political parties in Northern Ireland and was 
seen as having led the way for many years (Ibid. ). 
Journalists interviewed for Fawcett's research also believed that Sinn Fein had 
benefited from being both close-knit and operating as a team. In their evaluations, 
journalists also placed an even greater emphasis on a party's ability to deliver what 
they wanted, than on its astuteness and skill at media relations. Of the main 
political parties in Northern Ireland, it was only Sinn Fein (according to some of the 
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journalists) who had mastered the art of `spin' to any degree of sophistication and 
success. (Ibid. p. 13) 
Although evident in the pre-Agreement years, in the aftermath of the setting up of 
devolved institutions at Stormont, the symbiotic relationship between 
communications personnel and journalists became more acute. Communications 
personnel, by the fact that they were privy to a great deal of information, could be 
more aggressive and held a certain `power' over journalists who were in 
competition for `exclusives' or good stories, as acknowledged by Cohen: 
Relationships on some level are based on individuals. Different members of the Sinn Fein 
press team would have different relationships with individuals in the media, and would talk 
to them for different things. I have an excellent relationship with all members of the media, 
though in saying that I just had a long projected argument with the editor of Stormont Live. 
You really need to hold people to task, and go above them and go the senior people above 
them in their organisation if you have a complaint. You have to be very forthright in the 
way you approach it. There is a general way where up here I have access to a lot of 
information, what's happening and what's going to be coming out in the future. Certainly 
people won't want to get on the wrong side of you too much because you are potentially a 
provider of good stories. I've given someone at the BBC a good number of exclusives over 
the past couple of years and consequently when she runs a story she will ring up looking for 
a Sinn Fein person to insert into it. (Interview with McAteer, 7 June 2002) 
While Cohen (above) refers to the BBC or the Belfast-based regional media, Sinn 
Fein also aggressively pursued the targeting of local media in Northern Ireland 
during the pre-Agreement years: 
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In terms of how we approach it more professionally, we try to come at things a little bit 
differently than the other political parties. They tend to be tied into the way things have 
always been done, so there's a pattern as to how you approach the media, what journalists 
you talk to. We try to do it just a little bit differently; we try to have a focus on local media 
[more] than the other parties. (Ibid. ) 
Other political parties did not have the same resources to target local papers to the 
same degree or extent that Sinn Fein could, and as a result, local towns and 
communities throughout Northern Ireland would have seen the column inches or 
coverage in their local papers increasingly coloured by a Sinn Fein `tinge' on a 
variety of issues. 
Yet it was not simply a matter of Sinn Fein having greater resources (for example, 
10-12 full-time press officers) that set the party apart from the others on the 
Northern Ireland political scene. Dawn Doyle believed that the party differed from 
other political parties because they were more hands-on and imaginative, that they 
were more involved at a community level and that from the top-down their political 
representatives consistently acknowledged the strategic importance of PR and 
publicity: 
I think we come at it differently, and it can be a bit more imaginative sometimes. A lot of 
them [in other political parties] came through the same process, whether they were PR 
trained or were in the media and then went into PR. People come here [to Sinn Fein] and 
you learn in the job very much so, and because it's not as easy for us to get into the 
mainstream you come up with different ways to present your story. We may have to try a 
bit harder, and do things a bit differently, and we're also involved in street campaigning, 
active campaigning and involved in the communities and using that to get your message out 
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as well... which is PR in its own way [more] than other parties. The publicity structure is 
much more tied into the party itself than would be the case in other political parties; that I 
am almost definite about... the leadership is very much involved in the publicity and what 
happens, which they are probably not as involved in as much in other parties as they are in 
Sinn Fein. (Interview with McAteer, 7 June 2002) 
The fact that, unlike other political parties, Sinn Fein's PR strategy is very much 
tied into their political strategy is of fundamental importance and highlights that 
communications personnel serve and contribute at the highest level of the party, that 
is, `board room level'. Indeed, Doyle elaborated further: 
As decisions are taken at a political level, publicity is [also]. Not that you are doing 
something because of publicity but publicity is involved in how the decisions are come to, 
so it's very easy for you to work out the PR strategy out of it. It's not something that's added 
on afterwards, it's actually part of the discussion itself, which is important. I don't think that 
that happens everywhere. (Ibid. ) 
The importance and influence afforded to PR and communications within Sinn Fein 
has a long history, whereas, for example, within the SDLP it has been more of a 
recent undertaking and has indeed been more of a case of `adding on' afterwards as 
opposed to being an `integral' function from the leadership level downwards. 
McLernon believed that the SDLP were on the wane in recent years not only 
because they lacked Sinn Fein's younger, fresher and dynamic outlook, but more 
importantly that the SDLP had never been a campaigning party like themselves: 
"They never operated like a political party should. They never campaigned on any 
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issue, ever! So, it's going to be hard for them to start now. " (Interview with author, 
30 October 2001) 
There are a variety of reasons for Sinn Fein's communications success story as 
opposed to other political parties and not only the SDLP. They have continually 
progressed more professionally as a political party since the early 1980's and have 
become proficient at schooling both staff and party members alike in terms of 
dealing with the media. They have also been quite assiduous in promoting people 
up from within and they begin to think ahead very early about who is the next wave 
of people they want to represent them. 
In terms of the party's growing professionalism and in regard to ongoing media 
training for example, Kevin Magee highlights: 
The Shinners have workshops and even before an issue someone will sit in a room and three 
or four people will ask them questions, - "you're going to be asked this, you're going to be 
asked that and how are you going to deal with this? And, how are you going to deal with 
that? " And, I don't think it happens elsewhere. See what's important for them is the 
message. (Interview with author, 6 June 2002) 
An additional reason for the party's success on the communications front is their 
high degree of central control (almost militaristic) - meaning that there was little 
deviation from a clear and consistent `party line'. As Magee explained: 
Sinn Fein have a very, very high degree of centralisation and central control as to who they 
will put up on what particular issue. If they are attempting to push a particular person, 
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you'll see them coming to the fore more and more often. I've done interviews with Sinn 
Feinners in the past because I have a professional relationship with them, not through the 
press office, but that's very, very unusual. What you would tend to find is that they are 
totally centralised, that a lot of the queries would go straight to the press office. You would 
ring a Shinner and say: "What about doing an interview? " and they'd invariably ask: "Have 
you cleared it with the press office? " (Ibid. ) 
However, it is also true that in the post-Agreement political dispensation Sinn Fein 
communications staff had to adapt to the uncharacteristic position of not being in 
`full' control of their own media output, as McLernon highlighted: 
The biggest change for us since signing the Good Friday Agreement is how to slot ourselves 
and how to slot our ministers into the departmental press structures and the executive press 
structures as opposed to us having overall control if you like of our own media operations 
and our own media output. (Interview with author, 30 October 2001) 
Yet although Sinn Fein communications staff had to work with civil servants 
involved within departmental media relations, this did not adversely impact upon 
the party's ability to deliver a professional and controlled press operation. 
In addition, the party's communications success story could also be put down to a 
greater strategic sophistication than other political parties. They seem to have a 
heightened sense of being able to read a situation and use it to their political 
advantage. At times, they remain silent or stay out of the limelight, or conversely 
they use the media at other times for agenda-setting purposes, as Magee maintained: 
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The general rule is that they will participate in programmes if they think it is to their 
advantage. For example, the Shinners wouldn't put anybody up to talk about the Columbia 
Three for obvious reasons, an embarrassment to them. Adams was on [Spotlight] recently 
on a programme about the UDA and again I think they see what they consider as an 
opportunity for them. Whatever it is they are trying to push at a particular time. I think the 
reason why Adams did that recent interview was he wanted to show that the Shinners 
wanted to engage with loyalism. It's good from the position that he said he would like to 
meet the guy who shot him who is a senior UDA figure and that from a news point of view 
was quite a good angle. But, I think it will depend on what day, or what direction, or what 
topic they want to push at a particular time. (Interview with author, 6 June 2002) 
While Sinn Fein remains the most sophisticated political party in Northern Ireland 
in terms of their propaganda output, this does not mean that they are flawless and 
indeed they do make mistakes on occasions. However, the key to their success is 
that they learn from their mistakes and are quick to rectify them, as Magee points 
out in relation to one 2001 election broadcast: 
There was one party political piece that they did that was an absolute disaster. It was so 
unlike them and it was clear something had gone wrong in their internal mechanism to 
allow it to actually get to the stage of a party political broadcast of such poor quality. I 
mean it was atrocious. So, they do make mistakes. But the thing about them is that they 
realise when they've made them, in terms of trying to present their message and they'll be 
very quick to change that. (Ibid. ) 
A fundamental reason why mistakes may be becoming more prevalent within the 
Sinn Fein household is that their political operation was much smaller in the early 
90's and as a result it was much easier to manage their party communications. 
However, as they advanced in terms of their all-island electoral strength from the 
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mid 90's onwards these advances would have created problems that had subsequent 
repercussions, particularly in relation to their ability to run a `tight ship'. As former 
BBC political editor, Stephen Grimason maintained: 
They've got bodies on the ground. There is no doubt about it that the republican media 
effort is very aggressive and very organised but it is not as organised as people think it is. 
They have a reputation for being incredibly monolithic and not having any disagreements 
but they are also quite capable of making a complete mess of it as they would accept 
themselves and they do lose the run of themselves over certain bits and pieces. The reason 
for this is that when the movement was around 7,8,9 per cent of the population you could 
control it very comfortably in media terms... it's almost a throw over from the sort of old 
military structures that they had because they came out of a military movement with a top- 
down structure. The difficulty for them now is that when you represent more than 20% of 
the population, as they do, it's much more difficult to control and manage that. I think that 
is where a lot of their effort will go into. I'm not saying that they don't, but that it is a much 
more difficult scenario. You've so many views and added to that they are an all-Ireland 
party. There are differences of opinion North and South on a lot of key issues and they have 
to bring all of that together... it has been quite significant the amount of effort they have put 
into it, but they have to continue and communications is something that has to be 
continually worked at. (Interview with author, 30 March 2003) 
Electoral success for Sinn Fein is intimately linked with the ability to both 
continually work at, and provide a professional and strategic public relations 
service. Further success will be, in part, dependant upon their ability to control and 
manage an even greater communications remit. Sinn Fein's track record does, 
however, prove that they have always been prepared for the challenge or task ahead. 
Since the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, while at times they have shown reactive 
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or defensive characteristics, they have, for the most part, successfully adapted to the 
new political dispensation and remained both positive and proactive, as 
acknowledged by the BBC's Mark Simpson: 
I think that all of the parties with the exception of Sinn Fein have struggled to cope with the 
new dispensation and the fact that they don't always have to be on the back foot. To use a 
cricket analogy, very rarely do they [other political parties] come out and go on the front 
foot and hit a four and a six, they're always on the defence. (Interview with author, 4 June 
2002) 
In this respect, Sinn Fein's approach and political future looked promising. Indeed, 
as the 2003 Assembly election loomed, Sinn Fein's key slogan promoted a positive 
vision of the future: `Building an Ireland of Equals'. 
The party's 90-page election manifesto was available in both Irish and an audiotape 
version. During the campaign they targeted first-time voters and younger voters by 
producing a credit-card size calendar with the accompanying message `Sometimes it 
takes a four-letter word to be heard ... vote. ' They also targeted rural constituencies 
by producing a special election leaflet designed specifically with that audience in 
mind. 
During the election campaign, the party's Assembly election posters incorporated 
conventional images with a key election message: `Your Winning Team'. Although 
Gerry Adams did feature on every candidate's election leaflet and on the party's 
website throughout the campaign, Sinn Fein primarily promoted a `team' image. 
Many of their posters and newspaper advertisements promoted such an inclusive 
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image and featured group photographs of Sinn Fein leaders with women and 
younger politicians at the forefront, designed to play on nationalists' and 
republicans' wishes to both support and be part of the winning side. 
Their Party Election Broadcast (PEB) featured traditional Irish music and a series of 
split-screen images showing the party's politicians in action and other images with 
which their target voters could identify with, such as republican murals. Caitriona 
Ruane who was a new candidate for the party, provided the voiceover in a softly- 
spoken southern Irish accent, informing the audience that `growing numbers are 
voting for Sinn Fein north and south'. Designed to underline the `Your Winning 
Team' campaign theme, many of the images were of group shots of smiling party 
politicians, clearly enjoying themselves and getting on well together. 
As the 2003 Assembly results came in, it quickly became apparent that this election 
was Sinn Fein's strongest performance to date, that is, the party secured 24 seats in 
the Assembly (whereas the SDLP having gained only 18 seats, was it's weakest). 
The upward trend in Sinn Fein's vote was especially apparent since the IRA 
ceasefires of the mid-90's, the major casualty being its nationalist rival -a bitter 
irony for the SDLP who had helped Sinn Fein to negotiate a peaceful path. 
Their political strategy, allied to the IRA's (imperfect) ceasefires and the as yet 
unresolved (and opaque) process of `decommissioning' had undoubtedly reaped 
continuing electoral rewards. 
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Short of a complete breakdown in the `cessation' of paramilitary activities by the 
IRA and a disavowal of the principles underlying the Good Friday Agreement of 
1998 by the Sinn Fein leadership, there was little at hand to suggest that it would 
lose its newly-won electoral leadership of the nationalist community. 
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(v) The Media 
An analysis of the media in the post-Agreement era should begin by acknowledging 
the many positive developments that have taken place since 1998. For example, 
one needs only observe weather forecasts to see that a new approach has been taken 
whereby the broadcast media situate Northern Ireland within an all-island context. 
Pre-Agreement forecasts had a simple six-county map of Northern Ireland, as if it 
existed in isolation from the rest of Ireland or that `southern' weather systems did 
not affect Northern Ireland. Indeed, on the cultural front as a whole, there has been 
a more inclusive approach taken, whereby for example, Irish language programming 
has been given a greater emphasis. Also, in the field of sports, Gaelic games have 
become a common feature of programming, whereas in the pre-Agreement era, 
coverage would have been minimal or non-existent. 
Indeed, after a majority endorsement of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, its 
core principles including `equality', `parity of esteem' and `inclusiveness', slowly 
permeated through most, if not all, layers of society in Northern Ireland, and the 
media were by no means an exception to the rule. 
However, while there have been many positive developments in the post-Agreement 
era, there are also criticisms that can be levelled against the media. In the following 
subsection three such criticisms are examined: (i) media shortcomings by focusing 
on the peace process at the expense of the political process or issues of governance; 
(ii) the reluctance of broadcasters (for four and a half years) to deny the DUP the 
privilege of using a `remote studio' and thus help to bring the four parties in the 
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involuntary government coalition together in the TV studios to facilitate discussion 
and dialogue between, in particular, the DUP and Sinn Fein; and (iii) the media's 
short comings during the 2003 Assembly election campaign including their framing 
of the election as a communalist `battle' between two `tribes'. 
(i) Media shortcomings and coverage of the `peace process' versus the `political 
process' 
In the post-Agreement Northern Ireland, media organisations like the Press 
Association invested financial and human resources in covering the Assembly and 
issues of governance, yet it was unquestioningly the BBC who invested the greatest 
resources of all, developing flagship programmes like Today at the Assembly and 
Stormont Live. For Stephen Grimason, who left his job as BBC NI political editor 
to become Director of the new Executive Information Service (EIS) at Stormont, it 
was a case of money well spent: 
The BBC's investment in specialist correspondents has paid off for them because they are 
really wired into health, really wired into environment issues and they've got the security 
side sewn up. They've got a number of specialist people who can do all of this and it is they 
who direct and guide the coverage [in Northern Ireland]. (Interview with author, 20 March 
2003) 
However, while the BBC invested in specialist correspondents, a criticism levelled 
at the media in Northern Ireland (post-Agreement) was that journalists in general 
have not been keen to immerse themselves in issues of governance, or to put it more 
simply - bread and butter issues. As Grimason explained: 
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The difficulty the journalists had and continue to have is that we have a twin-track process - 
we have the peace process and we have the political process. While the peace process 
continues, it's altogether sexier for journalists to cover. It's also easier to understand. So, 
the bread and butter stuff is much more tricky. I think if it were only bread and butter stuff 
they'd turn into it much more dramatically than they have. Although that's not to say that 
there aren't a number of significant journalists who have begun to really understand how 
devolution works. (Ibid. ) 
In the main, however, journalists were reluctant to turn their attention or focus away 
from the peace process towards learning `the ropes' of the more difficult political 
process. Although Grimason excuses journalists or believes this to be part of a 
transitional phase, it is worrying nonetheless that after a number of years of 
devolution most journalists appeared to be disinterested in the workings of 
government: 
The average journalist has not focused to the extent that I think they should have on how 
government works. We know some of them who do, and they have come and we have told 
them just how you take a bill through the Assembly, how you take a bill through in primary 
legislation through parliament, all of those sorts of things. It's tricky, it's difficult and it's 
hard. Some people think it's boring but actually the more people who do come and look for 
it, do get into it and do find it interesting. But the difficulty you have is that the present 
hiatus is about guns or decommissioning and that's a sexier story than something around 
having seven extra sewage treatment works. So, because we're in transition and this 
transition will take quite a long while, journalism will be in that transition as long as 
anybody and that will provide its own difficulties for them. I think they take the easy option 
by covering the peace process because it's easier to report. I think the more difficult thing 
is how the country is run but that will happen in time... Security and politics tends to 
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dominate the news agenda and that's only to be expected. What happens, is that if you get 
rid of the security and hard political agenda insofar as you can, certainly the security 
agenda, that means the space will have to be filled by something else and that's when they'll 
come looking for us in terms of looking after business. (Ibid. ) 
Martina Purdy reiterates Grimason's view that the media are in a transitional phase 
and that many journalists find the political process `boring' in comparison to the 
peace process. (Interview with author, 6 June 2002) Yet the media, as a matter of 
urgency, should have assumed more responsibility, `rose to the occasion' or `took 
up the mantle' for one fundamental reason, if no other - with a devolved 
government made up of an involuntary coalition of the four main parties, the media 
play an important scrutinising role as an effective `opposition'. Purdy highlighted: 
I think the media now are in a phase of transition between the crisis politics of 
constitutionalism, decommissioning, and they were very good at dealing with that, to a 
settled period where you have to start learning about bread and butter issues. You need to 
start learning about the complexities of government and it can be very dull after the 
excitement of `guns and government'. I have heard some people in the media complain that 
bread and butter issues are boring. I think it can get exciting again but it's just going to take 
a bit of time to redevelop those skills and the media has a really important role in terms of a 
good effective opposition. You have four main parties up there in a very unusual 
government, they are the opposition and they are the government at the same time, which is 
rather bizarre. (Ibid. ) 
The `unusual government', that is, the political parties themselves, also level 
criticisms at the media for their failure to treat the political process with the same 
vigour as they did the peace process. For example, the SDLP's Gayle McGreevey 
358 
believed that the media should have been less fascinated with `division' and 
`sectarian politics' and more interested in highlighting `deeper policy issues. ' 
(Interview with author, 19 March 2003) By doing so, the media could have 
promoted a more positive or constructive view of the parties' attempts to work 
together and the significant accomplishments they made as `partners' when they did 
so: 
I think that they could be more interested in the deeper policy issues. That's always a 
complaint the SDLP has, that the media are more interested in the very sectarian nature of 
politics. Even when the Assembly was running most days you wouldn't have very many 
members of the media up here unless there was a debate on something `mental' which you 
knew was going to get everybody's backs up. But the general day-to-day work that was 
going on in committees or going on in the Assembly chamber wasn't picked up on as much 
as it could have been. There were organisations like the Press Association and the BBC 
who would have had people down here on a Monday and Tuesday, every week, week-in- 
week-out following the debates, but there wouldn't have been a huge amount of pick-up on 
some of that stuff. A lot of good work was done and people don't necessarily know that. I 
think that the media could have highlighted that rather than all of the divisions that there 
were between the parties, more of the progress that was made, the bread and butter issues 
that were being dealt with and in that way sold the institutions and sold the Agreement a bit 
more... the media has a responsibility and a role to play in promoting the work that is being 
done with the various political parties. (Ibid. ) 
(ii) The DUP and Sinn Fein - an opportunity lost? 
It was not until October 2002 or four and a half years after the signing of the Good 
Friday Agreement that the DUP entered the same television studio as Sinn Fein to 
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debate the political issues of the day. Yet, there is an interesting history behind this 
significant development that merits further examination. 
Following the 1994 IRA ceasefire the media in Northern Ireland began to treat (the 
more democratic) Sinn Fein with less hostility than they had done so previously. 
However, it was only in the post-Agreement era that one could detect a sea-change 
in attitudes towards Sinn Fein in the media or at least most sections of it, as Purdy 
pointed out: 
They [Sinn Fein] would still complain even now that some sections of the media are still at 
war with them. But I think there has been a sea-change in attitudes and how Sinn Fein is 
reported. They still get asked the tough questions but maybe in a more polite way. During 
the Troubles a BBC interviewer going along to a Sinn Fein press conference on health, not 
interested in health at all, would ask the same question over and over again "Are you going 
to condemn violence? " It was like a ritual interview. You can explore other issues with 
Sinn Fein now, not just the one-dimensional politics. As one person put it - the peace 
process created the "good paramilitary and the bad paramilitary". That's how things 
change. I suppose again, post-Agreement, Martin McGuinness is now a minister of the 
executive. He has to get the respect of that office whether you respect him or not. I think 
the media is conscious that it has to approach him the same way as they would approach all 
of the other ministers. (Interview with author, 6 June 2002) 
In the post-Agreement era the media began to invest a certain degree of trust in Sinn 
Fein that would certainly have been missing prior to their signing up to the Good 
Friday Agreement. For example, they were more inclined to believe the Sinn Fein 
`line' in negotiations that followed the Agreement, over and above the NIO or 
British government press officers, as the following vignette by Purdy highlights: 
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In the period when there was a deal done in the Mitchell talks, after the Agreement had 
failed to set up an executive, Mitchell came over and had those intensive talks at the 
American Ambassadors residence in London. Certainly there was an expectation of 
decommissioning. On the one hand you had Sinn Fein saying "There is no deal, don't 
expect decommissioning" and you had the NIO press officers on to key journalists telling 
them "I can tell you right now there will be decommissioning, you have to start saying this 
on air. " Journalists who are being very professional will resist that because they were 
hearing something totally different from the other side of the house [Sinn Fein] that they 
were more likely to believe to be honest. (Ibid. ) 
By 2002, although there were some individual journalists and editors who were 
`anti-Sinn Fein' in the eyes of their Northern Director of Communications, Mark 
McLernon, the fact that he also believed that the predominantly pro-Agreement 
media were less biased (in general) is a significant departure from Sinn Fein's pre- 
Agreement analysis of the media: 
I think generally the vast majority of the media in the North would be supportive of the 
Good Friday Agreement and supportive of the [peace] process. I think the DUP would say 
that there's a media bias but I don't think there's a great media bias out there. The media 
are trying to put it across as they see it and it is hard for some to take that journalists do 
have an opinion and they do have a political direction. Editorially the media in the North 
are supportive of the Good Friday Agreement, right from the time of the referendums when 
all the major newspaper editors went with a Yes vote and that would be their direction and 
their policy. (Interview with author, 30 October 2001) 
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Sinn Fein's relationship with the media in the post-Agreement era was certainly 
developing and moving in a positive direction, whereas for the DUP, if their 
relations with the media were not on a constant downward spiral, they at least 
became more fraught. As the DUP Director of Communications, St Clair McAllister 
maintained: 
The media are biased towards us or against us and that pertains right through to even today. 
I write a column every Friday for the News Letter and it was only after a couple of years of 
constant discussions and arguments with Geoff Martin [the editor] that we finally got a 
platform and it came to myself to write that. We have this column, but it was also because 
of the pressure that unionists were putting on the paper saying, "we're never hearing the 
other side of the story here". As for the media, I think there's a need for some basic honesty 
and fairness and they should at least try and give both sides of the case, which is what good 
journalism, what a good media is about... Ask appropriate questions but give equal time 
and space, but that doesn't happen and it's not happening today. It's a constant battle we 
have. (Interview with author, 1 November 2001) 
The DUP's similarities with a pre-Agreement Sinn Fein are unmistakeable, right 
down to the very complaints about the interviewing techniques of broadcasters and 
the party's insistence that they would continue the `battle'. In fact, McAllister 
could on most occasions be quoting a member of Sinn Fein from the pre-Agreement 
days (if only he substituted the names of both parties): 
I could name several broadcasters and even their very tone, attitude and body language 
towards the DUP is totally different than when they're interviewing anyone from the pro- 
Agreement camp. So there still is that, go lightly on the pro-Agreement people but put the 
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boot in as much as you can to the anti-Agreement people, which is mainly the DUP because 
it's the biggest party obviously. We're not deterred by that; we'll just keep on going. (Ibid. ) 
Whereas the pre-Agreement media had marginalised Sinn Fein, that is, party 
members had to participate in political debates from a remote studio, it was the 
DUP, in the post-Agreement era, who replaced Sinn Fein on the margins or 
sidelines. Grimason explained: 
The history of that is quite interesting. For a long time it was Sinn Fein who were excluded 
from that [studio debates] and then after the Good Friday Agreement the decision was taken 
by the BBC that it would be Sinn Fein who would be in the studio and it would be the DUP 
who would be remote. Because, if they [the DUP] were sitting with them [Sinn Fein] up in 
committees and discussing with them in councils, technically part of the same government, 
the BBC took the view it's about time we rattled a few cages. Then I think the real decision 
on all of this was taken by the DUP. They took the view that "we're really going to have to 
engage with these people at some point, so we better start doing it now", and I think it's 
been an interesting signal from the DUP. (Interview with author, 20 March 2003) 
Essentially, four and a half years after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, 
the broadcasters `hard-balled' the DUP by basically saying: "look, it costs money to 
operate a remote studio" in attempts to move the debate on (Ibid. ). Yet, a criticism 
that can be levelled at the broadcast media is that they did not attempt this sooner 
and in fact, buckled under the pressure of the issue being a difficult decision to take. 
Indeed, Grimason (BBC political editor at the time) wanted this to happen 
immediately after the 1998 referendum, but his colleagues within the BBC shied 
away: 
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It is timing; it is all timing. They [the BBC] didn't do it sooner because it was difficult 
territory. For what it's worth, I wanted it done instantly, that was my advice, but mine 
wasn't the only judgement to be weighed in the balance and there were issues around 
whether their position [the DUP's] was principled or not. For a time they weren't in the 
talks, they weren't sitting with them [Sinn Fein], but once they got into government, okay 
not sitting around the same executive, but those sorts of things said to me that it was time 
for the BBC to withdraw that particular bit of comfort, that we were all in the political 
business and we just better get on with it. However, Ian Paisley can be a tough negotiator 
and he fought his case and it was significant territory because someone was going to have to 
take a pounding for this. It's fine provided it works, provided you end up with them all in 
the same studio, but if you end up without properly reflecting the DUP's view then that's a 
different argument and that's actually serious in terms of the balance of an argument. So 
these things went on in broadcasting for a very long time and there were significant 
discussions about it. (Ibid. ) 
However, indications from some within the DUP (including St Clair McAllister) 
were that they understood the inevitability of sitting down in the television studios 
with Sinn Fein. If the broadcasters had made attempts to `hard-ball' the DUP 
sooner, it is not unreasonable to assume that discussion and dialogue (however 
vociferous) could have begun in the studios years earlier than it actually did, and 
potentially could have moved the peace process on to a new level much sooner than 
actually occurred. 
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(iii) The media and the 2003 Assembly election 
Wilson and Fawcett (2004) argued that the framing of the 2003 Assembly election 
in the media was predominantly as a masculinist, communalist `battle' between two 
`tribes' and confined to the four main political parties in Northern Ireland. 
Indeed, many criticisms can be levelled against the media during the election 
campaign. For example, there was little or no explanation (until the last minute) of 
what voters were voting for, that is, continued suspension and a review of the Good 
Friday Agreement. 
Furthermore, insofar as a review was addressed, it was presented in the media as a 
further round of `negotiations', rather than the deliberative process the word 
implies. (Ibid. ) Wilson and Fawcett claimed that: "This had real effects of 
incentivising voters to support those deemed the `toughest negotiators', rather than 
those parties who might adopt a more conciliatory line. " (Ibid. p. 4) 
The election was also consistently represented in the media as a `gladiatorial' 
contest, or rather, two separate contests between the leaders of the four main parties. 
The emphasis on who would emerge as `top dog' in each of the `unionist' and 
`nationalist' camps meant that the non-sectarian parties were either represented as `a 
wasted vote' or often presented in such a way as to delegitimise their very existence. 
(Ibid. ) 
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Wilson and Fawcett also argued that the endless predictions of the outcome of what 
were represented as the separate communalist `battles' implicitly disallowed the 
possibility that any voter might be persuaded by the very campaign the media were 
contemporaneously covering. (Ibid. ) Essentially, they believed that the media 
verged on creating self-fulfilling prophecies, by suggesting that the momentum lay 
behind certain parties (the DUP and Sinn Fein) while others (like the SDLP and 
UUP) would be `squeezed. ' (Ibid. ) 
The media also left little space for serious consideration of `bread-and-butter' issues 
and populist claims by parties were rarely subjected to critical or expert analysis. 
Indeed, while the media could have played a vital role in scrutinising the content of 
manifestos, those journalists who attended the parties' manifesto launches displayed 
very little interest in policies on bread-and-butter issues (Ibid. ). As aforementioned, 
there remains a question mark over the capacity of the media in Northern Ireland to 
interrogate fully `political issues' as opposed to those of a `peace process' nature. 
Significantly, none of the parties' policy propositions were subject to any media 
scrutiny as to their feasibility or desirability. UUP adviser, Alec Kane, complained: 
"manifestoes and policy papers are tumbling from the printing presses, stuffed with 
uncosted, unrealistic and largely unfulfillable promises. Publicity stunts and 
soundbite knockabouts have taken precedence over meaningful debate. The general 
public is utterly uninterested. " (Ibid. p. 62) 
In addition, the UUP's press officer, Alex Benjamin, concurred with Kane. He 
expected the campaign would be `issues-driven' yet, instead: "the media have given 
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all that stuff a wide berth, the press conferences on policy issues have not been 
covered and so it is very much stunt and personality-based. " (Ibid. p. 63) 
Essentially, Wilson and Fawcett concluded that the dominant media coverage of the 
election added up to a failure to both effectively inform and engage the public about 
the potential `deadlock' or impasse that would follow the election if the DUP and 
Sinn Fein came out `on top': 
It is hard to see that the media, with honourable exceptions, assisted electors to make an 
informed choice in this election. It was almost like a train crash that all the experts could 
see coming, but the observers (The Belfast Telegraph from the outset excepted) had failed to 
anticipate, and, more importantly, to communicate the risk to the passengers in advance. 
(Ibid. ) 
Although there were honourable individual and organisational exceptions, the media 
inadequately played the critical role as the `fourth estate' during the 2003 Assembly 
election. There were also concerns as to whether they (wittingly or unwittingly), 
were once again complicit in the `degenerate spirals of communication' that 
reproduce and even amplify communal division (Giddens 1994, p. 245). 
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Summation 
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) 
As the party most closely associated with the civil rights movement of the late 
1960's, the SDLP suffered most from the consequences of having achieved so many 
of their initial goals - culminating in the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. They 
found it increasingly difficult to both articulate a vision for the post-Agreement era 
and on many occasions, to simply `blow their own trumpet'. As a consequence, the 
SDLP was pushed further and further towards the margins of political life in 
Northern Ireland. 
Before the 1994 IRA ceasefire, the party could rely on a clear distinction between 
themselves and Sinn Fein on condemnation of, or support for, the resort to violence. 
Since then, and especially since Good Friday 1998, this difference was seriously 
eroded. For many nationalist/republican voters, in particular younger ones, the 
differences on violence narrowed to such a sufficient degree that both parties could 
be assessed on the basis of their relative political dynamism, their closeness to 
community organisation and their capacity to force the pace of change. In the post- 
Agreement era, in all of these areas, Sinn Fein held a significant advantage over the 
SDLP. 
To compound difficulties, the SDLP was a decentralised party and were slow to 
acknowledge, or were simply ignorant of, the benefits that strategic PR could bring 
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to their future development. Significantly, there was even an archaic view prevalent 
among many of its party members that you shouldn't really `talk to' never mind 
`tell' journalists things. (Interview with McGreevey, 19 March 2003) 
The SDLP also failed to invest adequate fmancial resources into its communications 
operation. McDevitt and Turley (both Directors of Communications) worked alone 
for the most part with limited resources at hand. In March 2001, when McGreevey 
took up her position as party press officer she described the SDLP's 
communications operation as an amateurish set-up that was both disorganised and 
unprofessional. (Ibid. ) Unsurprisingly then, in terms of the quality of their media 
service or efficiency, the SDLP were adjudged by political journalists and editors 
alike to be incapable of `delivering the goods'. (Fawcett 2001. p. 13) 
The party also experienced significant upheavals, being the only one of the four 
main political parties that changed its leadership in the post-Agreement era under 
consideration. After a humiliating defeat in the 2001 general election, John Hume 
stood down as leader to be replaced by Mark Durkan. Although Durkan enjoyed a 
higher profile since the setting up of devolved institutions in December 1999, he 
was considerably less well known than many of the figures within the leadership of 
their rivals for the nationalist vote, Sinn Fein. 
The SDLP's problems lay more with strategy and presentation than fundamental 
policy, and as such, when Durkan took over the reins as leader, he was adamant that 
the party's communications and organisational needs would be addressed. The new 
leadership sought to distance itself from Hume's label of post-nationalism and 
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instead framed its future policies in terms of an agreed Ireland. The leadership also 
began to introduce changes that included designing a new party logo. Nevertheless, 
the SDLP still failed to establish a clear identity for itself and although the logo was 
designed to symbolise a `new', dynamic and modem party, it simply disguised `old' 
problems, that is, on the communications front, their operation remained 
unstructured and unprofessional. Communications personnel had also no control 
over their party members and there was more of a one-to-one emphasis with 
journalists rather than the centralised nature of Sinn Fein communications. 
By the 2003 Assembly elections, the generation of high-profile SDLP politicians 
who had dominated nationalist politics over the previous two or three decades was 
quickly disappearing and it was far from clear that the party had indeed found the 
next cohort to fill their shoes. With the party's electoral `big hitters' or older 
members leaving, the SDLP had failed to develop and promote potential `heirs to 
the throne' and simply had not progressed as a political party in the same way as 
others, in particular, Sinn Fein. 
On the communications front, the SDLP had, for the first time in its history, three 
full-time staff working in their press office; were showing signs of central 
coordination; had in place daily dispatches and a rebuttal system and had become 
more PR-focused. Yet, such public relations developments were a matter of work- 
in-progress and crudely put, simply a case of too little, too late. 
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Ulster Unionist Party(UUP) 
During the period under consideration (that is, 1998-2003) there were very few 
positives that could be taken from developments in political public relations within 
the UUP. Indeed, the period was dominated by bitter internal feuding and 
debilitating infighting, and characterised by the party continually moving from one 
crisis to another. In such circumstances it was impossible for communications 
personnel to function effectively, that is, they were frustrated in attempts to play 
down division and dissent, and keep party members `on message'. Positive public 
relations attempts by Harris, Haydn and Laird to portray the party as a progressive 
political outfit were offset or cancelled out by the negative impact of a small, but 
vocal anti-Agreement cabal who contributed throughout the period to the party's 
overall mixed or disjointed messages. 
A further negative impact or weakness included the UUP's lack of clarity on the 
core issue of the day - the Agreement itself. Trimble's acknowledgement that he 
merely had a slight commitment to the Agreement speaks volumes. At a time when 
rational or moderate unionism required a principled leader with strong convictions 
to sell the vision of the Agreement, in essence, a historic accommodation with their 
Catholic neighbours, Trimble foundered and was simply lacking as the leader of 
pro-Agreement unionism. Importantly, throughout the period he never acted like a 
confident leader; that is, he should have forcefully dealt with, or should have even 
dismissed outright, party dissidents like Jeffrey Donaldson; he should have changed 
party structures that would have eliminated the block vote allocated to anti- 
Agreement factions like the Orange Order or the Ulster Young Unionist Council; 
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and he should have `reached out' more to the Catholic community, instead of 
making public relations blunders, that included branding the Irish Republic a 
`mono-ethnic, mono-cultural, pathetic, sectarian state' (The Observer, March 10, 
2002). 
Critically, throughout the post-Agreement years Trimble and his UUP members did 
not heed the advice of internal communications personnel (including David Kerr as 
Director of Communications). They also seemed oblivious to the immediate need 
for a thorough public relations overhaul and their relationship with the media during 
the period in question was little short of disastrous; that is, they were rated the least 
efficient of the four main political parties by political journalists and editors alike 
who acknowledged their `ability to deliver' as `poor'. (Fawcett 2001, p. 13) 
Yet, instead of hiring in the best public relations talent that money could buy, that 
is, PR or media relations `heavyweights', to begin the process of turning around the 
party's poor public image, they continued for the most part with a laissez-faire 
attitude to both public relations and the media, employing PR `lightweights' (like 
Cameron and McNeely) to oversee their communications. 
Although Ray Haydn, a media relations professional, became UUP Director of 
Communications in early 2003, it was very difficult to provide a cohesive 
communications strategy when a cohesive political entity simply did not exist and 
could not even agree on the most straightforward of messages. Indeed, the UUP 
really needed to begin the process of communicating as a team, rather than an 
amalgam of diverse individuals, and ultimately purge the party of rebels who had no 
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qualms with publicly attacking their own leader. The party also needed to begin the 
process of speaking with a confident, unified, progressive, pro-Agreement voice. 
Yet, by the 2003 Assembly elections, the fractious and chaotic nature of the party 
was still evident and the UIJP were facing not only short-term, but long-term 
electoral meltdown. 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 
During the period in question, the DUP made a strong stand against what they 
believed to be a flawed and dishonestly sold Agreement. Chief among their many 
gripes was that Tony Blair, whom they described as a media-driven liar, (Interview 
with McAllister, 1 November 2001) had dishonoured the pledges he made during 
the referendum campaign to win support for the Agreement in the unionist 
community (Sinn Fein would not enter government unless allied with 
decommissioning, the future of the RUC would be safe etc. ). Effectively, because 
they believed the Agreement was based on false promises, premises or foundations, 
they were convinced that it would end in failure and they remained adamant 
throughout that they would work towards a more honest, durable, new agreement. 
They also believed (throughout the period under consideration) that they were 
involved in an on-going battle and were up against two governments and the media. 
(Ibid. ) Yet, as with Sinn Fein in the past, they were not fazed by the challenges 
ahead and their perceived hostilities only seemed to harden their resolve to continue 
the fight. 
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The DUP made consistent attempts throughout the period to thwart progress and 
essentially delay the Agreement's implementation. However, with one eye on their 
electoral future, they sought to square the circle of participation in the Executive 
with their complete opposition to the Agreement by refusing to participate in full 
meetings of the Executive. They also made consistent attempts to exclude Sinn 
Fein from office and began to rotate their own ministers, thereby preventing any 
embedding of the structures of the Agreement. 
Throughout the period the DUP also conjured up `nightmare scenarios' of terrorists 
running the government of Northern Ireland. They incorporated strong moralistic 
overtones and a simplistic, yet dogmatic religious fervour into a great deal of their 
political rhetoric that encompassed notions of right and wrong, good and evil, truth 
and lies etc. Yet, portraying issues in black and white terms with little or no grey in 
the middle did not bode well for potential negotiation or political compromise with 
other pro-Agreement parties in the political fold. 
Yet, with the possibility of future electoral success, the DUP began to moderate its 
rhetoric and started to talk of recasting or renegotiating the Agreement rather than 
smashing it, as they had done so previously. 
On the communications personnel front, St Clair McAllister (as Director of 
Communications from 1998 to 2002) presided over the development of a centralised 
party system with an effective communications structure that included an efficient 
media relations operation. Indeed, the DUP and in particular their leader, Ian 
Paisley have always understood the importance of the media as the conduit or 
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channel through which they relay their political messages and have unquestionably 
appreciated the importance of television exposure. In the post-Agreement era, they 
remained keen to sell their argument and began to hire more communications 
personnel to make sure that their political messages were not lost on their target 
audiences. 
The party also showed a great deal of enthusiasm in progressing the technical side 
of their communications (for example, their party website) as well as both 
strengthening grassroots support and leading a crusade in the targeting of potential 
voters. They also became increasingly active on the ground, taking up a permanent 
campaigning position like Sinn Fein and were successful in targeting and attracting 
younger voters. 
For the first time, in October 2002, their strategic communications extended to 
entering the television studios, as opposed to being in remote studios, to confront 
Sinn Fein. Although in many respects the broadcast media left them with little 
choice, (that is, the media hinted at withdrawing their support for the DUP to use 
remote studios) communications personnel would have realised that the DUP could 
not be seen to be remaining at the margins of political life if they wanted to 
convincingly speak as the true voice of unionism. Essentially, from 1998 to 2003, 
the DUP took a more sophisticated, strategic, corporate and efficient approach to 
communications and they softened or moderated their rhetoric to appeal to a wider 
audience (that is, unionists of all hues, but in particular, disillusioned UUP 
supporters). Allied to these developments, the party's cohesion and its centralised 
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nature stood in sharp contrast to the internecine warfare and the decentralised nature 
of the UUP. 
Sinn Mn 
Sinn Fein remained the leading political party in Northern Ireland in terms of PR 
and communications during the period under consideration. They had developed a 
very strong press office system and an equally capable communications team to run 
it, based mainly in Belfast and Dublin. Indeed, Sinn Fein's Richard McAuley was 
even likened to New Labour's Alastair Campbell (Press Secretaries to Gerry Adams 
and Tony Blair respectively) by political journalists and editors alike. 
The party's immediate political priority after the 1998 referendum was to sustain the 
peace process and to defend the Agreement while pursuing its full implementation. 
Sinn Fein was also preoccupied with building a lasting political strength in both 
jurisdictions, that is, in the North and South of Ireland. As such, they were a party 
on the move; on this occasion armed not with the bombs or bullets of their military 
wing, the IRA, but with an appealing and democratic vision of a realisable goal -a 
united Ireland. 
By Northern Ireland political party standards, they had a very well-resourced 
communications operation, with 10-12 full-time members working in media 
relations. Yet as a party hungry for all-island political success, they continually 
thought about progression and indeed believed that their resources were limited for 
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the job ahead, that is, they had insufficient resources to carry out detailed research 
on policy issues, conduct thorough media analyses or have speedy responses to 
issues as they unfolded. 
Nevertheless, Sinn Fein's communications or political public relations strengths 
were far greater than any other party on the `Northern' Ireland political scene. Their 
sophisticated, strategic communications success story can be better explained by a 
long, yet not exhaustive, list of factors: they have an international fundraising 
capability; they have a vast number of party members and activists who are 
prepared to work without salaries; they are close-knit and operate as a team; they 
are hands-on and imaginative; they are a campaigning party on a permanent election 
footing; they are committed at community level; from the top-down their 
representatives understand the strategic importance of PR and publicity; 
communications personnel contribute at the highest level of the organisation; 
publicity is involved in how decisions are arrived at; they are proficient in schooling 
both staff and party members in dealing with the media (holding various media 
workshops); they are assiduous in promoting people up from within; and they have 
a high degree of central control (almost militaristic), and as a result, there is little 
deviation from a clear and consistent `party line'. 
Throughout the period in question, Sinn Fein also developed their relationships with 
a previously hostile media. As such, relationships were progressing and evolving as 
a result of understanding and attending to journalists' needs. They were also aware 
that journalists simply wanted communications personnel to be efficient, `straight' 
with them, and essentially `deliver', for example when contacted for information or 
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an interview request with a party member. (Interview with McLemon, 30 October 
2001) 
Yet, while Sinn Fein's successful progression as a political party seems in many 
ways faultless, it has not been without its difficulties. With republican dissidents 
posing a threat, the party has continually had to both sell and defend the Agreement 
as a staging post to a united Ireland and convince their constituency that the 
leadership had not reneged on republican principles. 
In addition, communications mistakes were becoming more prevalent in the Sinn 
Fein household because it was easier to control the movement in media terms when 
it represented less than 10 per cent of the population. Now that it had grown to over 
20 per cent it had become much more difficult to manage. 
Importantly, communications is something that needs to be continually worked at, 
and as the party progresses on an all-island basis, it has become much more difficult 
to control all avenues of communication and maintain a clear and consistent `party 
line'. Nevertheless, Sinn Fein has overcome tougher challenges in the not too 
distant past and has become more and more professional with every year that passes 
in the post-Agreement era. They also look like a party whose `run' is certainly not 
at an end, and in many respects seem unstoppable in their singular vision of 
becoming the largest political party on the island and fulfilling their overall 
objective of a united Ireland. 
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The Media 
While there have been many positive developments in the media since 1998, there 
are also criticisms that can be levelled at the media during the period under 
consideration. 
Journalists were reluctant to turn their attention or focus away from the peace 
process towards learning `the ropes' of the more difficult political process. Even 
after a number of years of devolution the `average' journalist appeared to be 
disinterested in the workings of government. As a matter of urgency, the media 
should have assumed more responsibility, `rose to the occasion' or `took up the 
mantle' for one fundamental reason, if no other - with a devolved government made 
up of an involuntary coalition of the four main political parties, the media play an 
important scrutinising role as an effective `opposition'. 
Throughout the period in question, the media should have been less fascinated with 
`division' and `sectarian politics' and more interested in highlighting `deeper policy 
issues'. By highlighting such issues, they could have promoted a more positive or 
constructive view of the parties' attempts to work together, as well as the significant 
accomplishments they made while `partners' in government. 
Whereas the pre-Agreement media had marginalised Sinn Fein, to the extent that 
party members had to participate in political debates from a remote studio, it was 
the DUP who replaced Sinn Fein on the margins or sidelines in the post-Agreement 
era. Indeed, it was not until October 2002 (four and a half years after the signing of 
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the Good Friday Agreement) that the DUP entered the same television studio as 
Sinn Fein to debate the political issues of the day. 
Essentially, the broadcasters `hard-balled' the DUP by basically saying: "look, it 
costs money to operate a remote studio" in attempts to move the debate on 
(Interview with Grimason, 20 March 2003). Yet, a criticism that can be levelled at 
the broadcast media is that they did not attempt to do this sooner, and in fact, 
buckled under the pressure of the decision being a difficult one to take. In effect, if 
the broadcasters had made attempts to `hard-ball' the DUP at an earlier date, it is 
not unreasonable to assume that discussion and dialogue (however vociferous) 
could have begun in the studios years earlier and potentially could have moved the 
peace process on to a new level much sooner than actually occurred. 
Moving on to the 2003 Assembly election campaign, many criticisms could once 
again be levelled at the media. For example, there was little or no explanation (until 
the last minute) by the media of what voters were actually voting for, that is, 
continued suspension and a review of the Agreement. 
Furthermore, insofar as a review was addressed, it was presented in the media as a 
further round of `negotiations', rather than the deliberative process the word 
implies. Wilson and Fawcett (2004, p. 4) argued that: "This had real effects of 
incentivising voters to support those deemed the `toughest negotiators', rather than 
those parties who might adopt a more conciliatory line. " Therefore, the media 
verged on creating self-fulfilling prophecies, by suggesting that the momentum lay 
behind certain parties or the toughest negotiators (the DUP and Sinn Fein) while 
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other, more conciliatory parties (including the SDLP and UUP) would be 
`squeezed. ' (Ibid. ) Essentially, the dominant media coverage of the election added 
up to a failure to both effectively inform and engage the public about the potential 
deadlock or impasse that would follow the election if the DUP and Sinn Fein came 
out `on top'. 
The media also left little space for serious consideration of `bread-and-butter' issues 
and populist claims by the four main political parties were rarely subjected to 
critical or expert analysis. As aforementioned, there remains a question mark over 
the capacity of the media in Northern Ireland to interrogate fully `political issues' as 
opposed to those of a `peace process' nature. 
Finally, by framing the election as a gladiatorial contest or battle between two tribes 
there are also concerns as to whether the media (wittingly or unwittingly) were once 
again complicit in the `degenerate spirals of communication' that reproduce and 
even amplify communal division. (Giddens 1994, p. 245) 
In Conclusion 
In the post-Agreement era, there was a strong correlation between the electoral 
successes of the four main political parties in Northern Ireland and their public 
relations developments or communications capabilities. Both Sinn Fein and the 
DUP, the two parties `hungry' for political success, who became the leading parties 
in nationalism and unionism respectively, `courted' the media and developed strong 
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and efficient communications structures, whereas the SDLP and the UUP had 
inefficient communications operations in comparison, and both had a laissez-faire 
approach to public relations and the media. 
On the one hand, both Sinn Fein and the DUP successfully developed into 
centralised, cohesive, efficient and professional parties who: operated as a team; 
were committed at community level; progressed onto a permanent election or 
campaign footing; assiduously promoted `promising party members' from within 
their own ranks; targeted a wider base of potential voters (including younger ones); 
and welcomed the input and advice of communications personnel at the highest 
levels of their respective parties. 
On the other hand, the SDLP and the UUP lacked cohesion and were decentralised 
parties who were slow to acknowledge, or were simply ignorant of, the benefits that 
strategic public relations could bring to their future development. Both parties, for 
the most part, failed to adequately address, or indeed invest the requisite financial 
resources into `turning around' their disorganised, unprofessional and inefficient 
communications operations. Also, by having failed to develop and promote 
promising party members from within their own ranks, they were also unable to 
project the dynamic and more youthful image of their rivals. Furthermore, the 
SDLP and the UUP failed to provide a strong, positive image or an appealing vision 
to the electorate of how they would progress, as political parties, in the medium to 
long-term future. 
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The 2003 Assembly election campaign saw the most sophisticated attempts to date 
by the four main political parties in Northern Ireland to utilise public relations 
strategies and techniques as well as new technology (such as the Internet) to try to 
get their political messages across, directly to the electorate. Indeed, the campaign 
highlighted that there was a growing realisation (evident even within the SDLP and 
the UUP) of the advantages that positive public relations could bring to their 
respective parties, and consequently enhance their image in the minds of the 
electorate. Each party developed a more sophisticated approach and seemed to 
acknowledge that either positive or negative public relations could contribute 
towards, or help to determine, the electoral success or failure of their party, which in 
turn could have profound implications for the peace process. Essentially, the 
momentum behind the peace process could be brought to a standstill with the 
electoral success and subsequent polarisation of the two more extreme parties (Sinn 
Fein and the DUP) or possibly progress slowly but steadily if agreement could be 
reached between the more moderate parties (the SDLP and the UUP). 
On the media front (during the post-Agreement years), journalists and editors could 
have turned their attention more vigorously towards the political process, thus 
providing a more constructive view of the work carried out by the political parties 
while in government. By highlighting the positive work and the significant 
consensus that had built up `across the board' (for example, in committees where 
the DUP and Sinn Fein worked closely together), the media could have helped the 
public or electorate to understand or conclude, that in many respects, the 
Agreement, the institutions and the political process were successful and worked 
(for the most part) as long as all parties remained committed to the process. 
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The broadcast media could also have withdrawn the provision of remote studios to 
the DUP, once that party decided to take up ministerial seats in the aftermath of 
devolution in December 1999, thereby facilitating inclusive discussion and debate, 
and helping to move the peace process forward. 
The media could also have set the 2003 Assembly election in context and 
effectively and responsibly informed the electorate of the deadlock that (more than 
likely) would ensue if Sinn Fein and the DUP came out on top. Also, by framing 
the election as a gladiatorial battle between (and within) two tribes, the media 
promoted contestation and dissensus over compromise or consensus. Essentially, 
they reproduced or amplified communal division and could, once again, be accused 
of being unhelpful in regard to concentrated efforts at promoting peace. 
Whether or not the media act in a responsible or irresponsible manner, they have at 
their disposal the power to influence and to make the path towards peace an easier 
one to walk, for all individuals and parties in Northern Ireland, or alternatively, a 
journey that is more dangerous or fraught with difficulty. As such, both positive 
and negative developments in the media can, and essentially does, have a significant 
impact upon the direction that an often-fragile peace process can take. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Rise of Party Political Public Relations in Northern Ireland 
The first and most obvious conclusion of this research is that there has been a steady 
growth or expansion of party political public relations in Northern Ireland. While 
Sinn Fein had full-time media relations personnel going back as far as the 1970's 
and have had a Director of Publicity since as early as 1981, the other three political 
parties only really began to `take off' in the communications stakes in the latter half 
of the 1990's. All of the main political parties are increasingly utilising PR to 
enhance their media relations capabilities and improve their image (or `brand') with 
the public. What was once mainly the remit of the British government and its 
agencies in Northern Ireland (that is, political public relations) has now become an 
area in which the four main political parties (to varying degrees of success) have 
become increasingly more professional and well-resourced. The result of this rise 
of party political public relations has seen the regional media in Northern Ireland 
become more vulnerable to the promotional efforts of `spin doctors' or media 
relations personnel from all four parties. 
The media in Northern Ireland provide the channels through which the four main 
political parties strive to register and disseminate to the rest of society their claims 
on resources, status, identity and power. This has prompted determined efforts by 
the parties to influence its content, and in so doing attempt to optimise their chances 
in the ongoing competition for image maintenance and social advantage. 
385 
Simply put, the media system in Northern Ireland has become a power-brokering 
sphere. The importance of media exposure has been recognised by all of the 
political parties as a vital source of potential influence and power, creating 
perceptions of key events, issues and distributions of public support. As such, all 
political parties in Northern Ireland have increasingly given a higher priority to the 
media in recent years, recognising 1) that it is a competitive arena, in which their 
rivals are also seeking footholds and 2) that it is dominated by the standards of 
journalism to which their own media-destined materials must conform. 
As such, political parties, politicians and their public relations personnel in Northern 
Ireland have increasingly become more sophisticated in their application of public 
relations strategies and techniques, from framing language into terse, crisp and 
arresting `sound-bites' to stage-managing media events attractive to journalists and 
reporters (for example, the peace concert during the 1998 referendum campaign). 
In addition, party political public relations personnel now offer journalists what 
Gandy (1982) has referred to as `information subsidies' in attempts to reduce the 
costs to journalists of obtaining newsworthy material. These include press releases 
that tell the story as journalists would write it, arranging press conferences and other 
media events at times optimal for news organisations' deadlines and routines, and 
providing a digest of new information that cannot be obtained elsewhere without 
effort on the journalist's behalf. Such measures not only make a journalist's job 
easier and less costly; they also stand a chance of converting him or her into an 
unwitting vehicle of party propaganda. 
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Overall, it seems that the public sphere in Northern Ireland is slowly being 
permeated by a `promotional culture' (Wemick 1991). Indeed, greater resources are 
increasingly being devoted to media publicity. Higher status is also accorded, and 
more attention paid to, public relations and media strategists, for example John 
Laird or Eoghan Harris in the case of the UUP. Indeed, greater value and increased 
priority are being conferred on image-making skills and getting the appearance of 
things right (to varying degrees) by all four parties. 
Moreover, it is where the power stakes are highest - namely in the combat between 
political parties, especially (though not only) during election campaigns - that 
political public relations in Northern Ireland has advanced furthest (as in the 1998 
referendum campaign and the November 2003 Assembly election). This growing 
`professionalism' has manifested in a number of ways: increased reliance on media 
strategists, and on publicity advisers, public relations specialists, campaign 
management consultants and the like; tactics of close message control (remaining 
`on message'); bombarding journalists and editors with a deluge of complaints to 
show that their coverage is being paid close attention to; and an acknowledgement 
that the quickest and most effective way to act on the balance of public opinion is to 
mount strongly negative attacks on one's opponents. 
At this juncture, because this research primarily charts the chronological public 
relations developments of Northern Ireland's four main political parties as well as 
developments in the media, it is important to summarise these developments at this 
point in the conclusion. Following this, key findings from the research are 
acknowledged before a discussion of the interaction between journalists and party 
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political public relations personnel, and issues surrounding source access to the 
media in Northern Ireland. Finally, limitations of the study and future research are 
touched upon before some concluding remarks. 
Sinn Fein Public Relations Developments 
In terms of its communicative or public relations capabilities, Sinn Fein is the one 
political party who stands out among all others on Northern Ireland's political stage. 
Over the last three decades they have shown a strategic astuteness and an ability to 
adapt and evolve, often under very difficult circumstances (for example the 1988-94 
Broadcasting Ban). According to Stephen Grimason: 
Ten years ago they [the political parties] all struggled. Less so the Republicans [Sinn Fein] 
because they were always struggling and they had all sorts of obstacles put in their way that 
nobody else had, for example, with the Broadcasting Ban they couldn't get their voices on 
radio or television. So they had fewer resources to work with in terms of access. They 
worked really hard at that and then when things opened up they were better placed to 
bounce on from it. (Interview with author, 20 March 2003) 
Indeed, the 1994 IRA ceasefire was a watershed. In its aftermath, the Broadcasting 
Ban was lifted and Sinn Fein began to break into the established elite discourse 
networks dominated by the British government, and to use the media to bring 
forward their own political analyses into the public sphere. Since then, Sinn Fein 
has progressively developed as a political party and they have established more 
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productive working relationships with the media (which was previously hostile to 
them) by efficiently attending to their needs. 
Their successful development over the years, including that of their well-resourced 
communications operation, can be better explained by a long, yet not exhaustive, 
list of factors: they have an international fundraising capability; they have a vast 
number of party members and activists who are prepared to work without salaries; 
they are close-knit and operate as a team; they are hands-on and imaginative; they 
are a campaigning party on a permanent election footing; they are committed at 
community level; from the top-down their representatives understand the strategic 
importance of PR and publicity; communications personnel contribute at the highest 
level of the organisation; publicity is involved in how decisions are arrived at; they 
are proficient in schooling both staff and party members in dealing with the media; 
they are assiduous in promoting people up from within; and they have a high degree 
of central control (almost militaristic), and therefore there is little deviation from a 
clear and consistent `party line'. 
SDLP Public Relations Developments 
As for the SDLP, their rusty communications machine has stood (for a very long 
time) in stark contrast to Sinn Fein's slick, highly polished one. Indeed, unlike Sinn 
Fein, the SDLP could historically be characterised as having had a laissez-faire 
attitude towards both the media and public relations/communications more 
generally. 
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In the past, the SDLP have had a legacy of organisational problems and under John 
Hume's leadership they consistently failed to grasp the idea or the strategic 
advantages that both internal and external public relations could bring to the 
successful development of their party. They also neglected to nurture their best 
calibre candidates and senior party figures were reluctant to subject themselves to a 
diminution of their own power or control at the hands of a younger generation in the 
party. 
The SDLP, as the one political party who was most closely associated with the civil 
rights movement of the late 1960's, suffered a great deal from the consequences of 
having achieved so many of their initial goals - culminating in the Good Friday 
Agreement. They found it increasingly difficult to both articulate a vision for the 
post-Agreement era and on many occasions to simply `blow their own trumpet'. As 
a consequence, the party was pushed further and further towards the margins of 
political life in Northern Ireland. 
On the basis of their relative political dynamism, their closeness to community 
organisation and their capacity to force the pace of change in the years that followed 
the Agreement, in all of these areas, Sinn Fein held a significant advantage over the 
SDLP. The party also failed to invest adequate financial resources in its 
communications operation, which for the most part remained both unstructured and 
unprofessional. When they eventually did begin to address their wide-ranging 
organisational and public relations shortcomings in 2002-03, their efforts could best 
be described as a case of `too little, too late'. 
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Indeed, with the SDLP's electoral `big hitters' or older members leaving at this 
time, their problems were compounded by the fact that they had failed to develop 
and promote potential `heirs to the throne'. Simply put, they had not progressed as 
a professional political party should, or in the same way as some others had, in 
particular, Sinn Fein. 
DUP Public Relations Developments 
On the unionist side of the equation, the DUP were `late starters' when it came to 
employing full-time public relations personnel. In fact, their first Director of 
Communications, St Clair McAllister, only took up the position a matter of months 
before Good Friday 1998. 
Yet, from that point until 2002 (when McAllister left), he presided over the rapid 
development of a centralised party system with an effective communications 
structure, and one that included an efficient media relations operation. Indeed, the 
DUP, and in particular their leader, Ian Paisley, have long understood the 
importance of the media as the conduit or channel through which they relay their 
political messages, and they have unquestionably appreciated the importance of 
media exposure. In the post-Agreement era, they remained keen to sell their 
argument and also began to hire additional communications personnel to ensure that 
their political messages were not lost on their target audiences. 
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In addition, the DUP showed a great deal of enthusiasm in progressing the technical 
side of their communications (for example, their party website) as well as both 
strengthening grassroots support and leading a crusade in the targeting of potential 
(mainly UUP) voters. They also became increasingly active on the ground, taking 
up a permanent campaigning position (akin to Sinn Fein) and were successful in 
targeting and attracting younger voters. 
Effectively, from 1998 to 2003, the DUP adopted a more sophisticated, strategic, 
corporate and efficient approach to communications. They also began to soften or 
moderate their (often apocalyptic) rhetoric to appeal to a wider audience (that is, 
unionists of all hues, but in particular, disillusioned UUP supporters). Allied to 
these developments, the party's cohesion and its centralised nature stood in sharp 
contrast to the internecine warfare and the decentralised nature of the UUP. 
UUP Public Relations Developments 
As for the UUP, the 1970's and 80's were characterised by woeful public relations, 
and a belief that the media were so much against them that theirs was a lost cause. 
They also had an unrelenting arrogance that they were so `right' that they didn't 
have to apologise for past indiscretions against their Catholic neighbours or `sell' 
either themselves or their case to a wider world. 
Yet, slowly but surely the `penny dropped' and by the mid-90's there was a growing 
realisation in UUP circles that fundamental changes were required in their public 
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relations. In 1996, David Kerr (a young law graduate) was hired as a full-time press 
officer/press secretary to the UUP leader, David Trimble. Yet at this stage, the 
party were in need of a complete communications overhaul and should have been 
hiring the best public relations talent that money could buy, not an inexperienced 
graduate with little or no public relations background. This appointment would 
simply not have occurred, for example, in Sinn Fein. 
By Good Friday 1998, (as the case of David Kerr highlights) there seemed to be a 
lack of urgency on the UUP's behalf to radically develop their communications or 
public relations capabilities. Essentially, they were taking `baby-steps' in the right 
direction when they should have been taking `giant leaps'. 
During the post-Agreement era, there were also very few positives that could be 
taken from developments in UUP public relations. Indeed, the period was 
dominated by bitter internal feuding and debilitating infighting, and characterised 
by the party continually moving from one crisis to another. In such circumstances it 
was impossible for communications personnel to function effectively, that is, they 
were frustrated in their attempts to play down division and dissent, and keep party 
members `on message'. Positive public relations efforts by a number of key 
strategists (including Harris, Haydn and Laird) to portray the party as a progressive 
political outfit, were offset or cancelled out by the negative impact of a small, but 
vocal anti-Agreement cabal who contributed greatly to the party's overall mixed or 
disjointed messages. 
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A further negative impact or weakness during this period included the UUP's lack 
of clarity on the core issue of the day - the Agreement itself. Trimble's 
acknowledgement that he merely had a slight commitment to it speaks volumes. At 
a time when rational or moderate unionism required a principled leader with strong 
convictions to sell a positive vision of the Agreement, (in essence, a historic 
accommodation with their Catholic neighbours), Trimble foundered and was simply 
lacking as the leader of pro-Agreement unionism. 
Critically, throughout these years, UUP politicians failed to heed the advice of their 
public relations personnel (including David Kerr, who was promoted to Director of 
Communications). Indeed, the main difficulty for Kerr and those who followed in 
his footsteps was how to provide cohesive communications strategies when a 
cohesive political entity simply did not exist and could not agree on the most 
straightforward political messages. Significantly, the UUP should have begun a 
process of communicating as a team, rather than as an amalgam of diverse 
individuals. As such, they should have ultimately purged the party of rebels or 
dissidents who had no qualms with publicly attacking their leader. The UUP could 
also have `publicly' highlighted the `clear blue sea' that existed between the 
majority in their party and the DUP, by simply speaking with a confident, unified, 
progressive, pro-Agreement voice. 
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Media Developments 
Moving on to the media in Northern Ireland, it would not be wrong to conclude that 
in general, the role they played throughout the pre-Agreement era was plagued by a 
litany of complaints or criticisms. 
These included: they were anti-unionist; they were anti-republican; they were 
systematically orientated towards a British government perspective; they 
consistently failed to adequately question `primary definers' or `official sources'; 
they provided images and stories of irrational violence without sufficient context; 
they reproduced and amplified division through easy ideological labelling; they 
promoted contestation rather than consensus or emphasised disputes and dissensus; 
they reinforced differences and disagreement; and, they were unhelpful in relation 
to concentrated efforts at promoting peace. 
In addition, while there remains no doubt that sections of the media and individual 
journalists deserve to be singled out and praised for various honourable 
contributions in speaking `truth to power', what remains problematic is that this was 
not the norm, and such cases were few and far between. From the beginning of the 
Troubles until Good Friday 1998, a lively, enquiring, questioning, challenging 
journalism was certainly not endemic in Northern Ireland; it was more a case of 
mavericks or loners (like Eamonn Mallie) who questioned and challenged the 
highest levels of authority, for example, the British government's direction and 
policy over the years. 
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During the pre-Agreement era, it was in assisting positive spirals of communication, 
rather than degenerate ones, that the media in Northern Ireland could and should 
have played a more positive and constructive role. 
In many respects, however, the media made up for some of their past indiscretions 
by playing a more constructive role during the 1998 referendum campaign. In the 
event, they supported, rather than obstructed the dominant political discourse (that 
is, a pro-Agreement one), and they were helpful, rather than unhelpful, in relation to 
concentrated efforts at promoting peace. 
In the post-Agreement era, while it must be acknowledged that there were many 
positive developments in the media, there were also further criticisms. Indeed, 
journalists were reluctant to turn their attention or focus away from the `peace 
process' towards learning `the ropes' of the more difficult `political process'. Even 
after a number of years of devolution most journalists appeared to be disinterested 
in the workings of government. As a matter of urgency, the media should have 
assumed more responsibility, `rose to the occasion' or `took up the mantle' for one 
fundamental reason, if no other - with a devolved government made up of an 
involuntary coalition of the four main political parties, the media play an important 
scrutinising role as an effective `opposition'. 
Throughout the post-Agreement years, the media should also have been less 
fascinated with `division' and `sectarian politics' and more interested in 
highlighting `deeper policy issues'. By highlighting such issues, they could have 
promoted a more positive or constructive view of the parties' attempts to work 
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together, as well as the significant accomplishments they made while `partners' in 
government. 
A further criticism that can be levelled (specifically) at the broadcast media is that 
they should have withdrawn the provision of remote studios to the DUP, that is, 
once they decided to take up ministerial seats in the aftermath of devolution in 
December 1999. Such moves would have forced the anti-Agreement DUP into the 
television studios to discuss and debate the political issues of the day with their pro- 
Agreement opponents, thereby facilitating and helping to move the peace process 
forward (sooner rather than later). 
A final criticism of the media is that they should have set the 2003 Assembly 
election in context, by `responsibly' informing the electorate of the deadlock that 
(more than likely) would ensue if Sinn Fein and the DUP came out on top. In 
addition, by framing the election as a gladiatorial battle between (and within) two 
tribes, the media promoted contestation and dissensus over compromise and 
consensus. Significantly, during the course of the election campaign, they 
reproduced or amplified communal division and could, once again, stand accused of 
being unhelpful in regard to concentrated efforts at promoting peace. 
With the summaries completed, the key findings from the research are advanced... 
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Pre-Agreement Key Findings 
Apart from Sinn Fein, the months following the Entry to Negotiations election of 
May 1996 represented a turning point for the other political parties in that they 
realised they would now require full-time public relations or communications 
personnel to deal with both the national and international media interest surrounding 
the talks/negotiations (which ultimately led to the Good Friday Agreement). 
Indeed, the party political public relations personnel or `spin doctors' who were 
hired in 1996 became more experienced and professional during the course of the 
talks/negotiations, not necessarily because of their own endeavours, but because of 
circumstances - the long drawn-out talks/negotiations gave them a unique platform 
to both `learn' and `ply' their trade, to make pivotal contacts with media personnel, 
and (in the latter stages) to `spin' on an almost daily basis to a wide array of 
journalists camped outside the negotiations. 
By Good Friday 1998, (in broad brushstrokes), Sinn Fein and the DUP were the 
`hungry' parties who were more interested in getting into the media because they 
wanted to get ahead. As for the SDLP and the UUP, they adopted a more laissez- 
faire or complacent approach towards the media, and public relations more 
generally. 
Selling the Good Friday Agreement 
During the 1998 referendum campaign, it became obvious at the outset that attempts 
to sell the Good Friday Agreement to the people of Northern Ireland would be 
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conducted in a haphazard or disparate fashion, that is, there would be no `collective' 
party political `Yes' campaign. In the political spectrum and the public arena, party 
leaders, after signing the Good Friday Agreement together, failed to show the 
political will or courage to develop a new politics for Northern Ireland. The UUP in 
particular, were wary about joining forces with pro-Agreement nationalists and 
republicans. As a result, the fractured nature of the Yes campaigns were set against 
a singularly strong and emotionally appealing `No' campaign by the United 
Unionists - an anti-Agreement faction made up mainly (but not exclusively) of the 
DUP. 
Essentially, there are two main institutions in Northern Ireland that wield a 
significant amount of power and influence - the media and the British 
government/NIO. On the one hand, while the media may not have unabashedly 
come out in full support of the Agreement, they did divert from their own (often 
strict) remits of objectivity and impartiality to at worst favour, at best promote, a 
Yes vote. On the other hand, the British government (as co-signatories) were 
anxious to both promote the Agreement and to ensure that it was supported by the 
people of Northern Ireland. Indeed, the pro-Agreement British government/NIO 
made attempts during the referendum campaign to use their influence within media 
circles in an effort to legitimate the call for peace epitomised by voting Yes for the 
Agreement. The extent to which the media acquiesced is not easily discernible. 
It is also difficult to discern or determine exactly how the 71.12% vote in favour of 
the Good Friday Agreement was achieved. From a public relations perspective, the 
evaluation stage of the cause and effect of political campaigning is always difficult 
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to measure. Nevertheless, it can be argued that certain public relations activities and 
communications personnel were highly influential during the course of the 
referendum campaign, for example: Sinn Fein's public relations efforts that 
included endorsement of the Agreement by ANC leaders and the Balcombe Street 
Four; Ray Haydn's involvement with the UUP, as well as other contributors like 
Tony Blair and Jack Hermon who helped persuade unionists to come out in support 
of a Yes vote; and last but not least, the SDLP-inspired U2/Ash peace concert that 
provided the dominant image of the referendum campaign and helped to gamer 
cross-community support for a Yes vote. 
Essentially, public relations activities, like the peace concert, contributed to an all- 
important swing of 15 per cent in support for the Agreement within unionism in the 
final week of campaigning. Considering that two referendum exit polls33 variously 
estimated that 55 per cent and 51 per cent of unionist electors voted in favour of the 
Agreement, this `swing' was crucially important. As Stephen Grimason, (and 
almost everyone else who was interviewed in the course of this research) 
acknowledged: `The Bono bringing together Trimble and Hume was a big moment. 
It turned the campaign. ' (Interview with author, 20 March 2003) It follows then, 
that it would have been impossible for the Agreement (which is based on sufficient 
consensus or cross-community support) to achieve the requisite support (that is, 
over 50% in favour) in the Protestant/unionist community, had it not been for a 
number of pivotal, pre-arranged public relations activities. Indeed, the Agreement 
may not have even `gotten off the ground' were it not for such activities. 
Significantly, the public relations strategies employed by a number of key behind- 
33 The Sunday Times, May 24th, 1998 and RTE May 23rd, 1998 
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the-scenes players and conducted publicly by influential, high-profile figures, were 
critical in managing public opinion and manufacturing consent in Northern Ireland 
for the Good Friday Agreement. As such, the 1998 referendum campaign 
represents `a case in point' to argue (because of the all-important swing of 15 per 
cent in unionist support) that `public relations' can indeed have a significant impact 
on voting behaviour, the reverberations of which also impacted more generally on 
the peace process itself. Effectively, this `manufactured consent' allowed the 
Agreement a chance to `live', and with this life, create from a strong foundation the 
subsequent conditions whereby a realistic vision of peace could be conceived by the 
people of Northern Ireland. 
This research then, while acknowledging that there are undoubtedly multiple factors 
involved in how people decide to vote, argues that the 71.12% Yes vote in favour of 
the Good Friday Agreement can be partly explained by the significant impact of 
public relations strategies and techniques employed by a number of key behind-the- 
scenes players and conducted publicly by influential, high-profile figures. 
Essentially, this research challenges the argument prevalent in the vast majority of 
literature on elections, which argue that public relations campaigns have very little 
`effect' on voting behaviour or that changes of voting behaviour are due either to 
other factors or to long-term media campaigns and influences (for example, 
Kavanagh 1995, Norris et al. 1999). 
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Post-Agreement Key Findings 
In the aftermath of the June 1998 Assembly election and up until the November 
2003 Assembly election, the electoral success of both Sinn Fein and the DUP (the 
two parties `hungry' for political power, who became the leading political parties in 
nationalism and unionism respectively) can be partly explained by their `courting' 
of the media and their development of strong and efficient communications 
structures. Indeed, the electoral failure of both the SDLP and the UUP can also be 
partly explained by their laissez-faire or complacent approach to both public 
relations and the media and their weak and inefficient communications structures in 
comparison to both Sinn Fein and the DUP. 
On the one hand, both Sinn Fein and the DUP successfully developed into 
centralised, cohesive, efficient and professional parties who: operated as a team; 
were committed at community level; progressed onto a permanent election or 
campaign footing; assiduously promoted `promising party members' from within 
their own ranks; successfully targeted a wider base of potential voters (including 
younger ones); and welcomed the input and advice of communications personnel at 
the highest levels of their respective parties. 
On the other hand, the SDLP and the UUP lacked cohesion and were decentralised 
parties who were slow to acknowledge, or were simply ignorant of, the benefits that 
strategic public relations could bring to their future development. Both parties, for 
the most part, failed to adequately address, or indeed invest the requisite financial 
resources into `turning around' their disorganised, unprofessional and inefficient 
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communications operations. In addition, by having failed to develop and promote 
promising party members from within their own ranks, they were also unable to 
project the dynamic and more youthful image of their rivals. Finally, the SDLP and 
the UUP failed to provide a strong, positive image or an appealing vision to the 
electorate of how they would progress as political parties in the medium to long- 
term future. 
The Interaction between Journalists and Party Political Public Relations 
Personnel in Northern Ireland 
In the course of this research, arguments about who is in control in a Northern 
Ireland-centric `tug of war' (Gans, 1979) between media and sources all tend to be 
rather vague and inconclusive. For example, one question in this study asked 
whether the media `toe the establishment line'? On the one hand, there is anecdotal 
evidence to suggest that journalists do in fact reproduce copy from the British 
government/NIO as seemingly `independent and newsworthy' stories. However, on 
the other hand, there is also evidence from interviews with journalists to suggest 
that they have maintained a professional attitude, a fierce independence from 
sources, and have continued to fend off attempts to influence their output. 
Anecdotal evidence obtained from interviewees then, tended to be subjective and 
confused by too many variables. One cannot derive clear conclusions about who is 
winning in the `tug of war' between journalists and party political public relations 
personnel, only suggest that there is a certain degree of complexity in their 
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continuing relations or that journalists and public relations personnel work together 
in a symbiotic, yet strained relationship. 
Nevertheless, by looking at resources (financial and organisational for example), 
trends do in fact become a little more discernible. From this perspective, while 
journalists in Northern Ireland continue to act with a high degree of conscious 
autonomy, that autonomy is ultimately subject to resource constraints. 
Indeed, as the print and broadcast media in Northern Ireland continues to be cut and 
squeezed in recent years, and working journalists become increasingly stretched, 
their standards and objectivity decrease, and the need to cut corners becomes 
critical. Essentially, journalists have to do more with fewer resources. Under these 
circumstances, a weakened media industry in Northern Ireland becomes an easier 
target for an increasingly well-resourced political public relations sector. Political 
public relations personnel will therefore be ideally placed to make good any 
shortfalls in the news-producing industries. Indeed, the influence of party political 
public relations show growing signs that it will slowly expand its role in news 
production. As a result, journalistic autonomy will slowly be undermined by the 
effects of the rise of party political public relations in Northern Ireland. 
Political Public Relations and Source Access in Northern Ireland 
For most of the Troubles `political public relations' or `media relations' was a 
means by which the British government could dominate access and manage media 
agendas in Northern Ireland. Yet, as the peace process developed in the 1990's 
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political public relations also became a means by which the mainly `resource-poor' 
political parties could gain an influence in the media previously denied to them. 
Indeed, the `culturally' resource-poor Sinn Fein made use of voluntary human 
resources and professional public relations strategies in place of the institutional 
legitimacy and/or large capital expenditure of the British government's 
communicative apparatus to gain a foothold in the media. It follows then, that 
professional political public relations offers the potential for widening, rather than 
restricting, source access. As such, the emergence of a new professional class of 
political public relations personnel in Northern Ireland has affected the abilities of 
political parties to gain access to journalists and set media agendas. 
Anecdotal evidence from this research points to an increase in the dependence of 
journalists on information subsidies from political public relations personnel in 
Northern Ireland. Yet, is this dependence leading to significant changes in patterns 
of source access? Indeed, are certain political parties gaining more access than 
others in the new political public relations environment? Evidence in this research 
suggests that (more so than any other party) Sinn Mn, with their substantially 
greater communications operation as opposed to the other political parties, is 
continually increasing its access to the media. Indeed, a more recent development 
concerns Sinn Fein's specific targeting of local media in Northern Ireland. 
Significantly, the party have up to ten full-time (paid and unpaid) public relations or 
media relations personnel who inundate the media with information subsidies. By 
publicising the positive work carried out by Sinn Fein politicians and councillors 
alike in local constituencies, they thereby create higher media profiles that are 
pivotal come election time. The other political parties simply do not have the 
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human resources and cannot target the local media to the same extent as Sinn Fein, 
each party having at best three full-time staff involved in public relations or media 
relations. In addition, the media themselves (for example the Irish Mirror in 2003) 
have begun to give both Sinn Fein and the DUP a platform in the form of a 
`column' to voice their views on political developments. As a result, they have 
effectively excluded, and thereby helped to marginalise politically, both the SDLP 
and the UUP. Significantly, evidence from this research suggests that both Sinn 
Fein and the DUP are utilising public relations to secure their longer-term access 
advantages in sections of the media, whereas the SDLP and the UUP are simply 
being `left behind'. Such developments suggest that both Sinn Fein and the DUP 
will increasingly dominate the public sphere in Northern Ireland. Ultimately, the 
ability of political parties to access the media is one of constriction or expansion of 
the public sphere. When resources are not readily available (organisational or 
human in the SDLP's case, or are indeed effectively cancelled out by debilitating 
infighting in the case of the UUP) the ability of political parties to influence the 
media agenda and thus the public sphere are severely restricted. 
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Limitations and Further Research 
Much remains to be done, both empirically and theoretically, before one can claim 
to have fully established a critical understanding of the complex interaction between 
journalists and party political public relations personnel, as well as the factors that 
affect source access to the media in Northern Ireland. 
An important limitation of this research was imposed by the lack of significant 
literature specific to this inquiry. As such, this study in many respects has 
attempted to `feel its way through the dark' without the guidance of previous 
research to base assertions upon 
In addition, it is acknowledged that the influences of the British, Irish and American 
governments are not included in this study (although British government/N10 
involvement during the 1998 referendum campaign was explored). Whilst 
recognising that the inclusion of all influences would increase `width', it would 
have resulted in the diminishment of the essential focus and depth in the critical 
analysis requisite to this thesis. This points the way to a `wider' project that would 
connect the `voices' of the four main political parties with those `voices' of the 
aforementioned governments. 
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Concluding Remarks 
By looking back at the simplistic messages and slogans of the 1970's political 
posters and the haphazard media relations efforts of political parties during this 
period and beyond, one can comprehend not only the significant distances travelled 
by the parties on the road to conflict resolution but also the dramatic developments 
that have occurred in party political public relations over the years. Indeed, the 
2003 Assembly election campaign saw the most sophisticated attempts to date by 
the four main political parties to utilise public relations strategies and techniques 
(and make use of new technologies like the Internet) in their attempts to influence 
the electorate. Critically, the future political success of all four main parties in 
Northern Ireland will be partly dependent upon their ability to embrace `public 
relations' as a vital ingredient of modem-day politics. 
The 1998 Good Friday Agreement remains to this day the cornerstone upon which a 
new Northern Ireland can be built. Signed only days before Easter Sunday -a day 
replete with connotations of resurrection, the Agreement represented just that: a 
breathing of new life into a society that for a very long time was in decay. Indeed, 
the genuine hope is that at some point in the future, people will look back at the 
signing of the Good Friday Agreement as a pivotal moment in Irish history that 
represented the unearthing of a lost or forgotten thing, that is, how to live in peace 
and harmony with ones neighbours. 
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